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l)BUNDLING STRATEGIES IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
The development of logistics has offered a wide range of new business opportunities for
transport operators. Shipping lines have been taking advantage of these opportunities
and have expanded their business scope beyond the movement of cargo to include, for
example, coordination among transport modes, route rationalisation and even value added
logistics services. Carriers offer today transportation as part of integrated global supply
chain solutions in an attempt to provide a better service to their customers as well as
improve their bottom lines. This appears to be a winning strategy since an increasing number
of industry players are investing in logistics operations and infrastructure.
The offering of products and services jointly as a package or bundle is a common mar -
keting strategy in a variety of industries and also appears to be a successful strategy for
enhancing shipping lines’ competitiveness and profitability. Only limited research is available
though to better understand under what conditions such bundled sales are possible; what
attitude shippers show towards this industry trend; how bundling strategies could be
develop ed optimally; and how they could be priced. This thesis is a contribution to research
in this area and provides an analysis of the viability and the benefits of bundling strate -
gies in the container industry, and specifically with reference to the joint provision of ocean
transportation and other logistics services.
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though I was never alone during this journey, a large part of it has been consumed 
on lonely nights at my desk, or long days in the silence of the University library. 
For this reasons, without the support of my family and friends, to whom this thesis 
is dedicated, I would have never been able to come so far. This paragraph is the 
attempt to thank those that have made this journey possible. 
First I would like to thank Hercules Haralambides for having given me the 
opportunity to be part of MEL, pursue my doctoral research within it and develop 
together with MEL as a lecturer and researcher. My past six years at MEL have 
been the experience of a lifetime and although very demanding in a variety of 
ways, they have surely contributed in shaping me the way I am now. In particular 
I would like to thank him not only for his guidance as ‘promotor’ but also for hav-
ing offered me the possibility of making use of his extensive network of contacts for 
my professional and academic development. 
I would like also to thank the members of the Doctorate Committee: Peter 
Marlow, Rommert Dekker, Steef van de Velde, René de Koster, Enrico Musso 
and Bill Sjostrom for their insightful and useful comments and suggestions for im-
provement of this thesis. I would like also to thank the Beadle Office, the Dean of 
the Erasmus School of Economics, Philip-Hans Franses, and his office and the 
ERIM Offices for their support. I take the opportunity also to thank the various 
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members of the academic community at Erasmus University Rotterdam and else-
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on which this thesis is based on or have provided feedback and comments during 
conferences and presentations. In particular I would like to acknowledge the dis-
cussion opportunities offered at the International Association of Maritime Econo-
mists (IAME) annual conferences where several parts of this thesis have been pre-
sented since 2005. 
Similarly to many pieces of applied research, this thesis owns a lot to the 
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have attempted at doing in my research. Needless to say that the responsibility for 
eventual errors and omissions in the thesis remains mine and that not necessarily 
those mentioned below endorse the ideas and opinions expressed in the thesis. 
In particular I would like to mention in no particular order Simon Kirton, 
Ian Claxton, Long Chu, S. Rajendran and Peter Jongepier of NOL/APL, Yvonne 
Yeo and Kar Loke Ng of APL Logistics, Tom Boardley of NYK, Junichi Narita of 
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Consumers often purchase goods and services in bundles. All sort of package deals 
are on offer on the shelves of supermarkets; airplane tickets are offered with hotel 
sojourns as package holidays; bundles of financial services are proposed to bank 
customers on a regular basis; cable TV subscriptions comprise of collections of dif-
ferent channels and services, just to mentions some common examples. Notwith-
standing the pervasiveness of bundling as a sale practice, consumers are rarely 
aware of what motivates producers and retailers to offer goods and services in 
packages. Questions such as: ‘why is a specific detergent not available as a stand-
alone product anymore and can only be purchased in combination with another 
product?’ or: ‘why is travelling from Amsterdam to St Petersburg via Rome a 
cheaper alternative than travelling directly?’ may have occurred once in a while to 
the curious consumer, but in general they will not be the subject of extensive 
speculation. 
Most consumers are aware of the fact that many of the goods they purchase 
have been produced in other countries, often entailing several weeks of deep-sea 
sailing, but they rarely show interest on the journey a particular product has gone 
through in terms of transportation, or on the complexity of the transport and han-
dling operations that have taken place before the product reaches the shelves of a 
shop or the doorstep of our homes. This journey is sometimes the result of a large 
number of different activities that do not necessarily consist of simple transporta-
tion, but range from the storage of a product, to labelling, packaging or even as-
sembly of the product on its way to the final consumer. Similarly to a holiday 
package, also the journey a product makes from its production plant to its final 
user along the global supply chains is a collection of different logistics activities that 
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producers may perform directly or purchase from specialised logistics service pro-
viders and transport operators.  
The development of logistics has offered a wide range of new business oppor-
tunities for transport operators. In order to come closer to their customers’ de-
mands, carriers have expanded their business scope beyond the movement of 
cargo, to include coordination among transport modes, route rationalisation and 
value added logistics services. Moreover, shipping lines are expanding their busi-
ness scope by offering ocean transportation as part of supply chain integrated solu-
tions in an attempt to provide a better service to their clients as well as improve 
their bottom lines. This appears to be a winning strategy since an increasing num-
ber of industry players are investing in logistics operations and infrastructure.  
The greater attention of ocean carriers to logistics takes place in a market 
that has moved away from a collective pricing system, typical of an era dominated 
by the price setting agreements know as conferences, and increasingly focuses on 
tailor-made all-inclusive value propositions. The highly competitive nature of the 
ocean shipping business and the homogenous character of containerised ocean 
transportation have induced carriers to search for ways to differentiate their ser-
vices from rivals. This has resulted in carriers having engaged in some form of ver-
tical integration along the supply chain in order to better exploit possible econo-
mies of scale, scope, route density and network. 
It seems that the joint provision of transportation and logistics services could 
provide a successful strategy for enhancing shipping lines’ competitiveness and 
profitability. Only limited research though is available to better understand under 
what conditions such bundled sales are possible; what attitude shippers show to-
wards this industry trend; how bundling strategies could be developed optimally; 
and how they could be priced.  
A4B #*'-&,', +,-0&!&!,!'&', *+* (*'$%
This thesis aims at studying the viability and the benefits of bundling, defined as: “the 
sale of two or more separate products in one package” (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002: pg. 56)1 
in the container industry, and specifically with reference to the joint provision of 
ocean transportation and other logistics services. Bundling is: “akin to a volume dis-
count, but where the volume is based on aggregate sales across products. Instead of offering a dis-
count for buying two apples rather than one, the customer is given a better price for buying an apple 
                                                
1 In the same article the authors distinguish between Product Bundling and Price Bundling. The latter 
refers to the sale of two or more products in a package at a discount, without any integration of the 
bundle components. The former concept should be used instead when the creation of the bundle 
provides at least some of the consumers with an increase in value. The integration of logistics services 
and ocean transportation is a clear example of product bundles, as the provision of the two services as 
a package generates added value for the consumers in terms for example of better coordination and 
increased supply chain visibility.  
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and an orange together” (Nalebuff, 2008). Even if the practice of bundling is common 
in many consumer markets, in the case of ocean transportation and other logistics 
services it is still rare, and, in some circumstances, even forbidden by law (Marlow 
and Nair, 2008; Brooks, 2000). 
Notwithstanding the general acceptance in the industry of the advantages de-
livered by logistics service integration, the reluctance of shippers to accept product 
bundling is still substantial (Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007; Haralambides and 
Acciaro, 2010; EUR and SMU, 2006; 2007). Besides, the legal restrictions on pro-
duct bundling, the specific regulatory regime that governed the liner sector until 
recently and the debate that has animated the reform of its regulatory regime, 
have contributed to increase the diffidence towards this practice in the container 
sector (Haralambides, 2007). 
The large existing corpus of economic theory and legal cases are often cited as 
the reasons for dismissing product bundling as an anticompetitive practice and 
terminating any discussions on its possible implementation in the container in-
dustry (Kobayashi, 2005a). In addition, product bundling has been regarded by 
container carriers as difficult to sell and its potential as a marketing and strategic 
tool has never been structurally assessed in the context of container transportation. 
From the academic side, the analysis of the market structure effects of pro-
duct bundling has animated the debate since the seventies, and, although scientific 
studies have tried to apply the findings of the literature to a large number of in-
dustries—the hotel and holiday industry; the software industry; the health-care 
industry and the automobile industry are well-known examples of successful appli-
cations of bundling—a very limited amount of research has been devoted to the 
topic in the context of container transportation, where bundling is so important to 
constitute in essence the backbone of what we refer nowadays as (maritime) logis-
tics. 
With the exception of some exploratory works (Acciaro and Haralambides, 
2007; Acciaro, 2008b; Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010; EUR and SMU, 2006; 
2007) and seminal papers (Haralambides, et al. 2002), and of the very specific lit-
erature resulting from the debate on the so-called inland transportation clause of the 
European Commission review process of Regulation 823/2000 and the TACA 
case2, the discussion on product bundling has never been addressed systematically 
in the container industry. 
As pointed out by Stremersch and Tellis (2002), the academic publications on 
bundling in general in the various streams of literature—industrial organization, 
applied economics, marketing and law—have been inconsistent in the use of ter-
minology and have created ambiguity about the basic principles underlying pro-
                                                
2 In 1998 the European Commission found that parties adhering to the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Con-
ference Agreement) had abused their joint dominant position by inducing potential competitors to 
join TACA, thereby altering the competitive structure of the market.  
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duct bundling. Although the article of Stremersch and Tellis (2002), constitutes a 
substantial contribution to the creation of a uniform approach towards research in 
bundling, the use of bundling terminology and concepts in the context of logistics 
and container transportation is virtually entirely absent.   
This short overview indicates in effect the lack of any application of bundling 
in the container sector. At least three shortcomings in the current literature applied 
to container transportation can be identified: firstly the lack of analysis of the po-
tential and benefits of product bundling in the container industry for carriers; sec-
ondly the lack of a through discussion of the legal and antitrust implications of 
product bundling; and thirdly the analysis of the effects on shippers and logistics 
service providers. 
Especially in view of the increasing importance of integrated logistics and the 
simplification in transactions that the use of a single pricing mechanism would of-
fer carriers and shippers, the lack of theoretical investigation on the subject be-
comes obvious. In addition, the changes in the liner industry’s regulatory regime, 
with the de facto abolition of the conference system in 2008 in trades to and from 
Europe, will likely increase the ability of the industry to make use of product bun-
dling as it already happens in other industries. 
As indicated by Kühn, Stillman and Caffarra (2005), the legal implications of 
bundling have become clearer and the approach of legal authorities towards this 
practice more consistent and in line with the findings of economic theory. A recent 
set of interviews done by Erasmus University Rotterdam and Singapore Manage-
ment University (EUR and SMU, 2006), within a research framework promoted 
under the auspices of the NOL Foundation of Singapore, indicated a large interest 
of the industry on the possibilities offered by product bundling and solicits the 
question whether the attitude towards price bundling in the container industry is 
about to change. 
A4C  +!+'",!.+&*+* )-+,!'&+
Main question: Is bundling of logistics services together with ocean transporta-
tion a winning strategy for shipping lines, shippers and society at large? 
In order to give an answer to the main research question, the research problem has 
been divided into secondary questions that will be discussed in the different chap-
ters of the thesis. The secondary research questions can be grouped under the fol-
lowing headings. 
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i. Analysis of existing bundling practices in the industry. Logistics integration is a 
well-established trend in liner shipping as well as in all transportation 
industries, and refers to the tendency of transport operators and other 
logistics service providers to expand their scope of activities along the 
supply chain with the aim of offering differentiated logistics service 
packages. The analysis of the degree of integration that characterises 
the liner shipping industry and of the extent to which bundling takes 
place as an industry practice is a necessary part of this research.  
ii. Shipper’s perception of bundled services. The development of bundling 
proposition from the side of carriers is motivated, among other rea-
sons, by shippers’ demand. In order to substantiate this claim, further 
insight in shippers’ demand is necessary. Furthermore the develop-
ment of optimal bundling propositions cannot leave aside shipper de-
mand considerations, since a successful bundle offer need to be dove-
tailed to customer requirements. 
iii. Definition of bundling strategies for ocean carriers and logistics service providers. 
The development of integrated logistics allows for the provision of ad-
vanced supply chain solutions. The economies deriving from these so-
lutions may be substantial for certain bundles and marginal for others. 
This research aims at quantifying these economies in order to deter-
mine which bundles should be provided and at what cost. 
iv. Application of the existing theory on bundling to the logistics and ocean transporta-
tion industry. This research assesses the extent to which the findings 
from the industrial organisation and marketing management literature 
are applicable to the liner shipping industry. This would lead to the 
possibility of expanding the existing research on bundling with new in-
sights obtainable from the ocean transportation sector. 
v. Competition issues and the impact of bundling strategies on entry/exit barriers. 
Bundling has the potential to increase firm market power and affect 
competition. Although the literature evidence on this issue is not con-
clusive (see below), this research should assess and account for the pos-
sible strategic effects of bundling practices.  
vi. Assessment of the strategic value of other logistics activities for shipping lines. In 
view of shipper preferences, cost economies deriving from bundle pro-
vision and market outcomes, the research should evaluate the strategic 
value of bundle propositions and how this value could be maximised. 
A4D  %+
The appearance of bundling in multiple forms in modern business practice and the 
far-reaching implications of this pricing strategy have generated a large set of in-
teresting and important research issues. The strategic nature of bundling decisions 
in ocean transportation and the exploratory nature of a large part of this study call 
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for a holistic and transdisciplinary approach to the research questions. For this rea-
son the thesis can be connected to the following not exclusive research domains: 
 Applied (Transport) Economics; 
 Industrial Organisation; 
 Marketing management; 
 Supply Chain Management. 
 
The current research aims at exploring, without the presumption of being exhaus-
tive, some of these issues. Although throughout our research work and within the 
thesis itself a large number of issues emerged, six key themes can be traced as 
dominant in the thesis: 
 Bundling impact on society and shippers; 
 Bundling and carriers’ competitive advantage; 
 Transaction costs and bundling; 
 Strategic bundling; 
 Bundling and the supply chain; 
 Competition issues and regulation. 
The themes are related to the research questions as shown in the following 
diagram.  
Table 1: Relation between research questions and themes. 
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The diagram below (table 2) aims at clarifying the relations among the vari-
ous thesis chapters and the thesis themes. 
Table 2: Relation between thesis chapters and thesis themes. 
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Bundling of logistics services 
The research creates a theoretical framework on the issue of bundling with 
an application to logistics and maritime transport. The idea is to visualise ocean 
transportation as a segment in the chain and identify which services are or could 
be bundled together with it. The selection of the components to be bundled re-
sponds to different considerations, such as the degree of complementarity among 
services, transaction cost issues and demand characteristics. 
Bundling strategies in the presence of scope, scale and network economies 
The testing of the feasibility of bundling within transport and logistics, as well 
as the proposition of optimal bundling strategies requires an extension of the theo-
retical approach used in the literature. This involves the necessity of extending the 
bundling paradigm proposed by Adams and Yellen (1976) to encompass some of 
the distinctive characteristics of transport and logistics services, the existence of 
economies of scope, scale and network among others, but primarily the investiga-
tion on the nature of the transaction between logistics service providers and ship-
pers.  
Bundling and pricing of logistics services and ocean transportation: evidence 
The research relies on a market survey of shippers and carriers in order to as-
sess the willingness to pay for a bundled service instead of an unbundled one. The 
indirect estimation of elasticities of demand and other conceptual issues are also 
addressed in the thesis and increase the relevance of the research, both from an 
empirical and a theoretical point of view. 
Logistics services definition problems 
From the research it should be clear what logistics services are outsourced by 
whom and how much they differ from each other. The problem of the definition of 
services leads also to the issue of complementarity and substitutability among logis-
tics services and logistics chains. Complementary logistics services, in fact, are 
bound to be more easily combined in successful bundles. The attractiveness of a 
bundled proposition though is not only related to how easily can services be com-
bined together, but also to the existence of substitutes that are provided, for in-
stance, by competitors. Further issues refer to the easiness with which a bundle 
component can be replaced, e.g. with a component provided by a competitor. 
When bundles result in a symbiotic relation between the supplier and the cus-
tomer, in other words when the degree of asset specificity is high, bilateral depend-
ency develops and switching costs are high. 
Issues of competition and policy implications 
There are several aspects related to competition that are relevant for this re-
search. Firstly, it is worth discussing whether bundling grants shipping lines any 
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type of market dominance on the logistics market, either by rising barriers to entry, 
or soothing competition. Secondly, it is interesting to analyse to what extent ship-
ping lines compete with logistics operators in the provision of bundles. Thirdly 
how competition in the shipping and the logistics markets is affected by vertical 
integration among logistics operators and shipping lines. This aspect has naturally 
a determinant geographical dimension, as well as a vertical dimension within the 
logistics chain. Nowadays carriers’ sources of competitive advantage are to be 
found at the network or at the chain level more than at the level of the chain com-
ponent.  
Proposed approach 
The research underlying the thesis consisted of the following phases: 
 Phase 1 - Literature review. In this phase a comprehensive literature re-
view was performed in the various research sub-areas. The outcome is the 
overview of the results, hypotheses and problems discussed in the contem-
porary literature on commodity bundling and in the applied field of logis-
tics integration. The information collected is analysed and synthesised. 
The output of this phase is a clearly structured framework of the available 
theory and methods aiming at selecting the conceptual frameworks that 
better fit the research problem. 
 Phase 2 - Empirical survey. This phase of the research consisted of a sur-
vey of carriers’ business practice with respect to bundling and of shippers’ 
perception. This phase aimed at gaining insight to the feasibility of bun-
dling practices in the liner and logistics industry and at inferring possible 
future developments. 
 Phase 3 - Model. This phase entailed the selection and the elaboration of 
theoretical models that encompass the relevance of bundling in the logis-
tics and transportation sectors. The outcome of phase 3 consists of: a) a 
theoretical model of product bundling in an oligopolistic market; b) a op-
timal bundling strategy definition model. 
 Phase 4 - Evaluation of the model(s). Once the models had been selected, 
their validity is tested against the survey data previously collected. The ob-
jective of phase 4 will be to answer the major research question. 
A4F , ''$'!$((*' +&,
The thesis makes use of a large set of methodologies. In addition to desk research, 
the following methodologies are used in the thesis: 
 Interviews; 
 Survey; 
 Game theory; 
 Simulation; 
 Conjoint analysis. 
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In addition to applying existing methodologies to a new problem, the thesis 
also contributes in a new direction by developing a conjoint analysis methodology 
for application in ocean transportation. 
The information used in the research derives from ocean carriers and their 
customers, as well as logistics operators. Given the strategic importance of the 
topic, the limited research performed so far and in order to reduce uncertainty on 
this business practice, the NOL Foundation has entrusted to the Center for Mari-
time Economics and Logistics (MEL), Erasmus University Rotterdam and to the 
School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management University with 
a long-term research project to investigate the applicability of bundling to the 
ocean transportation and logistics industries. The NOL Fellowship is an initiative 
launched in February 2006 by Singapore’s former Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong, who is the Patron of the Fellowship.  The Fellowship has been seeded by a 
large contribution from NOL, to bring about multi-disciplinary, applied research 
among centres of excellence in universities and research institutes internationally, 
to enhance knowledge and expertise in the field of global cargo transportation and 
logistics. 
Within the Fellowship’s general scope, the aim of the research project Bun-
dling in the Liner and Logistics Industries—one of the two flagship projects of the Foun-
dation—is to investigate the scientific underpinnings of product bundling in liner 
and logistics sectors; determine shippers’ perceptions of bundled logistics products; 
and assess whether the provision of bundled services can sustain, if not enhance, 
carriers’ competitive advantage. This thesis has made extensive use of the informa-
tion made available to the author through this project.  
A4G .*.!/', , +!+
In addition to this introduction the thesis provides an extensive literature review of 
the theory of bundling (chapter 2). This chapter is structured around the two ma-
jor research areas where bundling has emerged as a literature subtheme: industrial 
organisation and marketing management. The chapter differs from previously ap-
peared reviews, not only as it is the first to give equal importance and to review 
simultaneously the literature in both research subareas, but also in the fact that 
each concept reviewed in the literature is shortly discussed with reference to the 
maritime industry. 
A more detailed analysis of the foundations of liner shipping economics is 
provided in chapter 3. This chapter aims at highlighting the salient traits of the 
industry with respect to other forms of transportation and other industries by and 
large. The focus of this chapter is pricing, costs and the determinants of competi-
tive advantage. Research on liner shipping economics has focused on a handful of 
crucial issues, e.g. competition, pricing, vertical integration, and major economic 
journal contributions have been scarce, so that it is still perceived as a rather exotic 
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research area within the broader domains of transport economics and applied 
economics.  Chapter 3 is therefore essential in framing the industry in the more 
general economic context. 
The discussion of the first three chapters has been limited to the theoretical 
aspects of bundling and liner shipping. The subsequent two chapters aim at adding 
the empirical dimension to the discussion. Chapter 4 focuses on the perceptions of 
shippers to the provision of bundles and logistics outsourcing by and large. The 
aim of the chapter is to provide a review of the advantages obtainable through 
bundling from the perspective of the shippers. This is done by presenting the em-
pirical evidence available in the literature on the use of bundles and the result of 
two shipper surveys: one done on a general population of shippers, limited geo-
graphically to Singapore, and another performed among the customers of a major 
carrier.   
Chapter 5 integrates the discussion with the perspective of the carriers. The 
chapter presents, in addition to the literature and documentary evidence, the re-
sults of five year targeted interviews with carrier representatives and experts. The 
chapter pulls together the experience of some of the major carriers, such as Maersk 
Line, CMA-CGM, American President Line/Neptune Orient Line, NYK Logis-
tics and Megacarriers, and others. The chapter aims at identifying best practice in 
the current business environment and present to the reader how bundles are 
formed in practice. 
On the basis of the results of chapter 5 and building on the approaches de-
veloped in the marketing management literature, chapter 6 provides a set of guide-
lines on how to set up optimal bundling strategies in the case of logistics and ocean 
transportation. The chapter provides a set of propositions that help defining the 
desirability of a bundle on the basis of the characteristics of the shipper, the pro-
duct transported and the logistics services included in the bundle. In addition, the 
chapter provides a procedure on how to set up a marketing study at company level 
making use of conjoint analysis methodologies. 
The cost profile of each bundle component and integration capabilities of 
each carrier, are crucial in the definition of optimal bundling strategies. This issue 
can be referred theoretically to the concept of transaction costs and the approaches 
developed within the domains of transaction cost economics. This is the subject of 
chapter 7. Transaction cost reduction is one of the fundamental justifications for 
successful bundling and provide an interesting perspective to the problem under 
analysis. The issues related to the make-or-buy decision and vertical integration 
are addressed also in this chapter. 
Reference to transaction costs inevitably points at the issues of measurement 
and performance metrics. If transaction costs are not measured and do not consti-
tute part of the company performance measurement system, the formulation of 
bundling propositions can only be done haphazardly. Bundling can only be suc-
cessful if the liner shipping company is strategically oriented towards building its 
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competitive advantage on the supply chain and when performance metrics are fine 
tuned with the supply chain dimension so that they become transcorporate per-
formance metrics. Chapter 8 explores these issues and provides extensive discus-
sions on the importance of using the supply chain perspective when setting up per-
formance measurement systems for ocean carriers and container terminals. 
Chapter 9 and chapter 10 focus on the strategic potential of bundling. Draw-
ing on the extensive number of examples in the industrial organisation literature of 
oligopoly models with bundling, chapter 9 presents two game theory models that 
connect market dominance, bundling and transaction costs. The results of the 
model are interpreted on the basis of carriers’ payoffs and social welfare. The 
overarching conclusion of the models is that when bundling appears in oligopoly as 
a result of exploiting transaction costs differentials among carriers, results are am-
bivalent, although gains for society can be substantial. 
Chapter 10 expands on the issues presented in chapter 9 and complements 
the results with an overview of antitrust legislation in Europe, United States and 
Asia, and its implications on the liner shipping industry. The chapter argues that 
so far, antitrust legislation has limited the applicability and scope of bundling in the 
context of ocean transportation. This is as a result of the fact that antitrust exemp-
tions have been granted to ocean transportation only against the vertical integra-
tion tendency of the industry. Thus carriers have tried, although unsuccessfully, to 
bundle around the only service that enjoys antitrust immunity, i.e. port to port ser-
vices. The consequences are that, if on the one side, eventual competition distor-
tion have been avoided, on the other side, this has also limited the possibility for 
carriers and society to benefit from bundling and develop the practice as it has 
happened in other industries. 
Chapter 11 concludes and provides a summary of the research issues that can 
be further explored. 
A4H '&$-+!'&+
This introduction aimed at presenting the research problem, the main and secon-
dary research questions, the research approach adopted in the thesis and its overall 
structure. It has been argued that although the sale of goods and services in a bun-
dle at a single price is a pervasive business practice, and extensive research has 
been conducted in the industrial organisation and marketing management litera-
ture, limited attention has been given to the bundled sale of (ocean) transportation 
and other logistics services. 
This has lead to the formulation of the main research question; on whether 
bundling of logistics services together with ocean transportation is a winning strat-
egy for shipping lines, shippers and society at large. The main research question 
entailed the subdivision of the research problem in six areas of research: the analy-
sis of the bundling practices in the industry; shippers’ perception of bundled ser-
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vices; definition of bundling strategies for ocean carriers and logistics service pro-
viders; the application of the existing bundling theory to the logistics and ocean 
transportation industries; competition and the impact of bundling strategies on 
entry/exit barriers; and the assessment of the strategic value of logistics activities 
for a shipping line. 
These areas of research are represented in six themes deriving from the four 
major research domains connected to the thesis: Transport Economies, Industrial 
Organisation, Marketing Management and Supply Chain Management. 
The introduction also explains what is the methodological framework that 
the thesis makes reference to in order to answer the main research question and 
address the major research issues emerging from the research problem.  
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This chapter presents the detailed review of the theory of strategic bundling drawn 
from the existing economics and management literature. It also provides the 
reader with the key concepts and basic terminology that the rest of the study makes 
reference to. The chapter is based on the discussion of the academic contributions 
to the issues connected to bundling, and as such, it accomplishes some of the major 
tasks of a literature review. A literature review is performed in two stages: the first 
stage aims at defining a research problem and research questions, confirming hy-
pothesis and selecting adequate research methodologies; the second more exten-
sive stage focuses on identifying past theoretical research that is relevant (Hair, et 
al. 2003: pg. 94). This chapter is the result of the second stage of the literature re-
view. The significance of the second stage of the review cannot be underestimated, 
and it is therefore useful to mention at least the most important tasks it is expected 
to accomplish. 
Firstly, as also mentioned by Creswell (2003), a literature review relates the 
current work ‘to the larger dialogue in the literature about the topic’ (Creswell, 2003, pg. 
30). By summarising and presenting the ideas behind the most important literature 
contributions, the chapter frames the research problem in the bigger theoretical 
stance. In particular, as clearly discussed by Arksey and Knight (1999: pg. 47-49), 
for studies where interviews constitute an important methodological component, 
such as ours, the literature review is an essential step in order to avoid repeating 
research already performed, missing significant results, conceptual frameworks and 
information already available to the researcher and that could be useful in the 
study. Furthermore, ocean transportation and logistics seldom constitute the objec-
tive of the investigation in industrial organisation articles, if compared with tele-
communications or financial services for example, and as a result are perceived as 
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somewhat ‘exotic’ in the academic community. This review is thus important in 
order to connect the discussions on bundling of ocean transportation and other 
logistics services, which constitute the topic of the following chapters, to the ongo-
ing debate on bundling.  
Secondly, it is generally recognised (Cooper, 1984; Marshall and Rossman, 
1999), that the aim of the literature review should contribute identifying the gaps 
in the ongoing research and how the current research can be extended. The major 
objective of this study is naturally to extend the findings of the literature on bun-
dling to the ocean transportation and logistics industries, but in doing so other un-
resolved more general issues are addressed. For example, the role that bundling 
may play in enhancing market power in oligopolies or how the presence of ec-
onomies of scope impacts the success of product bundling strategies are core to our 
discussions and the debate in the industrial organisation literature is still ongoing. 
The rest of the chapter therefore will present an account of the issues still open in 
the literature on bundling, and at the end, it explains how this study contributes in 
addressing these issues. 
A third task of a literature review is to provide a coherent framework for es-
tablishing and benchmarking the importance of the study with respect to what has 
been done so far (Miller, 1991). Although theoretical in its nature, this chapter 
provides several industry examples, explaining how the theory of bundling has 
been more or less successfully applied in different industries. For instance, the ex-
periences deriving from the use of bundles in the tourism industry provide a useful 
benchmark against which bundles of ocean transportation and other logistics ser-
vices can be tested. Although the analysis of the applicability of bundling in con-
nection to the container industry, because of its centrality to the current discussion, 
is the topic of the next chapter, which simultaneously equips the reader with the 
fundamentals of liner shipping economics, this chapter frames the present study in 
the broader applied economic literature on bundling. 
The importance of this chapter lies not only in the accomplishment of the 
previous tasks, but also in providing the reader with a coherent and consistent ter-
minology. As pointed out by Stremersch and Tellis (2002), the academic publica-
tions on bundling in general in the various streams of literature—industrial organi-
zation, applied economics, marketing and law—have been inconsistent in the use 
of terminology and have created ambiguity about the basic principles underlying 
bundling. The lack of a rigorous terminology and of a consistent definition of the 
theoretical concepts hinders the comprehension of the benefits and consequences 
of bundling, therefore undermining its potential as a new business strategy in liner 
shipping and its attractiveness to industry practitioners and academics. It is there-
fore critical, before proceeding further to provide a set of rigorous definitions of the 
various forms of bundling and explain the theoretical underpinnings of strategic 
bundling in the various market structures. 
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The rest of the chapter is structured in the following way. The next section 
deals with definitions and key concepts in the theory of strategic bundling. The 
overall framework for the literature analysis and a literature map is presented in 
the following section. Section three discusses the most relevant contributions in the 
industrial organisation literature. The following paragraph presents the review of 
the major concepts presented in the marketing management literature. Paragraph 
five reviews the most important debate in the various industries on the use of bun-
dling. Section six explain the connection of the present study with the current lit-
erature debate and explain how this chapter contributes extending the current 
findings. 
B4B +!'&(,+&!&!,!'&+
The sale of products3 as a package or as a bundle is a common business practice in 
multiproduct firms. This practice is generally referred to in the literature as com-
modity bundling or tie-in sale, and can be formally defined as: ‘the sale of two or more 
separate products in one package’ (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002: pg. 56). A textbook ex-
ample of bundling is the well-known case of Microsoft Windows operating system 
and Internet Explorer web browser that resulted in litigation against Microsoft 
(Rubinfeld, 2009; Whinston, 2001; Liebowits and Margolis, 1999; Ayres and 
Nalebuff 2005). Before the trial, a consumer had the option of purchasing a 
Microsoft Windows operating system only in combination with Internet Explorer 
web browser. In other words only the bundle Microsoft Windows operating system 
and Internet Explorer was available to consumers. When the products or services 
are sold without the requirement that the customer also purchases some other 
products or services, in other words no bundling of products or services has taken 
place, we say that the firm pursues an unbundling strategy also sometimes referred 
to as a pure component strategy (Adams and Yellen, 1976) or no bundling (Dolan 
and Simon, 1996).  
An important distinction is between commodity bundling and tie-in sale, 
sometimes also referred to as tying (Burstein, 1960a). While in commodity bundling 
the bundled package contains a fixed proportion of each of the individual compo-
nents, in tie-in sales the firm does not control the proportions in which the two or 
more products are consumed. Nevertheless the purchase of some amount of one of 
the products is conditional to the purchase of some amount of a second, tied pro-
duct. A typical example of tied-in sales refers to the policy that Kodak adopted in 
the mid-1980s of selling parts of its photocopier and its micrographics equipment 
exclusively to controlled maintenance service dealers. This practice allegedly 
aimed at making it virtually impossible to an independent service organization to 
provide maintenance contracts for Kodak equipment. In 1987, these organizations 
                                                
3 Here and in the rest of the study product is defined to include both goods and services. 
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filed suit against Kodak who lost at trial and on appeal (McKie-Mason and 
Metzler, 2004). 
A classic example of tie-in sales is the IBM tabulating machines (Telser, 1965; 
Wharhit, 1980; Liebowitz, 1983; Simon, 1989; Simon and Wübker, 1999). At the 
time IBM was the dominant producer of tabulating machines and a lessee of an 
IBM-patented tabulating machine was required to purchase punch cards (the tied 
good) from IBM as a condition of the lease. The tying relations were artificially set, 
as in principle the tabulating machine could perfectly work also with punch cards 
produced by other manufacturers4. The IBM example is a case of contractual tie-in 
sales. In more modern examples, firms generally make use of technology-based tie-in 
sales, where it is not a contractual agreement that forces the customer to purchase 
also the tied good, but more the technical specifications of the product. For in-
stance, Sony’s PlayStation 2 games function neither on Microsoft’s Xbox systems, 
nor on Nintendo GameCube. Analogously, Hewlett-Packard, Canon and Epson, 
for example, manufacture printers that can use only their own brand cartridges 
and not those of their competitors. Other classic cases discussed in the literature 
are International Salt (Peterman, 1979), Northern Pacific (Cummings and Ruther, 
1979) and Xerox (Blackstone, 1975; Nagle & Holden, 2002; Phlips, 1989; Simon, 
Faßnacht & Wübker,1995). 
In the article of Stremersch and Tellis (2002), the authors distinguish between 
product bundling and price bundling. With the latter they refer to the sale of two or 
more products in a package at a discount, without any economies deriving from 
the joint production of the bundle components. This implies that the reservation 
price for the bundle is equal to the linear sum of the reservation prices for the 
separate components. This type of strategy is common in consumer goods, for ex-
ample when a certain shampoo is sold in a package with a hair conditioner. It 
should be noted that this type of strategy takes advantage of a certain degree of 
complementarity between the two products, and leverages on the likelihood that a 
consumer that requires one product will need also the bundled one.  
The concept of product bundling should be used instead when the creation of 
the bundle provides at least some of the consumers with an increase in value 
(Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). In other words, the bundle is somewhat perceived 
by the consumer as a different (new) product and as such consumer reservation 
prices are different than the linear sum of the prices of the individual bundle com-
ponents (most likely higher). The sale of holiday travel packages is an example of 
this type of bundles that may include a return flight to Milan, a four nights’ ac-
commodation and two operas at the Scala theatre. Another example of product 
bundling is the integration of logistics services and ocean transportation. The pro-
vision of the two services in an integrated form generates added values for the con-
sumers in terms of better coordination, supply chain visibility, etc. 
                                                
4 International Business Machines vs US (1936) 298, US 131. 
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Product bundling should not be confused with premium bundling. In the case of 
premium bundling, the bundle is sold at a premium rather than at discount 
(Cready, 1991). Implementing a premium bundling strategy requires the seller to 
be able to prevent consumers to purchase more than one of the bundle compo-
nents individually. This possibility is excluded in most of the studies on bundling 
(Bitran and Ferrer, 2007). It should be noted that premium bundling differs from 
product bundling insofar as the former refers to the price that is charged to the 
consumer, while the latter to the intrinsic characteristics of the bundle. 
A further important distinction that is generally made in the literature is be-
tween pure bundling and mixed bundling. These two approaches are defined by the 
options the firm makes available to its customers in the market place. In the case of 
pure bundling the products are sold together only as a package and consumers do 
not have the possibility of purchasing them separately. The classic example of pure 
bundling is provided by Stigler (1968) on its note on block booking in the movie 
industry5. Cable television providers market access to TV channels only as a bun-
dle, and consumers cannot purchase access to one channel only (Crawford 2008; 
Crawford and Cullen, 2007; Crampes and Hollander, 2005; Rennhoff and Serfes, 
2009). This differs from the case of mixed bundling, where consumers are given 
the choice of purchasing the products or services separately or together as a pack-
age (Guiltinan, 1987). Mixed bundling is in general a more common approach 
than pure bundling, and most of the firms engage in some form of mixed bundling 
(Simon and Wübker, 1999). 
Typical examples are the hotel and tourism industry (Kim, Bojanic and 
Warnick, 2009; Rewtrakunphaiboon and Oppewal, 2008; Campo and Yagüe, 
2007; 2008), restaurant menus (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Heide, et al. 2008), the 
software industry (Liebowitz and Margolis, 1999; 2009; Sidak, 2001), the high-tech 
industry (Sarin, Sego and Chanvarasuth 2003), telecommunications (Kridel and 
Taylor, 1993), academic journals (Edlin and Rubinfeld, 2004; 2005), WiFi connec-
tions (Efimov and Whalley, 2004), health products (Simon and Wübker, 1999), 
pain relief and cold medicines (Evans and Salinger, 2004), mobile navigation ser-
vices (Bouwman, Haaker & de Vos, 2007), e-banking services (Altinkemer, 2001), 
and industrial maintenance services (Stremersch, Wuyts and Frambach, 2001). 
                                                
5 see Hanssen (2000) for a careful review of the US vs. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131 of 1948 
and US vs. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 of 1962 and the arguments that lead the Supreme Court to ban 
the practice. 
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Table 3: Bundling strategies alternatives. 
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A more general concept but closely connected to strategic bundling is nonlinear pric-
ing. Nonlinear pricing occurs when a consumer’s total expenditure on an item does 
not rise linearly (proportionally) with the amount purchased (Wilson, 1993). Meth-
ods of nonlinear pricing are used to practice second-degree price discrimination, 
where arbitrage is difficult and firms do not know the demands of each individual 
(Carlton and Perloff, 2005). Particular forms of product bundling are volume dis-
counts either in the form of a lower unit price for a pack of a homogeneous pro-
duct or for a multiple-unit pack of the product that are generally discussed as non-
linear pricing. Examples include energy markets where consumers are often able 
to buy their gas and electricity from a single supplier or from different suppliers. In 
both cases consumers face volume discounts and further price reduction if they 
purchase both services from the same supplier (Armstrong and Vickers, 2010; 
Armstrong, 2006; Stole, 2007). 
Often companies offer customers an annual rebate on total annual sales 
across the entire company product line. This type of sales rebates are aiming at in-
creasing customer loyalty (Dolan and Simon, 1996) and are a mixture of mixed-
bundling and nonlinear pricing, in the sense that the discount is independent of 
whether the sale comes from a single product or the entire company production 
line. This kind of bundles are similar to discounted annual contracts where the dis-
count is based on the commitment the customer makes to purchase at a certain 
store, or retailer of supplier and are very close to forms of prepayment discounting. 
Another form of bundle is that of providing a certain stand-alone basic pro-
duct with a set of add-on enhancing features. This form of pricing goes under the 
name of add-on bundling and is not strictly a mixed bundling option because the 
add-on feature will not be sold unless the basic product is sold (Guiltinan, 1987). In 
this sense they are more similar to tie-in sales (Simon and Wübker, 1999). A com-
mon example of this form of bundling are cars, that can be offered as stand alone 
products or with a set of additional features such as ABS, airbags, radio, etc. (Lie-
bowits and Margolis, 2009). Another example are Oracle customer licenses to 
database use, for which Oracle faces competition from other products such as SQL 
Server, etc. for the initial sale. In order to make access to the databases more effec-
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tive, Oracle provides a performance tuning product or other add-ons (Wright 
2001). 
A common form of bundling that is encountered in practice in markets for 
consumer goods is cross couponing. Coupons grant consumers who purchase a cer-
tain product discount on the purchase of another product from the firm assortment 
(Simon and Wübker, 1999). They are generally used to introduce new products or 
increase the sale of less popular products by linking them to the established pro-
ducts of the firm’s line. This represents bundling because the buyer of both pro-
ducts receives a discount compared to someone who buys them separately without 
the benefits of the coupon. 
B4C &'.*$$*%/'*#'*$!,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The various definitions of bundling discussed in the previous paragraph may ap-
pear very different from each other. Some refer to rigorously defined economic 
concepts, other are more loose industry practice descriptions. A possible reason is 
that all formalisations on bundling emerged in different contexts and aimed at ex-
plaining the different objectives that firms may try to achieve when setting up a 
bundling strategy, often to a very different audience and with dissimilar objectives. 
The resulting ambiguity in formalization and definition already addressed by 
Stremersch and Tellis (2002) is probably the direct consequence of a concept that 
developed in parallel in different disciplines. As mentioned by Fuerderer(1999), the 
literature treats the rationale and results of commodity bundling within the frame-
works of industrial organisation; competition legislation; economic analysis; behav-
ioural economics; and decision-making. 
The idea of bundling originated in the 1960s in the seminal works of Burstein 
(1960a, 1960b) and Stigler (1961) but can be also linked to the work on transaction 
costs of Coase (1960) and Demsetz (1968). The early examinations in the economic 
literature aimed at assisting policy makers in assessing the antitrust implications of 
bundling and tying practices (Stigler, 1968; Burstein, 1960a; 1960b; Telser, 1965; 
Blackstone 1975; etc). This expanded in a more general attempt to understand the 
potential of bundling for companies and consumers in monopoly (Adams and Yel-
len, 1976; Warhit, 1980; Palfrey, 1983; Schmalensee, 1984; Whinston, 1990) or in 
more generalised settings such as oligopoly or monopolistic competition (Porter, 
1985; Carabjo, de Meza and Seidmann, 1990; Lawless, 1991). 
A parallel stream of research aimed at defining optimal bundling strategies 
from the marketing management point of view. This required on the one side, set-
ting up guidelines for companies on how to successfully implement strategic bun-
dling in general (Porter, 1985; Eppen, Hanson and Martin, 1991; Stremersch and 
Tellis, 2002; Fuerderer, Herrmann and Wübker, 1999) and in connection to the 
market conditions (Wilson, Weiss and John, 1990; Guiltinan, 1987; Stremersch 
and Tellis, 2002), and on the other side, investigate customer’s perception of bun-
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dled products (Nagle and Holden, 2002; Gaeth, et al. 1991; Yadav and Monroe, 
1993). This connected with the literature on how to measure utility and structure 
product lines maximizing market share, buyer’s utility and seller’s profit. A large 
set of literature refers, for example, to conjoint analysis (e.g. Zufryden, 1977; Dob-
son and Kalish, 1993; Bauer, Herrmann and Mengen, 1994; Cattin and Wittink, 
1989) while other explored stochastic choice models (e.g. Ogawa 1987) or aggre-
gate utility structure (e.g. Green 1984; McFadden 1974, 1980; Daganzo 1979). 
Table 4: Market structure assumptions in the literature. 
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The brief review presented in the previous two paragraphs is by no means 
exhaustive and it aims at summarising the major research streams in which the 
concept of bundling has been discussed. A more detailed review of the existing lit-
erature on bundling is presented in the following sections. In order to proceed with 
a systematic presentation of the key findings on bundling a somewhat more sys-
tematic approach to literature analysis is required. Generally speaking we can dis-
tinguish the literature on bundling on the basis of several characteristics: its refer-
ence discipline, the affinity of the authors with a certain scientific domain, the 
market structures it refers to, the objectives of the paper, the objectives that bun-
dling aims at achieving. For the purpose of this study we decided to subdivide the 
literature contributions in two major groups: the contributions that refer in a 
broader sense to the industrial organisation literature (presented in section 2.3 to 
2.10) and the contributions that can be tagged under the marketing management 
label (2.11 to 2.12). 
As far as the industrial organisation literature is concerned we has several op-
tions at hand in order to categorize the different streams of research. In previous 
literature reviews (see for example Kobayashi, 2005a) the leading subdivision has 
been the market structure to which the authors referred to (monopoly, oligopoly, 
competition). This approach is presented in table 5. Others (e.g. Stremersch and 
Tellis, 2002) categorised the contributions on the basis of the objective of the pa-
per. In the following, the contributions have been grouped around key themes, 
mirroring the attention that these themes have received in the academia. This re-
view is in a certain way also historical as the themes presented are ordered, to the 
extent possible, following the logic that older contributions are discussed before 
newer ones. Our framework for reviewing the literature is presented in the follow-
ing table. In particular is should be noted that section 2.5, 2.6, 2.8 and 2.9 are 
closely related, and the setting somehow differs only on the market structures put 
forward in the models and are not presented sequentially for exposition reasons. 
Finally, like often in this case, this subdivision is purely conventional and motivated 
by practical reasons. 
Table 5: Literature review organisation. 
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One of the first articles directed specifically to bundling is the already cited paper 
of Stigler (1968). The focus of the paper on block booking in the film distribution 
industry is price discrimination through bundling, and it led to a particularly rel-
evant stream of literature. In this influential paper, Stigler argues that in case cus-
tomer valuations of two movies are negatively correlated, pure bundling helps re-
duce the valuation heterogeneity across customers and allows the film distributor 
to effectively price discriminate and extract consumer surplus. The author shows 
how this strategy delivers better results than the independent setting of the (mo-
nopoly) price for each movie. The example thus clearly illustrates the role of pro-
duct bundling as a pure price discrimination tool for the extraction of consumer 
surplus6. 
This is also the focus of the important article of Adams and Yellen (1976) that 
constitutes also the first structured attempt to present the rationale and effects of 
bundling as a pricing strategy and is the first to introduce a graphical representa-
tion of commodity bundling. Adams and Yellen (1976) in particular demonstrate 
that product bundling achieves the objective of sorting consumers on the basis of 
their reservation prices thus, allowing price discrimination. The incentive for bun-
dling under short-run profit maximization arises exclusively in order to price dis-
criminate (Kühn, et al. 2005). The original article and Simon and Wübker  (1999) 
among others, provide numerical examples of the gains deriving from this form of 
bundling. 
Several contributions have followed the direction set by Stigler (1968) and 
Adams and Yellen (1976) in discussing and explaining under which conditions 
bundling acts as an effective consumer segmentation mechanism (Schmalensee, 
1982; 1984; Guiltinan, 1987; McAfee, McMillan and Whinston, 1989; Salinger, 
1995; Pearce and Winter, 1996; Steremersch and Tellis, 2002). In general all con-
tributions show that with bundling, sellers could extract more revenue from cus-
tomers. For this to be true in the case of pure bundling additional assumptions on 
consumers’ preferences are required. Pure bundling acts as an effective price dis-
crimination tool for consumers with strong preference for one of the goods in the 
bundle (Adams and Yellen, 1976). In more general terms the effectiveness of pure 
bundling as a price discrimination tool depends on the distribution of reservation 
prices (e.g. normal or uniform distribution) and their joint distribution across the 
bundled products and on the correlation of consumer valuation across the pro-
ducts (Schmalensee, 1984). Stremersch and Tellis (2002) refine this finding clarify-
                                                
6 This was also the position taken by the Supreme Court in the two landmark cases that triggered 
Stigler’s analysis (See previous footnote). Although the arguments of Stigler are logically sound, more 
recently it has been argued that in reality the rationale for block booking was more related to the 
practical necessity of providing films in large quantity and at a lower cost (Hanssen, 2000). The anti-
trust regulation preventing block booking has been argued to have been actually detrimental to the 
industry (Orbach and Einav, 2007). 
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ing an implicit assumption of the model of Adams and Yellen (1976) and Guiltinan 
(1987), i.e. that reservation prices for the bundle are assumed to vary across con-
sumers. If this is not true, pure price bundling yields always at least as good results 
as mixed price bundling.  
Even when the consumer valuations for the products are not negatively cor-
related, mixed-bundling could be profitable. Schmalensee (1982) shows that mixed 
bundling can be profitable to the firm even when customer valuations are posi-
tively correlated as long as the correlation is not near to or equal one. The profita-
bility of bundling is based on its ability to reduce the dispersion of reservation 
prices and thereby makes it possible for the monopolist to extract a greater share of 
consumer surplus (Schmalensee 1982; 1984). The contribution of McAfee, et al. 
(1989) is important in two respects. Firstly they demonstrated that a mixed bun-
dling strategy almost always strictly dominates pure bundling, when cost effects are 
absent and customer valuations are uniformly or normally distributed. Secondly 
they demonstrated that a mixed bundling strategy dominates unbundled sales for 
virtually all distributions of reservation prices as long as component re-sale can be 
prevented. In these circumstances, the optimal bundling price can exceed the sum 
of the prices of the individual goods. 
In a recent article, Fang and Norman (2006) expand the analysis of 
Schmalensee (1984) to the case of a limited number of goods with zero marginal 
cost. Similarly to Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) and more recently Geng, Stinch-
combe, and Whinston (2005) and Ibragimov (2005), the authors aim at establish-
ing reasonably general conditions under which bundling is a profit-maximising 
strategy. They argue that pure bundling in the case of monopoly should be pre-
ferred to pure components strategy for high marginal costs and low mean valu-
ation. In general in accordance with the results of Schmalensee (1984), they note 
that the variance in the willingness to pay is reduced when products are bundled, 
i.e. bundling reduces dispersion. These findings seem also to be supported by re-
cent empirical results (Crawford, 2008).  
Salinger (1995) developed the analysis in a different direction. In his article, 
he proposes a graphical interpretation of bundling that clarifies the profitability 
and welfare consequences of bundling and extends the considerations of 
Schmalensee to all distributions defined over a finite range. But probably the most 
interesting extension in the analysis refers to the explicit consideration of cost sav-
ings from bundling and not only demand interactions. In other words, Salinger 
expands the findings of the literature on price bundling to product bundling. The 
finding of Salinger are particularly interesting as he shows that when bundling 
lowers costs, it tends to be more profitable when demands for the components are 
highly positive correlated and the components costs are high. This is in net con-
trast to the pure demand-based theory of price bundling, where this strategy tends 
to be more profitable when components costs are low and demands are negatively 
correlated. 
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It is convenient to continue the review of the industrial organisation literature on 
commodity bundling with the case of a multi-product monopolist. This is not only 
because originally the idea of bundling has been developed within the settings of 
this market structure but also because understanding how product bundling may 
be profitably employed by a multi-product monopolist is useful in realizing why 
certain problems have been given particular attention in the literature and why the 
legal framework has developed as it is today. 
In general we refer to the conventional two-product framework, although, 
occasionally, reference will be made to the n-product case. In general most of the 
results discussed in the literature can be extended, not always without complicating 
heavily the notation, to the n-product case. 
The articles of Burstein (1960a, 1960b) dealt more in general with tie-in sales 
and in particular with the possibility offered by this practice to extend monopoly 
control to the tied product market, thus violating sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act in the U.S. and Article 82 of the EC treaty in 
the European Union. The interest in bundling was stirred by a series of legal cases7 
in the United States and more recently in Europe where it was argued that the 
firms involved engaged in restrictive market practices that violated competition 
rules. The essence of the legal cases was whether the firms had violated the rel-
evant competition rule (or as in the case of GE/Honeywell, would be in a position 
to violate EC competition rules) by means of commodity bundling. The discussion 
was based on the observation that the defendant firms enjoyed some sort of mo-
nopoly position in a certain market as a result of a patent protection or of a merger 
but competed with other companies on a complementary product.  
This issue is central in the literature on bundling and is connected to the 
broader debate on the leverage theory. The traditional interpretation of the leverage 
theory argues that a firm with monopoly power in one market can use the leverage 
provided by this power to foreclose sales in, and thereby monopolise, a second 
market (e.g. Kaysen and Turner, 1959). The discussion presented by Burstein on 
the relevance of the leverage theory for bundling was then further discussed in 
                                                
7 Landmark cases of this type include Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. vs. Eureka Specialty 
Co. 77. Fed. 288. (Sixth Cir. 1896); United Shoe Machinery Corp. vs. United States, 258 U.S. 451 
(1922); International Business Machines Corp. vs. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); International 
Salt Co., Inc. vs. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), United States vs. IBM, C.A., 69-200 (1969) and 
United States vs. Microsoft Corp., C.A., 98-1232 (2000), United States vs Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 
34 (D.C. Cir., 2001); U.S vs Microsoft Corp., 231 F.Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), the European 
Commission Decision against the merger of General Electric and Honeywell, (Case COMP/M.2220 
General Electric/Honeywell 2001), the European Commission decision on Microsoft and Windows 
Media Player (Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft, 2004). 
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Warhit (1980) and more recently in Whinston (1990) and Seidmann (1991). It 
should be noted that the major focus of these papers is pure bundling8.  
Although pure price bundling by a firm with market power is forbidden 
under antitrust law, the leverage theory is generally dismissed by economists on the 
basis of an argument attributed to Aaron Director (Director and Levi, 1956) ac-
cording to which if the monopolist could extract full consumer surplus when selling 
the tying good independently, it would never find it profitable to bundle, as this 
would require that every increase in the tied good price to be matched by an equi-
valent decrease in the price of the tying good9. This formulation of the Director’s 
argument implies that the logical purpose to bundle is to allow a seller to make use 
of the patent rights that it holds with regard to a product through for example 
price discrimination as discussed below. 
And indeed some of the firms in the legal cases previously mentioned did refer 
to price discrimination, or more precisely to metering, explaining that the purpose of 
bundling was that of distinguishing between different type of users. For example in 
the Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co case, the firm required the customers 
of its patented stapling machines also to purchase the staples form it, effectively 
facilitating the extraction of monopoly rents. By forcing its users to purchase sta-
ples jointly with the stapling machine, the company had the possibility of charging 
those customers that made heavier use of the machine a higher price than those 
who made a more limited use of the machine, as indicted by the staples purchased. 
The analogy with the IBM tabulating machines described before is obvious. 
By this reasoning, the bundling practice in question is effectively an exercise 
in price discrimination and has nothing to do with leverage. The Chicago School 
strongly endorsed this view (Director and Levi, 1956; Bowman, 1957; Burstein 
1960a; Posner, 1976; Bork, 1978 and others), and although this is not conclusive 
on the legality of the practice, the economics underlying this discussion suggests 
that indeed no extension of monopoly power from the tying good market to the 
tied good market has taken place.  
                                                
8 Although, for example, Warhit (1980) recognises the role that bundling may play in reducing of 
transaction costs, she dismisses this as a good reason to practice pure bundling, as the same benefits 
can be achieved by means of mixed bundling. In reality, Warhit dismisses the advantages of bun-
dling, as they referred to product bundling, instead of price bundling, that is the core of the discussion of 
Burstein (1990a). It should be observed that the practice of pure price bundling by a firm with market 
power could be unfavourable to consumer as it allows for an effective application of the leverage 
theory (Warhit, 1980; Whinston, 1990). 
9 The essence of Director’s argument is that bundling does not lead to higher profits. In fact if the 
monopolist could earn a higher profit by selling its product in a bundle for a bundle price b, lower 
than the sum of the monopoly price m and the price c of the good produced competitively, this 
would be equivalent to a new implicit monopoly price m’ = b – c < m. Since the competitively pro-
duced good is available at c, anyone who buys the bundle is willing to pay for the product provided 
under monopoly m’ = b – c. The monopolist could then directly sell the product at m’, eliminate the 
bundle and its profits would be at least as large. 
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Nonetheless, this argument only holds when consumers make use of the bun-
dled products in different proportions and it is possible for the firm to observe the 
extent to which the consumer makes use of the product. When the tying and the 
tied goods are used in fixed proportion, as in the formal definition of bundling dis-
cussed in section 2.2, this justification for tying cease to be relevant. Analogously 
when the bundle components are unrelated, i.e. there is no possibility for product 
bundling or there are no economies of scope on the consumption side, there is no 
real incentive for the firm to consider product bundling when the correlation in the 
valuations of the products is not known (Schmalensee, 1982; 1984; Stigler, 1968).  
This point of view is examined further in detail in Seidmann (1991). In this 
article the author argues that Director’s Argument against the leverage theory is 
true only in particular circumstances and in general it is possible for a firm to bun-
dle in order to extend monopoly power. This happens as Director’s argument 
holds only if the monopolist obtained on the tied-good market full consumer sur-
plus or monopoly profits and applied linear pricing for the tied good and for the 
bundle (Seidmann, 1991). 
In Nalebuff (2004a; 2004b; 2005) the potential for a monopolist to extend its 
influence to adjacent markets by mixed bundling of a product produced under 
monopoly and another product is further discussed. The interesting point of the 
article lies in the fact that consumers are not forced to buy the bundle, but accept it 
voluntarily. The firm achieves this outcome by reducing the price of the bundle 
and maintaining the price of the tied product sufficiently high. The reduction in 
price causes no first-order loss to the firm, while providing a first-order incentive 
for customers to voluntarily accept the deal (Nalebuff, 2004a).  
This approach is similar to the one discussed by Whinston (1990) although 
his article ‘Tying, foreclosure and exclusion’ brings the discussion on a different 
level. Whinston demonstrates that in theory, leverage through bundling is feasible 
in a strategic setting. The leverage theory is also reinterpreted in view of the possi-
bilities offered by product bundling. If we allow for economies of scale (and scope), 
bundling could remain a profitable strategy for the incumbent multi-product mo-
nopolist. In this case in fact, bundling will ensure that a higher level of sales in the 
tied market is achieved, in turn implying lower unit costs of production for the firm 
compared to that of its rivals. This provides the firm with the opportunity to fore-
close its competitors by lowering the price that it charges for tied product. In prin-
ciple, only the threat to tie could deter rivals from entering the tied product mar-
ket. 
Nevertheless, the argument presented by Whinston (1990), although interest-
ing in theory, is based on the assumption that the bundling firm never prices below 
marginal cost. As a result, rivals with equal or lower marginal cost are excluded 
only if fixed costs are high enough (Kühn, et al. 2005). In addition the theory gives 
limited insight into the issue of complementarity, as for highly complementary 
products Director’ argument holds. In addition Carlton and Waldman (2006) did 
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not find practical evidence that could support Whinstons’s point. Although vir-
tually all cases of technical bundles would then be eligible for foreclosure, in prac-
tice the conditions required for the it to actually happen are too restrictive (Lie-
bowits and Margolis, 2009). 
The article of Whinston can be connected to the literature developed by the 
so-called New Chicago School. In the perspective of the New Chicago School, the at-
tractiveness of bundling is not based on the benefits that it delivers to the firm at 
present, but on the shift of demand from the competitor to the bundling firm in the 
future. This theory is often referred to as the foreclosure argument that is discussed in 
the next paragraph. 
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The foreclosure argument presented by Whinston (1990) and more recently by 
Carlton and Waldman (2002; 2006) and De Graba and Mohammed (1999), postu-
lates that bundling firms could preserve and create market power in evolving in-
dustries. Market foreclosure is one of the last standing defences of antitrust provi-
sions against bundling. In its original formulation, the theory is as follows10. A first 
assumption in the model is that a firm enjoys monopoly power for a product whose 
consumption requires the purchase by consumers of a second product provided in 
a more competitive downstream market. By tying the two products together, the 
monopolist has the possibility of crowding out potential rivals in the downstream 
market. As already mentioned, production of the tied product is subject in the 
model of Whinston to scale economies, implying that a company providing the 
tied product can survive only if it reaches a certain minimum efficient scale. If 
users of the tying product constitute a large enough proportion of the downstream 
market, the tying strategy would have the potential to foreclose it. 
It should be noted that raising prices in the downstream market for the share 
of customers that purchase the tying product would not increase the profits of the 
monopolist, as he is already extracting monopoly rents and a price increase on the 
tied market would most likely result in some customers switching to a competitor, 
so in other words, rising the price for the product produced in the competitive 
market will only lower the price the monopolist can charge users of the product 
produced under monopoly. The advantage of the tying strategy would lie in the 
ability that the monopolist would acquire to extract monopoly rents from the con-
sumers that purchase exclusively the tied product.  
In Whinston’s discussion on the foreclosure argument, Liebowitz and Mar-
golis (2009) argue that the set of hypotheses required for this situation to happen 
are far too restrictive and unrealistic. The users of the product provided under 
monopoly must constitute a large enough share of the market for the product pro-
                                                
10 A critical discussion on the foreclosure argument is provided by Liebowits and Margolis (2009). 
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vided in competition in order to reach minimum scale effects, but at the same time 
not too large, as otherwise there would be not enough consumers in the tied mar-
ket to make the tie-in worthwhile (given that the monopolist would already control 
the tied market). In addition the minimum efficient scale for the tied product is not 
large enough then the monopolist will have difficulty crowding out rivals in this 
market. Furthermore, the average cost curve must be steep enough so that entry at 
output levels below the minimum efficient scale is deterred even as prices for the 
product produced in competition increase. 
Also Liebowitz and Margolis (2009) note that if increasing returns to scale are 
great enough in the market for the product sold in the competitive market, it might 
have been monopolized already so that the switch in monopoly ownership that 
could result from the tie-in would in reality not harm the consumers. In addition 
this formulation of the foreclosure argument lacks empirical evidence (Kühn, et al. 
2005; Liebowitz and Margolis, 2009). In practice in fact, the direct effect of tie-in 
contracts were observed, was to allow the seller to charge a price for the tied-good 
that was above the price available elsewhere. Competitors were not foreclosed from 
the market for the tied product. In some cases, the seller of the tying product could 
even purchase the tied product form other producers and resell is at a higher price. 
IBM, for example, did this with Hollerith cards. IBM had no chance to mo-
nopolize the paper or cardboard market and made no attempt to do so (Liebowitz 
and Margolis, 2009). 
Carlton and Waldman (2002) present a similar discussion. In their framework 
a multi-product monopolist could hold at bay a potential entrant into the primary 
and complementary product markets through bundling. The focus of this paper is 
the sequential strategy of entry. In their model, an entrant is considering sequential 
entry into the primary market and subsequently into the complementary one. The 
model considers the case where the entrant may possess a superior technology. If 
the entrant only enters the primary market, industry profits would rise, and the 
monopolist would be better off. Under these circumstances, pure bundling would 
not be used to deter entry. However, Carlton and Waldman show that pure bun-
dling may be used if the entrant also attempts to enter the complementary product 
market at a later stage. If this reduction in profits is large enough, the deterrence of 
entry may be sufficient. 
Once again, the Carlton and Waldman result requires that the initial mo-
nopolist commits to bundle—he would otherwise choose to cease bundling if entry 
actually occurred—. In this way, the monopoly status of the incumbent is pre-
served. Carlton and Waldman (2005b) also extend the theory encompassing the 
prospect that the incumbent multiproduct monopolist may try to acquire a mo-
nopoly position in a newly emerging market that makes use of the same comple-
mentary product and examine the use of tying in the presence of anticipated pro-
duct upgrades and consumer switching costs (Carlton and Waldman, 2005b). 
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The results of Carlton and Waldman (2002; 2005b; 2006) create dynamic in-
centives for entry deterrence that are not present in static models. These results 
seem rather convincing in theory, but nonetheless in another paper (Carlton and 
Waldman, 2005a), the authors suggest that “a very cautions approach” to antitrust 
liability be taken based on such dynamic models (Kobayashi, 2005a). The debate 
of the foreclosure argument is not exhausted. In particular its relevance in different 
formulations shaped part of the literature focusing on the importance of bundling 
in the imperfect competition setting. Before addressing this and other theories, it is 
expedient to consider first the reasons that might motivate bundling and tying 
when strategic incentives are not present. This is the topic of the next section. 
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In his influential article ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Ronald Coase (1937) set the founda-
tions of transaction costs economics11. The efficacy of bundling in reducing trans-
action costs is often cited as one of the major reasons why firms may want to en-
gage in this type of strategy (Adams and Yellen, 1976; Lawless, 1991; Kohli and 
Park 1994). The literature on bundling indicates that potential efficiency benefits 
form bundling could arise essentially because of two mechanisms: benefits on the 
production side and benefits on the consumption side (Kühn, et al. 2005). On the 
consumption side, bundling allows buyers to avoid the transaction costs of con-
tracting with several firms and therefore save time and information costs (Simon 
and Wübker, 1999; Kobayashi, 2005a; 2005b; Evans and Salinger, 2005). On the 
production side bundling reduces costs by allowing the firm to reap economies of 
scale (Paroush and Peles, 1981; Guiltinan, 1987) and scope (Guiltinan 1987; Ven-
katesh and Mahajan, 1993; Liebowitz and Margolis, 2009) of joint production, 
and reduce complexity costs (Eppen, el al. 1991; Anderson and Narus, 1995). If 
these cost reductions are passed on to consumers, bundling further benefits society 
by and large (Simon and Wübker, 1999). 
An example presented by Telser (1979) and more recently refined by Lie-
bowitz and Margolis (2009) may be useful to explain the advantages deriving from 
bundling that occur independently of the hypotheses made on the structure of the 
markets for the bundle components. The authors refer to a car as a bundle of differ-
ent components (seats, engine, radio, heating system, brakes, etc.) similarly to per-
sonal computers that are a bundle of keyboard, monitors, motherboards, software, 
etc. 
The example on the automobile should not be interpreted as if all products 
are the result on bundling—along this line Stigler (1968) argued that also a pair of 
shoes could be considered a bundle—. Firstly the standard automobiles come with 
a set of options that are bundled together with the basic model, such as air-
                                                
11 A further review of the literature on transaction costs is provided in chapter 6. 
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condition, radio, airbags, etc. As such, this is an example of add-on bundling as 
defined above. Some of these options were not included in the standard equipment 
in the past and have become an integral part of the modern automobile. Heaters, 
rust proofing and sound systems are simple example of what in the past was op-
tional and supported an active aftermarket, and has now become standard equip-
ment. This shows that what might have been perceived as a bundle in the past, 
may be perceived as a product in its own right now12 (Liebowits and Margolis, 
2009). 
Secondly, while there is not aftermarket for left or right shoes alone, there is a 
considerable aftermarket for some car parts such as radio equipment and tires. 
These components are products in their own right although most of their uses are 
tied to the automobile. For some of these options, there are economies of produc-
ing and selling these options together with the car, for others, simply shipping and 
assembling them to the car generates additional costs that can be avoided when 
the car is purchased as a all inclusive bundle. These savings in production and 
transaction costs changed as new technologies in car manufacturing were intro-
duced and mass production required integration in order to make automobiles 
available to the masses. 
Thirdly, it is observed that the sum of the prices of all the parts in an auto-
mobile, is a large multiple of the price of the entire car. This may be motivated by 
the market conditions under which some car parts are produced and provided, but 
it cannot be denied that much of that cost differential has to do with the high costs 
of maintaining inventories, arranging supply channels, packaging and shipping 
individual items, and handling the transactions. Bundling provides important re-
ductions in these transaction costs (Liebowits and Margolis, 2009). 
In particular in those cases where no market power is involved, the econo-
mies deriving from bundling seem to be sufficient to motivate this ubiquitous prac-
tice. The industrial organisation literature on bundling in view of its potential in 
generating cost efficiencies is far more limited that that on the multiproduct mo-
nopoly. Two major exceptions are worth mentioning. The first article is Craswell 
(1982) that discusses whether there is any role for antitrust policy when bundling is 
applied in competitive markets. The author recognises that in general bundling 
would benefit both producers and consumers in virtue of the cost efficiencies de-
scribed above. Craswell attributes the beneficial effects of bundling on consumer to 
the following four classes of efficiencies: 
Efficiencies in production; these efficiencies arise when products are 
cheaper to be produced or distributed as one instead of separately. The automo-
                                                
12 Consider that in the early days of the automobile, chassis, drivetrains and instrument panel were 
assembled and sold separately from the coachwork and the car body itself. At the time this constitute 
two different products with interrelated, but yet independent markets. As Liebowits and Margolis 
(2009) suggest, a car manufacturer that sold both as a unique product would have practiced a form of 
bundling. 
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bile example given above is an obvious case of this type of efficiencies. Craswell 
(1982) argues also that although customisation in the case of these efficiencies 
might still be possible, as time passes and the production process develops to em-
bed these production efficiencies, customization may become prohibitively expen-
sive. This is the phase, when, the bundle effectively becomes a separate product 
(Liebowits and Margolis, 2009). 
Efficiencies in product selection; when the information costs make it diffi-
cult for the buyer to make the selection of the complementary product or the seller 
can enjoy economies of scale or greater bargaining power in procurement, we can 
talk of efficiencies in product selection. This type of efficiencies is common when 
the seller has a better understanding of the operational or quality requirements of a 
bundled product as in some cases of franchising relations. Consider for example 
that a certain appliance functions better with certain products. The seller can tie 
the use of the appliance to the use of the product so that to ensure best perform-
ance of the appliance. This is also the case of logistics integration in the case of cus-
tomers that possess less understanding of the quality of a certain transport mode 
choice with respect of a third party logistics service provider (Acciaro and Hara-
lambides, 2007; EUR and SMU, 2006; 2007). Franchisors may tie the franchise 
together with certain specifications on the location or attributes of the premises 
where the product has to be sold. This is the result of a better understanding of the 
franchisor of the quality requirements of the product (Craswell, 1982). 
Efficiencies in product evaluation; Craswell argues that when a consumer 
purchases unbundled products from different producers, there might be circum-
stances in which he is able to assess the quality of the joint product but not the 
quality of the individual components. Think for example of software running on 
computer. As a consumer, it might be difficult to verify, in case the software does 
not perform as expected, whether the computer or the software is of poor quality. 
A more concrete example may involve a franchisee that makes use of low quality 
supplies. The franchisor may require the franchisee to make use of certain supplies 
in order to safeguard the quality of the franchised product. This is the case, for 
instance, of McDonalds restaurants that require in the franchise contract a large 
component of supplies, e.g. frying fat, potatoes, milkshakes, to be purchased di-
rectly by McDonalds-approved retailer.  
Efficiencies in allocating risk; these efficiencies arise when the seller and 
the buyer do not have full knowledge of the amount of product that needs to pur-
chased. A buyer might not know in advance how much the tying product will be 
used and how it will perform (for example, a new printer), but the amount of the 
tied product that is purchased will depend roughly on the amount of use the tying 
product receives (for example, ink cartridges). In such a case, both buyer and seller 
may prefer a sale of the tying product at a price that is below its cost, on condition 
that the buyer purchases the tied supplies at an above-market price. If the tying 
product turns out to be useless, not many supplies will be purchased, and the total 
  32 
amount the buyer will have paid will not be very much. Conversely, if the tying 
product turns out to be successful, then the buyer will purchase more supplies, re-
sulting in a larger total return for the seller. Such an arrangement thus shifts some 
of the risk as to the product's value from the buyer to the seller. 
 A further interesting point of the article of Craswell is that certain patterns of 
imperfect information may allow bundling to harm consumers. This can happen 
as tying does not represent a cost reduction but is the result of some market failure 
other than monopoly. In this case three non-exclusive explanations are provided: 
a) Fraud or surprise: the consumer is not entirely aware or does not completely 
understand the tying arrangement. This case manifests when the consumer does 
not have possibilities of estimating how much of the tied product he will need to 
consume, but he is unable to escape the bundle.  
b) Opportunism: In this case the consumer is forced to further purchase the tied 
product even if it was not aware of this requirement at the moment of the purchase 
of the tying product; this can be the case technology-based bundles. As an exam-
ple, Sony marketed a music portable player that converted all music formats in a 
unique format, the .oma that could only be read by Sony-technology-based devices. 
Users might have purchased the player attracted by the versatility and sharing 
possibilities of the digital music file, such as .mp3, but, as Sony had a direct interest 
in preserving the copyright of the music it sold, earlier versions of its digital music 
players would not allow file transfer; 
c) Lemons equilibria: in the previous two cases the buyer receives some element 
of surprise, but asymmetries in information can imply that buyers can be harmed 
even if they understand well the implications on the offer they are purchasing. This 
can happen because they do not posses full information in terms of prices and 
quality on options made available to them by competitors (Akerlof, 1970). 
In a more recent contribution by Evans and Salinger (2005), the authors sug-
gest that in those markets where competition results in setting market prices equal 
to average costs, bundling can emerge as a result of cost based reasons. Also in this 
contribution, price discrimination and strategic considerations are explicitly ex-
cluded from the analysis. The model allows for mixed bundling, and assumes that 
all product components are produced at fixed marginal costs, fixed costs do not 
change among the various product components, and that economies of scale in 
production characterise all markets as natural monopolies, so that only one firm 
produces in equilibrium. The model assumes free entry and contestability ensures 
zero profits. In their analysis they allow two costs saving mechanisms; marginal 
cost savings and fixed costs savings. Their analysis shows how industries with high 
fixed costs, or moderate fixed costs and limited demand for one of the components 
of the bundle, may benefit from bundling. 
In their model they assume three type of consumers, that prefer consuming 
only X, Y or a combination of both X and Y respectively. Demands are assumed 
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inelastic and uniformly distributed among the three classes of consumers. They 
assume five possible seller strategies:  
1. X and Y are sold separately; 
2. X and Y are sold as a bundle and individually (mixed bundling); 
3. X and Y are sold as a bundle only (pure bundling);  
4. X and Y are sold as a bundle and only X is made available separately; 
5. X and Y are sold as a bundle and only X is made available separately. 
In their discussions, options 2-5 are defined as bundling, while 3-5 as tying. The 
article offers the following conclusions. Marginal costs savings are neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for tying to occur in competitive markets. Fixed costs saving are 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for tying to rise in competitive markets. 
Pure bundling will occur either when fixed costs are high, or, if fixed costs are 
moderate, when consumers demand all components in the bundle and at least one 
of those products is demanded in small quantity. Mixed bundling will emerge 
when fixed costs are absent. Finally, firms will sell products in addition to the bun-
dle when demand for one component is high but it is low for the other (Evans and 
Salinger, 2005). 
In essence bundling will occur only if it generates fixed costs or variable costs 
savings. In particular if fixed costs are high enough13, then pure bundling is sus-
tainable. Mixed bundling is induced by a combination of fixed costs and variable 
costs savings. The major finding of the model is that firms may decide to eliminate 
certain configurations for two main reasons: i) They eliminate a choice because it 
saves costs and in turn lowers the price of the other offers; ii) they eliminate the 
choice because it is not profitable to offer that choice to the group of consumers 
that demand it (Evans and Salinger, 2005). The article concludes with examples of 
the empirical applicability of the findings in the following industries: over the 
counter cold remedies and pain relievers; foreign electrical adapters; optional 
equipment on automobiles. 
The article of Stremersch and Tellis (2002) points out that little research has 
been done to understand the role of costs in the optimality of bundling. They men-
tion that the relevance of costs for product and price bundling is related essentially 
to the relative contribution margin, given by the difference between price and 
variable costs divided by price, the existence of economies of scale and scope and 
the additivity of costs in the bundling process. They argue that price bundling is 
likely to be more profitable than unbundling when the relative contribution mar-
gin is higher and when economies of scale and scope are stronger. In addition they 
mention that if costs deriving form a product bundle are subadditive, this strategy 
is always superior to unbundling strategy irrespective of consumer reservation 
prices or the nature of competition. 
                                                
13 In the example provided in the article, higher than three times the total variable costs of producing 
the stand-alone product. 
  34 
McCormick, Shughart and Tollison (2006) provided an interesting applica-
tion of transfer pricing theory to bundling that suggests that bundling is equivalent 
to vertical integration in final consumption goods. The authors argue that if one of 
the products is provided at prices above marginal cost in the market, as a result of 
for example market power, consumers will be prompted to buy them in less than 
optimal quantities by substituting them with other products. This is the result of 
what is generally referred to as the Transfer Pricing Theorem (Hirshleifer, 1956). Let 
us assume for example that a certain transport corridor is entirely controlled by a 
provider, so that tariffs to exploit this route are maintained above marginal costs. 
Transport operators will avoid using this route and will develop alternatives that 
may be less efficient, so that the allocation of traffic flows through the fully mo-
nopolised route and the alternatives will be suboptimal. 
McCormick et al. (2006) suggest that assembling products in a bundle would 
overcome this type of distortions in the relative prices of the alternative routes, al-
though it would maintain the deadweight loss. The transport operator could pro-
vide an integrated route as a bundle and reallocate traffic on the fully monopolised 
route. They observe in essence that bundling has the potential of correcting distor-
tions in the combinations of final goods employed in household production, con-
tributing an additional efficiency rationale to the literature. 
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Once the importance of costs issues has been assessed, it might be worth discussing 
the role of bundling as a leveraging device in markets characterized by imperfect 
competition in one or both products. The difference with the traditional formula-
tion of the leverage theory is that in the case of a multiproduct monopolist, the 
leverage issue becomes relevant only in a dynamic setting (foreclosure). 
The literature on strategic bundling in imperfect competition is more limited 
and seems to point to two major directions. On the one side there are those, such 
as Carbajo, et al. (1990) and Chen (1997) that emphasize the reduction of aggres-
siveness in duopolistic competition, i.e. higher prices, and in general find that bun-
dling tends to decrease competition. This argument derives from the ability that 
bundling grants the firm to differentiate its product from rivals. In contrast with 
the article of Whinston (1990) previously discussed firm entry and exit decisions 
are unaffected by bundling. 
More specifically, in Carbajo et al. the monopolist in the primary good (X) 
market engages in Bertrand price competition with its rival that distributes an 
identical product in the complementary good (Y) market. Under the hypothesis of 
Bertrand competition in the duopoly market, bundling is always profitable. In fact, 
if the monopolist does not bundle, the products in the Y market are perfect substi-
tutes and then prices are driven down to unit cost. Through bundling, the mo-
nopolist is able to differentiate Y from the rival, so that both firms are no longer 
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such close competitors and so both are able to raise price above cost. In equilib-
rium consumers with high (low) reservation prices for both goods purchase the 
bundle (the individual item). The authors also argue that this is not the case if the 
duopoly market for the complementary product is characterised by Cournot com-
petition. 
The model presented by Chen (1997) is different than those discussed so far 
as it considers a situation of duopoly characterised by Bertrand competition in the 
primary market, where both firms produce an undifferentiated good X, and a 
situation of competition in the secondary market, where more firms are active in 
the production of good Y. The two goods are complements, but consumers are 
indifferent between the various firms. The basic argument of the paper though is 
very similar to the one developed by Carbajo et al. (1990), in the sense that bun-
dling allows the firm that practices it to differentiate product X from its rival and as 
a result also induces a less aggressive pricing policy. The equilibrium solution of 
the game where one firm sells pure bundles and the other firm does not, results is 
increased profitability for both firms. This is because consumers that highly value 
X (duopoly), will purchase it from the firm that does not engage in bundling; those 
that have a relatively high value for both X and Y, will purchase the bundle. 
Finally, those consumers that have high reservation prices for Y only will purchase 
it directly from the competitive market. 
The equilibrium prices in this model are higher than the prices when bun-
dling is not allowed, i.e. the price for Y is higher than Y’s marginal cost and the 
price for the bundle is higher than the linear sum of the marginal costs of produc-
ing Y and X. It is worth noting that the profits of the company that provides Y as a 
stand-alone product are higher than the profits of the firm that provides the bun-
dle. In general the game formulation proposed by Chen allows for multiple equi-
libria, where one of the two firms provides the bundle and the other does not and 
an equilibrium in mixed strategy. The mixed strategy outcome is less favourable to 
both firms, while in general the firms would always prefer to be the producer of the 
stand-alone product14. How the firms solve the coordination problem is not ad-
dressed in the paper (Kobayashi, 2005a). According to Chen (1997), the policies 
adopted by some credit card institutions to bundle their cards with other goods as 
rewards is an example of this type of tying. 
The analysis of Matutes and Rigibeau (1992) arrives at different conclusions. 
In their formulation, that represents an extension of a previous article (Matutes 
and Rigibeau, 1988), the authors consider two firms that produce two products 
each (X and Y). The firms have to decide whether to make their products compati-
ble with those of the competitor and whether to engage in bundling. The paper 
shows that when bundling is allowed, the competing duopolists have a strong in-
                                                
14 The firm that bundles is said to follow the “puppy dog” strategy of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). 
But as is well known in the literature, it is the firm who did not bundle that will profit more from it. 
  36 
centive to produce compatible products. The game though generates a prisoner 
dilemma situation, since by bundling and producing compatible goods, the firms 
earn lower profits than in the case in which both firms sold their products indi-
vidually. From this point of view both firms would be better off if they could agree 
not to bundle. Bundling tends to increase consumer welfare, decrease profits, and 
decrease overall welfare. For this reason the duopolists will opt for a strategy that 
does not allow integration of their product, de facto, although not explicitly, avoid-
ing mixed bundling. 
The findings of Matutes and Rigibeau (1992) are close to those of Econo-
mides (1993). This problem is structured as a two-stage game in a duopoly market 
for two complementary products X and Y, where in the first stage firm 1 and firm 2 
decide whether to bundle or not and in the second stage, set prices. Consumers 
can choose whether to buy both products as a bundle by the same firm, or opt for 
the unbundled components. It is assumed that all consumers purchase a unit of 
product X and a unit of product Y respectively and that they are characterized by 
different preference for the four resulting market options. The author shows that 
mixed bundling is a dominant strategy over no bundling and pure bundling. How-
ever, when the composite goods are not close substitutes, in equilibrium firm prof-
its are lower than in the no bundling case. 
The setting of Economides is similar to the one used by Tauman, Urbano 
and Watanabe (1997), Liao and Urbano (2002) and Liao and Tauman (2002), 
which provides also a literature review on the role of bundling in price competi-
tion. In these contributions, the strategic interactions between the two duopolists 
are described by a two-stage game, where in the first stage the firms decide on 
their bundling strategy and prices and then, in the second stage, consumers make 
their consumption selection. The authors show that in these circumstances bun-
dling strategies play a central role, since if the use of bundling is not allowed, equi-
librium may not exist. Bundling strategies are therefore important as a market sta-
bilization mechanism (Liao and Tauman, 2002). Another important point of the 
above-mentioned contributions (but also of Chioveanu, 2007), is that, contrarily to 
the findings of Chen (1997), Matutes and Rigibeau (1992), and to a certain extent 
Carbajo et al. (1990), for example, bundling in oligopoly results in welfare maximi-
sation. The article though shares with these contributions and others (e.g. Liao and 
Urbano, 2002) that firms may be better off when bundling is not permitted. In 
other words bundling stimulates inter-firm competition. 
The model structure and findings are closely related to those of Anderson 
and Leruth (1993). In this article bundling never results in equilibrium, since in 
duopoly firms fear the increase in competition that results from bundling. This is in 
clear contrast to the results of Carbajo et al. (1990) and Economides (1993), where 
the equilibrium is characterised by pure bundling, and to the results of the litera-
ture on multiproduct monopoly (e.g. Whinston, 1990), where mixed bundling em-
erges as dominant strategy. Firms wish to avoid mixed bundling in this model be-
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cause it means increasing competition, and they wish to avoid pure bundling be-
cause all discriminatory power would be lost. The pure components pricing equi-
librium arises as the intermediate case. For this to hold, though, firms must be able 
to commit to this strategy (Anderson and Leruth, 1993). It should be noted that the 
article of Anderson and Leruth explicitly excludes the existence of economies of 
scale and scope or any other cost efficiencies, limiting the applicability of these 
findings to price bundling only. 
In general it seems that the emergence of bundling as equilibrium in oli-
gopoly and the resulting welfare effects are controversial, independently of the 
level of market power enjoyed by the bundling firm. In some cases the results on 
firm profits are ambiguous (Krämer, 2007a; 2007b). In some models firms are 
worse off as a result of the practice of mixed bundling, as some of the games clearly 
present prisoner dilemma situations (Economides, 1993; Chioveanu, 2007). In 
other cases, the benefits deriving for firms from bundling are unequivocal (Chen, 
1997; Farrell, Monroe and Saloner, 1998; Nalebuff, 2000; Choi and Stefanadis, 
2001; 2006). 
In some of these contributions the results of the models are highly dependent 
on the hypothesis on consumer reservation price distributions. In general we can 
observe that for low values of consumer reservation prices, if products are com-
patible, firms tends to prefer mixed bundling. This causes profits to fall. If the firms 
have the capacity to foresee this outcome, they may try to prevent the possibility of 
mixed bundling by producing incompatible products, and therefore engaging in 
pure bundling. For moderate values, mixed bundling by one firm and no bundling 
by the other is an equilibrium for a wide range of moderate reservation prices. For 
high, or low values of consumer reservation prices, both firms will sell pure com-
ponents (Kobayashi, 2005b). Stremersch and Tellis (2002) show through simula-
tion that in competitive markets a mixed price bundling strategy dominates a pure 
price bundling strategy. A mixed product bundling strategy should be preferred to 
a pure product bundling strategy. The authors though argue that further state-
ments on the impact of competition on the optimality of other bundling strategies 
cannot yet be made. 
An interesting perspective on the discussion is provided by Krämer (2007a), 
who expands the role of (pure) bundling as a quality leverage device in oligopoly 
for non-complementary products. The model is based on a reciprocal duopoly set-
ting that results in the convergence of the communication and entertainment me-
dia service industries as a result of the development of digital cable transmission 
technologies. These services are offered by former telecommunication and cable 
monopolists, which sell them in a bundle—the so-called Triple Play package. The 
author considers a three-stage game in order to investigate whether bundling is 
indeed a profitable pricing strategy, if it can facilitate market power leverage and if 
it emerges as an equilibrium strategy. The game is structured as follows: in the first 
stage the firm decides whether to engage in bundling at all, in the second stage it 
  38 
decides on the quality of the services provided and in the last stage on the price. In 
this setting bundling functions as a leverage device, through quality sorting effects 
where firms need to protect themselves from price competition in the bundled 
market. The result of the game is that one firm emerges as a high profit and high 
quality provider in both markets, while the other firm needs to settle for low quali-
ties and low profits. 
In Krämer, the welfare effects of bundling are unambiguously positive, as 
prices fall and quality rises. This conclusion is in contrast with other findings, e.g. 
Carbajo et al. (1990), Chen (1997), Choi and Stefanadis (2001, 2006) and Choi 
(2008), where the welfare effects of bundling are negative. Nonetheless, Krämer 
indicates that the welfare results in the case of bundling need to be judged on a 
case-by-case basis especially accounting for the different market structures and dy-
namics. The is also the recommendation emerging from the reviews of Kobayashi 
(2005a), Kühn et al. (2005), Hahn (2006), Evans and Salinger (2005) and in more 
general terms on the impact of price discrimination of Armstrong (2008). 
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In section 2.5 the historical foundations of the leverage theory have been pre-
sented. In that framework a monopolist in one product could expand its profits by 
means of bundling. We discussed how this argument has been criticised in the lit-
erature and how, subsequently it has been revisited through the foreclosure argu-
ment in Whinston (1990), and Carlton and Waldman (2002) among others. The 
arguments of Carlton and Waldman provide an alternative, and to a certain extent 
complementary, formulation of the foreclosure argument. The role of bundling as 
a vehicle to deter entry in imperfectly competitive markets is important and de-
serves some further discussion. The intuitive idea is that an incumbent firm makes 
entrance for a rival more difficult in a market if it engages in a set of interlocked 
activities. This argument is presented informally also in the management literature 
by Porter, when he notes “positions built on systems of activities are far more sustainable 
than those built on individual activities” (Porter 1996, pg. 73).  
This idea is central in the articles of Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and Nalebuff 
(2004a). An incumbent seller of two products X and Y, faces the threat of entry by 
single-product rivals producing a perfect substitute to either product. An appropri-
ate bundling strategy can be an effective vehicle to deter entry into either market 
by raising the level of investment costs necessary to enter the market. A good ex-
ample is provided by carriers that invest in logistics and hinterland terminals. In 
this way they are able to secure a solid position in the hinterland since a potential 
competitor would have to invest not only in assets but also in know-how. If a com-
petitor would be interested in entering the market an acquisition or a joint-venture 
would be a more effective way, e.g. NOL merger with APL.  
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This holds also in case of the risks associated with R&D costs. Choi and Ste-
fanadis (2001) present as an example the case of bundling of Microsoft’s Windows 
operating system with Internet Explorer previously discussed. In this example 
Microsoft faces competition by Sun Microsystems in the operating system and 
Netscape and other web browsers in the Internet browser market.  
A similar example is the case of the merger between General Electric and 
Honeywell previously mentioned that was blocked by the European Commission 
in July 2001. The commission feared that the merged company could bundle its 
products in the aircrafts and avionics sector together preventing competitors, such 
as Pratt & Whitney and Rolls-Royce, in engines, or Rockwell Collins, in avionics, 
from introducing product improvements into their markets. In a more recent arti-
cle, Choi (2008) examines mergers in the context of a duopoly model. The effects 
of a merger are to allow (or lower the cost of) bundling. The welfare consequences 
of allowing the merger are the same to the welfare consequences of allowing bun-
dling. 
Also Nalebuff (2004a) shows that bundling is a particularly effective entry-
deterrent strategy. Bundling allows an incumbent to credibly defend its array of 
interlocked products without having to price low in any of them. Even if a one-
product rival enters the market, bundling mitigates the market impact of entry. 
Making use of simulation, Nalebuff (2004a) showed that the rival takes fewer cus-
tomers away, and prices do not fall significantly. As an example, Nalebuff points to 
the case of Microsoft’s Office applications Word and Excel and their counterparts 
in Corel’s Word Perfect and IBM’s Lotus 123, respectively.  By bundling Word 
and Excel as part of MS Office, Microsoft is able to use the near-monopoly status 
of one product to protect the near-monopoly status of other and vice versa and a 
potential entrant in only one component will find it hard to enter the market 
against an incumbent that sells the bundle at a discount.  
The models of Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Whinston (1990) and Carlton and 
Waldman (2002) assume that one of the firms enjoys a monopoly position in one of 
the markets and that the second market is characterised by competition. These 
assumptions are relaxed in a more recent article (Choi and Stefanadis, 2006) 
where, similarly to the setting proposed by Nalebuff (2004a), both markets are as-
sumed to be oligopolies. This is similar for example to the case of container termi-
nals and ocean carriers. The results of the literature discussed above would provide 
a strategic motivation to the phenomenon generally referred to as dedicated terminals 
(Haralambides, Cariou and Benacchio, 2002). A carrier that invests in a dedicated 
terminal facility, that for example enjoys a certain degree of geographical market 
power, would be able to extend it to the complementary market for ocean trans-
portation. 
The model of Choi and Stefanadis is interesting also because they distinguish 
between two different types of potential entrants.  On the one hand there are those 
rivals that face low marginal costs for both products produced by the incumbent 
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company, on the other hand there are those competitors that face low marginal 
costs only on one of the products. The former are called generalists, while the latter 
specialists. The specialists may enter the market only if the complementary product 
to the one they produce is available as a separate component. Through bundling, 
the incumbent can keep specialist innovators out of the market, effectively deter-
ring the introduction of innovations. Clearly the impact on consumer and total 
welfare is ominous. 
In large part of the literature (e.g. Porter, 1985; Lawless, 1991; Choi and Ste-
fanadis, 2001; 2006; Choi, 1996; 2003; 2004; Nalebuff 2004a), the effectiveness of 
bundling as an entry barrier is rooted in the degree of complementarity among the 
bundle components. This corresponds to improving the strategic positioning of a 
firm on the basis of enhanced buyer-seller relationship (Penttinen and Palmer, 
2007) and is why logistics and supply chain management has become so attractive 
and seemingly indispensable. In most of these papers bundling the product in a 
market with an upstream or downstream product acts as an effective entry deter-
rence as long as the products are complementary in consumption (Lewbel, 1985). 
Product complementarity was also at the core of the discussion on technology-
based or contract-based tying, and has come back as a critical issue in some of the 
recent antitrust legal case involving for example software manufacturers. It is 
therefore expedient now to address the issue more in detail. 
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Producing a good or getting it to a final consumer often entails more than one 
stage or component of production. These stages and components of production are 
often combined and coordinated to create bundles of complementary activities 
that result in what is often referred to in the literature as systems (Farrell, et al. 
1998). Efficiency, consumption and profit considerations influence the way the 
industry organises in order to manage these complementarities. On the one side, 
firms can compete on the final product (system) or alternative they can compete on 
the intermediate stages (components), or on both, systems and components. 
In the case of a multiproduct monopolist, this corresponds to the case pre-
sented by Stigler (1968), whose ideas can be traced back to Cournot’s discussion on 
the problem of double mark-up (Cournot, 1838) and have been generalised by 
Telser (1979). In the situation in which a monopolist produces two (or more) com-
plementary products and faces a set of customers that require the different compo-
nents in different but fixed proportions, the monopolist will find more profitable to 
sell some of the products as bundles. These bundles can be customised to the re-
quirements of the consumers and will result in higher level of profitability than that 
achievable under no bundling. The resulting mixed bundling strategy may entail 
that some of the products need be sold below marginal cost, but by doing so, it 
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would allow higher sales of the bundle or system with a net positive effect on the 
overall company profits.  
Farrell et al. (1998) extends this line of reasoning to a more competitive envi-
ronment. In their model the authors assume that a firm can pursue two different 
strategies without vertically integrating. It could either develop the administrative 
ability of providing an entire system, or can limit itself in providing the separate 
components. Competition on systems requires active managerial effort to coordinate 
the various complementary activities. Each firm has to closely co-operate with the 
others and in the end compete on the final system. In Farrell et al. this way of pro-
viding complementary products define a closed organisation, since only a selected 
group of firms can contribute an intermediate input. This is opposed to an open 
organisation, where firms produce system components in the hope that they can be 
combined ex post with those produced by other firms. Notice that in the former 
type of organisation closed operation does not imply vertical integration strictly 
speaking, as each firm maintains its legal or financial independence. 
These two models of organisation are at the base of a large set of examples. 
The most obvious refers to the computer industry, where until the 1980s the vari-
ous components of a computer system where produced by large integrated firms 
such as IBM. Since then the industry has evolved towards a more open organisa-
tion, where users and manufacturers are able to assemble a system with off-the-
shelve components, although variations from this tendency still exists. Another ex-
ample, probably more pertinent to this thesis, is of course that of logistics service 
providers. While in the eighties many providers had the tendency of offering only 
those logistics services they could provide in house, we observe the tendency of 
expanding the range of capabilities, aiming at extensive network coverage or tai-
lored logistics solutions, often relying on local or smaller suppliers. This possibility 
is granted by the standardisation of logistics interfaces, among which IT is the most 
relevant, allowing therefore closed organisations to become open. 
The article of Farrell et al. is particularly interesting, as it offers a broader 
view on the impact that the vertical organisation of an industry has on competi-
tion, far beyond the role of bundling. The authors show that competition can be 
less intense when firms are organised in a closed way, i.e. each firm has hand-in-
glove partners in a closed value chain and competes on systems more than individ-
ual components. For a large enough number of firms in the industry, closed Ber-
trand competition is less fierce than open Bertrand competition. Their model 
shows that although open organisations are in general socially more desirable, 
firms in most cases would prefer closed vertical organisation. This result differs 
from the foreclosure argument, since in profitability does not emerge as a conse-
quence of an increase in market power, but is the result of an increase in cost het-
erogeneity among firms. 
Notwithstanding the far-reaching implications of the paper of Farrell et al. yet 
limited literature has stemmed from its principal idea. The contribution of Arora 
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and Bokhari (2007) is worth mentioning. In this article the authors develop a 
model of industry evolution where firms decide on whether to adopt a certain 
common standard or develop their own proprietary standard. The trade off is 
clearly identified by the authors between the advantages provided by a ‘mixing 
and matching’ (Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 1986; Matutes and Rigibeau, 1988; Ec-
onomides, 1989) versus the reduction in transaction costs within the organisation. In 
the article they model the advantages of open systems as deriving not from the het-
erogeneity in consumer preference, but by allowing firms to draw different costs of 
producing the various components. Since being a low cost producer of multiple 
components is more difficult, open systems have the advantage that firms can spe-
cialize in the production of single components. 
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The discussion so far has focused on the implications of bundling as a vehicle to 
increase profit or sales, for consumers, for society by and large and in terms of 
market structures. We have shown that bundling is a pervasive business practice in 
a large number of industries and that its consequences and impacts are far from 
clear-cut. What has not been the objective of the analysis so far is how firms set up 
adequate bundling strategies and how consumers perceive bundles. There is a 
large amount of literature that aims at answering these questions. This is the litera-
ture that refers to marketing management and that will be reviewed in this and the 
following section. 
The marketing management literature has aimed at analysing two distinct, 
but inevitably overlapping streams of research. On the one side a large set of con-
tributions (Hanson and Martin, 1990; Eppen, et al. 1991; Guiltinan, 1987; Bakos 
and Brynjolfsson, 1999; 2000; Venkatesh and Mahajan, 1993; Ben-Akiva and 
Gershenfeld, 1998; Wübker and Mahajan, 1999; Stremersch and Tellis, 2002) fo-
cused on the analytical determination of optimal bundles. On the other side others 
(e.g. Yadav, 1994; Yadav and Monroe, 1993; Soman and Gourville, 2001; John-
son, Herrmann and Bauer, 1999) concentrated on consumer perceptions of bun-
dles.  
Eppen, et al. (1991) present seven strategic guidelines for the successful im-
plementation of bundling to a large extent based on the Hanson and Martin model 
discussed above. One general point the authors make refers to the fact that bundles 
act in markets as new products, but they are in general cheaper and less risky to 
create. They proceed with a set of guidelines for the use of bundles depending on 
whether the firm’s basic strategic position is low costs or differentiation. 
They identify the following rationales for bundling: 
 Cost efficiencies:  a) production efficiency bundling aims at promoting 
components that have high setup costs; b) margin spread bundling aims at 
pricing together products that deliver similar margins;  
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 Market expansion strategies: c) aggregation bundling aims at combin-
ing together different market segments, reducing product complexity and 
expanding sales; d) trade up bundling entails creating a product line that 
consists of a number of bundles that gradually include more items, so that 
this can lead consumers to increase the number of products bought in the 
bundle over time; e) in loyalty bundling, the seller tries to reduce consum-
ers incentives to sample in order to reduce the likelihood of a consumer 
switching to a competitor;  
 Bundling as a vehicle to improve product performance: f) Joint per-
formance bundling aims at increasing consumer satisfaction by bundling 
together products that tend to perform better if they are jointly used. This 
is often the result of asymmetries between producers and consumers on the 
functionality of the product; g) product definition bundling aims at simpli-
fying consumer selection especially for new products. 
At the end of the article, Eppen et al. also provide some guidelines on how to 
implement bundling in practice. The major obstacles in designing and pricing 
bundles, lies in the limitation in management’s ability to analyse the large number 
of possible bundles and to track consumer choice and response to them. In order 
to solve this problem they propose the use of conjoint analysis. A similar contribu-
tion is Green, Krieger and Agarwal (1991), who analysed how to design and bun-
dle services in order to gain market share in certain aggregate markets or market 
segments. 
The first contribution to provide a practical method for a single firm to de-
sign and price optimal bundles is Hanson and Martin (1990). The mode of Hanson 
and Martin is a liner programming formulation of the optimal bundling formation 
and pricing problem, where the objective function is the firm’s profit and the be-
haviour of the consumers as maximisers of their surplus is treated in the model as a 
constraint on the firm’s objective function. Fuerderer (1999), points out at some of 
the issues that are not considered in the model of Hanson and Martin. Firstly in 
the formulation, segmenting consumers on he basis of their reservation prices re-
sults in too many market segments. This can be simplified by clustering similar 
segments together and assigning a stochastic reservation price variable to each 
segment. Secondly, the model does not account for complementarity and substi-
tutability effects among bundles and components. Thirdly, the model has been 
developed for a multiproduct monopolist, but clearly in many applications, compe-
tition and strategic behaviour may play a crucial role in the determination of the 
optimality of the strategy. Finally the model does not account for the fixed costs 
that the firm will have to incur as a consequence of the introduction of the bundle. 
Venkatesh and Mahajan (1993), propose a probabilistic approach that would 
enable sellers to determine optimal prices in pure components, mixed bundling 
and pure bundling strategies. They use as an example a season ticket for various 
events and music performances. Consumer decisions were modelled as a function 
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of two variables: the time available to attend the performance and the reservation 
price for the performance. The distribution of reservation prices is assumed to fol-
low a specific probability distribution directly related to demand. On the basis of 
this they calculated price strategies that resulted from profit optimisation under 
each strategy. In this approach, respondents were requested to indicate their reser-
vation prices directly. This is clearly one of the disadvantages of the model. 
In a more recent article, Wübker and Mahajan (1999), propose the use of 
conjoint analysis to measure reservation prices in order to price bundles. Conjoint 
analysis is a marketing technique that allows educing consumer preferences for 
alternative sets of product attributes (Urban and Hauser, 1993). They compare the 
results of conjoint analysis based approaches with the results obtained by directly 
eliciting the reservation price in an application to the fast-food industry. In the 
model the bundle composition and its price are attributes in conjoint models. They 
observe that in general, consumers underestimate their reservation price for the 
bundle when asked directly. In addition the conjoint analysis leads to more realistic 
results because the price is not evaluated in isolation. This is argued to be the result 
of the ability of conjoint analysis to address trade-off issues more effectively. None-
theless, the model does not account for competition, and the application it does not 
allow for variations in the prices for all bundles and components at the same time. 
Since the formulation of Zufryden (1977) of a market share maximizing pro-
duct line as an integer programme, the problem of optimal product line design, i.e. 
the determination of what products to bring to the market, in the context of con-
joint analysis has generated an extensive literature. In general we can distinguish 
between approaches that assume deterministic preferences and those that assume 
stochastic preferences. Deterministic approaches are in general flexible enough to 
adapt to the variety of bundling problems. Unfortunately though, these ap-
proaches are often computationally intractable and objective functions are not 
concave (Fuerderer, 1999). In the article of Zufryden, the author suggests the selec-
tion of the product line directly from the idiosyncratic part-worth utility data ob-
tained by conjoint analysis. Similar approaches have been followed by Dobson and 
Kalish (1993), and Bauer, et al. (1994). Kohli and Sukumar (1990) present a 0-1 
integer formulation on how to structure product lines maximising share, buyer’s 
utility and seller’s profit. Classic non-linear programming problems for product 
line selection and pricing are NP-hard (Dobson and Kalish, 1988), therefore they 
proposed a dynamic programming heuristic that extends the results of Kohli and 
Krishnamurti (1987) for choosing a share maximizing single item. Other contribu-
tions (McBride and Zufryden, 1988; Green and Krieger, 1992) consider a finite 
reference set of candidate items from which they select the product line. Dobson 
and Kalish (1988) measure consumer’s utility in reservation prices and consumer 
choice behaviour by the obtained surplus.  They consider fixed and variable pro-
duction costs and propose heuristic to solve the resulting non-linear problem to 
maximise profit. 
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The second class of approaches makes use of stochastic choice models to rep-
resent consumer utility and segment consumers accordingly. Many contributions 
aimed at exploring the aggregate utility function. They assumed different func-
tional specifications: linear (Green, 1984), quadratic (Louviere and Woodworth, 
1983), logit (McFadden, 1974), probit (Daganzo 1979), maximum score (Manski 
1975) or Generalized Extreme Value (McFadden, 1980). In particular the multi-
nomial logit model (McFadden, 1986) has been particularly successful. Several 
authors (e.g. Kamakura and Russell, 1989; Allenby and Rossi, 1991) applied this 
model to product line design and pricing. Hanson and Martin (1994) present an 
interesting approach on how to maximise a non-concave profit function using a 
multinomial logit model. 
Lele (1992) points out that if customers do not have information about the 
components, bundling then can be priced as a new single product. For customers 
that do have some or full knowledge of the components, the bundle needs to be 
priced below the sum of the prices of the single components. Therefore bundling is 
profitable for the introduction of new products. Carlton and Perloff (2005) show 
that bundling is profitable in the case of consumer with heterogeneous demand15. 
Another contribution (Fuerderer, Huchzermeier and Schrage, 1999) presents 
an optimisation model for a single firm under uncertainty in reservation prices and 
consumer choice behaviour considering both volume dependent and variant-
dependent costs. The model allows also for assessing the optimality of pure bun-
dling versus mixed bundling. The authors also provide an application to the auto-
mobile industry. This is the first article that allows for uncertainty in reservation 
prices. The model though does not allow for a choice of several products or pro-
duct bundles within the same product line. Scale economies are also ignored. The 
solution is achieved by decomposing the stochastic bundling problem in an integer 
master problem and a non-linear sub-problem. 
A similar problem is discussed in Tönshoff, Fine and Huchzermeier (1999), 
with reference to the customisation of modular machine tools. In the early nineties 
countries such as Germany have been struck by economic downturn in the manu-
facturing industries for industrial machinery. This has forced firms to seek effi-
ciency and specialisation. A result of this strategy has been the development of 
modular manufacturing that has been widely adopted (Campagnolo and Camuffo, 
2009). The problem is connected with the literature on variety management (cfr. 
Tönshoff et al. 1999, for a selected literature review on the problem). The authors 
argue that bundling can potentially overcome some of the traditional setbacks of a 
mere modularization strategy as it can achieve cost reduction through standardisa-
tion of modules and consideration for demand risks, shorter delivery time as a con-
sequence of reduced complexity and customer differentiation through the use of 
add-on bundles. The models presented in the literature so far (e.g. Hanson and 
                                                
15 See Stremersch and Tellis (2002) for more detail. 
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Martin, 1990; and its generalisation Fuerderer, et al. 1999) aggregate customers in 
broad market segments. This approach is inappropriate for the machine tool in-
dustry as customers demand very specialised products, and sales, compared for 
example with the automobile industry, are relatively small. In addition machine 
tool manufacturers face very volatile demands, as they are positioned at the end of 
the supply chain (Tönshoff, et al. 1999). Customers are therefore treated in the arti-
cle as individuals facing uncertain demand for their own product. Tönshoff, et al. 
use a stochastic optimisation model that is fed by information on the conjoint an-
alysis provided exogenously (for a review of the literature on conjoint analysis see 
Green and Srinivasan, 1990). The model is structured in four sub-models each 
dealing with module design, module selection, bundle pricing and demand interac-
tions. 
An important question in the selection of bundling and customisation is at 
what point to stop (Ringbeck, Neumann and Comet, 1999). Competitive pressure 
forces manufacturers to maintain prices low and sustain quality, and as a conse-
quence new products are launched at shorter and shorter intervals. In the auto-
mobile industry product cycles have shrunk from eight to four years between 1980 
and 1995. This has gone hand in hand with increased customisation, facilitated by 
product modularity in production, bundling in marketing and IT. This resulted in 
companies targeting increasingly micro-markets. McKinsey has developed a con-
cept for successful micromarketing in which bundling plays a crucial role. In their 
example based on Lufthansa the authors explain how simulating customer re-
sponse can help a company penetrate micro-markets better. In the study, each 
flight is a product, where some flights can function as a transfer connection in a 
package of flights. The authors argue that in these applications, the costs of pro-
duct differentiation are to be made transparent through IT. This can be achieved 
through product configurations. The article of Volker Lingnau (1999) discusses the 
important issue of costs associated with variants. The article concludes that where 
a large number of variants are produced leads to costs increase in practically all 
areas of a company.  
A complete review of the conditions under which bundling is advisable is pre-
sented by Stremersch and Tellis (2002). In their article, the authors list and test 
through simulation twelve propositions on the optimality of bundling in different 
situations. These propositions result in the optimality of choices between pure and 
mixed bundling and pure components, product and price bundling on the basis of 
asymmetry and variation of the distribution of reservation prices. They argue that 
price bundling should be preferred over pure components when reservation prices 
are asymmetric. Product bundling always yields higher revenues than no bundling. 
Mixed product or price bundling should be preferred to pure price bundling when 
reservation prices vary across consumers. Combining product and price bundling 
is a better proposition than only product bundling for consumers whose reserva-
tion prices are asymmetric for the separate components and for the product and 
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price bundles. They summarise their conclusions on the ability of a firm to achieve 
its objectives through bundling, stating that market penetration objectives can be 
achieved equally well with pure price or product bundling than any other strategy. 
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The previous section discussed the approaches used to establish optimal combina-
tions of bundles in order to define a product line and a related marketing strategy 
for a firm. It has been shown that most of these techniques would require observa-
tion or assumptions on reservation prices of consumers. But constructing attractive 
bundle offers depends on more than an understanding of the distribution of con-
sumer reservation prices. Equally important is the process by which consumers 
evaluate bundles, or how bundling has been defined in the literature (e.g. Janiszew-
ski and Cunha, 2004), ‘framing of price information in a bundle offer’ (pg. 534). In parallel 
to the developments discussed in the previous paragraph, since the early 1990’s 
researchers have attempted at explaining consumers perception of bundling on the 
basis of several behavioural theories. Some researchers (Mazumdar and Jun, 1993; 
Kaicker, Bearden and Manning, 1995; Heath, Chatterjee and France, 1995; John-
son, et al. 1999; Janiszewski and Cuhna, 2004) have looked at consumers selection 
of bundles using prospect theory, proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), or 
the mental accounting theory developed by Thaler (1980). Prospect theory pro-
vides an alternative approach to consumer behaviour, other than expected utility, 
based on the evaluation of losses and gains (McDermott, Fawler and Smirnov 
2008; Post et al. 2008). Similarly, according to the mental accounting theory (Tha-
ler, 1980), the utility an individual receives or expects from a transaction (e.g. a 
purchase) is determined by the way the transaction is framed in the individual’s 
mind. 
The application to bundling can be traced back to the work of Thaler (1985; 
1999) that proposed that the overall utility of a transaction could be decomposed 
into acquisition utility or value and transaction utility (value). The acquisition value 
corresponds to the money the individual is willing to part with for physically ac-
quiring a product or ‘the value of the good received compared to the outlay’ (Thaler, 1985, 
pg. 205). The transaction value is the value that the consumer attaches to purchas-
ing the good at a price below its outlay, or in other word the satisfaction deriving 
from having made a bargain. The formulation proposed by Thaler referred to a 
single item transaction, but Yadav and Monroe (1993) extended this concept to 
transactions involving multiple items such as in the case of bundling. The work of 
Yadav seems to indicate that the acquisition utility depends on two evaluations: the 
processing of non-price information about the bundle items in order to calculate 
the value of what is received, and the processing of price information to calculate 
the sacrifice it represents. Some contributions (Yadav, 1994; Yadav and Monroe, 
1993; Suri and Monroe, 2003) analysed how consumers perceived transaction 
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value of the bundle is influenced by the magnitude of the savings offered directly or 
on individual items. Their findings imply that a discount offered on a bundle is 
perceived by buyers as having a greater impact than a discount offered on the 
bundle’s individual components (Wübker and Mahajan, 1999). 
These contributions as clearly summarised by Stremersch and Tellis (2002) in 
proposition 12 of their article already cited several times (pg. 69):  
For price information is optimal for companies to (a) integrate all prices 
information in a single bundle price rather than present it in a list of 
separate product prices and (b) spread the bundle discount in multiple 
savings rather than present it as a single saving. 
The rationale for this proposition is that a single bundle price lowers price 
sensitivity, since consumers tend to perceive aggregated losses less than multiple 
losses. As a consequence they tend to value a single bundle price more than one 
that sums the prices of the separate components.  
In general there is evidence that bundle prices and discounts are sensitive to 
the framing of the prices and discounts in the presentation of the offer. This leads 
to the discussion on the correct presentation of the bundle discount for example in 
contracts. In the case of shipping service contracts are the standard instrument that 
regulates carrier-shipper relations (Marlow and Nair, 2008). Although large parts 
of these contracts are standardised, they allow for flexibility in the pricing scheme 
to be applied, since they are confidential and do not need to follow published tariff 
rules. There is no study, to our knowledge, aiming at assessing the impact of offer 
presentation in service contracts.  
There is evidence that equivalent price savings on the overall bundle, or on 
one of the bundle components, or distributed among the individual components in 
the bundle can alter the perceived attractiveness of the offer (Heath, et al. 1995; 
Johnson, et al. 1999; Kaicker, et al. 1995; Mazumdar and Jun, 1993; Yadav, 1995; 
Yadav and Monroe, 1993). The contributions of Mazumdar and Jun (1993) and 
Kaiker at al. (1995), for example, seem to indicate that buyers prefer the bundle 
when the price(s) were higher than expected, while the individually priced alterna-
tive was preferred over the bundle when selling prices were lower than expected. 
Similarly, it has been shown that combining the price of the components in a sin-
gle bundle price can influence the attractiveness of the bundle offer (Chakravarti, et 
al. 2002; Drumwright, 1992; Johnson, et al. 1999; Yadav and Monroe, 1993). 
Yadav (1994; 1995) noted that the information that a buyer has to analyse 
even for simple bundles, might be significant and that it is likely that individuals 
will try to simplify the assessment process, by, for example, following a set of se-
quential evaluation steps. This step-by-step evaluation procedure has been ana-
lysed by Lopes (1982) and can be traced back already in the anchoring and ad-
justment heuristic discussed in Tversky and Kahneman (1982). It is suggested that 
in the evaluation of the bundle an arbitrary chosen reference point may substan-
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tially affect the perception of the savings for the bundle. Lopes argues that it is dur-
ing the selection process of this reference point (i.e. the anchor) that the evaluation 
process starts. Yadav and Monroe (1993) indicate that consumers are likely to start 
their assessment from the savings attainable in the bundle, and then move to the 
savings attainable in the separate components. 
In the process of adjusting their assessment from the anchor, some informa-
tion will be lost or considered irrelevant or less important in order to minimise the 
cognitive effort, suggesting that buyers will anchor to the most relevant piece of 
information and marginally adjust on the basis of aggregate evaluation of the re-
maining information (Lopes, 1982; Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1988). The an-
choring and adjustment approach has been further elaborated in Yadav (1994) in 
the context of bundling. The result of the two studies undertaken by the researcher 
show that consumers examine information in decreasing order of importance and, 
when if the anchor is properly selected, they would readily adjust the value of the 
bundle downwards. In case though the anchor was poor, the readiness to adjust 
upwards was considerably lower. Bundle complexity, expressed either by the num-
ber of bundle components or by the number of possible bundles, substantially low-
ered the level of adjustment. 
A similar effect is reported by Gaeth et al. (1991). In their article, the authors 
use the information integration theory to assess how consumers evaluate bundles. 
The Information integration theory proposed by Anderson (1981), postulates that 
consumers integrate several information sources to make a judgement through 
three functions: the valuation function, the integration function, and the response 
function. In this respect negative information tend to impact judgment more than 
positive information. Therefore, in the bundle evaluation it is easier to lower the 
value of the anchor, than to increase it (Gaeth, et al. 1991). This justified Yadav 
(1994) to conclude that consistent quality levels in a bundle proposition are im-
portant. 
The analysis is expanded in a recent article by Janiszewski and Cunha (2004). 
The authors show through six experiments that consumers subjectively value the 
components of the bundle and then sum these values to arrive at an overall evalu-
ation of the bundle. When price discounts are assigned to a bundle component, the 
value of these discounts are referent dependent, or in other words are based on a 
reference point rather than a general state of wealth. Price referents act as anchors 
on the value function for the value of a bundled product, and price reductions are 
viewed as movements along the value function. Note that the value function has 
diminishing marginal returns for gains (i.e., concavity) relative to a referent and 
increasing marginal costs for losses (i.e., convexity) relative to a referent (i.e., di-
minishing sensitivity), and is steeper for losses than it is for gains (i.e., loss aversion). 
Therefore a lower price with respect to a referent will have smaller impact than a 
higher price. 
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The behavioural evidence on the response of consumers to bundle discounts 
is not yet conclusive, nonetheless these contributions offer insight on the import-
ance of bundled offer presentations. Herrmann, Huber and Coulter (1997) provide 
an interesting expansion of the analysis. In their article the authors aim at assessing 
the impact of four key determinants of a bundling strategy: whether the bundle is 
pure or mixed, the number of components included in the bundle, the functional 
relation among the bundle components and the price discounts on the bundle in 
respect to the sum of the components in mixed bundling. They conducted two 
studies, one in the context of goods choice (a car purchase) and the other in the 
context of service choices (the purchase of automotive maintenance service pack-
age). The findings of the studies point at price discount and complementarity as 
key drivers of purchase intention. In general, a 20% price reduction results in the 
greatest purchase intention. The results indicate though that on average the inter-
actions between the discounts influence the likelihood of consumers to purchase. 
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The previous review provided a comprehensive summary of the extensive litera-
ture available in the context of bundling and tying. The contributions have been 
grouped around key themes, mirroring the attention that these themes have re-
ceived in the academia. It should be clear that, notwithstanding how pervasive the 
practice of bundling may be, a rigorous, coherent and far-reaching theory of bun-
dling encompassing all its implications for business and consumers is still missing. 
In particular, as far as the industrial organisation literature is concerned, 
authors primarily focused on the purpose that bundling might serve to multipro-
duct firms enjoying market power. Although this theory in the case of multipro-
duct monopoly is rather extensive—but, it should be noted, not yet conclusive—, 
only a handful of contributions have aimed at explaining the role that bundling 
might play in more complex market environments. Recent reformulations of the 
leverage theory in imperfect competition have seldom tried to assess the joint ef-
fects of bundling as a vehicle to increase market power, to differentiate consumers 
and provide costs efficiencies. With reference to the latter, with the exception of a 
few papers, no investigation has been directed on the influence that cost efficien-
cies, in the form of economies of scale and scope, and transaction costs reduction, 
accruing from bundling practices play in a strategic environment. Furthermore, 
the types of bundles used in the models are always rather fundamental, while in 
practice we observe a variety of bundle structures. 
Even in the case of firms with considerable market power, the understanding 
of the mechanisms through which bundling may harm consumers is limited, and 
evidence of the likelihood of bundling to hinder competition is far from conclusive. 
This is epitomised in the words of the United States brief as Amicus Curiae to the 
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Supreme Court in the case of M3 vs LePage’s in 2004 (Rubinfeld 2005, footnote 5, 
pg. 244): 
[A]lthough the business community and consumers would benefit from 
clear, objective guidance on the application of Section 2 to bundled re-
bates, … the United States submits that, at this juncture, it would be 
preferable to allow the case law and economic analysis to develop further 
and to await a case with a record better adapted to development of an 
appropriate standard.    
This point of view is supported by the literature reviews more eminently di-
rected to the assessment of bundling as an anticompetitive practice16. We can only 
associate with those authors in recognising the lack of conclusive evidence on the 
applicability of antitrust regulation to bundling. In particular, as noted by Kobaya-
shi (2005a), the majority of the advances on the competition front have been pri-
marily theoretical, with little or no empirical support other than Court rulings. Be-
sides, limited attention has been paid to identifying testable hypotheses and carry-
ing out empirical tests of the theories and their underlying assumptions.  
Considering the pervasiveness of bundling business practices, it is rather sur-
prising that no further attention has been paid to bundling in the case of monopo-
listic competition. The literature in this area is scant and results hardly compa-
rable. The results on overall welfare effects are controversial, although there seems 
to be accordance that mixed bundling increases consumer welfare. In particular 
the impact of bundling strategies on profit is not yet fully understood. Another 
point that requires further investigation is the impact of bundling commitment on 
welfare. The results so far seem to indicate that the ability of a firm to credibly 
commit to the provision of a bundle may critically influence the effectiveness of 
bundling in achieving its objectives. 
A further point of attention is that in most of the publications, bundling of 
goods or services has been treated identically. Commodities and services though 
may have very different characteristics, so that further characterisation of he pro-
duct typology can be relevant. So far, only the issues of complementarity and sub-
stitutability have received some attention. We can also mention the growing 
amount of contributions focusing on fixed and marginal costs characteristic of the 
production/provision of the product. The literature on marketing management 
can be very illustrative in this respect. 
Issues related to the reduction of transaction costs are also relevant in the de-
velopment and organisation of an industry. In particular the article presented by 
Farrell, Monroe and Saloner (1998) and their discussion on open and closed or-
ganisation could be a prolific area of investigation. This is somewhat related to the 
                                                
16 See for example the already cited reviews of Kobayashi (2005) and Kühn, et al. (2005). A discussion 
on the competition issues and bundling is presented in ch. 10. 
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article of McCormick et al. (2006), that indicates a new possible area of investiga-
tion in bundling. In particular, the considerations of McCormick et al. in reference 
to household production could be extended to include other production processes. 
This leads to a more general observation, that bundling has been analysed to a 
large extent as explaining a (final) consumer-firm transaction. Nevertheless, in 
many real instances—an example of which is full-line forcing, when a manufacturer 
forces a retailer to carry an entire line of products—it should be noted that bun-
dling takes place at an earlier stage of the production process, i.e. firm-firm trans-
actions or channel transactions. Consumers purchase choices and firm procure-
ment decisions are characterised in practice by very different motivations, pro-
cesses and rationales. It is therefore imperative to adapt this framework to the firm-
firm context, as bundling may have implications beyond the boundaries of a sec-
tor. 
Moreover, the quality sorting effect discussed by Krämer (2007a) could be a 
prolific direction for further research, in particular if investigated in its strategic 
implications. In this respect the only article so far make reference to pure bundling, 
while mixed bundling effects have been ignored. This analysis could be associated 
with the investigation of the role of bundling-related cost efficiencies in granting 
firms strategic advantages in bundling, previously mentioned. A further observa-
tion is also relevant for the industrial organisation literature. While the marketing 
management literature has widely referred to the corpus of investigations provided 
in the industrial organisation literature, rarely, the industrial organisation literature 
has referred to the results and recommendations provided in the marketing man-
agement publications. Further interaction between the two disciplines should be 
fruitful. 
As far as the marketing management literature is concerned, two major re-
search directions emerge clearly as urgent. Firstly, no clear, coherent framework 
on the determination of optimal bundles is available in the literature. Although the 
article of Stremersch and Tellis (2002) is an important contribution in this direc-
tion, they provide neither formal mathematical proof nor empirical validation of 
the propositions they present, nor an indication of the relative importance of con-
ditions for optimality. Limited literature has aimed at using the concepts of price 
and product bundling as defined by Stremersch and Tellis (2002). In particular 
product bundling has hardly been discussed. In our view this distinction is funda-
mental in correctly and clearly modelling bundling strategic effects. In their article 
they indicate several possible directions for research. No research has addressed 
the optimality either of product bundles, or of the combination of price and pro-
duct bundling. Furthermore, the literature has not addressed any goals of the firm 
other than profit or revenue maximisation. 
Secondly the literature on the perception of bundles by consumers is far than 
conclusive, although large amount of contributions have appeared in recent years. 
One of the areas still open for research deals understanding the reasons of the dif-
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ferent and sometimes contradicting results on why and how consumers’ perception 
of bundles differs in the various studies. Another direction where research could 
reveal to be prolific refers to the assessment and explanation of the cognitive effort 
involved in evaluating bundles or the relevance of discounts in bundles and bundle 
components. 
The ultimate aim of this literature review is to provide the theoretical under-
pinnings of the chapters that follow and a bridge between the broader research on 
bundling and the investigations, of a more applied nature, of the following chap-
ters. Accordingly, before concluding it is useful to briefly discuss the areas of re-
search in the industrial organisation and marketing management literature that 
could benefit from the scrutiny of the container transportation and logistics in-
dustries and that will be addressed partially in the rest of the study.  
It should be clear that the container transportation and the logistics sectors 
deal primarily with the provision of services provided as components of a supply 
chain and therefore to a large extent characterised by a high degree of comple-
mentarity. Although the issue of competition in the provision of these services is 
said to vary from market to market, empirical evidence is limited. In addition, the 
highly dynamic nature of the market for transportation and logistics services, and 
the high geographical difference, limit the validity of any study to a determined 
physical and temporal context, therefore it is simplistic to state that a specific seg-
ment of the chain is competitive as this highly depends on the location where the 
service is demanded and the time of reference. The temporal dimension in particu-
lar is relevant as the transportation, and even more the maritime transportation 
industries are characterised by pronounced cyclical fluctuations in price (freight 
rates) and demand. Phenomena of overcapacity or, on the other side congestion 
may influence substantially the competition nature of the supply chain components 
under analysis and, consequently, of the strategic desirability of bundling practices. 
A further interesting challenge in the application of the bundling concepts 
developed in theory refers to the specificity of consumer demand. If on the one 
side a large number of supply chain components is homogeneous in their nature—
warehousing and transportation in container being typical examples—the inte-
grated final collection of services demanded by every consumer as a supply chain, 
or part thereof, can be highly differentiated. In other words each consumer will 
demand different bundles. This is true not only in terms of actual differences 
among the services provided but also in terms of volume and quality. The issue of 
volume in particular is relevant as many of the services provided are characterised 
by indivisibilities in production, scale efficiencies and network effects, that may 
grant producers substantial volume-related savings. 
SMU and EUR (2008a; 2008b) note that an innovative integrator could 
quickly intervene in the chain in order to provide integrated services enjoying 
somehow the advantages of a multi-product monopolist as mentioned in theory in 
Telser (1979). In their argument they state that the integrator could reap econo-
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mies of scale and scope, especially when the individual component providers en-
gage in fierce competition, somehow creating a situation equivalent to having ac-
cess to constant returns to scale technologies for every component. This point, al-
though interesting, seems difficult to accept in reality, since the market for the in-
novative integrator operates virtually at no fixed costs, and therefore contestability 
is high. This is surely the case for logistics, as proven by the large number of 3PLs, 
forwarders, consolidators, etc. If cash on the table was available, it is difficult to 
justify why a producer of one or more of the individual components could not step 
up to the level of integrator. 
This leads to the interesting point on whether such a asset-based integrator 
would have advantages in providing the integrated service with respect to a asset-
light integrator. This problem can be reframed in the following terms if we con-
sider that the integrator, in essence, is the provider of another service, i.e. combin-
ing the supply chain components in a value delivery proposition for its customers. 
This issue can then associated with the more general problem of competition be-
tween vertically integrated firms with divergent fixed cost profiles. An interesting 
issue for further research is on whether one of the two would be in a better position 
to make use of bundling strategies and with what results and what consequences 
for consumers and society by and large. 
The issue is closely connected with the ability of an integrator to control 
transaction costs, not in absolute terms but in relation to the same ability of com-
petitors. The competitive advantage of the integrator, in the end, lies in its aptitude 
to control and reduce transaction costs deriving from the integration of the supply 
chain components at the benefit of its customers. In terms of management and 
optimality of the bundle, an additional point of discussion refers to the strategy that 
the integrator would have to pursue in terms of providing services independently 
or outsourcing them from third parties, in order to minimise transaction costs. 
This issue is related to the question that also Stremersch and Tellis (2002, pg. 71) 
formulate at the end of their article as ‘especially pressing: […] How can suppliers opti-
mally organise themselves to offer product bundles when they do not have competence in all products 
in the bundle?’ 
With reference to the marketing management literature, the analysis of the 
container transportation and logistics industries, may contribute on a variety of 
issues. First and foremost, the identification of optimal bundling strategies in the 
case of logistics is a new issue and it has hardly been discussed. Most of the litera-
ture (not part of this review) makes reference to supply chain management, where 
bundling as such has been the subject of limited investigation. Secondly, the study 
of the perception of bundles from the side of customers is virtually limited to inter-
nal company marketing investigations. Better understating of consumers percep-
tion of bundled offers could be crucial in determining the effectiveness of a bundle 
proposition.  
  55 
C 
	

2




C4A 
&,*'-,!'&
The importance of the global liner shipping industry cannot be overstressed. It is a 
well-known fact that without the development of containerisation and the liner 
shipping industry, globalisation could not have taken place the way we know it 
nowadays. Transport in fact is one of the four cornerstones of globalisation, to-
gether with telecommunications, trade liberalisation and international standardisa-
tion (Kumar and Hoffmann, 2002). The role of (global) transport networks in de-
termining the competitiveness of a country or an industry has been widely recog-
nised in the literature (see for example the often cited article of Krugman and 
Venables, 1995) and so has the influence that institutional agreements (or lack 
thereof) can have on the achievement of benefits of trade (Londoño, 2006). 
The economic characteristics of the liner shipping industry are bound to have 
an impact on the competitiveness of countries and on global production systems by 
and large (Haralambides, 2007). The crucial role of the liner shipping industry in 
the world economy has been the ground for the antitrust regulation exemption 
from which this sector has benefited in a large number of countries, and has al-
lowed for the existence of industry cartels—the so-called conferences—for decades 
(Jansson and Shneerson, 1987: pg 36). Although the conference system has been 
the subject of a harsh debate (see Haralambides, et al.  2003 and Sjostrom, 2004 for 
a review), which partially influenced the repeal of the conference exemption for 
trades from and to Europe in October 200817, it is widely recognised that the liner 
                                                
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 1419/2006 of 25 September 2006 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to mari-
time transport, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 as regards the extension of its scope to 
include cabotage and international tramp services. 
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shipping industry possesses some distinctive characteristics, which seem to require 
some form of self-regulation18 (Jansson and Shneerson, 1987; Haralambides, 
2007). 
It has been noted that as the value of the goods transported rises, the relative 
importance of transport costs with respect to the good delivery price decreases, 
while the value of transit time increases (Brooks, 2002a). In particular any change 
in liner shipping business practices that affects the quality of the service provided is 
likely to have also an impact on global supply chains and world production systems 
(Heaver, 2002a; 2002b). This is also the result of modern logistics systems where 
outsourcing and supply chain management concepts determine high degrees of 
interdependencies among the various stages of the chain (see for example Dubois, 
Hulthén and Pedersen, 2004). The development of bundling practices in liner 
shipping is therefore representative of the changes that are taking place and may 
contribute to reshape the industry (Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010). 
Although carriers have been providing intermodal services since the 1980s, it 
is only since the mid-1990s that the major shipping lines have set up logistics 
branches and given logistics activities a more central role in their group strategies 
(Midoro and Parola, 2006; Olivier, et al. 2007; Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007; 
Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010). As pointed out in these studies and already 
theoretically anticipated by Casson (1986), Henriksson, Chow and Heaver (1994), 
Frankel (1999b) and others, the interrelation between the maritime sector and lo-
gistics has become a necessity and it makes limited sense to discuss maritime con-
tainer transportation without considering a supply chain approach. 
The logistics industry though presents very different characteristics from the 
liner industry. It is in general characterised by a larger number of products and 
suppliers. If liner companies dominate the market on the sea leg of the supply 
chain, on the landside the scene is set by third-party logistics operators (3PL) who 
provide, coordinate and oversee land transportation, often extending their role to 
the ocean leg as well. The general tendency observed in the liner sector of an in-
creased participation in the provision of land based logistics services is counter-
acted by the practice of 3PLs of offering services as Non Vessel Operating Com-
mon Carriers (NVOCC). The borderline and the definition of the markets thus 
becomes somewhat blurred. 
The integration of maritime container transportation services and logistics is 
a fact and is likely to develop further. Logistics operators and shipping lines are 
already de facto providing product bundles or better service bundles, when they take 
                                                
18 See for example point (4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 246/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices between liner shipping companies (consortia), or the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) 
of 1998 or Federal Maritime Commission (1989). 
  57 
care of terminal handling, hinterland transportation, container services, etc. So 
that product bundling is not a new concept in container transportation. 
The industry general perception on integration is rather positive (EUR and 
SMU, 2006).  This of course represents the first step towards the possibility of pro-
viding integrated supply chain solutions under a single price, or in other words 
price bundles.  
This chapter aims at presenting the salient characteristics of the liner ship-
ping industry relevant for the purposes of the thesis. In doing so we will focus on 
pricing, cost determinants and sources of competitive advantage. Although liner 
shipping regulation will be the subject of a more extensive discussion in Chapter 
10, some critical issues will be introduced in the this chapter. In general in this 
chapter the perspective that will be adopted is that of strategic management, hop-
ing in this way to point at the benefits that can accrue to ocean carriers from bun-
dling. Although pricing and cost determinants will be discussed in detail, the real 
focus is more eminently on how shipping lines achieve (and maintain) competitive 
advantage. 
The chapter is structured in the following way. The next section presents an 
introduction on the basic concepts of liner shipping economics, namely: demand, 
supply and market structure. Section 3.3 zooms in the determinants of demand, 
while section 3.4 and 3.5 address costs and scale and scope economies. Section 3.6 
briefly introduces the port and terminal industries. This is followed by pricing and 
market structures in the liner and logistics industries. The following section dis-
cusses different forms of horizontal integration in the industry, such as alliances, 
consortia, mergers and acquisitions. Discussion on vertical integration along the 
supply chain follows in the section 3.10. The issues presented so far are reviewed 
and expanded in section 3.11 from the perspective on how ocean carriers achieve 
and maintain their competitive advantage. Section 3.12 summarises and con-
cludes. 
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A definition of liner shipping is given by Fayle in 1933: 
‘The liner service is a fleet of ships, with common ownership or manage-
ment, which provide a fixed service, at regular intervals, between named 
ports, and offer transport to any good in the catchment area served by 
those ports and ready for transit by their sailing dates. A fixed itinerary, 
inclusion in a regular service, or obligation to accept cargo from all 
comers and to sail, whether filled or not, on the date fixed by a published 
schedule are what distinguish the liner from the tramp’ (Fayle, 1933, p. 
253). 
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The two major differences observed with respect to tramp shipping lie in the 
fact that a large number of customers and parcel sizes requires a larger and more 
complex administrative overhead, mostly due to regularity and service network, 
and, secondly, the obligation to sail to a fixed schedule makes capacity even more 
inflexible and costs fixed. These differences may seem trivial but in reality have 
shaped liner shipping as a complex industry. Whereas tramp operators have the 
possibility of mitigating the imbalances between supply and demand by for exam-
ple laying up their most inefficient ships, liner operator are forced to respect their 
schedules (Stopford, 2002). In general capacity management is of paramount im-
portance for liner shipping (Brooks, Blundel and Bidgood, 1993). 
Container traffic has been growing close to 11 percent yearly in the period 
2004-2008, which represents one of the periods of highest growth in the sector 
ever observed19. This growth has come to a dramatic slow down in late 2008. A 
growth rate between 8 and 9 percent is considered20 to be a reasonable average 
demand growth in the long term. It is difficult nonetheless to estimate the conse-
quences of the world economic crisis on long-term forecasts, although there is good 
evidence that container demand tends to grow in general twice as fast as GDP 
(Drewry, 2009; Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2009). Container traffic presents 
large seasonal and cyclical patterns, with 10 to 20 percent shifts between the winter 
months and the summer months (Drewry, 2009) and cycles of 3 to 6 years on av-
erage although with large variations (Stopford, 2009). 
The peculiarity of the industry profile is attributable to the economic features 
of liner shipping, which, albeit not exclusive to this industry, imply that the sector 
is not characterised by perfectly competitive stable equilibria. In particular, the 
following traits are generally referred to as typical of liner shipping: 
 it is capital-intensive, not only as a result of the use of ships but also as the 
requirement of schedule regularity (Davies, et al. 1995);  
 supply is lagged by the long ship construction time and supply adjustments 
are difficult (OECD, 2002); 
 load factors are variable, with directional imbalances and cyclical and 
seasonal variations (Brooks, 2004); 
 this variability requires excess capacity that is another distinctive trait of 
the industry (Fusillo, 2003); 
 strategic excess capacity aiming at deter competitors’ entrance in certain 
markets exists in the industry (Fusillo, 2003); 
 inventories are not feasible (Sjostrom, 2004); 
 the resultant reserve capacity tempts firms to engage in discounted pricing 
when demand is not at the peak (Brooks, 2004); 
                                                
19 The data in this paragraph is loosely based on Drewry (2008). 
20 Ocean Shipping Consultants and Drewry Shipping Consultants among others. 9% growth rate is 
referred to as ‘Hercules law’, see for example Haralambides, et al. (2003). 
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 demand is relatively inelastic to price changes, therefore lower rates do not 
result in more demand, similarly to the airline industry (Davies, et al. 
1995); 
 economies of both scale and density, high fixed avoidable costs (Davies, et 
al. 1995) and network effects (Bergantino and Veenstra, 2002); 
 price discrimination can be an effective way to allocate these costs without 
depressing trade (Jansson and Shneerson, 1985; 1987; Sjostrom, 1992). 
 supply is indivisible, cannot be incremented to the margin, and changes in 
capacity can only take place in lumps (Davies et al. 1995). 
C4C %&
Demand for ocean transportation is a derived demand, its major determinant be-
ing seaborne trade (Stopford, 2002) and as such it is relatively inelastic to price 
changes (OECD, 2002). This, in conjunction to inelastic supply motivated by the 
lag between ordering and taking delivery of a new ship has been traditionally con-
sidered the cause of cycles in liner shipping (Stopford, 2009) and high variability in 
freight rates. It can be argued that the development of supply chain management 
concepts such as just-in-time (JIT) or materials requirements planning (MRP) may have 
increased the dependency of modern supply chain on timely and reliable transport, 
for which shippers might be prepared to pay a premium (Morash and Clinton, 
1997). 
Since transportation costs are estimated to count 2 to 4 percent of the final 
delivery price of the goods transported, while other logistics costs may reach up to 
one third (Brooks, 1995), it is obvious that the attention in the case of general cargo 
has shifted from price to quality (Liberatore and Miller, 1995; Murphy and Hall, 
1995). This is particularly true for containerised cargo and it is one of the major 
considerations that determine carrier strategic decisions, such as network planning 
(Notteboom, 2006). 
Ocean transportation is a constituent of the supply chain and customers per-
ceive the costs and benefits of transportation in the context of the business as a 
whole (Brooks and Fraser, 2001). The character of manufactured good transporta-
tion has changed dramatically in the last decades as a consequence of the glob-
alisation of production and consumption, and products may be moved several 
times before reaching the retail shelf or the assembly plant. This is definitely the 
result of lower real transportation costs, but also of the lower information and 
communication technologies (ICT) costs and the decreasing weight to volume ratio 
(Meersman and Van de Voorde, 2001).   
Increasingly qualitative factors are perceived as more important than price 
by shippers (Carbone and Gouvernal, 2007). A survey by Durvasula, Lysonski and 
Mehta (2000) of a sample of 221 Singapore-based companies, which make use of 
ocean transportation, indicates that shippers tend to highly value the ability of car-
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riers to deal with claims and complaints quickly and effectively. The problem 
solving ability of ocean carrier is a determinant factor in the shippers’ choice of the 
transport provider. Since time reliability, network coverage and service frequency 
are necessary requirement for all carriers, customer-service-related attributes be-
come decisive aspects in determining the competitiveness of a carrier.  
This trend is in general well accepted in theory. Stopford (1997, pg. 362) for 
example summarizes the major determinants of liner shipping demand in: 
 freight costs; 
 frequency of sailing;  
 transit time door-to-door; 
 reliability of timekeeping; 
 reliability of administration; 
 space availability. 
In general ocean transportation is considered a complement of other modes 
of transport since transportation chains rarely end in the port (Brooks and Fraser, 
2001; Panayides, 2007a; Haralambides, 2000). Ocean transportation alone faces 
no competition from other modes of transport for long distances, e.g transconti-
nental routes, as the low values of the elasticities of substitution seem to suggest 
(Oum, Waters and Yong, 1992). This is not necessarily the case for shorter dis-
tances, with short-sea shipping (SSS), barge, train or road being adequate substi-
tutes. When ocean transportation is considered as one of the many components of 
a supply chain, substitutability with other supply chains may become relevant 
(Notteboom and Merckx, 2006; Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2008). In this sense, a 
certain route, i.e. Singapore-Rotterdam, can be a (almost perfect) substitute in the 
supply chain with another route, i.e. Singapore-Hamburg, depending on the final 
destination of cargo. The issue has been analysed extensively in the perspective of 
port competition (see for example Robinson, 2002; Notteboom and Winkelmans, 
2001b and Heaver, et al. 2000 and the next paragraph). In order to serve as many 
supply chains as possible, ocean carriers will ideally call at several ports in the same 
region (Frémont, 2007; 2009), although the number of direct ports of call is ex-
pected to be reduced due to the growth in the vessel size (Cullinane and Khanna, 
1999; Gilman, 1999). 
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The liner shipping industry has developed very rapidly since the introduction of 
the container in 1956. At the basis of the container revolution there is the con-
tainer box, which allows for faster and cheaper handling, reduces damage and im-
proves the overall transport service (Notteboom and Rodrigue, 2008). The con-
tainer itself had appeared already in different shapes and sizes in the XIX century 
(Levinson, 2006). The importance of the box is due to the economic conditions of 
the Fifties and Sixties, namely the growth of post-fordist production processes and 
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international trade growth, that allowed for the exceptional growth in containeri-
sation of the past fifty yeas (Jessop, 1994). As pointed out by Brynjolfsson and Hitt 
(2000) in the context of IT, economics benefits arise not from the innovation itself, 
but from the organisational changes through which businesses reshape themselves 
to take advantage of the new technology. 
One of the most important developments necessary for the growth of con-
tainerised ocean traffic is the evolution of the cellular ship (Hayuth, 1987; Slack 
and Frémont, 2008). Cellular ships have substantially improved in terms of fuel 
consumption efficiency, speed and navigation safety, but most notably have con-
stantly grown in size and capacity from a couple of hundred TEUs of the first ves-
sels to over 13’000 TEUs of the last generation post-panamax container carriers21. 
This growth has important implications on ports, terminals and their hinterland 
but is bound to have even more determinative effects on the liner industry itself 
(Klein and Kyle, 1997; Fusillo, 2003) and is motivated by the economies of scale 
obtainable through large vessels (Cullinane and Khanna, 1999; 2000). 
Similarly to other shipping sectors, costs in liner shipping can be subdivided 
in capital costs, operating costs, voyage costs and cargo handling costs (Drewry 
2008; 2009). This is similar to the categorisation proposed in the literature (Gil-
man, 1985; Goss, 1985; Jansson and Shneerson, 1987: pg. 118 et passim; Stopford, 
2009: pg. 221), in capital costs, operating costs, voyage costs and cargo handling 
costs that this paragraph will follow22. 
Capital costs obviously depend on the newbuilding or chartered price of the 
ship, increase with interest rates and decrease with the economic life of the vessel 
(Benford, 1985). These costs highly depend on the structure that is used to finance 
the ship but in general consist of depreciation, interest payment and return on 
owner’s equity (Douglas, 1985). It should be noted that in many cases capacity has 
increasingly become available through institutional investors, thereby lowering the 
capital commitment necessary to enter the shipping business. Ocean carriers are in 
a position to charter capacity when needed from, for instance, KG funds. 
Operating costs consist mainly of labour costs, maintenance and repairs, 
stores and lubricants, insurance and other general costs (Heaver, 1985; Stopford, 
2009; Leader, 1985; Proctor, 1985; Köhn, 2008). Labour costs represent the high-
est cost item among the operating costs and are related to administrative personnel 
and personnel at sea (Moreby, 1985). The crew costs as a percentage of operating 
costs have been decreasing steadily in the last forty years, as a consequence of pro-
ductivity increases, the shift in the nationality of seafarers towards low wages 
countries, the development of labour-saving technologies and the development of 
                                                
21 See for example Wijnolst and Wergeland (2009) ch. 7, for a technical account of the growth in 
container vessel size. 
22 A detailed account and categorisation of container shipping costs is provided by Kru ger-Kopiske 
(2008). 
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the flag of convenience (FOC) system that allows ship owners to avoid the sophisti-
cation of the labour regulatory regimes of many maritime nations (ILO, 2004). 
The number of seafarers onboard a ship is decreasing, in spite of the increase in 
vessel size, with post-panamax container vessels requiring as little as between 15 to 
18 crew members (Wijnolst and Wergeland, 2009).  Nonetheless, the availability of 
seafarers is likely to become a bottleneck in the future with the majority of sea-
farers coming from developing countries and with increasing wage differentials. 
Voyage costs comprise essentially of fuel and diesel costs, port costs and canal 
dues (Stopford, 2009). Fuel costs are the most important single item of shipping 
costs, are highly volatile and dependent essentially on oil prices (Buxton, 1985). 
Fuel consumption has been reduced as a consequence of better vessel and engine 
design, consumption of lower grade fuels and sailing speed (Notteboom and 
Vernimmen, 2009). Variability in fuel costs is passed on to the shippers through a 
Bunker Adjustment Factor (BAF) on the freight rate (Cariou and Wolff, 2008) that 
will be discussed in the section on pricing. 
The remaining important items included in the voyage costs are canal dues, 
charged when a vessel transit a canal—most notably the Suez or Panama Canal—
or a waterway, and port costs. Port costs are a set of charges and levies on the ves-
sel or the cargo, that are due when a vessel makes use of a port or of the services it 
provides. These include pilotage, towage, mooring, docking and wharfage or sim-
ply the provision of basic port infrastructure, and vary substantially from port to 
port (Reid, Dally and Welard, 1978). Port charges depend on the charging policy 
of the port authority, vessel size, vessel type, time spent at port and the type of 
cargo loaded or unloaded (Button, 1979; Walters, 1975; Goss and Stevens, 2001). 
In liner shipping port dues and charges related to the vessel are paid by the ship-
owner, while the cargo owner pays all charges on the cargo (Branch, 1998: pg. 
203). In the specific case of cargo-handling charges, the stevedore pays a lease to 
the port authority out of the income deriving from the cargo handling activities. 
This income derives from the fees charged to the shipping lines, that will then 
transfer the cargo handling costs incurred to the cargo owner through a set of an-
cillary charges, referred to as Terminal Handling Charges (THC) (Fung et al. 
2003). 
The characteristics of the liner shipping industry require further clarification 
on costs. It is often argued that overheads and non-shipping related costs are sub-
stantial in liner shipping (Stopford, 2009: pg 231) especially if agency and other 
shore-based managerial and administrative activities are taken into account. Fol-
lowing the analysis of MergeGlobal Value Creation Initiative (2008b), they account 
for half of the total industry cost structure, or even more depending on the level of 
fuel costs. In particular liner shipping specific (operating) costs include: container 
management costs, shipment origination and routing costs (agency costs), as well 
costs related to inland delivery. Container management costs are the costs neces-
sary to acquire, maintain and operate a fleet of containers. Containers are part of 
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the equipment owned or leased by the carrier that need to be available in the right 
size and type where and when the shipper requires them. This comes along with 
the repositioning and empty management costs that, in an industry where margins 
can be extremely thin, may make a difference between successful and unsuccessful 
carriers.  
Considering modern industry practices, it is not possible to operate liner 
trades without the support of corporate department such as marketing and sales, 
human resources or strategic planning. In this sense liner shipping companies dif-
fer substantially from many bulk and tanker companies. 
A further important issue relates also to the more theoretical definition of 
output in liner shipping. If in general it can be argued that the output of shipping 
service provision as a production process is the amount of cargo a ship can trans-
port, a closer analysis reveals that this is not so simple. First of all the process of 
transporting cargo requires at least a complementary service, port handling, that is 
in general not directly performed by the ocean carrier. The effectiveness of deliver-
ing a certain service is therefore constrained by the terminal and port where the 
ship berths, more or less similarly to the way the effectiveness of road transport is 
affected by the quality and congestion of roads. 
Secondly, in the moment in which the service that is purchased is not pure 
port-to-port transportation, but, in view of the demands of shippers and the chan-
ges in business practice, becomes door-to-door transportation, the nature of the 
liner company is fundamentally changed, since then issues of hinterland congestion 
and hinterland costs become crucial. This becomes even more apparent when time 
considerations become relevant, since the service purchased by a shipper is not 
merely a port-to-port delivery, or a door-to-door delivery, but a door-to-door de-
livery within a specific time framework. 
This framework in theory can be generalised to the observation that what a 
container carrier is delivering to its customers is essentially value, by allowing them 
to change the spatial attributes of a product in the first place, but eventually also in 
other ways. In this value delivery framework, liner shipping becomes intrinsically dif-
ferent from bulk or general cargo shipping, and closer to airline transportation or 
freight forwarding. This is partially also the view of Robinson (2005), whose argu-
ments will be discussed further down in this chapter. 
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Source: MergeGlobal Value Creation Initiative 2008b. 
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Similar to other shipping sectors, the liner shipping industry enjoys economies of 
scale (EoS) deriving from the vessel size, the length of the haul and the size of the 
fleet (Jansson and Shneerson, 1978; 1985; Cullinane and Khanna, 1999; 2000). 
Particular attention has been paid to economies of scale and scope. These econo-
mies may be the result of various characteristics of the production process (Be-
sanko, Shanley and Dranove, 2007: pg. 78) such as fixed costs indivisibilities; pro-
ductivity increases due to specialisation; joint costs; construction economies; joint 
purchases and inventories, marketing, and R&D costs (Van de Voorde and 
Vaneslander, 2009).  
The major determinants of the vessel size economies of scale are the techni-
cal costs of building and operating a ship that grow less than proportionally than 
its carrying capacity (Jansson and Shneerson, 1987). The largest containerships 
carry 13,000 TEU with similar and larger ships to be delivered in the coming 
years. For over a decade now the maximum size of vessels is considered to be 
18,000 TEU, since larger ships would require two engines and would be con-
strained by the size of the Malacca Strait (Wijnolst, Scholtens and Waals, 1999). It 
is likely though that limitations on the ship sizes will come from the port sector, 
seeing that productivity increase constraints in ship handling are likely to offset the 
benefits obtainable from the growth in the ship size (Jansson and Shneerson, 1987). 
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Figure 1: Container shipping industry cost structure. 
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In addition is should be noted that EoS exist only when a certain level of uti-
lisation is achieved (Cullinane and Khanna, 1999). Given the non-storable nature 
of transportation services, all transport industries operate with a certain degree of 
excess capacity in order to meet fluctuations in demand that in manufacturing can 
be accommodated by means of inventories (Button, 1993). Excess capacity is a de-
fining trait also of ocean shipping and has been analysed extensively in the litera-
ture (e.g. Zerby and Conlon, 1978; Davies, 1983; Fusillo, 2003; 2004). The use of 
excess capacity as an entry deterrence or as a form of limit pricing has been the 
subject of a harsh debate (see for a review Fusillo, 2003) to which we will refer to in 
paragraph 3.7 and chapter 10. 
Although empirical work in this area is scarce (Button, 1993: pg.  74), ec-
onomies deriving from larger fleet size over a certain level seem to be less relevant 
in the industry (Jansson and Shneerson, 1985). Although a study of Tolofari, But-
ton and Pitfield (1986) found evidence of limited economies of fleet size (EoF) in 
the bulk sector, flagging out and the diversity of market conditions tend to make 
the assessment of EoF rather complex (Button, 1993). In addition, EoF are difficult 
to disentangle from economies of density (EoD) if they exist at all. 
At the basis of the Economies of Scope (EoSc) is the multi output nature of 
transportation services and tend to develop when there are costs savings in a sup-
plier producing a range of services rather than having a range of suppliers each 
specialising (Hensher and Brewer, 2001). EoSc are also present in liner shipping. 
They derive from the possibility of setting up networks and provide additional 
strings from a specific hub. The ability of shipping lines to provide integrated ser-
vices increases the potential for scope economies (Heaver, 2002b). Often in trans-
portation scope economies are not always present at all levels of output. EoD em-
erge when larger markets allow for higher load factors to be enjoyed, and therefore 
lower per unit costs. This is clearly the case for container transportation (Notte-
boom, 2004a). The combination of EoD and EoSc has been characterised by the 
development of the hub-and-spoke (H&S) operations (Brown, 1991). 
Network economies are present in liner shipping, since a carrier with better 
network coverage represents a better alternative for a shipper (Frémont, 2007). 
Although nowadays, with the development of global alliances, all major shipping 
lines virtually compete on all destinations, network coverage still represents one of 
the strategic decisions for the carrier (Bergantino and Veenstra, 2002; Ferrari, Pa-
rola and Benacchio, 2008). Network and service schedules remain one of the sour-
ces of competitive advantage for global carriers (Brooks and Fraser, 2001; Robin-
son, 2005). The existence of EoN is generally used as one of the major justifications 
of alliances (see paragraph 3.8) 
A possible further source of costs savings is related to the existence of econo-
mies of experience, or learning-by-doing cost advantages in the liner shipping in-
dustry. Learning-by-doing implies that firm specialisation increase over time as a 
consequence of the knowledge and experience it acquires by performing a certain 
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production activity (Arrow, 1967). Although to date no empirical survey exists in 
this sector, and limited analysis has been presented in transportation by and large 
(Button, 1993), it is to be expected that economies of experience might play an im-
portant role in ocean transportation. This role may even be greater when inte-
grated transportation is provided. 
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A crucial development that allowed the phenomenal growth of containerised 
ocean traffic in the last fifty years involved the port and terminal industry, that is 
the complementary necessary counterpart of the liner-shipping sector. A large 
amount of literature has focused on the port sector (see for example Pallis, Vit-
sounis and De Langen, 2010 for a review of the emerging distinct domain of Port 
Economics). The port represents the point of contact of the ship with its demand 
basin, and the demand of a certain area (hinterland) can only be channelled 
through the port (Rodrigue, Comtois and Slack, 2009; Notteboom, 2004a). Con-
sumers are located at various distances away from the port and may have the 
possibility of choosing among different ports if they are located in what is called 
contestable hinterland. Consumers who are obliged to make use of a port because dis-
tances between the demand location and the port are to great or transportation is 
too expensive are said to be located in the captive hinterland of the port (De Langen, 
2007). The extension of the captive hinterland has decreased especially in those 
areas of the world that show a high degree of supply chain integration (Hara-
lambides, 2002). 
The relation between ports and shipping lines, albeit symbiotic, has generally 
been characterised by arm’s length negotiation, where competition among ports 
for throughput has tended to favour shipping lines against port authorities (Slack, 
1993; 2001). Ports have been investing heavily in new infrastructure in the attempt 
to capture a bigger share of (transhipment) container traffic (Acciaro, 2003; 2006c) 
and as a consequence of the increasing size of vessels (Cullinane and Khanna, 
1999; Peters, 2001). In the last decades, as pointed out, for example, by Hara-
lambides (2004), port authorities and governments have attempted to boost termi-
nal productivity, since they realise that for carriers to benefit from economies of 
scale, it is necessary that ports meet the efficiency requirements of larger vessels. 
The effects on ports of the changes in the structure of the liner industry deriv-
ing from larger vessels, concentration and trade rationalisation are deep and multi-
faceted, and it seems clear that competition for acquiring and maintaining hub 
status will increase (Rimmer, 1998; Acciaro, 2006b; 2006c). Intense port competi-
tion, the fear of congestion and the complexity of port planning process, have also 
resulted in an extensive expansion investment programme in all major ports in the 
world. It is often perceived in fact that only those ports that are in a position to 
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offer capacity and accommodate larger vessels will surge to the role of global hubs 
(Gilman and Williams, 1976; Baird, 2002).  
Although the development of strategic alliances among competing ports en-
visaged for example by Frankel (1996) seems unlikely at least among port in differ-
ent countries, ports are actively pursuing collaboration along the supply chain. 
Cooperation agreements with transport service providers in forms of joint ventures 
or public private partnerships (PPP) are common and are aiming at increasing ac-
cessibility and maintaining centrality in transport and distribution networks 
(Heaver, et al. 2000; Van der Horst and De Langen, 2008). This centrality is also 
essential for ports to realise their development potential (Acciaro, 2005; 2008a), 
and policy makers should aim at port hinterland accessibility if their objective is to 
foster regional development (Acciaro, 2006a). 
Consolidation and internationalisation trends are visible in the terminal in-
dustry, where large global operators as part of industrial conglomerates, such a 
Hutchinson Port Holdings (HPH) or container transportation groups (APM Ter-
minals) have taken the stage next to internationalised port authorities, such as PSA 
and DP World (Acciaro, 2004; 2008b; Midoro, Musso and Parola, 2005; Olivier, et 
al. 2007). 
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Probably one of the most debated issues in liner shipping, the antitrust exemptions 
granted to it has become a less relevant issue since the repeal of Council Regula-
tion 4056/86 in Europe in 2008 and the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) of 
1998 (Benacchio, Ferrari and Musso, 2007; Brooks, 2000; Marlow and Nair, 
2008). Although collective pricing is still allowed in some region of the world, the 
prohibition for trades to and from Europe and the de facto irrelevance of the con-
ference rate in trades to and from the USA has substantially reduced the import-
ance of such agreements. Ocean transportation pricing is the result of negotiations 
between carriers and shippers on terms that are essentially confidential and reflect 
market conditions (Marlow and Nair, 2008). 
Given the importance of the topic, it is expedient nonetheless to briefly out-
line the pricing mechanisms that determined ocean container transport tariffs for 
over forty years and that was inherited from the general cargo liner tariff setting 
structures that dominated trades before the advent of containerisation: the confer-
ence system (see Jennings 1980 for an historical review). Conferences are price-
setting cooperative schemes among carriers aimed at the limitation of price compe-
tition and at the setting of rates at ‘minimum common denominator’. The most 
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often cited formal definition23 is provided in the first chapter of the UNCTAD Code 
of Conduct for Liner Conferences (UNCTAD, 1974; Malinowski, 1974): 
[A conference is] a group of tow or more vessel-operating carriers which 
provides international liner services for carriage f cargo on a particular 
route or routes within specified geographical limits and which has an 
agreement or arrangement, whatever its nature, within this framework of 
which they operate under uniform or common freight rates and any other 
agreed conditions with respect to the provision of liner services. 
The major rationale for the existence of conferences was allowing an inter-
organisation structure able to control destructive competition, reduce price varia-
bility, and allow sustainable services in the long run to the benefit of shippers (Ha-
ralambides, 2007). Since the 1980s though the market share of conferences has 
declined and conference membership in many jurisdictions eroded (Brooks, 2000). 
The reasons for this change are manifold, and will be dealt with more in detail in 
chapter 10, nonetheless they refer to: change in industry structure, the increasing 
use of confidential contracts outside of the conference regulation (independent ac-
tion), the increase in the importance of alliances and consortia (Haralambides, 
2004; 2007). 
A relatively large portion of liner shipping economics literature has focused 
on the industry structure, although empirical studies are scant. In a recent article 
Christa Sys (2009) calculates and compares the market shares of major container 
carriers and alliances of carriers as shares of total capacity available on major ship-
ping routes. Her conclusions show that, if we consider capacity as a proxy of out-
put, the liner shipping industry is organised as an oligopoly. The degree of oli-
gopoly is dependent on the trade route, but in general it has increased, although at 
decreasing rates. However, it would be interesting to evaluate how much of the 
available capacity is actually employed at various points in time. With large 
amounts of newly built capacity coming into the market and decreasing vessel utili-
sation rates, a high capacity share would not necessarily imply a higher market 
share in terms of TEUs carried. This is the major conclusion of Lam, Yap and 
Cullinane (2000) who observe that notwithstanding the increase in concentration, 
the industry is still contestable. 
The theory of contestable markets has been applied in liner shipping in the 
attempt of assessing liner conferences’ market power (Davies, 1986a; 1986b). Since 
liner shipping markets typically involve a relatively limited number of firms provid-
                                                
23 Another often cited definition is due to Daniel Marx Jr: ‘[Conferences are]…agreements organised by ship-
ping lines to restrict or eliminate competition, to regulate and rationalise sailing schedules and ports of call, and occa-
sionally to arrange for the pooling of cargo, freight monies or net earnings. They generally control prices, i.e. freight rates 
and passenger fares. The nature of their organisation varies considerably, depending on the market structure of the trade 
route. Some have been conferences quite literally -informal oral conferences- but many have employed written agreements 
establishing a permanent body with a chairman or secretary, and containing carefully described rights and obligations of 
the conference membership...’ (Marx, 1953). 
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ing a fairly homogenous product fear of abuse of market power has characterised 
early discussions24 (among others Deakin and Seward, 1973; Bryan, 1974; Heaver, 
1972; 1973a; 1973b; Shneerson, 1976; Jansson and Shneerson, 1987). As clearly 
outlined by Haralambides (2000) two factors were discussed as crucial in the ex-
planation of conference freight rates: unit values and stowage factors. The signifi-
cance of the former versus the latter would imply existence of market power versus 
cost-based competition, therefore demonstrating the allegation that conference 
would abuse market power. 
Particularly crucial in these discussions was the existence of barriers to entry 
in the industry (Franck and Bunel, 1991). Drawing on the extensive literature on 
the theory of contestable markets proposed by Baumol (1982), barriers to entry 
were perceived to be relatively high due to the high fixed costs of ships. Davies and 
others (Davies, 1984; 1986a; 1986b; 1988; Jankowski and Davies, 1989; Zerby, 
1988) argued that contestability in the industry was ensured by access to the same 
technology be potential entrants and low sunk costs, since ships could be easily di-
verted and reemployed on other routes among other arguments. In addition it can 
be argued that the increase tonnage made available by institutional investors has 
somewhat lowered the barrier to entry in the market (Haralambides, 2007). 
Franck and Bunel (1991) observed that although some of these considerations 
are undeniable, contractual obligations and the necessity of liner companies to 
maintain network coverage might reduce contestability. In any case, the authors 
conclude that even when contestability is not ensured, conferences were unable to 
limit competition from, for example, large independent carriers. 
More recent studies (Reitzes and Sheran, 2002; Brooks and Button, 2006; 
Lam, et al. 2007; Fusillo, 2006; 2009; Ferrari, et al. 2008) moved away from the 
theory of contestable markets and aimed at assessing the degree of competition in 
the industry in the absence of effectively functioning conferences. Although conclu-
sive evidence is lacking, these studies seem to indicate the overall tendency of the 
industry towards concentration, mostly as a consequence of economies of scope, 
density and network. The increase of cartel enforcement costs that followed 
OSRA, although benefiting shippers through efficiency gains, might favour larger 
carriers, better apt to exploit economies of network and scale (Reitzes and Sheran, 
2002; Fusillo, 2006). In particular when demand conditions become unfavourable, 
there seem to be evidence of increasing M&A activity, therefore raising the fear of 
increase industry concentration (Fusillo, 2009; Benacchio, et al. 2007). Lam et al. 
2007 nonetheless argue using data up to 2003, that consolidation does not seem 
necessarily to grant carriers the possibility of exploiting market power, and high-
lights, similarly to Haralambides, et al. (2003), the necessity of a mechanisms able 
to ensure price stability.  
                                                
24 See Haralambides (2007) and Sjostrom (2004) for a review. 
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Similar conclusions arise from the theory of the core proposed in general by 
Telser (1978; 1987; 1994; 1996) and applied to liner shipping in search for a for-
mally-rigorous theoretical support to the argument of destructive competition by 
Sjostrom (1989; 1993), Pirrong (1992), Davies, et al. (1995) and Jenkins (1996). The 
theory of the core is based on cooperative game theory and derives from a simple 
basic consideration: an increase in capacity by entry of a firm cannot take place 
below a certain level (integer problem) since avoidable fixed costs would make en-
try below a certain capacity level unprofitable (Sjostrom, 1993). This can happen if 
there are EOS and capacity constraints, since transporting an additional unit of 
cargo reduces average costs up to the level of full capacity. This implies that a sup-
plier has incentives to attract demand in order to reduce average costs. The impos-
sibility of demand to perfectly match supply implies high instability of prices (or 
core emptiness). 
The implication of the existence of an empty core are that shippers would 
gain from cooperation among carriers, who would have no or limited incentive to 
undercut the agreement. Contrarily to a cartel model where both shippers and 
carriers would have advantages deriving from deviation from the agreement (read 
conference). Three major empirical contributions aimed at testing the theory of 
the core: Sjostrom (1989), Pirrong (1992) and, albeit indirectly, Haralambides, et al. 
(2003) in what is generally know as Erasmus Report (Marlow and Nair, 2006). Sjos-
trom (1989) shows that output increases when conferences’ market share is higher 
and that conferences are more dominant when demand variability is higher. Pir-
rong (1992) proves declining average costs over a substantial range of outputs that 
can be considered as proof of the relevance in liner shipping of the integer prob-
lem. 
Although not specifically aiming at testing the theory of the core, the Erasmus 
Report shows that rather than adhering to conference rate structures, individual 
carriers tend to cut prices and cause instability in pricing (Haralambides, et al. 
2003). Their results suggest also that the larger the imbalance between supply and 
demand the higher the freight rate, which subsequently may be regarded as evi-
dence of collusive price setting behaviour. The authors observe though that market 
concentration is not positively related to freight rates, while excess capacity is. This 
leads to the conclusion, in line with Clyde and Reitzes (1995), that conference 
market share is unimportant in the level of freight rates (or even dampen it), while 
industry concentration could exert a positive influence via tacit collusion. This is in 
line with the overall thesis conclusion that the relevance on the debate on confer-
ences had been fading away in view of the fact that nowadays 80-90% of general 
cargo traffic is carried under service contracts (Haralambides, et al. 2003). 
Further insight on the market structure and consequent pricing strategies 
for ocean carriers can be obtained from the extensive debate on price discrimina-
tion in liner shipping (Heaver, 1973a; 1973b; Bryan, 1974; Jansson and Shneerson, 
1987; Sjostrom, 1992). Originally aimed at substantiating claims of abuse of mar-
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ket power by liner conferences, acting as price fixing cartels and therefore able to 
effectively discriminate prices (Heaver, 1972; 1973a; 1973b; Bryan, 1974), this re-
search may be read as an indication of the potential offered by price discrimination 
in the liner shipping industry. Ocean carriers price discriminate because the large 
element of fixed common costs requires carriers to price discriminate in order to 
survive (Jansson and Shneerson, 1987: pg. 79; Sjostrom, 1992). Price discrimina-
tion is therefore a mechanism that allows sustainability in liner shipping, similarly 
to what happen in the airline industry and consistently with price discrimination 
models in monopolistic competition (see for example Borenstein and Rose, 1994; 
Stavins, 2001; Giaume and Guillou, 2004).  
Although containers come in different sizes and types and may have different 
transportation requirements—refrigerated containers need electricity, containers 
carrying hazardous materials need special handling, etc.—containerisation has 
transformed ocean shipping in a relatively standardised process. Further possibili-
ties to differentiate service provision exist as a result of route densities, cargo, cus-
tomers, shipment time sensitivity, dangerous cargo, risk and security issues. It is to 
be expected that shippers with larger volumes will be treated differently than ship-
pers with only a few containers, and some shippers may have logistics require-
ments or may be shipping time sensitive cargo, thus implicitly differentiating 
among the various containers. Furthermore the development of supply chain com-
petition has allowed carriers to further differentiate an otherwise relatively homo-
geneous product. 
The claim that carriers and conferences were able to discriminate among 
shippers or ‘charge what the market can bear’ as a result of market power, may 
have had some substantiation before containerisation, when competition on cer-
tain routes was thin and cargo types required different handling (Hummels, 
Lugovsky and Skiba, 2009), but most of the empirical test in the literature on the 
topic is unconvincing (Sjostrom, 1992). Containerisation in addition is likely to re-
duce the traditional practice of price discrimination on the basis of the treatment of 
different goods according to their particular characteristics (Haralambides, 2000). 
When price discrimination can be observed among routes (Hummels, et al. 2009), 
it is likely to be the result of Ramsey pricing in the attempt to cover fixed costs for 
routes where traffics are too thin (OECD/ITF, 2009). In these circumstances con-
testability seems to ensure that market power is not abused (OECD/ITF, 2009). 
In the past, a certain degree of geographical segmentation could also be ob-
served in the liner shipping markets, with Japanese carriers such as MOL and 
NYK serving Japan and the Far East, American carriers such as APL taking care 
of traffics to and from the USA and European carriers, such as Maersk or Nedl-
loyd entrusted with trades to and from Europe. The increasing focus on global 
network coverage and the development of strategic alliances have expanded the 
geographical focus of carriers, even if some still retain better control of certain re-
gions for historical reasons (Parola and Veenstra, 2008). In a globalised industry 
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such as liner shipping discrimination on the basis of geography seem therefore less 
and less viable. 
The ability of carriers to differentiate their services on the basis of quality, al-
though not explicitly addressed, has been investigated in the context of conferences 
by (Devanney, Livanos and Stewart, 1975; Fox, 1992; 1994; Haralambides, 2007). 
Both Devanney, et al. (1975) and Fox (1994) propose an oligopoly model where 
increase cartel (read conference) membership would lead to increase in price but 
also in quality of services. Given the higher importance of quality aspects relatively 
to price in liner shipping, the authors suggests that conferences have been instru-
mental in increasing industry quality levels. Although these contributions explicitly 
focused on conference, their discussion on competition among carriers on the 
quality of service highlights the relevance of quality issues in container transporta-
tion. The authors indicate that the main variable in this respect is speed: some con-
ference members are simply able to offer quicker services or, in case of difficult 
circumstances such as congestion in ports and bad weather, are better able to 
maintain sailing schedules. Haralmbides (2007) expands the analysis and suggest 
the following quality variables: the provision of information and EDI systems; lo-
gistical services; better coordination and integration with inland transport com-
panies; ownership of terminals and equipment; frequency of service; geographical 
coverage and efficient response to the particular requirements of customers. Al-
though price differentials seem to be positive correlated with quality variables such 
as schedule integrity and carrier reliability, limited empirical testing of the ability 
of carriers to price discriminate on quality variables has been provided so far (Not-
teboom, 2006; Saldanha, Russell and Tyworth, 2006; Chen, Chang and Lai, 
2009). 
Although container transportation between two locations within a specific 
time frame can be considered a homogenous service, this is not necessarily the case 
when the supply chain to which the container belongs to is taken into account 
(Lyridis, et al. 2005; Wong, Yan and Bamford, 2008). This is because each ship-
ment then becomes virtually a different product, and as such costs and shipper’s 
willingness to pay may differ. No systematic attempts have been made to test this 
hypothesis so far although reference to this issues are implicitly present in the lit-
erature, e.g. in Brooks (1985); Wong, et al. (2008); Notteboom and Rodrigue, 
(2008). 
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Pricing in the logistics industry has been characterised by a relatively high level of 
freedom in the price stipulation (Jané and de Ochoa, 2007). However, the overall 
complexity of logistic contracts and the specificity of many service provision 
agreements, that sometime prevent the determination of initial prices have created 
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a set of price mechanisms that although not limited to logistics pricing are particu-
larly common in this industry. These pricing mechanisms can be grouped into two 
families: fixed remuneration systems and variable remuneration systems (Jané and 
de Ochoa, 2007). 
Fixed remuneration systems are the most widely used. In fixed remuneration 
systems the customer firm agrees to pay the logistics service provider (LSP) a fixed 
amount for providing logistics services based on the pricing model agreed in the 
contract. This pricing model is in general either transactional pricing or activity-
based costing. In transactional pricing, also referred to as unit pricing, the cus-
tomer pays a fixed flat fee per unit of work. The unit of work is contractually de-
fined and can be the number of pallets or boxes loaded, or more in general the 
number of units of cargo moved, the weight of the cargo transported, the amount 
of space used in the warehouse, measured for example in shelve space, or square 
or cubic meters, or the number of order prepared. This depends clearly on the ty-
pology of services provided by the LSP in the specific contract. 
A second pricing model is called activity-based costing and is structured as a 
two-part tariff. The customer company agrees to pay a flat fee aiming at covering 
the LSP fixed costs such as leases, equipment or management, on top of which a 
variable component is added, ideally aiming at covering the variable cost compo-
nent of the service provided, e.g. labour costs, fuel and maintenance. This system 
tends to adhere better to the costs structure of the LSP and allows more competi-
tive pricing. In general contracts based on fixed remuneration systems will include 
a revision clause that leads to standard yearly tariff renegotiations. 
Variable remuneration systems do not involved the payment of a fixed 
amount and are generally referred to as cost-plus pricing mechanisms or open 
book. The tariff consists of the costs incurred by the LSP on top of which the cus-
tomer firms pays a mark-up or profit margin agreed upon in the contract. The cus-
tomer firm is allowed to audit the invoices for the services offered by the LSP, and 
therefore has to be granted access to the LSP account, that for this purpose will 
keep separate registration of the expenses incurred for each and every customer. 
The profit margin is generally set as a percentage of the costs incurred in the oper-
ation. Variable remuneration pricing is generally used when the contractual as-
signment is bound to change in nature, such us when a new service is launched or 
a company is starting new operations. 
The main advantage of cost-plus pricing is that the LSP is guaranteed a fixed 
level of pricing and the customer firm can enact some control on costs and reduce 
the fees that would arise with transactional pricing. In addition to the technical 
difficulties related to how to apportion joint costs and other issues of an accounting 
nature, cost-plus pricing does not encourage cost reduction, since the profits are 
calculated as a fixed percentage of costs incurred. This type of pricing scheme is as 
a consequence not viable in long-term transactions unless a gain-sharing clause is 
added in the outsourcing contract. 
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Gain sharing clauses are in principle independent from the type of pricing 
scheme that is agreed upon, and allow for both parties to benefit from the optimi-
sation of the logistics chain or system and works as an incentive for both the cus-
tomer firm and the LSP to keep costs down, improve processes, IT and technology 
and in general increase supply chain performance. 
Recent literature has investigated the possibilities offered by more complex 
forms of pricing in freight transportation and logistics outsourcing. Talluri and 
Van Ryzin (2004) for example refer to freight transportation as a natural candidate 
for revenue management methods, and indeed just in time manufacturing pro-
cesses and other supply chain concepts facilitate freight product differentiation. In 
particular they list some characteristics of freight transportation as relevant in the 
process of differentiation of freight products such as service level requirements (dif-
ferent sensitivity to delivery time and service reliability), customer relations and 
customer types. It seems that all large freight companies have implemented some 
forms of revenue management systems. However revenue management is not yet 
widely practiced in freight although its potential is significant. Often low-value 
demand fills up the weight limits of a ship or a truck before the volume limit is 
reached. This results in high value demand being rejected since low-value custom-
ers tend to appear before high-value ones, similarly to what happens in the airline 
industry (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004). 
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Given the economic characteristics of liner shipping presented by, for example, 
Davies, et al. (1995) and described above, it is not surprising that the industry has 
shown a tendency towards consolidation (Fusillo, 2009). This has taken the form 
of: 
 M&A;  
 Horizontal forms of cooperation such as alliances and consortia; 
 Vertical forms of cooperation. 
Since the beginning of the 20th century, M&A have been a recurring trend in 
liner shipping, with a marked increase since the late 80’s (Fusillo, 2009). Although 
not always successful, the announcements of mergers or acquisitions have always 
attracted a great deal of attention of authorities, general public and the industry. 
The acquisition of Sealand by the AP Møller-Mærsk Group was the subject of 
large media debate in 1999, and so was a few years later the acquisition by the 
same group of P&O Nedlloyd. The take over by the Singapore-based group NOL 
of American President Line in 1997 also raised a large public debate on the legiti-
macy of this large-scale integration and fear of abuse of market power. 
Since the important article of Williamson (1968), it has been shown that small 
cost savings can be sufficient to offset a price increase due to the merger, in what 
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generally is referred to as the Williamson Trade-off. This cost reduction can be justi-
fied by efficiency increase, scale economies, synergy creation and scope economies 
(Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; Andrade and Stafford, 2001; Golbe and White, 1988). 
Increase of market power has been also listed among the reasons of merges, al-
though there is little empirical evidence that market power actually increases as a 
consequence of mergers (White, 2002). 
Although generally welcomed by the stock market also in liner shipping 
(Panayides and Gong, 2002), the results of mergers are diverse, and not necessarily 
beneficial for the merging firms (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, pg. 22). Van de 
Voorde and Vaneslander (2009) report that the attractiveness of an M&A in liner 
shipping depends on the benefits of scale and scope obtainable from integration. In 
the case of the merges of Nedloyd and P&O in 1996 and P&O Nedlloyd and 
Maersk Sealand in 2005, scope benefit exploitation and cost reduction were a 
stated objective of the merger (Van de Voorde and Vaneslander, 2009). It can be 
argued though that these objectives were not met in the first case and partially met 
in the second (Van de Voorde and Vaneslander, 2009). Substantial market share 
increase also does not seem to be observable in the case of liner shipping (Van de 
Voorde and Vaneslander (2009) somewhat in contradistinction with the results of 
Sys (2009).  
Sjostrom (2004) observes that the erosion of conference membership has 
been accompanied by an increase in M&A. Referring to anecdotic evidence ad-
vanced by Trace (2002) the author, albeit not explicitly, suggests a negative corre-
lation between the decline of conference and M&A. This claim emerges implicitly 
also from the study of Sys (2009) and is systematically tested in a recent study by 
Fusillo (2009) based on US data, that indicates that the probability of mergers and 
acquisitions tend to increase when regulatory regimes that favour industry cooper-
ation are altered. Fusillo shows that OSRA has been inadvertently instrumental in 
the growth of M&A activity in the US market, although the effects of regulatory 
shocks cannot be disentangled from the effects of the new regulation. The author 
also argues that when demand conditions are unfavourable, indicated by decrease 
of freight rate levels and increase in idle capacity, mergers are more likely to occur 
(Fusillo, 2009). Particularly interesting is the observation that increases in excess 
capacity tend to destabilise the competitive environment and increase the attrac-
tiveness of M&A. 
The issue of excess capacity has been tackled by carriers also through co-
operation agreements that go under the name of consortia and alliances25. Liner con-
sortia have been used next to conferences with the objective of rationalising ca-
pacity utilisation since the 70’s (Farthing, 1993: p.109-110; Clarke, 1997; OECD, 
                                                
25 Alliances and consortia are operational agreements among carriers aiming at allowing the provi-
sion of a better service by increasing service frequencies and the number of vessels used in the trade 
string. Consortia are agreements among conference members while alliances do not require member-
ship to a conference (Sjostrom, 2004). The two terms are often used interchangeably.  
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2001, p.18). Strategic alliances have grown in significance since the 1990s (OECD, 
2001) and aim at route rationalisation with the objective of reducing risk, invest-
ment and costs, exploiting EOS, and increase service frequencies (Midoro and 
Pitto, 2000; Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999; 2000). Bergantino and Veenstra 
(2002) highlight the importance of EOD and EON, while Evangelista and Mor-
villo (1999) advance the hypothesis that alliances are a response of carriers to the 
demand for better supply chain coordination. Unlike conferences, neither consor-
tia nor alliances engage in joint tariff setting and alliances tend to have a broader 
geographical scope (Sjostrom, 2004). Some authors (Midoro and Pitto, 2000; 
Sheppard and Seidman, 2001; Haralambides, 2007) suggest that alliances are one 
of the responses of the decreasing role of conferences in the industry. 
Sheppard and Seidman (2001) explain that the increasing importance of alli-
ances is motivated by the demand of shippers for global coverage, limit the costs of 
trade imbalances and rationalise schedules. They list the following benefits to alli-
ance members: 
 The ability to provide a seamless service equivalent to the service of a sin-
gle carrier; 
 The ability to expand service coverage cheaply; 
 Increase revenues and reduce costs through productivity improvements; 
 Offset losses on a market with rate increases on other markets; 
 Gain market share by diverting cargo from other carriers; 
 Improve service quality. 
The first alliance was created in 1994 by APL, OOCL, MOL and Nedloyd 
and was named Global Alliance. The second alliance was the Grand Alliance and 
it was formed by Hapag-Lloyd, NOL, NYK and P&OCL, the third was the for-
mation of alliance (consortia) between Maersk and Sea-Land and the forth alliance 
was formed from DSR-Senator and Cho-Yang. The number of alliances has re-
duced and their membership changed as a consequence of M&A activity in the 
industry. Of the seven alliances existing in 2004 only three large alliances remain 
today: the Grand Alliance, the CHKY Alliance and the new World Alliance. After 
the withdrawal of P&O Nedlloyd in February 2006, the ‘new’ Grand Alliance was 
formed by Hapag-Lloyd (that acquired CP Ships), MISC (only for the Europe–
Asia route), NYK and OOCL. The CHKY alliance includes COSCO, Hanjin 
that has merged in the meanwhile with Senator, K-Line and Yang Ming. The 
New World Alliance comprises of APL/NOL, Hyundai and MOL. 
Only in the last decade the liner shipping economics literature has started to 
investigate the phenomenon of alliances (Ryoo and Thanopoulou, 1999; Tha-
nopoulou, Ryoo and Lee, 1999; Evangelista and Morvillo, 1999; Song and Panay-
ides, 2002; Midoro and Pitto, 2000; Sheppard and Seidman, 2001). The emphasis 
of alliances with respect to consortia, lies in the fact that the original aim of consor-
tia was to supplement the price fixing function of a conference (Breitzmann, 1991) 
while alliances seems to have a broader scope of cooperation (Evangelista and 
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Morvillo, 1999). Although from the study of Evangelista and Morvillo26 (1999) it 
emerges that the function of alliances is mostly limited to ocean slot sharing 
agreements, the authors point out the existence of alliance agreements that go be-
yond the sea leg of transportation to include rail and other transportation services. 
One of the interesting aspects of alliances is that they seem to be rather un-
stable agreements (Midoro and Pitto, 2000), where the composition of alliance 
changes on the background of M&A activities and competition among alliances, 
alliance members and independent carriers, often referred to as soloists. The appli-
cation of the theory of the core to the strategic nature of alliance composition theo-
retically confirms this claim (Song and Panayides, 2002). From their analysis it em-
erges that alliances are the only way carriers can effectively compete with larger 
operators. 
In addition to providing an extensive overview of the legal background of al-
liances, Sheppard and Seidman (2001) also list some possible factors determining 
the future of alliances: consolidation; vessel efficiency and transhipment; US regu-
latory priorities; and online exchanges. Consolidation seems to be the natural step 
when an alliance is successful—see for example the case of Maersk and Sealand—
although the authors so not conclude that the existence of alliances have an impact 
on increase M&A. The increase in vessel size seems also to strengthen the role of 
alliances, even if, we could argue, the benefits of alliances can be obtained through 
M&A. The US regulatory framework is unlikely to be affected in the short term 
and the more extensive scrutiny from FMC anticipated in the article does not seem 
to have materialised. Nonetheless, the repeal of conference antitrust exemption 
and the review of the consortia regulation in Europe are definitely likely to in-
crease regulatory examination on these types of agreements. Finally the impact of 
online exchange does not seem to be of substance in the industry so far, notwith-
standing the proliferation of on-line container booking and monitoring initiatives, 
but it is bound to influence the business in the years to come (Stopford, 2002). 
C4A@ 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The liner shipping industry presents various forms of vertical integration. We ob-
serve upstream vertical integration in the production activities linked to the provi-
sion of ocean transportation, such as containers production and shipbuilding, and 
downstream integration along the supply chain, with activities such as terminal 
handling, hinterland transportation, freight forwarding, distribution and other lo-
gistics activities. We range from companies like Maersk Line27, that produces its 
                                                
26 Please note that the term alliance is used by the author to include broader forms of cooperation, 
such as joint venturers, slot sharing agreements, etc. 
27 Note that the AP Møller Mærsk, Maersk Line’s parent company, is a large diversified industrial 
conglomerate active in energy production, shipbuilding, shipping, transportation, logistics and distri-
bution, and controls various retail chains and supermarkets in Scandinavia. 
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own vessels and containers and runs its own terminals and trains, to companies like 
MSC, whose involvement in logistics is limited to some joint ventures with termi-
nal operators (Frémont, 2009). 
Table 6: Main logistics branches of ocean carriers’ groups. 
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Although carriers have been providing intermodal services since the 1980s, it 
is only since the mid-1990s that the major shipping lines have set up logistics 
branches and given logistics activities a more central role in their group strategies, 
as recently surveyed by Midoro and Parola (2006) and Frémont (2009). Contain-
erization (Hayuth, 1987; 1992), the advances of ICT (Evangelista, 2005) and the 
centrality of ocean transportation in global supply chains (Rao and Young, 1994), 
have offered shipping lines the possibility to engage in the provision of additional 
logistics services in addition to ocean transportation. The opportunities offered by 
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this new form of business have been rapidly embraced by all major carriers (Mi-
doro and Parola, 2006), that recognise the importance of providing integrated ser-
vices (Heaver, 2005), and door-to-door rates, as opposed to port-to-port rates, have be-
come common in the industry (Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007). 
The reasons behind the decision of carriers to step into the logistics sector 
may be connected to the increasing shippers’ demand of integrated supply chain 
services, the desire to product differentiate in the attempt to stabilise revenues or 
better control the market (Heaver, 2002b). 
The increasing demand of cargo owners for integrated logistics solutions lies 
in the renewed importance of JIT deliveries, control over inventory costs and the 
reduction of uncertainty in the supply chain that are a precondition for a successful 
global distribution and production strategy (Brooks, 2000; Cullinane, 2004; Evan-
gelista and Morvillo, 1999). Cargo owners that have strong relations with a carrier 
may naturally prefer the shipping line to walk the extra mile instead of having to 
involve other parties. 
Logistics may have also offered the opportunity to carriers to product differ-
entiate and price discriminate (see paragraph 3.7). In addition logistics may repre-
sent an alternative source of revenues when the freight rates are at their low, allow-
ing a sort of revenue portfolio management within the group (Heaver, 2002b; Ha-
ralambides and Acciaro, 2010). Many companies have invested in parallel activi-
ties, in other shipping sectors or other businesses. This is believed to allow a better 
control of demand and reduce revenue volatility in the liner branch of the com-
pany or group. 
Finally, a further reason is the attempt to better control the market by tying 
ocean transportation customers also in the upstream and downstream logistics ser-
vices. This may increase the switching costs for shippers and work as a deterrent 
for competitors, rising entry barriers (Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010). 
The integration efforts however have been met with varying degrees of suc-
cess (Frémont 2009). The various challenges imposed on carriers by the combina-
tion of ocean transportation with the services of a logistics provider can be summa-
rised, not exhaustively, as (Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010): 
 the strategic and operational difficulties deriving from the joint provision 
of two intrinsically different services: ocean transportation, characterised 
by large assets, tight cost control and in general a business focus on asset 
use maximisation, and logistics, typically asset-light, highly competitive 
and with a distinctive focus on customer demands; 
 the sceptical and suspicious shippers requiring cost break downs and more 
transparency; 
 the complications generated by the unusual situation of integrated carriers 
competing with global freight forwarders, de facto some of their major cus-
tomers. 
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Notwithstanding some uncertainties and the aforementioned difficulties in 
providing ocean transportation within the logistics chain as an integrated service, 
the general perception of the industry seems positive, also encouraged by the suc-
cessful examples of some leading carriers, such as Maersk and NOL/APL. 
With the exception of some recent contributions (e.g. Frémont, 2009), litera-
ture on vertical integration in shipping has been scant and descriptive, rarely in-
cluding in the analysis of carriers’ strategic decisions, the role of freight forwarders, 
the economic drivers of vertical integration and the possible outcomes for shippers 
and society by and large. This lack of scientific output on the topic could be justi-
fied by the limited availability of data and by a certain resistance, on behalf of the 
carriers, to disclose information perceived as commercially sensitive.  
Even if first seminal contributions may be traced back to the 70’s, the first 
structured approach to frame ocean transportation in a more complex (vertical) 
transportation chain appeared in Casson (1986). The author concluded that verti-
cal integration is clearly a trend in the shipping industry since carriers could enjoy 
substantial costs advantages when investing in terminals and hinterland transporta-
tion. Casson also argues that some of these advantages can be obtainable by means 
of contractual arrangements (i.e. outsourcing) and do not necessary call for vertical 
integration. As clearly discussed by Heaver (2002b), even if shipping lines are in-
creasingly becoming vertically integrated, the management of logistics services re-
mains distinct from the management of shipping. This has also been observed in a 
survey conducted by Frémont (2009): even if a large number of shipping lines pro-
vide logistics services, they are in most cases neither priced nor offered in conjunc-
tion with ocean transportation. 
It seems that the forecast of Frankel (1999a) that integration in the supply 
chain would become in the long term the only viable strategy for ocean carriers, 
has not yet been realised. More recent contributions (Heaver 2002a; 2002b; 2005; 
Evangelista, 2005; Frémont, 2009), although recognising the crucial impact of 
integration strategies on ocean carriers and shippers, are more cautious and stress 
the fact that integration along the supply chain raises a set of controversial issues. 
First and foremost the perception of liner shipping customers that may prefer to 
deal with independent logistic service providers (Heaver, 2002a). Secondly are is-
sues related to the different managerial focus of ocean transportation and logistics 
service provision: costs control for the former and customer service for the latter 
(Frémont, 2009). To those we could add that empirically the claims for the cost 
advantages deriving from vertical integration have not yet been tested. 
An important example of vertical integration is represented by the joint pro-
vision of ocean transportation and terminal operations in the phenomenon de-
scribed as dedicated terminals (Haralambides, et al. 2002; Acciaro, 2009b). The 
provision of transport together with terminal operations is the first and easiest form 
of vertical integration in the shipping industry (Parola and Musso, 2007). Soppé, 
Parola and Frémont (2009) present a detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of 
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dedicated terminals for ocean carriers and the implications for port authorities. 
Haralambides et al. (2002) identify as a major driver behind the development of 
dedicated container terminals the greater flexibility, reliability, short turnaround 
times and enhanced efficiency in the management of the global chain. These ad-
vantages though did not seem to be enough to prevent the recent cases of con-
tainer terminal participation sales that took place in the past year. Whether these 
are the results of conscious strategic decisions or of the need for immediate cash 
relief is difficult to assess at this stage (Hailey, 2009). 
Downturn or not, some fundamental reasons to vertically integrate are 
bound to remain important. In the end, one of the fundamental theoretical argu-
ments presented in support of vertical integration refers to the technical econo-
mies, of which vertical economies and economies of diversification are typical ex-
amples (Shepherd, 1997: p. 152). Most of the literature on integration along the 
supply chain in general refers to some forms of cost advantages attainable through 
vertical integration, since cost reduction is one of the preeminent goals for com-
panies (Treacy and Wieresma, 1993). At the basis of the discussion for vertical 
integration, is the possibility of attaining some sort of economic advantages by 
changing the nature of the transaction. Typical examples are better control of the 
supply base (Choi and Krause, 2006) and procurement (Bharadwaj and Matsuno, 
2006). The competitive advantage of a logistics service provider lies in its ability to 
harness the costs deriving from combining logistics services together (Deepen, et al. 
2008). In doing so he is in a better position to control and reduce costs, and iden-
tify value creation opportunities for its customers. 
We can rephrase the previous line of reasoning stating that vertical integra-
tion in liner shipping is motivated by the advantages that accrue to ocean carriers 
and their customers from a different way of transacting. Vertical integration in 
liner shipping implies a change in chain control from the shipper (or logistics ser-
vice provider) to the ocean carrier. This is consistent with the approach taken by 
Robinson (2005). In his insightful paper, the author goes even a step further, stat-
ing that a shipping line is de facto a LSP.  
‘Shipping lines will only derive competitive advantage by delivering the 
value that the customer will accept – not by operating on extensive net-
works, or by operating with larger and faster ships or by operating clever 
e-business systems through these may be fundamental to the value propo-
sition offered by the line and accepted by the customer’ (Robinson, 
2005: p. 252).  
Competitive advantage and the chain system perspective that Robinson pro-
poses provide an alternative interpretation of vertical integration. 
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One of the important insights in the work of Robinson (2005) consists of looking at 
ocean carriers’ strategies beyond the operational point of view of vessel sizes, net-
work coverage or scheduling. Operational aspects, even if crucial, are not sufficient 
to explain the consequences of supply chain thinking on carriers’ success and per-
formance. This distinction has marginally been addressed in the literature, al-
though references can be found for example in Notteboom (2002) when he ex-
plains why ocean carriers have shown an interest on the landside part of container 
transportation. The author points out that the synchronization of liner schedules 
and hinterland networks not only increases efficiency (operational perspective), but 
also guarantees competitiveness and survival in the long-run (strategic perspective). 
In other contributions (e.g. Frémont, 2009) the analysis is purposely restricted to 
the operational dimension of vertical integration, while in other (e.g. Heaver, 
2002a) the strategic dimension of vertical integration is only hinted at. 
It is our conviction that in order to fully comprehend the nature of vertical 
integration in the industry, considerations of an operational nature only provide a 
partial, albeit important, perspective. Only reference to strategic management can 
fully encompass the momentous and far-reaching implications of vertical integra-
tion for the liner shipping industry. This is the perspective presented by Robinson 
(2005) and to an extent with reference to short sea shipping by Paixão Casaca and 
Marlow (2005). 
 
Figure 2: Container shipping value chain. 
Source: MergeGlobal Value Creation Initiative 2008b. 
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In particular Robinson (2005) extends the Chain System Framework (CSF) de-
veloped for ports elsewhere (Robinson 2002; 2003) to the liner shipping industry. 
This framework is structured around the following concepts and assumptions: 
 ocean carriers are logistics service providers: since liner companies are in the busi-
ness of moving freight they intervene in the transaction between buyers 
and sellers. Freight moves only as long as by so doing it creates value and 
competitive advantage to the buyer, the seller and to the service provider. 
Carriers will only derive competitive advantage by delivering the value 
that the customer will accept, as such they are not only the business of 
moving freight but also in that of providing logistics services. 
 ocean carriers’ activities are framed within networks that are artefacts of corporate strat-
egy: carriers need to deliver the value demanded by their customers, but 
the characteristics of the networks they operate impose significant restric-
tion on the value that they are able to capture. 
 ocean carriers do not only compete in markets but also in chains: the strategy a car-
rier decides to follow is impacted upon not only by their relative position 
in the market where they operate and by the degree of competition that 
exists within it, but also by the value they create and are able to capture in 
the chains they belong to. 
 power and dominance relationships are the determinants of chain structures and oper-
ations: power and market dominance refers to the ability of a carrier to 
control critical assets in markets and chains that allow leveraging on its 
customers, suppliers and rivals and in this way capture value for itself 
(Cox, et al. 2002). 
 ocean carriers achieve business success when they are able to achieve and exploit supply 
chain and market power: this view implies that carriers will use their market 
power to close on weaker and less efficient competitors and their supply 
chain power to gain cost and quality advantages from their suppliers and 
increase or maintain their share of total revenues from customers.  
These arguments are discussed extensively in Robinson (2005), and are based 
on the alternative view on competitive advantage proposed by Porter (1979), Pen-
rose (1959), Cox (1997) and Cox, et al. (2002). On the basis of these five assump-
tions Robinson argues that chain perspective is appropriate, even mandatory. 
Shipping lines carry out their business not simply within marketplaces but also 
within corporately structured chains and supply chains reflecting particular logistic 
functions and spatial pathways (Robinson, 2003). Carriers will only derive com-
petitive advantage by delivering the value that their customers will accept. Since 
ocean carriers are third party service providers, their customers are the end-users 
of the service process, i.e. shippers or consignees (Robinson, 2005). Chains exist 
only on the basis that they not only deliver value for the customer but they also 
capture values for the chain parties involved (Robinson, 2003). 
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Figure 3: Port-oriented value-driven chain systems. 
Source:  Adapted from Robinson (2002) 
The emergence of megacarriers implies that a better control of the chain is 
necessary in order to better manage the larger container flows channelled through 
the port (figure 3), or in other words to better capture value. Since ocean transpor-
tation is one of the defining components in global supply chains, carriers are in the 
best position to do so by offering integrated solutions to their customers in direct 
competition with third party logistics service providers (Acciaro and Haralambides, 
2007). Vertical integration provides an opportunity for megacarriers to reduce or 
even eliminate the transaction costs among different components in the supply 
chain.  
By reducing transaction costs carriers are able to acquire and exploit power 
along the supply chain and in turn ensure strategy sustainability. In addition they 
would gain the capability to use their supply chain power over dependent suppliers 
to extract cost and quality improvements or impose standards and business prac-
tices. Liner companies could gain further resources from the integration of com-
ponents in chains, and it could even be argued that the advantages of larger vessels 
are simply the result of increased supply chain power. The conceptualisation of 
liner strategies in terms of CSF is far from definitive and offers opportunities for 
further investigation. One of the possible expansions may embed carriers’ strategic 
decisions in frameworks developed in the context of the Resource Based View 
(RBV) (Mandebvu, 2009). 
The RBV argues that the competitive advantage of a firm can be developed 
on the basis of access and exploitation of resources that are unique to a firm. In 
other words, competitive advantage can be attained when a firm’s strategy is value 
creating and is not imitated by a competitor (Barney, 1991). A firm’s competitive 
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advantage is sustainable when it is based on resources that cannot be acquired or 
exploited by a competitor. The analysis of RBV should not be restricted to single 
organizations, but it could also be expanded to partnerships or alliances of firms or 
even a whole industry. Since resources are scarce, it may be convenient that some 
firms attempt at gaining critical resources through vertical or horizontal integra-
tion.  In this sense the expansion of an organisation along the value chain ensures 
resources sustainability. As instance, the advantages of EOS or EOSC can be at-
tained through the combination of resources upstream and downstream along the 
supply chain. 
It is important to note, nonetheless, that some carriers prefer to pool limited 
resource onto their core business and outsource their supporting business. This 
does not necessarily imply that carriers may not acquire supply chain power with-
out integrating vertically. Resources in fact can be traded. Some carriers may be 
even reluctant to get involved with logistic integration in general as a result short-
age of resources. It should be noted in this respect that the provision of integrated 
services does not necessarily imply integration since some carriers have preferred 
to buy services on an ad-hoc basis. We can identify three different basic strategic 
models with respect to integration along the supply chain: 
A) Pure transport service provides (single service); 
B) Non asset based logistics service provider; 
C) Asset based logistics service provider. 
In view of the discussions presented above we believe that the paradigm of 
reference for liner companies is that of logistics service providers that have strategi-
cally selected those assets (strategic resources) that give them the strongest and sus-
tainable competitive advantage.  
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This chapter presented a review of liner shipping economics highlighting the cru-
cial characteristics of the industry that are relevant for understanding the potential 
of bundling. The liner shipping industry is characterised by the following economic 
features, which, although not exclusive to this industry, imply that the sector is not 
characterised by perfectly competitive stable equilibria. In particular, these traits 
are generally referred to as typical of liner shipping: 
 it is capital-intensive, not only as a result of the use of ships but also as the 
requirement of schedule regularity (Davies, et al. 1995);  
 supply is lagged by the long ship construction time and supply adjustments 
are difficult (OECD, 2002); 
 load factors are variable, with directional imbalances and cyclical and 
seasonal variations (Brooks, 2004); 
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 this variability requires excess capacity that is another distinctive trait of 
the industry (Fusillo, 2003); 
 inventories are not feasible (Sjostrom, 1992); 
 the resultant reserve capacity tempts firms to engage in discounted pricing 
when demand is not at the peak (Brooks, 2004); 
 demand is relatively inelastic to price changes, therefore lower rates do not 
result in more demand, similarly to the airline industry (Davies 1990); 
 Economies of both scale and density, high fixed avoidable costs (Davies, et 
al. 1995) and network effects (Bergantino and Veenstra, 2002); 
 Price discrimination can be an effective way to allocate these costs without 
depressing trade (Jansson and Shneerson, 1987; 1979; Sjostrom, 1992; 
2002); 
 Supply cannot be incremented to the margin, and changes in capacity can 
only take place in lumps (Davies, et al. 1995; Davies, 1990). 
These characteristics have been at the basis of the antitrust exemption (con-
ferences) that the industry has enjoyed for centuries, and that, although heavily 
questioned in the USA and Europe in the last decades, is still a crucial step in 
understanding the industry pricing practices. In particular it can be argued that the 
existence of conference has affected the ability of carriers to develop integrated 
door-to-door solution under a single price. This difficulty has been overcome with 
the development of service contracts and the tendency, after the repeal of the anti-
trust immunity in October 2008 in Europe, has been towards the development of 
more innovative pricing strategies. 
From an operational point of view, the industry characteristics have lead to 
the development of large container carriers (megacarriers) in the attempt of achiev-
ing EOS. Since EOS appear only when vessels sail with high utilisation rates, the 
effective exploitation of megacarriers requires liners to increase their control on the 
chains that move containers to and form the port. This has lead, among other fac-
tors, to an increase in vertical integration from the side of carriers. In other words 
carriers have realised that as LSPs their success does not lie exclusively in optimis-
ing their operations but in controlling the chains where they operate. The chain 
control consists in the ability of an LSP to create value for their customers and to 
capture value from their suppliers. This value is approximated by the price at 
which the (integrated) service is provided. An effective strategy to create and cap-
ture value is integration along the supply chain. 
Vertical integration, although not necessary for bundling in general, is a ne-
cessary condition for product bundling. Since product bundling provides at least some 
consumers with added value and product bundles can be thought as an integral ar-
chitecture (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2004), in the case of logistics, it requires the redefi-
nition of services, optimisation of the interfaces among services and redesign of 
service delivery processes (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). The questions that the rest 
of the thesis will aim at investigating refer to what is the best model in terms of 
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value creation and capture and what role product and price bundling may play in 
this process. 
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A crucial condition for the success of bundling as a business practice is that the 
bundle needs to be attractive for the shipper. Although some advantages for the 
shippers—such as easiness to compare logistics costs among various providers—
are intrinsic to the practice of bundling, the attractiveness of a bundle is inextri-
cably linked to the attractiveness of its components. These components are what is 
collectively referred to as logistics outsourcing, and consist of: 
‘[…] activities carried out by a logistics service provider on behalf of a 
shipper and consisting of at least management and execution of transpor-
tation and warehousing. In addition, other activities can be included, for 
example inventory management, information related activities, such as 
tracking and tracing, value added activities, such as secondary assembly 
and installation of products, or even supply chain management. Also, the 
contract is required to contain some management, analytical or design ac-
tivities, and the length of the co-operation between shipper and provider to 
be at least one year, to distinguish third-party logistics from traditional 
‘‘arm’s length’’ sourcing of transportation and/or warehousing’ (Ber-
glund, et al. 1999: pg. 59) 
There is an extensive literature on the attractiveness of logistics outsourcing 
and a large number of field studies are conducted every year with the objective of 
monitoring the development of the industry. Although bundling and outsourcing are 
two separate concepts, outsourcing is a necessary condition to bundling. It has 
been observed that shippers outsource services in bundles (e.g. warehousing and 
                                                
* A preliminary version of this chapter appeared as Acciaro (2008b) and Acciaro (2009a). 
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inventory control) and in general logistics service providers (LSPs) tend to combine 
activities that share common transactional elements and information flows (Maltz 
and Ellram, 2000; Maltz, Riley and Boberg, 1993; Rabinovich, et al. 1999). 
Of the many studies that focused on logistics outsourcing, none has focused 
on shippers’ interest in bundles of logistics services. The aim of this chapter is to 
present the result of two surveys aiming at obtaining a better insight in the attrac-
tiveness for shippers of bundling in the logistics sector and the types of services that 
are more likely to be outsourced jointly. Before presenting the results of the surveys 
it is expedient to explain the motivation from the side of shippers of outsourcing by 
and large and review the benefits (and risks) traditionally associated with logistics 
outsourcing.  
The chapter is thus structured as follows. After this introduction the next two 
paragraphs present a short review of the theory of logistics outsourcing and of the 
benefits (and risks) associated with this practice. The following sections present the 
results of a survey conducted as part of the MEL-SMU research on bundling on 
the advantages that logistics outsourcing delivers to shippers and the type of ser-
vices that are most likely to be outsourced. This is followed by the analysis of the 
results of a global survey on shippers’ preferences on bundling carried out by a ma-
jor integrated transport provider on its customers in 2007. The results of this sec-
ond survey were made available in confidence to MEL researchers in the context 
of the joint project mentioned above. The last section will present a set of recom-
mendations, topics for further research, and conclusions. 
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Before proceeding with the analysis of the shipper perspective on bundling, it is 
expedient to discuss the extent to which logistics outsourcing has become a perva-
sive business practice, what motivates a shipper to outsource and what services are 
most likely to be outsourced. The literature on logistics outsourcing is rather exten-
sive and the aim of this paragraph is to focus only on the issues important for the 
discussions that will follow. More extensive reviews are available for example in 
Marasco (2007), Razzaque and Sheng (2001) and Selviaridis and Spring (2007). 
Deepen (2007) also provides a comprehensive discussion on all aspects of logistics 
outsourcing.  
The first issue that we aim at discussing is the shipper decision on whether to 
outsource logistics services to third parties. The so-called make-or-buy decision is re-
lated to a large variety of considerations, among which the cost of providing the 
service in-house against the price to be paid to logistics service providers is prob-
ably the most obvious (Van Damme and Ploos van Amstel, 1996). Outsourcing is 
an efficient way of providing a service without the necessity in investing in new 
assets and developing new capabilities (Persson and Virum, 2001; Stank and Matz, 
1996; Bolumole, 2001; 2003). The level of asset specificity associated with the pro-
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vision of a certain service has also been used to explain outsourcing. High asset 
specificity in association with uncertainty should lead to in-house provision (Aert-
sen, 1993; Maltz, 1994a; Skjoett-Larsen, 2000). 
Cost and asset specificity are clearly not the only dimensions of the make-or-
buy decision, and should always be weighted against service level considerations 
(Matlz, 1994b; La Londe and Maltz, 1992; McGinnis, Kochunny and Ackerman, 
1995; Sarel and Zinn, 1992).  Van Damme and Ploos van Amstel (1996) summa-
rise the determinants of firms’ decision to outsource in four groups. They are the 
economic viability of the service provision, demand variability and customer ser-
vice, availability of personnel and equipment and the level of dependency on the 
supplier. The outsourcing decision may also be related to the shipper characterist-
ics, such as firm’s size (Hong, Chin and Lin, 2004b), or the shipper’s organisational 
structure (Daugherty and Droge, 1997). 
Since the aggregating and risk reducing nature of shipper requirements is 
what makes consolidation, and thus outsourcing, attractive (Van Asperen, 2009), a 
large number of studies focused on the demand side, surveying shippers and logis-
tics service providers in the attempt to determine which services are most likely to 
be outsourced. Shippers seem to demand outsourcing mostly of transportation, 
distribution and warehousing, while advanced logistics solutions such as informa-
tion management systems or services aiming at supporting production activities are 
less popular (van Hoek, 2000b; 2000c; van Hoek and Dierdonck, 2000; Selviaridis 
et al. 2008). On the side of supply these surveys highlight an increase in the offer 
and complexity of supply chain solutions (Lieb and Randall, 1999; Lieb and Bentz, 
2005a; 2005b), and in general reveal a mismatch between supply and demand 
(Murphy and Poist, 1998).  
Shipper demand for logistics services may also be very diverse depending on 
the geography of the market where the shipper is operating or the industry sector 
(Rushton and Walker, 2007). A large number of studies survey the extent of logis-
tics outsourcing in Europe (Virum, 1993; Lieb, Millen and Van Wassenhove, 
1993; Gooley, 1997; Van Laarhoven, Berglund and Peters, 2000; Van Hoek, 
2001; Hertz and Alfredsson, 2003; Wilding and Juriado, 2004; Selviaridis et al. 
2008). One of the common observations of these studies is that Europe represents 
one of the most mature markets in the world, with most European shippers looking 
at outsourcing as part of their business model, although the historical local focus 
for each country makes this region a particularly challenging marketplace. Wilding 
and Juriado (2004) observe that European firms tend to use a mix of in-house and 
contract logistics, especially in the consumer good industry. The most commonly 
outsourced services seem to be transportation and overflow storage. 
 North America represents also a mature market for logistics outsourcing. 
This has triggered a large amount of surveys (Bardi and Tracey, 1991; Lieb and 
Randall, 1996; Bradley, et al. 1999; Daugherty, Stank and Rogers, 1996; Rabino-
vich, et al. 1999; Maltz, et al. 1993; Boyson, et al. 1999; Murphy and Poist, 2000; 
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Knemeyer, Corsi and Murphy, 2003; Lieb and Benz, 2004; 2005a; Arroyo, Gay-
tan and De Boer, 2006). Larger companies seem to be more likely to outsource 
logistics and supply chain services (Lieb and Benz, 2005a). Furthermore logistics 
outsourcing plays a crucial role for the automotive, the high-tech and the large 
retail industries (Lieb and Kendrick, 2003; Lieb and Miller, 2003). 
A more limited number of studies focused on the Far East (Yeung, et al. 2006; 
Sum and Teo, 1999; Wang, et al. 2006; Sohail, Bhatnagar and Sohal, 2006; Sohail 
and Sohal, 2003; Bhatnagar, Sohal and Millen, 1999; Hong, Chin and Lin, 2004a; 
2004b; Yang, 2009), the Indian Sub-continent (Sahay and Mohan 2006; Vinay et 
al. 2009), the Middle East (Sohail and Al-Abdali 2005), Australia (Dapiran et al. 
1996; Sankaran, Mun and Charman, 2002; Sohal, Millen and Moss, 2002) and 
Latin America (Bowersox and Closs, 1997; McCormack, Bronzo Ladeira and Va-
ladares de Oliveira, 2008; Zinn, 1996). The level of logistics outsourcing in these 
countries is very diverse, ranging from countries with relatively mature markets 
such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Australia, to new rapidly growing ec-
onomies such as China, India and Asia Pacific Countries. In the case of China, for 
example, the development of logistics outsourcing has been identified as one of the 
most urgent requirements for the development of Chinese logistics chains (Yang, 
2009). Although the logistics infrastructure of these countries is improving very 
rapidly, as the entry of foreign retailers such as Wal-Mart, Tesco, Metro and Car-
refour (Rushton and Walker, 2007) seems to suggest, local logistics providers seem 
to be able with difficulty to cope with the requirements of modern supply chains, 
therefore requiring some form of coordination or support at a national level (Yang, 
2009). 
All studies though confirm the continuing growth of logistics outsourcing 
(Ashenbaum, Maltz and Rabinovich, 2005; Lieb and Bentz, 2005b; Murphy and 
Poist, 1998; 2000). This growth is facilitated on the demand side by the reduction 
in asset intensity and increase in labour costs and the restructuring of distribution, 
while on the supply side by the reduction in profit margins for basic services, in 
conjunction with deregulation (Berglund, et al. 1999) and ICT developments 
(Lewis and Talalayersky, 2000; Sauvage, 2003). In particular transport service 
providers have expanded the scope of their activities in the attempt to differentiate 
their service offerings from those of their competitors (Sheffi, 1990; Virum, 1993). 
This expansion, however, has not always been matched by the development of 
their actual capabilities (Bask, 2001), so that a certain degree of fuzziness remains 
on the distinction between pure transport providers and logistics service providers 
(Razzaque and Sheng, 1998). 
D4C -,+'-*!&.&,+&*!+#+'*+ !((*+
As mentioned before one of the reasons companies engage in logistics outsourcing 
is that it allows reduction in logistics costs (Cavinato, 1989; Bardi and Tracey, 
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1991; La Londe and Maltz, 1992; Lieb, 1992; Browne and Allen, 2001). This lo-
gistics cost reduction may take different forms, such as reducing capital investment 
or maintenance costs (Bardi and Tracey, 1991). The reduction in capital invest-
ment may refer to physical facilities such as warehouses or transport vehicles  (Fos-
ter and Muller, 1990; Richardson 1995) but also IT and other soft infrastructure 
(Sheffi, 1995; Lacity, Wilcoks and Feeny, 1995; Richardson, 1995). This is also 
related to the fact that the firm can outsource a certain service only when this is 
required, avoiding investment in assets that are seldom used, and turning therefore 
fixed costs in variable costs (Deepen, 2007; Bardi and Tracey, 1991).  
In addition, it is to be expected that since logistics is the core activity for LSP, 
specialization and focus on core competencies should allow them to achieve higher 
level of efficiency and lower production costs (Lieb, 1992; Bradley, 1994), or sim-
ply identify inefficiencies that were not visible when the activity was performed by 
the firm in-house (Cahill, 2007). Cost reduction can be the result of economies of 
scale and scope (Van Damme and Ploos van Amstel, 1996; Lutz & Ritter, 2009) 
deriving from larger volumes (Wallenburg, 2009), higher asset utilization (Weiden-
baum, 2005), reduced demand variability (Deepen, et al. 2008). 
An additional source of cost savings may be related to the reduction in labour 
costs (Bardi and Tracey, 1991). This can be the result of differentials between 
wages in the logistics sector and in the manufacturing sectors (Lynch, 2000a; 
Deepen, 2007), or of the reduction in workforce and related expenditures 
(Richardson, 1995), or of the elimination of labour legal constraints in highly 
unionised countries (Lynch, 2000b). 
Cost reductions are naturally not the only reason for outsourcing. An addi-
tional advantage of outsourcing is that is allows firms to focus on their core busi-
ness, while activities that are strategically less important can be entrusted to others 
(Sink and Langley, 1997). This focus allows the firm to simplify its business pro-
cesses and concentrate resources on those areas that have the potential to deliver 
higher market competitive advantage (Cahill, 2007).   
A further important advantage of logistics outsourcing is that the logistics 
performance of the firm can be improved, since the LSPs are likely to possess bet-
ter technology, infrastructure and logistics expertise than the outsourcing firm 
(Browne and Allen, 2001).  This performance improvement can materialise in bet-
ter logistics service quality, optimised asset use (Wallenburg, 2009), greater flexi-
bility (La Londe and Maltz, 1992; Deepen, 2007), faster transit times, less damage, 
and improved on-time delivery (Richardson, 1995), reduction in inventory costs 
(Daugherty, et al. 1996), order cycle times, lead times (Bhatnagar and 
Viswanathan, 2000) and improvement in customer service (Wong, et al. 2000). 
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Table 7: Benefits and risks of logistics outsourcing. 
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Source: Selviaridis, et al. (2008) 
Selviaridis, et al. (2008) surveyed the literature on outsourcing and classified 
these and other benefits associated with outsourcing in three categories: those re-
lated to the firm strategy; those connected to the financial flows of the firm; and 
those related to operations. Their categorisation is reported in the table above, that 
also lists the risks and problem associated with logistics outsourcing. 
Since the early 90’s it has become clear that disadvantages are also associated 
with outsourcing (Lynch, Imada and Bookbinder, 1994; McIvor, 2000; Wen-
tworth, 2003). Some of the most often cited issue refer to the loss of control of the 
logistics function (Bardi and Tracey, 1991), loss of customer contact (Ellram and 
Cooper, 1990) and the loss of the ability to provide the service in-house that in-
creases the dependence of the firm on the LSP (Wentworth, 2003). It has been ob-
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served that firms will attempt to reduce these risks by retaining some logistics ac-
tivities (Wilding and Juriado, 2004). This strategy nonetheless contributes to in-
creasing the complexity of the relations with the LSP, another disadvantage of out-
sourcing (Wallenburg, 2009).  
The issue of asset dependency in outsourcing relations and the costs associ-
ated with the complexity of outsourcing contracts has been studied extensively, 
and although some contractual characteristics may contribute to mitigate these 
disadvantages, the relationship between LSPs and shippers can be critical 
(Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006). The cost savings described above in this para-
graph, even if realised, may not offset these complexity costs. Outsourcing may 
also increase costs as a consequence of excessive fees and overheads (Ackerman, 
1996; Wilding and Juriado, 2004), and its financial benefits are in many cases diffi-
cult to measure, since firms may not be aware of their actual logistics costs (Sel-
viaridis and Spring, 2007). 
Other important disadvantages of outsourcing could be decrease in respon-
siveness to customer’s needs (Van Damme and Ploos van Amstel, 1996); decrease 
in service quality (Ellram and Cooper, 1990) especially in case special products are 
requested or in emergency circumstances; lack of workforce expertise and capabili-
ties (Sink and Langley, 1997; Gibson and Cook, 2001; Svensson, 2001); low quality 
IT capabilities (Van Laarhoven, et al. 2000). 
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The rest of the chapter presents the results of two surveys. One of the surveys re-
fers to a study by SMU and EUR (2008b), performed in the context of the NOL 
Foundation project previously mentioned. The authors surveyed 53 Singapore 
based companies in the attempt to understand the role outsourcing plays in differ-
ent industries and what are the logistics outsourcing preferences. The second sur-
vey summarises some of the results of a survey performed by a container carrier, 
which was made available in confidence to MEL researchers in the context of the 
MEL-SMU research project at the condition that the identity of the carrier was 
not to be disclosed. The carrier is a global logistics service provider with an excel-
lent reputation in the provision of supply chain solution and worldwide coverage of 
its shipping network. 
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In May-June 2007 a questionnaire was sent to the 203 traders in Singapore with 
total trade value of S$10 million and above (SMU and EUR, 2008b). The ranking 
was obtained from the Top Singapore Importers and Exporters Directory 2005, 
published by IE Singapore. The objectives of the survey were:  
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 to better understand shippers’ current practices in liner transportation and 
logistics services; and  
 to understand how changes in the provision of these services impact ship-
pers’ demand and propensity for such services.  
In all, 53 companies took part in this survey. This translates into an effective re-
sponse rate of 27%. In terms of revenue, three out of five companies were me-
dium-sized with revenues between S$ 10 million to 99 million. Companies with 
revenues above S$ 100 million accounted for a quarter of the sample (fig. 4). In 
terms of trade profile, more than half of the respondents declared an annual trade 
value between S$ 15 million to S$ 50 million. One in five companies can be con-
sidered a large trader with a trade value above S$ 50 million (fig. 4).  
 
Figure 4: Profiles of the respondents in terms of revenue (left pie) and trade value (right 
pie). 
Source: SMU and EUR (2008b). 
Industries predominantly represented by the survey respondents are:  
 Industrial Manufacturing; 
 Food and Beverage; 
 Electronic Parts and Consumer Electronics; 
 Chemicals; 
 Construction and Industrial Machinery; 
 Retail; 
 Automotive; 
 Marine and Marine-Related; 
 Textile and Garments. 
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The first part of the survey aimed at assessing the logistics needs of the respond-
ents. On the entire sample, the most-required logistics functions were freight 
scheduling and routing, warehousing, inventory management, and customs clear-
ance, with 9-out-of-10 respondents requiring such services (see table 8). These 
functions are clearly not entirely provided in-house, in fact, the top five functions 
that survey respondents appear to be most willing to outsource include customs 
brokerage, and in- and out-bound land transportation. 
Table 8: Most- and least-required logistics functions. 
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The following activities are likely to be outsourced on a regular basis, but do not 
rank among the functions that are perceived as the most needed: terminal handling 
and transhipment /relay (table 9). For all the outsourced functions, the preference is 
for direct liaison with providers (rather than engaging third party logistics service pro-
viders). Outsourcing decisions seem to be motivated mostly by better service con-
siderations (58%), costs savings from shared services (46%) and volume consolida-
tion (44%). 
On the other hand, the following functions are most likely to be provided in-
house: customer and supplier compliance, order entry processing and customer 
service, and inventory management (table 10). This seems to be motivated by the 
desire to retain control over these activities (73%), ensure that service levels are not 
compromised (48%) and, to a lesser extent by the perception that these functions 
constitute company core competences (42%). 
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Table 9: Outsourced logistics functions. 
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Table 10: In-house logistics functions. 
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Sector Focus 1: Industrial Manufacturing 
For respondents in the industrial manufacturing business, the top five logistics 
functions do not differ substantially from those selected by the average respondent 
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(table 11). The only noticeable difference is rate negotiation, which appears slightly 
more important than for the average respondent, probably as a result of the larger 
cargo volumes that these shippers need to move.  
Table 11: Sectors focus 1, logistics functions most- and least-wanted. 
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Table 12: Sectors focus 1, outsourced logistics functions. 
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In terms of the outsourced functions, table 12 shows that materials flow man-
agement and factoring are more likely to be outsourced than in the case of the average 
respondent. This is in line with the general observation that respondents in the 
industrial manufacturing sector make a greater use of third party logistics service 
providers. Seven of the listed logistics functions, including the top five, are all out-
sourced to third party service providers by at least 70% of the respondents.  
Table 13 lists the logistics functions provided in-house for this sector focus. 
82% of the respondents prefer direct rate negotiation, compared to just 69% for the 
average respondent. This could be related to the higher importance industrial 
manufacturers place on this function.  
Table 13: Sectors focus 1, in-house logistics functions. 
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Sector Focus 2: Food and Beverage 
Respondents in the food and beverage industries are generally smaller both in 
terms of revenue and trade values compared to the average respondent. Amongst 
the key logistics functions required, customs clearance and customs brokerage are ranked 
much higher than for the average respondent (see table 14). This could be due in 
part to the complexities of trade and non-trade barriers in the import and export 
of this type of products. The respondents in these industries also appear to require 
a more limited number of logistics functions, since 6-of-24 functions are required 
by less than half the companies. 
From table 15 it can be observed that the respondents in the food and bever-
age industries generally outsource fewer functions than the average respondent, 
with the exception of freight scheduling & routing. This is not surprising since only for 
smaller volumes outsourcing appears to offer cost advantages.  
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Table 14: Sector focus 2, logistics functions most- and least-wanted 
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Table 15: Sectors focus 2, outsourced logistics functions. 
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Sector Focus 3: Electronic Parts and Consumer Electronics 
Respondents in the electronics industry are generally larger both in terms of rev-
enue and trade values than the average respondent and the industrial manufactur-
ing and the food and beverage respondents. 
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In terms of the key logistics functions demanded, all the respondents included 
in this sector focus functions demand 7 of the 24 logistics functions listed in the 
survey, as shown in table 16. This is more substantial than in the industrial manu-
facturing and the food and beverage sectors.  
Table 16: Sector focus 3, logistics functions most- and least-wanted. 
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Table 17: Sector focus 3, outsourced logistics functions. 
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Table 17 lists terminal handling, customs brokerage and transhipment / relay as the 
logistic functions most often outsourced by the respondents in the electronic parts 
and consumer electronics industrial sectors. These functions are also outsourced 
directly with the logistics providers, similarly to what happens for the average re-
spondent. 
Among the four types of door-to-door logistics providers listed in the survey, 
the completely integrated asset-based liner operator is associated with the majority 
of the advantages of outsourcing, as shown in figure 5 below.  
 
 
Figure 5: Perceived advantages of outsourcing. 
Source: SMU and EUR (2008b) 
Specifically, half of the respondents agreed that a completed integrated pro-
vider delivers greater standardization of logistics processes, provides access to valuable informa-
tion technologies, enhances on-time delivery, and has the ability to provide global / regional supply 
chain solutions. 
On the other hand, respondents are generally least favourable of the non-
asset-based independent logistics provider. Disadvantages most commonly cited 
are: higher costs (59%), higher risk (49%), and reduced flexibility in service provision (49%) 
(figure 6). For the other two categories, respondents are generally indifferent. 
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Figure 6: Perceived disadvantages of outsourcing. 
Source: SMU and EUR (2008b). 
 
 
Figure 7: Potential outsourcing partner. 
Source: SMU and EUR (2008b). 
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greater flexibility offered by this type of logistics service provider in selecting the 
ocean carrier that suits better the needs of its customer. Logistics service providers 
that are not associated with a liner company appear to offer “higher flexibility in 
choosing the liner operator” and “better services, lower costs and higher flexibility 
of services”. 
A set of questions in the survey aimed at investigating the relevance of pricing 
in the outsourcing decision. Almost the totality of the respondents (94%) indicates 
that price is an important consideration in their choice of service provider. If given 
a significant price discount, two thirds of the respondents would consider engaging 
a door-to-door service provider. The survey also required respondents to list the 
key factors regarded as crucial in the choice of a logistics service provider. Those 
more frequently mentioned include (in brackets the number of respondents who 
indicate this factor), level of service (16); reliability (7); price (7); efficiency (6); and 
commitment (3). 
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0*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This section presents a summary and an analysis of the results of a survey con-
ducted by a major carrier on the preferences for bundled offers of logistics and 
ocean transportation services. The survey was conducted in 2007 and surveyed 
355 customers from all over the world. 
The first point of the survey analysed where does the interest of the shippers 
lie in bundled offers. The 355 shippers provided 542 choices. Approximately half 
of the customers rate bundling as an important concept, independently from their 
geographical location. Asian and North American shippers though rate bundling 
slightly higher than European ones, indicating that bundling attractiveness is not 
related to the maturity of the logistics industry. As far as the product verticals are 
concerned, automotives and technological products seem to lead, with almost 50% 
of the customers expressing an interest in bundling. The survey defines the follow-
ing attributes as characteristics of bundled offers: 
 cost efficiencies by working with one vendor; 
 single account manager for complete services; 
 one stop shopping for all needs under one contracts; 
 door-to-door delivery; 
 single invoice for all services. 
Shippers seem to prefer bundled offers because of ‘cost efficiencies’ and ‘sin-
gle account manager’, although no significant differences appear from the survey. 
Only the possibility of a single invoice for all services is rated somewhat lower than 
the other attributes. This result seems to indicate that the respondents regard bun-
dling as being able to generate economies of scale effects.  
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Customers view bundled offering as appealing because working with one 
vendor will allow them to leverage the relationship for costs efficiencies as well as 
make it easy for them to handle transport/logistics matters. 
The survey also investigates why shippers attach a higher value to bundled 
offers than to unbundled services. The survey indicated the following alternatives:  
 production efficiency; 
 cost efficiencies; 
 ease of managing shipping; 
 better service to customers. 
Among the 355 respondents to this question, no significant preference for 
any of the four alternatives is indicated. The differences appear more evident at a 
geographical detail. North American shippers seem to care more for production 
efficiency and ease of managing shipping, while European shippers seem to prefer 
bundling for the cost advantages it can provide. For technical and consumer goods 
production efficiencies seem to be the most relevant while, ease to manage ship-
ping is the most relevant attribute for garments. The automotive industry seems to 
be more concerned with costs savings deriving from bundling. 
The survey also enquired how many products should be included in a bun-
dle. The results show that shippers would on average favour bundles that include 
five logistics services. Products generally involve some form of transportation, 
warehousing/related product handling and customs. Asia/ISC tend to bundle the 
least products (4.4). Auto customers tend to bundle most products (6) while Gar-
ments bundle the least (4.2). 
The following question in the survey focused on what products would ship-
pers be most interested to see in a bundle. The results are presented in the follow-
ing chart. The graph shows the propensity of bundling ocean transportation with 
pre-carriage and on-carriage. Please note that terminal handling is included for the 
purpose of the discussions already in ocean transportation, as this bundle is already 
established in the industry. 
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Figure 8: Type of logistics services and how likely they are part of a bundle. 
Source: Carrier’s customer survey. 
The following question in the survey enquired what propensity would have 
shippers to pay a premium for the bundle. Except for Europe, at least a quarter of 
the customers across all regions indicate a willingness to pay a premium of more 
than10%, while in Greater China, more than a quarter of customers are willing to 
pay up to 16%-20% premium for “Bundled offering”. From the point of view of 
product verticals, Auto and Tech customers have slightly more than a quarter of 
customers willing to pay premiums of more that 10%, but differences among pro-
duct verticals are not significant. 
Half of the customers refused to answer or does not believe any companies 
have a comparative ability in providing bundles. The alternatives proposed also 
included DHL Danzas and UPS that did not appear to be preferred. This answer 
to this question though might suffer from respondent bias, as the interviewees are 
customers of a shipping line. 
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Shippers may require a single rate including hinterland transportation on the basis 
of the traditional one-stop-shop arguments. In particular the costs associated with 
the finding the hinterland transportation suppliers, in addition to the better know-
ledge that the carrier may have of the market, as well as the necessity to be able to 
compare the costs of the entire route are all reasons for which a shipper may prefer 
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a point to point rate inclusive of hinterland transportation. The frequency in the 
use of bundles depends very much on three aspects: the nature of the commodity, 
the trade line and whether the trade is a head-haul or a back-haul trade. 
All-inclusive point-to-point rates are particularly common in certain market 
segments. For example the waste paper market is a case where rates are tradition-
ally quoted all-inclusive. This is common among low value commodities and may 
be motivated by the fact that the margins for these commodities are so low that 
carriers opt for a bundle rate in order to disguise the very low ocean freight rates 
they have to offer to attract the cargo. In some circumstances on the paper market 
in the past rates might very well have been negative, but the carriers managed to 
hide this fact by proposing a bundle inclusive of Terminal Handling Charges 
(THC), Bunker Adjustment Factors (BAF) and pre carriage in the UK for example 
and hinterland transportation at destination. 
One possible advantage is the use of bundle rates to reduce cost pressure for 
the shippers. According to some industry experts, bundled rates have been used in 
the case of increasing ocean freight rates in order to soften cost pressure for ship-
pers. In the past for sure, an increase in the ocean freight rate through the confer-
ence public rates for example, might have translated in increasing pressure to 
lower hinterland transportation rates. This might have been achieved by reducing 
the price of the bundle. While the sum of ocean transportation, adjustment factors, 
surcharges and hinterland transportation was not attractive enough for the ship-
per, a bundle whose price was below the sum of the above mentioned components 
may well have been. 
In general the attractiveness of the bundle may be related to the trade lines. It 
is likely that in head-hauls hinterland transportation will not be quoted unless spe-
cifically requested, but this may vary depending on the part of the world where the 
shipper is located. In addition bundles can be used by the logistics operator associ-
ated with the liner to attract new business for the ocean leg. This may be common 
practice with retail logistics, where in general prices will be quoted per box or per 
item and will be inclusive of a large set of logistics services including ocean trans-
portation. 
The recent survey of shippers operating out of Singapore, that has been dis-
cussed in this chapter (SMU and EUR, 2008b), however noted that shippers are 
more comfortable dealing with asset-owning service providers than non-asset own-
ing service providers. The reason for this are not yet understood, and further re-
search is ongoing. 
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Although carriers have been providing intermodal services since the 1980s, it is 
only recently that the major shipping lines have set up logistics operations, giving 
this type of activities a more central role in their group strategies (Midoro and Pa-
rola, 2006). In this way, carriers are increasingly competing with some of their own 
customers, notably freight forwarders and Non Vessel Operating Common Carri-
ers (NVOCC) (Haralambides, 2007). 
Bundling is also not a new concept in the liner shipping industry. However, 
its practice has not been the subject of any detailed analysis in the ocean transpor-
tation. Davies (1986b) provides one of the first references to bundling in his influen-
tial article ‘Competition, contestability and the liner shipping industry’: 
In many ways the offering of multimodal services is an exercise in broker-
age and they can be put together through the appropriate purchase of 
space on the requisite modes, much in the manner of the holiday packages 
put together by a travel agent. In this way then services can be tailored to 
the needs of individual customers and commensurate with demand, the 
number of product offerings is potentially much greater under a multi-
modal than under a port-to-port regime. (Davies, 1986b: pg. 96) 
 
                                                
* This chapter is based to a large extent on the results of a study conducted between 2007 and 2010 
under the auspices of the NOL Foundation, in cooperation with Singapore Management University 
and a working paper of the author on the subject. Part of this study has been published in Acciaro 
and Haralambides (2007) and Haralambides and Acciaro (2010). 
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The reasons behind the decision of carriers to step into the logistics sector are 
motivated by increasing shipper demand for integrated supply chain solutions; ser-
vice and price differentiation; revenue stabilisation, and long-run profitability and 
market share. 
The increasing demand of shippers for integrated logistics solutions derives 
from the widespread these days importance of just-in-time and make-to-order pro-
duction-distribution systems. Inter alia, such technologies help manufacturers cope 
with the vagaries and unpredictability of the business cycle, and plan business de-
velopment in a more cost effective way (Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010). 
The port-to-port ocean transportation service is highly homogenized. Com-
petition among carriers is thus intensive and profit margins squeezed as a result. 
The provision of logistics services offers carriers the opportunity for service differ-
entiation aiming at premium pricing. The predominance of long-term service con-
tracts with shippers, based on volume discounts, attests to the relevance of such 
strategies.  In addition, vertical integration along the supply chain and the bun-
dling of logistics services around ocean transportation give carriers a strong com-
parative advantage (yet to be exploited) against 3PLs, NVOCCs and global for-
warders. 
Furthermore, logistics activities represent an additional source of a more 
stable revenue, compared to the high volatility of freight revenue, thus allowing 
carriers to hedge, in a way, freight rate risk. Finally, by tying ocean transportation 
customers to the upstream and downstream logistics services, carriers increase cus-
tomer switching costs and can thus erect, purposely or not, barriers to entry for 
aspiring newcomers. 
Carrier efforts towards greater supply chain integration have however been 
met with varying degrees of success. The various challenges facing carriers in such 
a strategy include: 
 operational difficulties in combining two intrinsically different services: 
ocean transportation—a highly competitive asset-heavy activity of tight 
cost control and, in general, a business focusing on asset use maximisa-
tion—and logistics—typically asset-light and organisationally-heavy, with 
a distinctive focus on customer requirements; 
 sceptical and suspicious shippers requiring cost break downs and more 
transparency; 
 complications deriving from the rather unusual situation of carriers on the 
one hand competing with 3PLs and global freight forwarders, and on the 
other one supplying them, wholesale, with ship capacity in an effort to fill 
their increasingly larger vessels; 
 regulatory jurisprudence, particularly in Europe, whereby tying arrange-
ments and the ensuing reduction of competition are not looked at favour-
ably by the competent authorities.  
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Notwithstanding all the above, the general perception of the industry seems 
positive, also encouraged by the successful examples of some leading carriers, such 
as NYK, Maersk and APL. 
One of the possibilities offered by the closer control of the global supply chain 
is the ability of providing door-to-door services under a single, all-in, price. This 
strategy, known as bundling or tying sales in the literature, has shown to be very 
successful in a variety of industries, ranging from computer software (Microsoft 
Windows bundled with Internet Explorer); computer hard- and firmware (Dell 
computers bundled with Intel processors); mobile telephony (SIM-locked devices); 
tourism (package holidays), real estate (mortgage credit and life assurance); to vari-
ous sectors of the manufacturing industry. 
This chapter aims at presenting an overview of the practice of bundling in 
the liner industry. As the industry is changing rapidly and carriers perceive bun-
dling as a highly strategic issue, empirical investigation on this topic cannot be 
done systematically. This chapter combines the results of a set of open interviews 
carried out in 2006 and in 2009 with representatives of major carriers. The com-
panies contacted for an interview were: Maersk Line, NYK, APL/NOL, MSC, 
CMA-CGM, MOL, UASC, Hapag-Lloyd as well as representatives of ELAA and 
the major conference organisations. Not all companies and organisations con-
tacted equally contributed to the information collected – some refused to discuss 
the issue as deemed strategically too sensitive. Most of the data collected has been 
provided under request of confidentiality. In what follows therefore, we will not 
refer to specific carriers or people although records of the interviews, and interview 
reports are kept by the author. 
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In general, bundling does not require the company to be vertically integrated. As a 
matter of fact, most third party logistics service providers are non-asset based and 
provide bundles by insourcing part or all of their components. Similarly, shipping 
lines that offer an all inclusive rate between two inland locations do not necessarily 
have to own the trans-port means from the port to the inland location, nor the 
terminal where the container is handled. Instead, they can insource inland trans-
port and terminal-handling services, to deliver an all-inclusive service to the cus-
tomer themselves. 
There is however one fundamental strategic difference between bundling by 
3PLs and bundling by carriers. By insourcing ocean transportation, 3PLs are asset-
light and thus in a better position to adjust their services to demand. Carriers on 
the other hand, asset-heavy due to the ownership of vessels, as well as to an intrin-
sic and often chronic overcapacity, have lesser capabilities of doing so, being thus 
more vulnerable to the vagaries of the business cycle. This difference has an obvi-
ous impact on the bottom line: logistics companies are able to ensure higher rates 
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of asset utilization and, as can be seen in figure 9, in general they tend to achieve 
higher return on equity than pure transportation companies. 
 
Figure 9: Asset intensity and return on investment. 
Source: Bloomberg. 
It is the basic tenet of this chapter that carrier strategies of building increas-
ingly larger vessels, in the pursuit of the holy grail of ‘economies of scale’, and then 
selling the un-used capacity to their competitors (2PLs) is fundamentally flawed. 
Carriers, it is submit-ted here, should strategically use their unduplicated resource, 
the ship, and develop bundling strategies the pricing of which leverages around the 
ship. Economies of scale can then be achieved not by going-it-alone with larger 
ships but through better alliance co-ordination and uniformity in ship sizes. 
It can be argued that shipping lines have always provided integrated services 
by means of selling intermodal transportation or quoting all-inclusive rates. In this 
sense bundling is not a new concept. What is new is the increased attention to the 
subject and the greater importance that has been given to the logistics business by 
the carriers, and their change in strategy that has transformed logistics from a 
marginal activity to an important component, even if yet ancillary to ocean trans-
portation. 
Bundling in the supply chain, from an ocean transportation perspective, 
naturally includes the provision of services such as terminal operations, feedering, 
warehousing, and hinterland transportation. Carriers tend to increasingly extend 
their business scope, integrating the aforesaid services. Vertical integration, at least 
partially, is thus a direct con-sequence of the carriers’ decision to provide bundles 
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and, analogously, bundles constitute the most logical outcome of a vertically inte-
grated carrier.  
Bundles involving ocean transportation may be provided in the following 
contexts, all competing with each other to a certain extent. 
 Ocean transportation may be sold jointly with logistics services by a 3PL, 
not under the control of the shipping line. In this case, the logistics opera-
tor may or may not be asset based. 
 Ocean transportation may be sold jointly with some logistics services by 
the logistics affiliate of the same shipping group, which often functions as 
an independent profit centre, pursuing its own business objectives. In this 
case, the ship-ping line presents a certain degree of vertical integration (at 
least within the group), although additional logistics services may still be 
insourced from third parties.  
 Ocean transportation may be sold jointly with other logistics services by 
the shipping line directly. The shipping line may or may not be vertically 
integrated. If vertically integrated, the company will use its own trains or 
trucks or dedicated terminals, alternatively it will insource these services 
(Acciaro, 2009b). 
The above distinctions highlight the complex market structure that the provi-
sion of bundles creates. As shown in Figure 10, the ocean carrier may be facing 
competition not only from other (integrated and non-integrated) carriers, but also 
by (asset and non-asset based) logistics service providers, which are also their cus-
tomers; by cargo owners who may provide logistics solutions through their own 
shipping department; and even by the logistics affiliate of their own group. 
 
Figure 10: Integration alternatives in the supply chain. 
Source: Acciaro and Haralambide, 2007. 
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It is clear that the degree of competition is related to the nature of the com-
ponents of the bundle. Some bundles, for example ocean transportation and ter-
minal handling, are more likely to be provided at a more competitive price by the 
ocean carrier than by the ship-ping department of large manufacturer. In essence, 
bundle competition boils down to the question of how good is the bundler in as-
sembling the bundle. This involves not only strategic aspects such as marketing, 
promotion, corporate image and market share, but also tactical ones relating to the 
efficiency of bundle production; i.e. at what prices can the components be pur-
chased, and at what cost can the bundle be assembled. 
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Four major groups of players seem to exist in the provision of bundles involv-
ing ocean transportation and logistics services.  
 Pure liner companies. These are companies whose main scope is ocean trans-
portation. Although the number of these companies is decreasing, as the 
majority of carriers provide other services too, they may exist separately in 
the same holding group, together with a sister company that specialises in 
the provision of third party logistics services and to which the demand for 
logistics services of the liner company is channelled.  
 Integrated liner companies. Some companies have extended their operations 
vertically so that they provide logistics services to some of their customers. 
These services are offered and charged directly by the liner company itself 
next to ocean transportation. Such activities have traditionally included 
hinterland transportation and short-sea distribution (feedering). 
 Third party logistics service providers connected to a liner company. Some liner com-
panies have created a subsidiary or a sister company within the same hold-
ing group that operates as an independent third party logistics (3PL) busi-
ness, such as NYK Logistics, Maersk Logistics (now Damco) APL Logis-
tics, etc. In general, these companies are independent operators and as 
such are not required to combine their logistics services with the ocean 
transportation provided by the group and vice versa. From the viewpoint 
of the logistics provider, ocean transportation is just another logistics ser-
vice, and it might well be that in some cases, for some customers, this ser-
vice may not be even required. The fact that the companies are in the 
same corporate group, does not necessarily imply joint provision of ser-
vices. 
 Pure third party logistics service providers. These are logistics providers who are 
not connected to a specific liner company and purchase ocean transporta-
tion independently from all carriers in the market. 
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It is generally acknowledged within the liner shipping sector that logistics 
does represent the direction in which business is expanding. Even Mediterranean 
Shipping Co (MSC), which has traditionally been looked at as a company not in-
terested in logistics, recently announced that it is looking into expansion possibili-
ties offered by the logistics sector.  
In any case, it is hard to consider logistics as the core business of liner opera-
tors, and even if there is an indication that shipping lines are investing in logistics, 
we are surely still far away from considering this as the core component of the liner 
business in general. The logistics business is generally perceived to constitute 15-
20% of the total revenues of liner companies, and generally no more than the 30% 
of group revenue (EUR and SMU, 2006). These findings conform to the general 
intuition that the involvement of shipping lines in logistics, even if this is a rapidly 
growing trend, still offers plenty of room for expansion, and the two should be seen 
as complementary activities.  
Shipping companies do seem to be willing to expand their logistics activities 
as long as the marginal revenue from this is greater than marginal cost or, in the 
longer-term, if it affords the company a strategic advantage over competitors. Ex-
pansion into logistics is rarely perceived as a cost saving strategy, but as performing 
a support function to ocean transportation in the attempt to provide a better ser-
vice to customers and differentiate the liner product. 
On the basis of the significance of logistics in company strategy, shipping 
lines may be categorised at least in the following three groups: 
 
 Logistics enthusiasts: those are companies that have invested heavily in lo-
gistics in an attempt to differentiate their service over that of their competi-
tors. Among them one can list the AP Møller Mærsk group, the NOL 
group and NYK Logistics and Megacarriers. 
 Logistics functionalists: companies that have invested in logistics in order to 
support the demand of some of their major customers. These include some 
of the major Japanese carriers such as MOL and K Line, that entered the 
logis-tics market in the early nineties to support the operations of their ma-
jor Japa-nese customers in Europe and in the USA. 
 Logistics cautious: are those companies that have invested in logistics, or are 
planning to do so, having realised that some of the market leaders are ex-
panding in this sector and are thus gaining competitive advantage. 
This categorization is similar to the one provided by Midoro and Parola 
(2006), distinguishing among highly integrated, latecomers and de-verticalized carriers. 
Their categorization points more to the direction of the stage of development, in 
terms of level of integration, rather than to strategic motivation.  
Although carrier decisions to provide bundles seem to be motivated by a 
number of factors, it was never suggested by the companies interviewed in the con-
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text of this research that bundles were used strategically to improve market control 
(EUR and SMU, 2006). Instead, the great majority of reasons mentioned as being 
behind bundling and vertical integration strategies had to do with cost efficiencies 
and in particular with: 
 the necessity to accommodate the demands of large customers in exporting 
countries that prefer to use the liner company also for their logistics oper-
ations, in the familiar on-stop-shopping formula; 
 the attempt to countervail cyclicality in the liner industry, with a steadier 
source of revenue, as, in general, the logistics market is less dependent on 
the volatility of freight rates;  
 the possibility of obtaining higher margins by jointly offering ocean and 
hinterland transportation; 
 the necessity to improve coordination with hinterland connections, as in-
creased coordination is required for effective delivery of door-to-door ser-
vices, by shippers and logistics operators with whom the carrier works.  
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Before discussing how bundles are composed in practice, it is important to high-
light the difficulty in univocally establishing the range of services that are provided 
in the logistics industry and their economic characteristics. In the EUR and SMU 
(2006) research, the following, non exhaustive, categorisation is proposed. 
 Terminal handling: includes loading and unloading operations from ship to 
shore; to another vessel; to an inland vessel (e.g. barge), or another means 
of transport; stacking of containers in the yard; yard movements; other op-
erations, characteristic of a container terminal; 
 Warehousing: includes storage; cross-docking; components retrieval; sorting; 
and (limited) assembling operations that are usually performed in a ware-
house;  
 Stuffing/Stripping of containers and cargo consolidation: this includes the loading 
and emptying of cargo in containers and the collection of cargo from vari-
ous shippers and vendors;  
 Container services: they include all services that are necessary for the con-
tainer itself, such as cleaning; pest control; fumigation; general mainte-
nance; repairing; painting; etc. These services were traditionally per-
formed by carriers, but they are also now carried out by terminal opera-
tors or specialised companies; 
 Container logistics: they comprise all movements of containers from the ter-
minal to the consignor/consignee and vice versa; 
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 Cargo logistics: involve all movements of cargo, from the moment it is un-
loaded from the container to its final destination; distribution centre or 
consumer. Cargo logistics also involve movements of cargo before it is 
stored in the container, from the production facility or the origin; 
 Value added logistics services: these include logistics operations on the cargo, 
such as the instalment of chips, barcodes, RFID labels, labelling, dating, 
packaging, sorting, etc; 
 Hinterland transportation: this refers to the simple movement of containers in-
land by means of truck, train or barge, as opposed to any other type of lo-
gistics activities performed on the container or the cargo. 
The above categorisation is the first necessary step for all analyses on bun-
dling. Bundles are feasible as long as they reduce costs for the customers, either by 
increasing the efficiency of the control of the transportation chain, or by lowering 
carrying (inventory) costs; in other words, by reducing transaction costs. 
Ocean transportation can be provided successfully together with cargo-
handling, container services, hinterland transportation and container logistics. 
Other services such as stripping and stuffing of containers; cargo consolidation; 
warehousing, etc., are often provided by logistics operators and not by the lines 
themselves. Cargo logistics and value added logistics do not seem, so far, to fall 
within the scope of bundling with ocean transportation.  
Supply chain components that are priced jointly with liner services are cargo-
handling, container services and hinterland transportation. Warehousing appears 
to be priced jointly with liner services only upon request and in general very rarely. 
Stuffing/stripping of containers and cargo consolidation services are provided by 
specialised companies, and al-though they can be priced together with ocean 
transportation, this also happens infrequently.  
The frequency of certain types of bundles, compared to others, may also de-
pend on customer preferences, common practice, geography and law. For example 
it is common practice for shipping lines to provide city-to-city rates in the US. 
These differences may be substantial even within the same region.  
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From the interviews carried out in the context of EUR and SMU (2006), it became 
fairly clear that the major determinants of bundle pricing are the value the bundle 
delivers to the customer and the cost of providing the bundle. One interviewee 
mentioned: ‘Provided the value our bundled service brings [to the customer] exceeds the cost of 
our offering, we can sell’. Another interviewee mentioned that bundles should be 
priced ‘taking full recognition of the costs and revenue potential for all individual components. 
The intention of bundling is that this isn’t a discount’. 
  118
Although a bundle is generally expected to afford shippers a lower or at least 
equal price than the sum of the prices of the individual components, this is often 
not the case in the logistics sector and the price of the bundle could be higher. This 
would happen if the bundle is perceived by the customer as a better proposition 
than the individual components purchased separately28. When the price of the 
bundle is below the sum of the prices of the individual components, this is the re-
sult of the opportunity of the liner company to cross-subsidize bundle components, 
ideally leveraging on the ocean transportation price, as well as the result of the ad-
vantages obtainable from lower transaction costs. This, in the end, is the compara-
tive advantage of those companies that have the skills to provide a larger set of ser-
vices, vis a vis those whose capabilities are limited to the provision of a single ser-
vice, either transportation or any other. 
In practice, the price of a bundle is set in various ways, ranging from the sum 
of the costs of the individual components plus a margin, to what the market can 
bear. As said, such bundles can only be sold (see model below) if their price is 
lower than the sum of the prices of individual components plus the shipper’s trans-
action costs in putting the bundle together himself. Bundles priced lower than this 
involve component cross-subsidization aimed at market entry and strategic long-
term profitability based on service differentiation. 
Of course this price increase can only be possible if the shipper values the 
provision of a bundle as a higher quality service than the pure combination of the 
stand-alone services. Often, this is because of a reduction in transaction- and co-
ordination-costs and in this way the shipper may be willing to give up some of the 
savings obtained and compensate the ‘risk’ taken up by the carrier. 
An additional point worth noting is that certain bundles may be unfeasible 
i.e. bundles whose cost is higher that the linear sum of component costs. Naturally, 
these bundles would not be offered. It seems though that the feasibility and profi-
tability of bundles might depend on the characteristics of the supply chain in terms 
of cargo, geography, time sensitivity and policy related issues in most cases. 
The discussion on the liner shipping industry presented in this section will be 
based on a set of expert and professionals interviews. In general it should be no-
ticed that the companies interviewed are large carriers that engage in a form of 
another in the provision of logistics services in addition to ocean transportation. 
The choice of these carriers is particularly interesting as these companies are some 
of the industry leaders, and therefore understanding how they approach the issue 
of bundling imply understanding the industry best-practices. 
Due to the companies concern for the disclosure of information, no company 
or interviewee names will be mentioned. It should be noted that four companies 
provided inputs for this discussion and seven experts or company representatives 
                                                
28 The case in which the price of the bundle is higher that the price of the individual components is 
known in the literature as premium bundling (Cready, 1991). 
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have been interviewed. The interviews have been done personally by the re-
searcher on the basis of a semi-structured format and varied in length from several 
hours to thirty minutes. The interviews have been transcribed and then verified 
with the interviewees for consistency. 
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In general it should be noted that collecting information on this topic has been ra-
ther difficult so far as carriers often perceive pricing as strategically very sensitive. 
It is surprising to many of the interviewees that pricing is perceived as such, as the 
way a company sets prices is generally in the public domain.  
One of the interviewees believes that one of the most critical issues in the 
management of a carrier refers to the way a carrier observes and evaluates its costs. 
Cost management and in particular costs apportion in the liner industry is particu-
larly difficult, as a large part of costs are shared. It is therefore difficult to asses 
whether a new shipment is bring in money or not, as some costs elements may be 
actually hidden. The ability of each carrier to apportion shared costs in the right 
way to each shipment/customer may in the end be one of the distinctive factors 
that might guarantee a company survival when markets are against. 
That is one of the reasons carriers constantly monitor their utilization levels. 
The utilisation level of the vessel, that is by far the most important asset of the 
company, is a good approximation of how well a carrier is doing in using his assets. 
Nevertheless utilisation levels are not enough in determining whether a company 
strategy is successful or not, nor is revenue per Forty-foot Equivalent Unit (FEU). 
This is because they do not provide an effective tool for steering the company 
strategy. Intercompany comparisons, however, should have something to say on 
efficiency. 
A first important statement that emerged from the interviews is that prices in 
the this industry are lead by supply and demand or in other words that each car-
rier has limited if no influence at all in determining whether the freight rate for a 
container goes up or down. One interviewee mentions that small premiums might 
exist for some carriers in recognition of their ability to provide a more reliable ser-
vice, accommodate customer demands better and maintain schedule integrity. 
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Traditional liner customers can be divided in three categories: 
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 Beneficial Cargo Owners (BCOs): they include direct shippers with size-
able volumes, such as Philips, Nike, etc. The relations with these customers 
are set on the basis of volumes, origin and destination of cargo, as well as 
other strategic considerations, such as increase in volume in the future, 
customer relations, customer loyalty, opportunities for sales of other re-
lated services. Typically contacts with those clients are negotiated yearly. 
In view of keen competition for such contracts, their ‘prices’ should closely 
reflect the cost of the service provided. 
 Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs) or Non-Vessel Op-
erators (NVOs): these are logistics service providers that reserve space on a 
ship and resell container slots either as part of integrated transport in an all 
inclusive rate basis, or jointly with other services but priced independently. 
NVOCCs handle containers referable to a BCO don’t understand this and 
Freight All Kinds (FAK) neither this. Contracts with NVOCCs are negoti-
ated quarterly. NVO rates are generally higher than BCO rates when 
markets are rising and lower than BCO rates when markets are declining, 
or in other words respond more rapidly to changes in the freight market. 
 Scrap market. This consists mostly of scrap metal, plastic and paper. Con-
tracts in this area are traditionally negotiated on an all-inclusive basis and 
this is an important market for backhaul trades. 
In the Europe/Far East and in the US/Asia trades, the overall customer base 
is subdivided approximately as follows: BCOs approximately 30%, NVOs 55% 
and scrap commodies 15%. On the US-Europe trade scrap commodities are al-
most absent and NVOs count for two thirds of the trade.  
Purchases in the liner industry are done through a network of agencies. The 
attempt to place orders on the internet has not been particularly successful so far 
(Lu, Lai and Cheng, 2007) even if web-based applications are commonly used for 
tracking and tracing the container and its cargo (in the supply chain). Next to con-
tainers booked on the spot, large shippers may have time contracts with a carrier 
of generally one year. Slots on board of a ship can be purchased either through a 
broker or directly through an agent of the carrier in the port of departure or in 
major locations, this can be done in person/by phone or through a IT booking 
system.  
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At this stage it is important to explain what type of services ocean carriers provide 
and what they quote when asked to do so by a customer. When requested for a 
price (P) for an integrated service a carrier will provide the following: 
 Pre-carriage (PC) (if necessary); 
 Ocean freight rate  (OF); 
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 Feeder transportation at origin (OFE) (if necessary) (it includes CAF, BAF 
and THC); 
 Origin terminal handling charges (OTHC);  
 Currency adjustment factor (CAF); 
 Bunker adjustment Factor (BAF); 
 Destination terminal handling charges (DTHC); 
 Feeder transportation at destination (DFE) (if necessary) (it includes CAF, 
BAF and THC); 
 On-carriage (OC) (if necessary). 
In case of transhipment, the shipper will not be charged extra Terminal 
Handling Charges (THC) in the port of transhipment that will be included in the 
OTHC and the DTHC. In case of feeder it should be noted that the bill of lading 
port determines the THC to be used. 
The first quotation will be then 
P = PC + OC + OFE + OTHC + OF + CAF + BAF + DTHC + DFE + OC  
The following negotiations will most likely aim at a reduction in the quota-
tion, but generally addressing only the Ocean Freight. It seems in this way that the 
carrier sets a sort of minimum tariff built up of all elements of P with the exception 
of OF. These elements might be perceived by the shipper as cost based and there-
fore non-negotiable, while the OF component seems to be the flexible part of the 
quotation open to negotiation. In this way the carrier is de facto setting a two part 
tariff, where the fixed component that is necessarily a function of the route and the 
location contains a certain mark-up that allows for pricing OF below marginal 
costs if necessary. In the case of the paper trade discussed later, the interviewee 
consistently referred to ‘negative’ ocean freights, in the sense that the all-inclusive 
prices quoted for the paper trade, if stripped of the price components other than 
the OF would generate a negative result. This can only be explained if all the com-
ponents contain a mark up that at least covers the variable costs of the freight rate 
of repositioning an empty container. 
If the carrier were to propose an all-inclusive price he would be willing to ne-
gotiate all the elements of P. Therefore he will not propose the use of all inclusive 
prices unless requested by customer or unless customary in the trade. This is the 
case of waste paper and scrap commodities. This type of trade has traditionally 
beet quoted on an all-inclusive basis, but the freight has always been very low. This 
trade on the Europe/ Far East route constitutes between 10% and 30 % of total 
volumes and although not remunerative in itself has been used by carriers as a way 
to reduce the empty imbalance and reduce the costs of repositioning. This type of 
trade is also particularly sensitive to changes in the price of the commodity. If the 
price of waste paper for example drops in China, due to a fall in demand, this is 
immediately reflected in the freight. 
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In addition the incorporation of certain price elements in the freight, might 
be consuetudinary in certain countries of the world. For example in some Middle 
Eastern countries ocean freight is quoted including THC. Similarly in Turkey and 
Poland THC are included in the feeder freight rates. 
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When discussing the issue of bundling, some of the interviewees mentioned that a 
bundling proposition is never perceived as too beneficial to the carrier, and they 
would therefore not propose bundles actively to a customer, but provide an all-
inclusive price only if requested. In the Europe/Far East trade bundles are rather 
uncommon, and when starting negotiations the first quotation is generally an un-
bundled price. In fact, the prices quoted may be different if the services were to be 
sold separately. In this sense the contacts will always provide a form of bundle, 
simply because the prices of the separate components, although independently 
quoted, would be higher if the services were not provided within the contract.  If 
we consider pricing of contracts as bundle pricing by definition, then bundling be-
comes much more substantial, as contracts represent 80% of total. In the Trans-
Atlantic Trade though bundles tend to be more common. 
The benefits of bundling as a marketing tool to increase sales do not seem to 
apply in this case. The question remains on whether the benefits obtainable from 
price bundling are exploited by the logistics service provider associated with the 
liner. In the end price bundling is a well-known practice for third party logistics 
providers (3PL), which as a matter of fact do this as part of their daily job. The 
interviewee mentions several times that the role of the 3PL is principally that of 
generating business for the liner branch of the company. This is at variance with 
discussions had with the 3PL branches of the same organisation, that claim to act 
independently of the liner company in the market. It is hard to believe though that 
the association of a 3PL company with one of the carriers does not generate any 
benefit, as most of the customers will perceive the carrier to be somewhat behind 
the scenes and guarantees slot capacity to its associated 3PL. It seems that in some 
cases the practice of price bundling of ocean transportation and other logistics ser-
vices is entrusted by the carrier to the 3PL branch of the group. 
3PL and carriers alike mentioned in several occasions that many customers 
prefer to deal with carriers and 3PL that are independent from each other. In 
other words, customers that make use of the 3PL associated with an ocean car-
rier—either as part of the carrier holding group or as sister company—fear that 
the 3PL will make use of the associated carrier despite it being more expansive. 
Similarly, logistics operators, which represent a substantial part of the liners’ ca-
pacity—in the case of APL for example on the Europe/Far East route they consti-
tute 55% of the total trade volume—want to be assured that they are not treated 
differently from the 3PL associated with the group.  
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The interviewees were asked whether in their experience the combination of ocean 
transportation with hinterland transportation could generate cost savings and 
under which circumstances they would actively propose such bundles to a cus-
tomer. From the interviews it does not emerge clearly that the carriers would ac-
tively propose bundles under a single price. 
The interviewees referred to triangulations as a possible way to reduce costs 
and stated that this is a regular practice among carriers. Cost savings through tri-
angulations are already embedded in the pricing mechanisms used by some of the 
companies. In general some of the companies make use of software that increases 
or reduces a base tariff on the basis of the costs savings achievable through, for ex-
ample, container repositioning. 
For instance, let us assume that containers are needed in Manchester for a 
large shipment to Singapore via Southampton (Shipment A) and that moving a 
container from Southampton to Manchester costs 300 GBP. If the carrier would 
be aware of a customer that would be willing to ship to Liverpool, it might propose 
to include on-carriage to Liverpool in a bundle together with ocean transportation 
to Southampton (Shipment B). Let’s assume that the shipment to Southampton 
generates X GBP (Shipment B), while the shipment from Manchester to Singapore 
generates Y GBP (Shipment A).  
The total revenue of the two shipments would be X + Y minus the cost of 
bringing the container from Southampton to Manchester, i.e. X + Y - 300 GBP. If 
the carrier is able to include in the shipment B also the on-carriage to Liverpool for 
a increase in price L he will obtain from shipment B the amount X + L. Assuming 
the costs of moving the container from Liverpool to Manchester are negligible, he 
could then charge for shipment A as before, without though incurring the costs of 
moving the container from Southampton to Manchester. In this second scenario 
he will have X + L + Y - 300. 
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Figure 11: Example of triangulation. 
The carrier could virtually set L = 0 for he would incur the cost of moving 
the container in any case, but it is likely that a shipper would accept L as high as 
300 GBP, depending on his ability to negotiate hinterland transportation rates. In 
this case the bundle price X + L would grant the carrier an increase in revenue, 
and it is a clear example of product bundling. Whether the two services would 
then be priced separately does not matter, as L is not representative of the cost of 
the service provided (road haulage from Southampton to Liverpool) but can only 
be explained through the overall understanding of the carrier strategy. Similar 
cases are common also in air transportation. 
Through these types of mechanisms, product bundling may grant liner com-
panies substantial costs savings. A second example involves the costs of feedering 
containers to a port that has a deficit in empty containers. Similarly to the previous 
triangulation case the carrier could virtually charge an extra cost for the service of 
bringing a container from a port to a feedering location that requires empty con-
tainers. What is more interesting in this case is that, THC excluded, the marginal 
costs of an extra container on the feeder service are negligible for the carrier if he 
already provides a feeder service to that location. Bundling feeder service with 
ocean transportation could in such cases virtually be done for free (or only upon 
the payment of the additional THC). 
What the carrier should observe is whether the delivery of an extra container 
to a certain destination either through feeder or road haulage does not increase 
any other costs. Some of the carriers seem to have included also this type of con-
siderations in their pricing software, that seem to be able to automatically calculate 
what are the cost advantages obtainable though triangulations on the basis of the 
existing bookings and is therefore able to offer a lower price for a specific shipment 
that favours repositioning. 
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A third case refers to the ability to balance eastbound and westbound cargo 
flows in the Europe/Far East trade. Let us assume that a shipper is interested to 
transport a certain amount of containers from Singapore to Rotterdam, and that 
the carrier is aware of a shipment of containers back from Rotterdam to Singapore 
with the same shipper that has not been booked yet. Assuming the revenue obtain-
able from Singapore to Rotterdam is R and that the costs of moving containers 
back from Rotterdam to Singapore is S, the carrier could offer a bundle of two 
shipments from Singapore to Rotterdam and from Rotterdam to Singapore at any 
price between R and R + S, as long as he is not subtracting capacity on the ship 
from Rotterdam to Singapore that could be sold at a price higher than S. The car-
rier could not charge anything above R + S as it is likely that in that case he could 
offer the unbundled alterative that would cost the shipper R + S. This in the end 
boils down to the pricing mechanisms discussed by Jansson and Shneerson’s Liner 
Shipping Economics (1987) among others, although bundling is not expressly men-
tioned there. 
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A particularly interesting case refers to terminal handling charges and the way they 
are levied. Terminal handling activities and ocean transportation are a clear ex-
ample of bundling (Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007). Terminal handling services 
are provided by the stevedoring company (or the port authority, in those cases 
where the two coincide) and are invoiced to the shipping line (exceptions exist in 
very special cases of ports directly invoicing the shippers, e.g. in Turkey). This cost 
(for the carrier) is passed downstream to the importer/exporter by means of 
THCs, or a through charge, i.e. all-inclusive charge, on the basis of the contractual 
agreement between shipping line, importer or exporter.  
The estimation of the average proportion of stevedoring charges in the total 
price of transport from port gate to port gate is a difficult exercise even for the 
shipping line itself. This is because in addition to terminal charges, tariffs are parts 
of contracts and are also confidential for over 80% of total liner trades. Additional 
reasons contributing to the complexity of calculating terminal charges can easily 
emerge from the relevant contracts between terminals and carriers. They often 
include provisions that affect the total cost of a ship call, such as total volume dis-
counts; discounts based on the size of the call; the modal split at which containers 
are transported out of the terminal; empty/full ratio; FEU/TEU ratio, etc. As a 
result, stevedoring costs may differ from call to call. 
The only formal definition of THC was the one presented in the CENSA 
Code, agreed upon in the ‘80s (but not ratified by the shippers in the nineties), that 
includes a specification of services and a cost split known as the 80/20 rule, where 
carriers were accountable for 20 percent of terminal handling charges. The propo-
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sal was initially accepted by the ESC in December 1989. In June 1991, the ESC 
formally notified CENSA that it no longer felt bound to the 80/20 rule. 
THCs have not been substantially modified (at least in Europe) in the last ten 
years.  This is remarkable given that, for the carrier, THCs are (or in principle 
they should be), a cost to be passed on to the cargo owner and this cost, i.e. termi-
nal charges, can vary considerably even among different ship-calls (see below). In 
this respect, ‘stability’ of THCs can be ‘suspect’ of tacit collusion and THCs may 
have been set at levels as high as to allow coverage of the most adverse cost chan-
ges (e.g. demurrage and other congestion surcharges). 
It is also fairly well understood that carriers (conference or independents) 
used not to deviate much from conference THCs. This is also remarkable (and 
indication of possible collusive behaviour) given that different shippers have differ-
ent needs and, in principle, they should be charged differently, the more so when 
carriers are being charged differently by terminals. THCs were collectively decided 
by conferences and protected under the antitrust immunity of tariffs. 
Most of the time THCs as set up by carriers that did not adhere to a confer-
ence did not diverge significantly and consistently from conference THCs (FEFC; 
TACA and IPBCC). It is a general understanding in the industry that it is to the 
benefit of independents to abide by conference THCs, as they are often set well 
above terminal costs. It is also known however that independents often quote lower 
THCs, for competitive advantage. What matters to the shipper in the end, how-
ever, is the final door-to-door price, especially taking into account other rather in-
tangible costs such as time; reliability; and security. In consultation with the Com-
mission, non-conference THCs will be surveyed, reported and benchmarked to the 
extent possible.  
THCs in non-EU countries are mostly charged by conferences or by individ-
ual lines. There are cases where THCs are charged by the port authority (tradi-
tionally in some countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, most notably Turkey). In 
and for trades from and to the United States, it is common practice to charge 
door-to-door tariffs that include ocean freight, THCs and hinterland transporta-
tion. Although THCs are not set by governments (other than public port authori-
ties mentioned above), governments have interfered with the conference or indi-
vidual line THC setting process, case in point being the Chinese government in 
2006 prohibiting further increases of THCs to and from ports of China. 
THCs are utterly predictable as they have remained virtually unchanged in 
Europe and are clearly mentioned in the contract with reference to conference 
surcharges as standard contractual terms. To what extent, however, THCs reflect 
the cost of terminal services, and they are thus just a pass-on cost, remains to be 
established. It is believed that, in a number of cases, THCs are set well above ter-
minal costs and, therefore, part of them constitutes a successful revenue generating 
exercise on behalf of carriers. This supports the discussion of THC being a first 
form or bundle pricing in the industry. 
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The case has often been considered whether terminals would be willing to 
charge shippers directly. Although a distinct possibility, earlier discussions of the 
investigators with terminal management have shown that the latter would be ra-
ther reluctant, in view of the administrative burden involved in dealing with thou-
sands of small shippers. Furthermore, shippers might end up worse off by losing 
the economies of scale achieved by carriers in view of their consolidated, large vol-
umes and thus negotiating power against terminals. Again, and for as long as 
THCs continue to be charged separately, this assumes that THCs are cost-related 
and any volume discounts achieved by carriers are passed on to shippers.  
For the carrier, THC is a pass-on cost. Each carrier (or group of carriers) has 
a contact with a terminal for cargo handling/terminal services. The costs of these 
are passed on to the shipper through THCs. At a port, it is possible that different 
carriers have different cargo handling contracts depending on the complexity and 
magnitude of the service they require: the length of the contract; the amount of 
carrier investments; and so on. It has however been observed that, despite cost dif-
ferences, often carriers charge shippers the same THC.  When this happens, this 
can be an indication of collusive behaviour, making THC non-cost related.  
It is also possible that the same carrier charges different THCs to different 
shippers (or cargo) in the same port. This is legitimate, for shippers/cargo have 
different service requirements e.g. for storage; movement; refrigeration; etc.  
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As shown in the previous chapters, price bundling in the service sector is well doc-
umented, (see for example the airline industry, the joint provision of hotel accom-
modation and air travel, as well as air travel in conjunction with bus transfers, or 
insurance packages). Nevertheless it is hard to find references in the logistics litera-
ture of bundling of logistics services together. If on the one side it can be argued that 
logistics operators have been providing integrated logistics services such as ware-
housing and distribution, or packaging/labelling, or jointly with trucking, rail 
transportation, etc. for more than thirty years now, they have traditionally been 
priced separately. 
In reality a closer look will reveal that most likely bundling has taken place in 
the industry but in a less evident manner. Although logistics services have been 
priced separately, their prices are set differently depending on whether the service 
is sold as part of an integrated service or as a standalone product. In this regard, 
we can talk of a form of cross subsidisation of services.  In order to be able to fully 
understand the impact of price bundling in the logistics industry, it should be 
pointed out that (price) bundling is not a discount. In other words, the reduced 
price in one of the logistics services jointly sold derives from i) the ability of the lo-
gistics provider to either reduce costs in his supply chain (product bundling) or ii) the 
ability to sell an additional service that may not reduce the supply chain costs but 
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may still be attractive for the shipper (price bundling). This is essentially different 
from a discount that may rise from high volumes, long-term relations with a client 
or strategic reasons. 
In the liner shipping industry any attempt of bundling, such as in the case for 
example of ocean transportation and terminal handling services, have been per-
ceived with diffidence by the customers. Nevertheless, the necessity for better re-
sponsiveness in the supply chain; the increasing demand for just in time logistics; 
and the general tendency towards a “one-stop-shop” could open opportunities for 
product bundling.  
In the particular case of ocean transportation, a bundle seems to be the most 
logical option at least in the following two cases: 
 the provision of ocean transportation and terminal handling; 
 the provision of ocean transportation (including terminal handling) and 
hinterland transportation or feedering services. 
The joint provision of ocean transportation and terminal handling services 
provides an interesting example of the analysis of carriers’ decisions within the 
supply chain. The provision of transport together with terminal operations is one 
of the obvious forms of vertical integration in the shipping industry and represents 
the most immediate example of natural bundle. In fact, it would not be feasible if 
every shipper was to pay handling charges directly to the terminal operator. By 
having to act as intermediaries, carriers may have the possibility of using terminal 
handling charges as steering tool for shippers choices, in other words to provide 
price bundles. In addition carriers have the choice of using common users termi-
nals or set up dedicated terminals29. Beyond the argument of being able to serve 
customers better through dedicated terminals, especially in times of port conges-
tion, intuitively dedicated terminals may grant shipping lines even the possibility to 
provide product bundles. This is because the major advantages deriving from the 
development of dedicated container terminals seem to be the greater flexibility, 
reliability, short turnaround times and enhanced efficiency in the management of 
the global supply chain (Haralambides, et al. 2002; Cariou, 2001; Acciaro, 2009b), 
that can be easily translated in lower production costs for the integrated shipping 
line. 
The second case of existing bundles is ocean transportation and hinterland 
transportation or feedering services. This grants the possibility of shipping lines to 
quote point-to-point tariffs as opposed to port-to-port tariffs. While point to point 
tariffs are a reality in the USA, they are not so common in Europe. The integra-
tion of ocean transportation with hinterland or feedering transportation as shown 
by the various examples of companies such as Maersk, NYK or APL is the first 
step to product bundling. It is likely that this practice will become increasingly 
                                                
29 For a more detailed analysis of the drivers behind the phenomenon of dedicated terminals refer to 
Haralambides, et al (2002) and to Cariou (2001). 
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common in the coming years as the conference system is dismantled and pricing 
mechanisms adapt to shippers requirements. 
The development of a logistics operator that has the additional advantage of 
controlling the ship, considered as a strategic asset, may seem not so far away. 
Nevertheless, as clearly discussed by Heaver (2002a), even if shipping lines are in-
creasingly becoming vertically integrated, the management of logistics services re-
mains distinct from the management of shipping and so does pricing. This has also 
been observed in a survey conducted by Frémont (2006; 2009): even though a 
large number of shipping lines provide logistics services, these services are in most 
cases neither priced nor offered in conjunction with ocean transportation. 
The limited use of this practice may still be explained on the basis of histori-
cal arguments (Midoro and Parola, 2006), the specific characteristics of the liner 
industry and, in the end, as the direct consequence of the contractual relations that 
have so far governed the shipment of containerized goods by sea. 
The development of global integrated logistics though and the increasing ne-
cessity of supply chain visibility have begun to change the attitude of shippers to-
wards price bundling. At least in the destination markets (Europe and the Unites 
States) where a large number of value adding logistics activities take place and the 
penetration of the container is substantial, the use of single price mechanisms 
would be beneficial both for the shippers and the carriers (Acciaro and Hara-
lambides, 2007; Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010). 
From the shippers perspective the advantages of price bundling are clear. 
They can be summarised under what is generally referred as one-stop-shopping 
principle. In addition, the following aspects could be considered in favour of price 
bundling:  
 It would simplify comparisons among logistics suppliers; 
 It would increase supply chain visibility; 
 It would provide better choice to shippers; 
 It would most likely increase competition among service provides and 
lower prices. 
The major disadvantage identifiable for shippers on the use of price bundling 
becoming more common, are linked to the dependency for the entire supply chain 
on a single operators. If on the one side it would be possible to reduce risk by cre-
ating parallel chains entrusted with different suppliers, this would reduce the ad-
vantage obtainable for example from large batch sizes, inventory coordination, etc. 
Given the importance of supply chain strategies in the majority of modern produc-
tion processes, it is rather unlikely that we will observe soon shippers entrusting 
their entire logistics and procurement activities to a single operator. Nevertheless 
middle solutions and a tendency towards integration are not unlikely to keep on 
appearing. 
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Since the 80’s several ocean carriers have invested in hinterland transportation and 
terminal facilities (Midoro and Parola, 2006). Although many carriers recognise 
the importance of providing integrated service at door-to-door rates, instead of pure 
ocean transportation (Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007; Haralambides and Ac-
ciaro, 2010), the 2008-2009 market downturn has forced many carriers to divest 
non-core assets (Hailey, 2009). Although offering door-to-door services does not re-
quire integration, an integrated carrier has the possibility of better controlling the 
transaction costs deriving from combining ocean transportation and other services 
(Williamson, 2008). Integration of course comes at a cost, but in practice, the cost 
of organising vertically integrated transportation may be outweighed by the gains 
obtainable from better coordination. At least in some cases. 
The reasons behind vertical integration in liner shipping have been analysed 
since the 70’s and 80’s (Casson, 1986), and to many vertical integration seemed the 
only way forward (Frankel, 1999a; 1999b). More recent contributions (Heaver 
2002a; 2002b; 2005; Evangelista, 2005; Frémont, 2009), although recognising the 
crucial impact of integration strategies on ocean carriers and shippers, are more 
cautious and stress the fact that integration along the supply chain raises a set of 
controversial issues, such as shippers perception (Heaver, 2002a; Acciaro, 2009a; 
Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007; Haralambides and Acciaro, 2010), or issues re-
lated to the different management skills required for ocean transportation and lo-
gistics (Frémont, 2009; Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007). 
                                                
* This chapter is based on Haralambides, Acciaro and Karydis (2009), and Acciaro (2010b). We ac-
knowledge reference to Karydis (2007) on which part of the chapter is based. 
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Among the key reasons in favour of vertical integration in liner shipping, 
Heaver (2002b) pointed out at demand complementarity, costs reduction and ben-
efits accruing from increase of market control and business diversification. In a 
broader sense we can refer to these economies as new and better ways to serve cus-
tomers. Using Porter’s words, these economies grant firms competitive advantage 
since firms create value for their buyers through performing these activities (Porter, 
1990). Using a different perspective, vertical integration is motivated by the advan-
tages that accrue to ocean carriers and their customers from a different way of 
transacting (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Vertical integration implies that 
the shipper (or the logistics service provider) transfers his control of the coordina-
tion of the chain to the ocean carrier. 
The use of the transaction concept as a unit of analysis calls naturally for the 
paradigms developed in the context of transaction cost economics (TCE). Al-
though a lot of common grounds can be identified between TCE and supply chain 
management, no applications have been made in the context of liner shipping, and 
limited reference even in the supply chain management literature by and large 
(Williamson, 2008). In the context of TCE, transaction costs are intended as the 
costs of using the market mechanism (Coase, 1937). The theory of transaction costs 
explains that in every economic transaction, in addition to the costs incurred in 
purchasing a product, a set of additional costs is relevant in explaining markets 
(Rao, 2003). Namely these costs are a consequence of asymmetries in information. 
In the case of integrated ocean carriers or of a third party logistics providers, their 
knowledge of the logistics service market may be better than that of the cargo 
owner. 
The use of TCE can be particularly valuable in the context of ocean trans-
portation and logistics outsourcing and constitutes a solid ground on which ocean 
carriers can engage in bundling strategies. Although bundling does not necessarily 
require vertical integration, when the transaction between the carrier and a logis-
tics service provider are taken out of the market, carriers may have a better posi-
tion to engage in bundling. This happens because of their better ability to harness 
transaction costs and reduce the impact of information asymmetries. This is the 
theme of the first part of the chapter. In section 6.2 to 6.4 we discuss the role of 
transaction costs in logistics and ocean transportation. 
Vertical integration though comes at a cost, and some carriers may prefer to 
opt for contractual agreements or other forms of cooperation that do not entail full 
vertical integration. These forms are often listed as hybrid governance models and 
include the large spectrum of contractual agreements between market and hierar-
chical governance models. But what organisational alignment should a carrier opt 
for? Also in this case TCE provides a valuable guide in selecting the parameters 
that are relevant in explaining the organisational alignments we observe today in 
the industry. This is the topic of sections 6.5 to 6.10. In this part of the chapter we 
investigate how TCE can contribute refocusing the issue of liner companies verti-
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cally integrating along the supply chain. The chapter presents a set of possible 
alignments that are consistent with what is observed in practice and build on bilat-
eral dependency and contractual safeguards. Finally the chapter discusses a simu-
lation exercise to show how vertical integration reduces transaction costs 
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The concept of transaction is central to the new institutional economics. Transac-
tions are fundamental in the economy since without adequate mechanisms to 
transfer rights, economic units do not have the possibility of taking advantage of 
the division of labour. The division of labour is at the basis of any form of eco-
nomic specialisation that therefore cannot take place without transactions. Trans-
actions, nonetheless, are not sufficient in explaining modern market economies. 
Once the possibility of transacting is there, economic units have to organise the 
production or provision of services, identify and select adequate technologies, fac-
tors of production, etc. This process entails also setting up property rights and the 
rules for their transfer. In a market economy, this acquires a more fundamental 
role, considering the special role property rights play (Ménard, 2004b). 
The concept of transaction costs appeared in the article The Nature of the Firm, 
of Coase (1937) and is defined simply as ‘the cost of using the price mechanism’ 
(Coase, 1988: pg. 38). Allen (1999) explains that the concept of transaction costs 
has been interpreted in two different ways. On the one side there is the ‘property 
rights’ tradition that focuses on the role of transaction costs in determining prop-
erty rights. In this sense, transaction costs can be defined as: ‘the costs of establishing 
and maintaining property rights’ (Allen, 1991). On the other side there is the ‘neoclassi-
cal tradition’, that defines transaction costs in a narrower and more explicit way 
assimilating them to transportation costs, taxation and the like. In this sense, trans-
action costs are defined as: ‘the costs resulting from the transfer of property rights’ (Allen, 
1999). Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) proposed a distinction between ex-ante 
and ex-post transaction costs, where the former are those costs that occur before the 
transaction and include gathering information and contract negotiation, while the 
latter occur after the transaction has taken place and include monitoring and en-
forcement costs. 
North (1990) introduced a distinction between transformation and transaction 
costs, the sum of which would make total production costs and shows that transac-
tion costs are to a large extent the result of measurement problems and the resul-
ting difficulty of enforcing the transfer of rights, particularly on extended markets 
dominated by impersonal exchanges. The underlying hypothesis behind transac-
tion costs, independently of the stream of literature, is limited information. Nego-
tiation, fraud, communication and contract stipulation all come about because 
knowledge is incomplete and not common (Allen, 1999). Information costs are 
prerequisite of transaction costs and are a necessary condition for their existence. 
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Information costs however are not always transaction costs. Barzel (1977) has been 
a strong supporter of this distinction and defines transaction costs as those costs 
that are required to formulate and police contracts. Information costs are at the 
heart of transaction costs because they lead to measurement (Barzel, 1982; 1985). 
This issue is addressed more in detail in chapter eight. 
Information asymmetries occur when a party in a transaction has more or 
better information than the other (Black, 2002). The concept of information 
asymmetries and related concepts such as moral hazard and adverse selection have 
forced economists to review traditional market models. Principal-agent problems 
are common in economics and have been extensively studied since the introduc-
tion of the concept by Akerlof (1970). Spence (1973) introduced the concept of sig-
nalling as a possible solution to information asymmetries, but, in practice, observing 
and interpreting signals also bears a cost. Similarly, the concept of screening pro-
posed by Stiglitz (1975) requires the agent to bear certain costs. 
The existence of information asymmetries and transaction costs influences 
market outcomes as opportunisms and bounded rationality affect transactions. 
Bounded rationality implies that agents have limited capability of handling too 
much information (associated with a given transaction), whereas opportunistic be-
haviour is maximizing profit or utility against a third party (Williamson, 1985). 
The result of information asymmetries and transaction costs implies that contracts 
are fairly incomplete. Although the theory on incomplete contracts is far from con-
clusive, Tirole (1988) indicates contracting, bargaining and arbitration as a fist type 
of resorts in order to prevent or deal with unforeseeable contingencies. Two inter-
esting concepts are used in theory as a substitute for contracts: reputation and dual 
sourcing. Reputation allows a firm to save on the costs of writing complete con-
tracts, since a firm that cheats runs the risk of losing profitable deals in the future. 
Dual sourcing entails introducing a form of competition on some variable that 
cannot adequately be negotiated ex ante (such a quality). In this way the buyer can 
choose the supplier that best fits its needs after the transaction has taken place. 
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Although the connection between transaction costs, information asymmetries and 
supply chain management seems natural, very few studies have taken up the chal-
lenge of analysing the traditional supply chain management problems though the 
lenses of transaction costs economics (Williamson, 2008). This is rather surprising, 
since transactions and contracts are at the core of supply chain management. In 
general, transaction cost economics focuses on a single transaction, while, supply 
chain management aims at understanding and managing related transactions 
grouped in chains. 
The use of transaction cost economics is particularly interesting especially 
when outsourcing and procurement decisions are analysed. The existence of posi-
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tive transaction costs is enough to justify inter-firm contracting mechanisms and to 
explain, in the limit, the case in which transactions are taken out of the market and 
are organised internally (Williamson, 1996). This leads to the emergence of differ-
ent governance models, where market and hierarchy, i.e. full vertical integration, 
are the extremes. Between the market and the hierarchy governance models, we 
have what is referred to as hybrid models (Williamson, 1996). Hybrid governance 
models rely on the credibility of commitments, the cost effectiveness of which va-
ries with the attributes of the transaction (Williamson, 1991; Ménard, 2004a) and 
are a possible way of looking at the organisational structure of integrated ocean 
carriers.    
Within hybrid models, information plays a crucial role (North, 1990) as dis-
cussed in the previous paragraph. Information in the supply chain allows for cost 
minimization if appropriately linked to the ideal sourcing selection, and is funda-
mental in supplier-manufacturer relationship (Corbett and Tang, 1999). Lee, So 
and Tang (2000) quantify the value of sharing demand information to retailers and 
manufacturers, and literature has emerged on the strategic implications of infor-
mation sharing (see Leng and Parlar, 2005). Özer and Raz (2006) provide a clear 
example of the link between information and transactions. Under symmetric in-
formation, when suppliers know each other’s cost, they prefer split award contract, 
i.e. they both want to provide sourcing to manufacturer, whereas the manufacturer 
prefers sole sourcing (Özer and Raz, 2006). On the other hand when information 
is asymmetric manufacturers prefer split award contract in order to benefit from 
suppliers’ differentiation in cost (and thus pricing) policy, since they do not know 
each other’s cost (Özer and Raz, 2006). 
Uncertainty plays a significant role also in determining the actual costs in-
curred after the transaction has taken place (see Shapiro, 2007). The higher the 
uncertainty involved in a transaction the higher the subsequent costs. In other 
words, asymmetry (the lack of free flow of information) causes uncertainty, which 
in turn causes transaction costs.  
Supply chain management requires dealing with uncertainty (Chopra and 
Meindl, 2004). This uncertainty derives from the existence of unpredictable costs 
that occur in operational interactions between service providers, market conditions 
and customer characteristics. The level of uncertainty varies from market to mar-
ket. If a provider operates alone in a competitive environment he deals with higher 
uncertainty than he would if he offered bundles of services. This statement refers to 
his internal/administrative transaction costs. For example, if he is offering sea 
transportation (carrier) and has to arrange inland transportation for his client, then 
he also has to gather information as to who is the more reliable provider for this 
service. And once he chooses a partner he needs to negotiate with him and (after 
the agreement) to monitor his operations. Extending this statement one step fur-
ther, a greater minimization of uncertainty is to be expected if he is the aggregate 
efficient provider of multiple logistics services because, in this case, he doesn’t have 
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to negotiate with or monitor his sister company. Of course, the operations of his 
network are not without control but this is more administrative than market based. 
We have identified three types of uncertainty in our system: 
1) The first one appears at the shipper-provider stage. The shipper is some-
what uncertain regarding the reliability of the service provided in terms of existing 
and inevitable transaction costs (we assume therefore that there isn’t free flow of 
information in the system). Various costs result from the endogenous uncertainty 
in transactions, as these take place in a network of asymmetric information. 
2) The second type of uncertainty is inherent to the production process of 
each provider. Cost minimization and productivity maximization within the pro-
vider’s intra-company infrastructure, may reveal numerous problems caused by 
unpredicted events in daily operations. In logistics this could be translated in delays 
in delivery, in container dwell time in terminal operations, and so on. 
3) The third type of uncertainty occurs among service providers. Insufficient 
information about the quality of service that the competitors offer and the extent at 
which these differences determine each provider’s efficiency, imply difficulties in 
strategic decisions. This type of uncertainty is perhaps the most important factor of 
the provider’s survival as it indicates his ability to cope with competition in the 
long run. 
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The importance of third-party logistics service provision also referred to as logistics 
outsourcing, has increased steadily in the last two decades and so has the attention 
that practitioners and academics alike have dedicated to the subject (Marasco, 
2008). Firms have several options available to them as far as logistics services are 
concerned. They can provide logistics services in-house, they can have these activi-
ties provided by a logistics subsidiary previously purchased or set up, or they can 
simply purchase the service from an external company (Razzaque and Sheng, 
1998). 
Transportation in particular is one of those activities that are most likely to be 
outsourced (Selviaridis, et al. 2008). Some of the reasons for this are cost savings, 
problems associated with the internal administration of transportation functions, 
the fact that transportation is not a core competence for many firms, issues related 
to supply chain flexibility, or simply the complexity of managing certain transport 
services or the high investment costs necessary to set them up (Boyson, et al.1998). 
This is certainly the case for ocean transportation, for which the high costs associ-
ated with the provision of a regular, frequent and reliable intercontinental service 
would be prohibitive for most firms, and surely highly inefficient for society 
(Brooks, 2000). Outsourcing relationships between shippers and ocean carriers are 
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central for international supply chains and globalisation by and large (Cullinane, 
2005). 
Since the 80’s, ocean carriers have expanded the scope of their operation to 
include other logistics services, such as terminal handling, hinterland transporta-
tion and to the extreme supply chain management and value added logistics, in the 
phenomenon referred to as vertical integration along the supply chain (Heaver, 
2002a). Since the extent to which a carrier embraces vertical integration is deeply 
rooted in its overall business strategy (Robinson, 2005), various degrees of integra-
tion can be observed in the industry (Frémont, 2009). The empirical review of the 
industry developments in the recent years (Slack and Frémont, 2008), reveals 
ocean carriers have developed their capabilities of providing logistics services along 
different paths. 
On the one extreme there are those carriers that have marginally invested in 
logistics beyond hinterland transportation, such as MSC, while on the other there 
are those that have centred their activities on integrated door-to-door logistics solu-
tions, such as NYK (Frémont, 2009). In between, we have carriers that have set up 
logistics services under the umbrella of the same parent company (APL and APL 
Logistics), and those who have built a considerable portfolio of parallel logistics 
activities (Maersk Line). In the recent months some ocean liners have divested par-
ticipation in container terminals (e.g. CMA-CGM) and other chain investment 
raising doubts on the viability of maritime supply chain integration strategies espe-
cially in market downturns (Hailey, 2009). 
The grounds on which an ocean carrier may be brought to opt for a certain 
logistics activity setup are still unclear, in particular in period of rapid business 
change. One of the core theoretical arguments used to justify vertical integration 
along the chain refers to the reduction in transaction costs that eventually it deliv-
ers (Haralambides, et al. 2010). Nonetheless, the role of transaction costs in shaping 
the organisational form of the logistics activities of a container carrier has not yet 
been satisfactorily explicated. What determines the degree of integration between 
an LSP and an ocean carrier? What are the attributes of the transaction govern-
ance models that make a carrier choose for a specific integration setup? 
These questions call naturally for the paradigms developed in the context of 
transaction cost economics (TCE). But to date no attempts have been made to ap-
ply the frameworks of TCE to the liner shipping industry30, and only few refer-
ences can be found in the supply chain management and logistics literature by and 
large (Williamson, 2008). TCE however offered successful analytical perspective in 
a wide range of applied problems (Geykens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006), includ-
ing outsourcing contracts (see Coltman, et al. 2009; Barthélemy and Quélin, 2006). 
                                                
30 Although no applications exist to liner shipping industry, in the article of Masten, Meehan and 
Snyder (1991), ‘The costs of organization’, the authors use the shipbuilding industry as an empirical 
estimation of organisation costs.  
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The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative and original analytical ap-
proach to issues connected to vertical integration in liner shipping by making use 
of the lenses of TCE. The aim of the article is use TCE in order to provide a re-
newed research agenda on vertical integration. 
The definition of logistics outsourcing provided in Chapter 4 highlights two 
important distinctions between third party logistics service provision and arm’s 
length contracts. It implies some sort of long-term agreement between the parties 
(typically a year) and the provision of management and design activities. 
Logistics outsourcing can be constructed on different forms of supply chain 
relationships. The spectrum of ways of building cooperation instead of adverse re-
lations exclusively based on price negotiations, has been studied extensively and 
concepts such as cooperation, coordination and collaboration in the chain have 
emerged as effective ways of structuring supply chain relations next to market ne-
gotiations (Speckmann, Kamauff and Spaer, 1999). Nonetheless supply chain rela-
tionships are not yet fully understood (Hines and Samuel, 2007) and the organisa-
tional structure that is better apt at providing an array of logistics services is still 
open to debate (Selviaridis and Spring, 2007). 
The benefits of outsourcing are multiple and can be summarised in strategic, 
financial and operational benefits (Selviaridis, et al. 2008), and refer mostly to the 
possibility of reducing costs and increasing competitive advantage (Razzaque and 
Sheng, 1998). Empirical analyses seem to point towards transportation and ware-
housing as the most outsourced services with respect to supply chain advanced so-
lutions such as information management and process control  (Lieb and Bentz, 
2005a; Wilding and Juriado, 2004). 
We hope in the next paragraphs to be able to show that TCE can offer an-
other valuable perspective. Before looking at the application of TCE to the liner 
shipping industry, it is expedient to provide a background note on the theory of 
economic organisation in the perspective of TCE. 
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The purpose of economic organisation 
Using the lenses of transaction cost economics, the main purpose of economic or-
ganisation is adaptation (Williamson, 2008). Economic actors adapt spontaneously 
to changes in the market (Hayek, 1945: pp. 526-527), or pursue a ‘conscious, deliber-
ate and purposeful’ adaptation through administration in hierarchies (Barnard, 1938, 
pg. 9). Markets and hierarchies are the polar modes of economic organisation, 
each with distinctive strengths and weaknesses. In order to explain the connection 
between transactions and organisational adaptation that lead to certain forms of 
economic organisation, it is important to focus on specific attributes of transac-
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tions. Most of the literature on TCE focused on asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency (Williamson, 2008). 
Asset specificity has been widely studied (Williamson, 1975; 1979; Grossman 
and Hart, 1986; Klein, et al. 1978). Williamson (1991) reports six asset-specificity 
distinctions: 
 Site specificity aiming at economising inventories and transportation costs; 
 Physical asset specificity that entail the development of technical relations 
n the transaction; 
 Human asset specificity deriving from learning-by-doing and economies of 
experience; 
 Brand name capital; 
 Dedicated asset that entail the development of infrastructure or investment 
dedicated to a specific customer; 
 And temporal specificity characterised by timely responsiveness. 
Asset specificity is also the driving force behind bilateral dependency. Bilat-
eral dependency though is not necessarily problematic if contracts were not in-
complete and parties would not have to adapt to disturbances. Disturbances are 
the result of uncertainty and jointly with asset specificity they constitute the major 
objective of contractual action. Frequency of contracting actions becomes relevant 
when reputation effects are tangible and the costs of setting up a contract with a 
new party are substantial (Williamson, 2008). 
Transaction governance attributes 
Next to the transaction aspects, the TCE identifies a set of attributes of trans-
action governance structures. These attributes give rise to different adaptive 
strengths and weaknesses and can be categorised as incentive intensity, administra-
tive command and control, and contract law regime. The relation among transac-
tion attributes and governance structures can be summarised using the words of 
Williamson (2008: pg. 9): 
‘Transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with govern-
ance structures, which differ in their adaptive strength and weaknesses, so 
that to accomplish a transaction cost economising result.’  
Incentives of decision-makers and other economic agents are the fundamen-
tal factors that distinguish among market and non-market organisations (William-
son, 1996). In particular market structures are characterised by high-powered in-
centives, little degree of administration control and legalistic contract law regime. 
Hierarchy in contrast features low-power incentives, high degree of administration 
and weak contract law regime, since the firm is its own dispute settlement forum 
(Williamson, 2008). Between the two extreme governance structures of hierarchy 
and market, Williamson (1991) proposes and analyses hybrid forms. Hybrid forms 
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feature semi-strong incentives, an intermediate administrative control and a semi-
legalistic contractual law regime (Williamson, 1991: pg. 281).  
The important issue is how the alignment between transactions and govern-
ance structures is achieved. Asset specificity plays a crucial role on the definition of 
the desirable governance structure. Asset specificity with limited or no exogenous 
disturbances places internal organisation at a disadvantage with respect to market 
contracting, since hierarchies entail increased bureaucratic costs. When disturb-
ances though become more frequent, the costs associated with asset specificity in-
crease and the strong market incentives may impede adaptability, since parties try 
to appropriate adaptive gains as much as possible. In this setting hierarchy may 
provide better governance (Williamson, 1991). 
The hybrid contracting is located in between hierarchy and market with re-
spect to incentives, adaptability and bureaucratic costs. With respect to markets, 
hybrid governance is characterised by lower incentives but allows for better co-
ordination among parties. With respect to hierarchy, hybrid governance reduces 
the ability to coordinate among parties but in turn increases the incentives in-
tensity (Williamson, 1991). A clear example provided by Williamson (1991) of the 
differences between the various forms of governance is the sale of branded pro-
ducts by single brand shops (hierarchy), market and franchise (hybrid). Further 
examples come to mind in supply chain context, where backward integration of 
manufacturing into procurement is an example of hierarchy. A form of hybrid is 
provided by the selective policy towards suppliers applied by McDonalds restau-
rants. 
It should be noted that vertical and lateral integration are considered forms 
of hierarchy. To the eyes of the transaction cost economist, these forms of integra-
tion come as a response to the necessity of parties to adapt. Williamson (1991) pre-
sents two forms of adaptation. Adaptation A, where A stands for Autonomy, corres-
ponds to the neoclassical paradigm according to which consumers and producers 
respond to prices in order to maximise utility and profits. Adaptation C, where C 
denotes Cooperation, enters the picture when, because of disturbances, bounded ra-
tionality and opportunism, bargaining becomes costly and authority has adaptive 
advantages with respect to markets. Integration should then be employed when 
other instruments fails, since markets deliver better results in adaptation A respect. 
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Transactions in liner shipping 
How could the concepts presented in the previous paragraph be applied to the 
liner shipping industry in the quest of explaining the specific type of set-ups we ob-
serve in practice? Before proceeding with the discussion on the organisation of 
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liner shipping, it is instrumental for a clearer definition of the problem to elaborate 
on the nature of the transactions we are focusing on. 
We can identify the following transactions that are relevant for our discus-
sions: the transaction of the carrier with a shipper (named B in fig. 19) and a trans-
action of a carrier with a logistics service provider (A in fig.19). In addition we will 
refer to the transaction of the LSP with the cargo owner (C in fig.19). It should be 
considered that the nature of transaction A is different is looked at from the side of 
the carrier or from the side of the LSP. For the former it is a customer transaction, 
while for the LSP it is one of the many outsourcing relations. In the rest we will 
refer to vertical integration as the situation in which the transaction A, instead of 
being aligned with a market is organised hierarchically or through a hybrid form of 
governance. 
 
Figure 12: Transaction among shippers, LSPs and ocean carriers. 
Source: Author. 
Adaptation in liner shipping 
In the rest of the discussion, in order to disentangle the issue of vertical integration 
along the supply chain, we will refer to the pragmatic methodology proposed by 
Williamson (2008). The pragmatic methodology is in line with the theoretical 
frameworks developed by the TCE and is built around three precepts: keep it sim-
ple, get it right and make it plausible. The theory develops on three steps, prioriti-
sation, conceptualisation and operationalisation. With the first we focus on what 
are the central forces in the theory, with the second we proceed with describing 
those defining aspects of the central forces and the third is achieved by naming and 
explicating the attributes of the transactions and the governance structures that 
emerged in the analysis.  

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Starting with prioritisation, the main purpose of all economic organisation is 
adaptation (Williamson, 1991) as mentioned in the previous paragraph. In order to 
identify how liner shipping adapts to the market disturbances, it is useful to analyse 
the reasons for which vertical integration is likely to emerge. This provides an indi-
cation of the type of disturbances that affect contracting between ocean carriers 
and LSP. 
Heaver (2002b; 2005) mentions demand complementarity, costs reduction 
and other benefits (mainly strategic market control increase and business diversifi-
cation). Similarly Frémont (2009) expands on the argument of Heaver (2002b) ex-
plaining that shipping lines integrate vertically in the attempt to capture cargo. 
This would reduce the dependency on freight forwarders for volumes. In addition 
Frémont (2009) refers to an argument presented by Notteboom (2002; 2004a) and 
points at the necessity for carriers to reduce costs on the hinterland leg of door-to-
door transportation since the use of larger vessels tends to increase the relevance of 
hinterland costs with respect to costs associated with the sea-leg. 
These explanations refer to a large extent to changes in the demand re-
quirements. The growth of the third party logistics service provision (Rabinovich, 
et al. 1999, among others), the increased centrality of supply chain management 
thinking (Horne, 1989) and the competitive pressure that characterises liner ship-
ping in the last thirty years (Fusillo, 2006; Slack and Frémont, 2008), constitute 
some of the disturbances that influence the industry governance structure. Al-
though in general disturbances in demand can be accommodated directly through 
the market (adaptation A), structural differences such as those we have witnessed 
may require adaptation of type C (Coltman, et al. 2009). 
Shippers have been faced with changing market conditions and this has trig-
gered the search for better ways of outsourcing their logistics (Berglund, et al. 1999; 
Notteboom and Merckx, 2006). But why should shipper entrust more than ocean 
transportation to an ocean carrier when they have a large number of third party 
logistics service providers that specialise in finding best logistics service solutions? 
Although a detailed answer to this question is not yet available, we can think of the 
following reasons: the shipper has already extensive relations with the ocean carri-
ers and the shipper’s chain is extensively based on ocean transportation. As the 
shipper is dependent on ocean transportation for the transaction, instead of using 
another party, he may find advantageous to make use of the same carrier. In high 
market conditions, the shipper may be under the impression that acquiring an 
integrated service from a carrier may even offer discount opportunities on the 
chain with respect to purchasing services from a third partly logistics service pro-
vider. 
Midoro and Parola (2006) try to explain from a business development point 
of view the reasons behind vertical integration. The major driver for some com-
panies seemed to be business diversification and build on investment opportunities 
in related markets. For other companies, generally part of larger industrial con-
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glomerates, the decision to invest in logistics is motivated by the desire at a group 
level to better control distribution and marketing in expanding markets. This is 
most notably the case for vertical integration in the 80’s for the major Japanese 
carriers and has been confirmed by a number of interviews done on the topic by 
Acciaro and Haralambides (2007). In this case, the disturbances influencing the 
industry structure are connected to the change in the global production system, i.e. 
globalisation, and the business diversification opportunities this opened.   
Vertical integration, nonetheless, could also be motivated by operational con-
siderations. In addition to the relevance of container logistics (in combination with 
vessel logistics and freight logistics) as a source of operational efficiency, as clearly 
discussed by Frémont (2009), integration in the terminal industry would grant a 
carrier advantageous conditions in terms of slot availability and increased flexi-
bility (Haralambides, et al. 2002; Heaver, 2005). The emergence of a global steve-
doring industry represents also a disturbance factor, by changing the nature of 
competition for terminal handling and by providing further business opportunities 
(Midoro, et al. 2005; Olivier, et al. 2007). The complete discussion on the issue of 
integration between terminals and ocean carriers though would require a more 
extensive analysis that what is the case here. 
The reasons discussed refer to specific types of disturbances that intervene to 
affect the organisational asset. We can summarise these disturbances around de-
mand, technical economies, competitive environment, and internal company strat-
egy. 
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Types of transaction costs 
The issue of transaction costs is often listed as an important concept to explain and 
justify vertical integration. Excluding conglomerate integration, that may be rel-
evant for shipping groups (e.g. AP Møller Mærsk), vertical integration in the tradi-
tional meaning occurs when transactions are taken out of the market and become 
organised by one firm. Using Coase’s words, where by combination the author in-
tends lateral integration (see text note in the original article):  
‘There is a combination when transactions which were previously organ-
ised by two or more entrepreneurs, become organised by one. This be-
comes integration when it involves the organisation of transactions which 
were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on a market.’ 
(Coase, 1937: pp. 397-398).  
In this sense, forms of vertical integration in the liner industry would include 
upstream, shipbuilding, container building and agency services, freight forwarding 
downstream. Transaction costs reduction opportunities seems obvious, mostly 
connected to contract negotiation and search costs, similarly to the case of rail-
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roads described by Coltman, et al. (2009). Nonetheless no empirical measurement 
has been performed so far in the liner industry. The integration between logistics 
service providers and ocean carriers on the other side, is somewhat different, since 
we have hardly witnessed full integration and most carriers will keep on selling ca-
pacity to competing LSP (Slack and Frémont, 2008; Frémont, 2009). In this sense, 
transaction cost reductions, although possible, might not be enough to justify verti-
cal integration. 
In addition to transaction costs, reasons for vertical integration are the tech-
nical economies and group synergies obtainable between an ocean carrier and a 
logistics provider, in terms of marketing, increase chain visibility and shared cost 
reduction. The issue is whether these economies are strong enough to grant the 
new integrated entity a competitive advantage with respect to other ocean carriers 
and LSPs. Although no conclusive answer is available in the literature or empiri-
cally, it is likely that the existence of these economies depends on shipper type, 
product and geographical circumstances. As pointed out by Frémont (2009) syner-
gies between container logistics (essentially terminal and hinterland transportation) 
are rather obvious, while synergies at the freight level of the chain are more diffi-
cult to justify. Nonetheless, recent interviews conducted by the author, seem to 
suggest that although rare, these synergies are possible. This is also in line with the 
survey performed by Selviaridis, et al. (2008) on the type of services outsourced to 
LSP. 
Asset specificity and bilateral dependency 
In the case of the transaction between an ocean carrier and LSP the relevant level 
of transaction costs depends on the asset specificity and the level of bilateral de-
pendency in the transaction. This level is bound to depend on the type of supply 
chain we are dealing with. If we analyse the list of categories of asset specificity 
provided by Williamson (1991), the following interpretation with reference to the 
liner and LSP industry and can be worked out.  
 Site specificity aiming at economising inventories and transportation costs; 
in this category the definition of network paths and the locations for ter-
minals, warehouses, and distribution centres.  
 Physical asset specificity that entail the development of technical relations 
in the transaction; This may related to the development of specific coding 
and RFID technologies, or, for the example the technical relation between 
post-panamax vessels and post-panamax cranes. 
 Human asset specificity deriving from learning-by-doing and economies of 
experience; this relays on the ability of accommodating customers re-
quests. 
 Brand name capital; this refers to the association of a carrier and its logis-
tics service provider. 
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 Dedicated asset that entail the development of infrastructure or investment 
dedicated to a specific customer; the development of terminals or hinter-
land gateways. 
 And temporal specificity characterised by timely responsiveness; funda-
mental in logistics to favour just-in-time responses for example. 
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Governance models 
If we define transaction cost as the costs emerging from a specific alignment be-
tween a transaction and a governance model, we can develop a conceptual testable 
comparison of three situations: 
 The transaction between an ocean carrier and a LSP takes place on a 
market (no-integration); 
 The transaction between an ocean carrier and a LSP takes place within 
the boundaries of an integrated firm (hierarchy). This corresponds to the 
case of a carrier that has the full capabilities of a LSP or of an LSP that has 
acquired vessels (full-integration). 
 The transaction between the ocean carrier and the logistics service pro-
vider is of a more hybrid nature. This can materialise in practice through 
long-term contracts, partnerships, integration of the logistics service provi-
sion and transportation under the same group management. 
If we work out the possible models nested in the last case, we can propose the 
categorisation presented in the following table. 
Table 18: Vertical integration models in liner shipping. 
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Pure ocean carriers and pure LSP (C; L) 
The advantages in terms of transaction costs of this form of organisation re-
lies on the high incentives it provides. This organisation form allows for rapid 
change in strategy and a strong focus on the bottom line. Business opportunities 
may be foregone and synergies between activities cannot be exploited. This organi-
sational form may not be able to respond effectively to changes in customer de-
mands. Transactions between carriers and LSP take place on the market. 
 Intuitively the structure of the liner industry was characterised by C until 
the 80’s, when the disturbances connected with supply chain thinking allowed for 
other forms of transaction governance. Although carriers have more and more 
moved in some forms of integration, examples still exist of carriers focusing exclu-
sively on ocean transportation. 
Integrated carriers (I) 
The main focus of integration is to take advantage of the cost reduction de-
riving from control vis-à-vis market transactions. Integration should be favoured 
when managing the critical chain interfaces on the market becomes more expen-
sive than the cost of higher degree of control and decrease of incentives. The as-
sessment of the effectiveness of this form of governance requires adopting the per-
spective of an LSP. Does the availability of an asset like ships grants the LSP a 
stronger competitive advantage with respect to a non-asset-based LSP? Does the 
provision of logistics services grant the carrier that chain competitive advantage as 
proposed by Robinson (2005)? 
 Full integration naturally sacrifices incentives in favour of better adminis-
trative command and control. The reduction in incentives deriving from integra-
tion may be compensated by the gains obtainable through coordination. Coordi-
nation though also comes at a cost. In general terms high coordination is recom-
mended for high level of bilateral dependency, so in those cases where the LSP 
and the carrier work hand in glove. In our categorisation, we propose integration 
centred on logistics and centred on ocean transportation.  These can be considered 
as transitory arrangements, until full integration is achieved. An example of com-
panies that has come close to full integration could be NYK Logistics and Mega-
carriers.  
Hybrid (CL; LC) 
The last set of possible outcomes refers to hybrid forms of integration that has 
been defined in the table above as CL and LC.  In these circumstances the ocean 
carrier and the LSP are independent companies, although under the same control 
of a holding company or group. This type of construction seems to be the most 
frequent in the industry, although the costs of hybrid models can also be substan-
tial (Williamson, 1991).   
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After the description of the possible governance models, it is useful to proceed de-
riving refutable implications the lead to efficient alignment between the economic 
organisation of ocean transportation and logistics service provision and the type of 
transactions involved between carriers and LSP. This phase of the analysis is re-
ferred to as operationalisation. Using the words of Williamson (2008: pg. 8):  
‘Operationalisation is accomplished by naming and explicating the key 
attributes of both transactions and governance structures, by working out 
the efficient alignments between transactions and governance and by em-
pirical testing. What is required is identifying bilateral dependency’. 
The theory calls for identifying those transaction costs that rise as a result of 
organisational maladaptaion. This is the result of a dimensionalisation phase, 
where the variation of costs is connected with the attributes of the transaction.  
Dimensionalisation 
Reviewing the various models developed in the previous paragraph, what is 
the level of asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency connected with each of the 
transaction governance model? A reasoned summary of the level of asset specificity 
is tentatively provided in the following table. 
Table 19: Governance forms in liner shipping. 
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The success of hybrid governance models is connected the level of efficacy of 
credible commitments (Williamson, 1983). When transactions become highly un-
certain, setup costs are high and the role of reputation is crucial for the transaction, 
then credible commitment is not effective in ensuring a successful transaction and 
hybrid models may lead to increase in costs. 
Predicted alignments 
Given the dynamic nature of the outsourcing relations, it is unlikely to be able to 
provide a one-size-fit-all type of solution. On the contrary, the observation of the 
changes taking place in the liner shipping industry point towards a very different 
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approach. It is important then to identify key parameters that may contribute to 
read the adaptation efforts made by carriers and LSPs.  
A first type of distinction points to measures of asset specificity. In some forms 
of vertical integration, asset specificity may play a crucial role. Let us consider the 
case of terminal integration. The transaction we are referring to is between a car-
rier and a terminal. The issue of asset specificity would lead to answer the ques-
tion, how crucial is the terminal in the provision of the service given the character-
istics of the carrier network? Let us assume that this level of asset specificity is k. If k 
is 0—i.e. there is no bilateral dependency—we may assume that the terminal does 
not respond to any specific needs of a carrier. In other words, the terminal can be 
easily replaced. In this context then it is advisable not to increase administrative 
control on the terminal (i.e. integration), and transact terminal services under un-
assisted market (e.g. multiuser terminals). 
Naturally integration is not the only option to reduce the exposure of a car-
rier-terminal bilateral dependency to disturbances. Terminals and carriers have 
developed a large variety of safeguard measures, ranging from long-term contracts 
to joint ventures. Williamson (2008) calls the level of these safeguard measures as s, 
where s=0 corresponds to unrelieved hazard. In those cases in which both k and s 
are positive, all forms of hybrid governance are possible, up to the extreme of inte-
gration. The level of inter-firm contractual safeguards is bound to increase as the 
complexity of the transactions increases. Integration should be opted for only when 
contractual breakdowns become frequent and costly and unified ownership is the 
only alternative to cooperative adaptation (Grossman and Hart, 1986). 
High frequency of disturbances in transactions, with an increase in contract 
breakdowns, might lead to preferences for market organisation or hierarchy with 
respect to hybrid organisations depending on the level of asset specificity (figure 
13). This observation would justify the ‘decoupling’ of logistics and ocean transpor-
tation trend that is taking place under the current more ‘uncertain’ market condi-
tions and provides an interesting explanation of increase integration of ocean 
transportation and logistics that took place in more stable markets. 
The implications of this approach to organisation are far-reaching. Consider 
for example the impact on the viability of bundle pricing for door-to-door trans-
portation, or even integrated logistics services. Since transaction costs savings are 
offset by higher variability, bundling propositions may be less attractive in highly 
variable markets. As an example, assume a customer interested in an integrated 
proposition. This requires from the side of both parties some degree of bilateral 
dependency. In the moment in which markets become unstable, the costs associ-
ated with the adaptation of the contract to the requirements of the parties increase 
so that to offset the costs advantages granted by the flexibility offered by the hybrid 
governance. Therefore either the parties move to a market governed transactions, 
characterised by the ability to renegotiate contracts, or full integration takes place, 
reducing incentives and at higher bureaucratic costs. The distinction between the 
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two depends on asset specificity, therefore terminals and hinterland transportation 
– that are components in the chain characterised by high asset specificity will be 
fully integrated, consumer logistics or value added logistic on the other side, will be 
governed by market transactions, to the extreme even in the case of the same 
group, e.g. Maersk Line and Damco, APL and APLL. Those companies nonethe-
less retain the cost saving associated with certain asset specificities, such as brand 
name. 
 
Figure 13: Organisation form responses to changes in frequency of disturbances. 
Source: Williamson (1991) 
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In the following paragraphs a theoretical model is presented aiming at explaining 
the effects of supply chain integration on transaction costs. The aim of the model is 
to show how supply chain integration provides better alignment in the case of un-
certain transactions and contributes to reducing transaction costs. A previous ver-
sion of the model appeared in the work of Karydis (2007). 
Let us consider a transaction between a shipper and a logistics service pro-
vider. In addition to the price for the service p, the shipper is faced with the ex-ante 
transaction costs (y) of collecting information about the provider and negotiating 
the contract. Once the transaction takes place, the shipper may have to deal with 
the ex-post transaction costs (z) of monitoring the performance of the logistics pro-
vider and enforcement in case the cargo is damaged or lost. In every transaction a 
shipper incurs: 
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The shipper does not know the values of y and z that are in fact unobservable. 
The aim of the model is minimising the uncertainty over the sum y + z. We can 
model the two costs as random variables, that we will call Y and Z. The uncertainty 
in a complex system of heterogeneous agents can be measured by Shannon’s In-
formation Theory (Shannon, 1948). Shannon’s Information Theory deals in gen-
eral with the problems connected with the reproduction at one or more locations 
of information produced elsewhere. Supplying information is equivalent to remov-
ing uncertainty, or in other words information is given by the difference between 
prior uncertainty and the posterior uncertainty.  
For a random variable X, we define x as the possible value of X and X as the 
set of all x. The a priori knowledge about x is given by the probability distribution 
{pX(x), x X }, where pX(x) = Pr[X=x]. The a priori uncertainty is defined as a 
functional H of the probability distribution {pX(x), x X }, that for simplicity can 
be denoted H({p}), that should satisfy certain axioms. 
Shannon proposes for the functional H({p}), the formula: 
 
 
The quantity H({p}) is called the entropy of {p}. Entropy is a measure of the 
uncertainty associated with a random variable. Whilst conducting a random ex-
periment there is always an amount of information connected with a random vari-
able that is missing. Entropy measures the amount of the information content as-
sociated with the outcome of a random variable. It is expressed in bits (or nats) per 
event, which is the unit of information. 
For two outcomes of a random experiment (e.g. tossing a coin), the entropy 
function is given in the figure below: 
 
Figure 14: Entropy curve. 
The curve is a parabola, which rises to a maximum when the two events are 
equally likely at (0.5) and falls towards 0 whenever one event becomes dominant at 
H p{ }( )= - p x( )
xX
 logp x( )
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the expense of the other. The above figure derives from the binary entropy func-
tion: 
 
For mathematical proofs and Entropy properties see the original article of 
Shannon (1948). 
The entropy indicates the amount of uncertainty in probability distributions 
(Soofi, 1992) or it is the lack of knowledge about a random event (Denbigh and 
Denbigh, 1986). Entropy has a long standing tradition in statistics (e.g. Kol-
mogorov,1959; Khinchin,1957), but is has also been used in economics (Theil, 
1967; Theil and Fiebig, 1984), political sciences (Darcy and Aigner, 1980) and 
voting (Gill, 2005).  
Entropy can also be used to quantify uncertainty in a supply chain network, 
although no examples of this application appear in the literature. In a transaction 
between a shipper and a logistics service provider, we can consider the event 
transaction fulfilment (T). We can define a probability distribution Pr on the trans-
action fulfilment, as follows: Pr is the probability that the transaction is successful. 
In the rest of the formalisation the focus is not on the distribution of T but on the 
distribution of Pr. As the probability of the event is unknown, we can define a ran-
dom variable Pr and we assume that Pr~U[0,1]. 
The ex-ante and ex-post costs are defined as functions of Pr, so that Y and Z 
are a function of the probability of the transaction fulfilment. The rationale behind 
this assumption is that transaction costs will be the highest the more unlikely the 
event T becomes. In the simple case we assume that Y is distributed independently 
from T and from Pr, and specifically Y ~U[u-,u+] and then we assume that Z, that 
indicates the ex-post transaction costs, is a function of Pr. If Pr0.5, where 0.5 is an 
arbitrary value, we assume that Z~U[v-,v+] otherwise Z~U[w-,w+], with u, v and w 
real non negative numbers and v  w. 
In the simple formulation we can assume that the supply chain consists of 
four components and five agents, i.e. a shipper and four independent logistics ser-
vice providers that need to be combined. For each component, we can define a 
random variable Pri, i=1,2,3,4 that indicates how likely is a transactions to end suc-
cessfully. We indicate with Pri the probability that transaction Ti is completed suc-
cessfully. The random variables, Pr1, Pr2, Pr3, Pr4, are independent and uniformly 
distributed on [0,1]. For each of these random variables the corresponding Y and Z 
variables can be obtained.  
In our analysis we will assume that a transaction cost is a function of the in-
formation possessed by a shipper at the moment of the contract stipulation. If we 
consider entropy to be a measurement of this information, we can quantify trans-
action costs for a set of hypothetical situations characterised by different degree of 
integration. We assume that full information corresponds to no uncertainty. 
Therefore if the shipper possesses full knowledge a priori of the result of the trans-
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action (complete contract), there is no uncertainty, and no information is transmit-
ted. If, however, disturbances are present, then contracts are incomplete, and hier-
archy or hybrid governance may be a better form of transaction alignment. The 
next paragraph provides a validation of this statement based on simulation. 
The probabilistic formalisation presented above accounts for the existence of 
uncertainty in the presence of disturbances in the transaction fulfilment random 
variable. It should be noted that in what follows no assumptions are made on the 
change in the variability of the disturbances, or in the quantity of uncertainty asso-
ciated with the random variable transaction fulfilment, i.e. the results are not based 
on changes in the variance of T. Williamson (1991) suggests that an increase in 
uncertainty would favour extreme governance forms, i.e. market or hierarchy, 
against hybrid governance. 
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The higher the degree of integration, the lower the level of uncertainty associated 
with a transaction and the lower the costs associated with the transaction. It should 
be noted, before proceeding to the actual simulation exercise, that the costs deriv-
ing from integration are excluded from the analysis. In order to fully disentangle 
the link between transaction costs and integration along the supply chain, also as-
sumptions on the nature and size of costs associated with the integration should be 
made (see Masten, et al. 1991).  
The simulation examines three different cases. In the first case the shipper 
interacts with a non-integrated supply chain. This case reflects the circumstances 
in which supply chain transactions are aligned with market governance. In the 
second case partial integration occurs. In the simulation we have assumed that the 
chain is managed by two logistics service providers that offer two distinct and 
complementary services each. The last case entails full vertical integration of the 
chain, that implies that the shipper transacts with one single vertically integrated 
logistics service provider. Case two and three are hybrid governance forms; hier-
archy being a fully integrated shipper that manages its own supply chain.  
The simulation system is a multistage and complex network of intermodal 
transportation, which comprises five components. We could assume these compo-
nents to be the shipper, the ocean carrier, the terminal operator, the rail carrier 
and the trucking service provider. The probabilistic input of the model is the ran-
dom variable that represents the probability of transaction fulfilment (Pr). Pr is a 
(pseudo) random number between 0 and 1 generated using Monte Carlo simula-
tion. 
The ex ante and ex post transaction costs are endogenously determined and are 
assigned conditional probabilities given Pr. No feedback is provided, in the sense 
that the results of each stage simulation is not re-input to the model. This implies 
that if the Pr is smaller or equal to 0.5, its value is not modified at the next trial. In 
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this sense the system should be regarded as an open-loop non-feedback system. 
The system components behave as if they had no memory. Although restrictive, 
this hypothesis is justified by the fact that the focus of the present analysis is the 
change in the level of uncertainty and transaction costs and not shippers’ behav-
iour and their ability to modify their choices on the basis of experience.  
A simulation model can be either static or dynamic, depending on whether 
time is taken into consideration, and deterministic or stochastic depending on 
whether it contains a random variable. The model presented here is static with 
dynamic expansion and stochastic. The term static with dynamic expansion refers 
to the fact that transaction costs are considered from the perspective of the shipper 
during the 1,000 repetitions of the transactions in period t. The simulation is then 
repeated 50 times (dynamic expansion). 
For every different level of integration we always begin with the hypothesis 
that the transactions take place at t=1 while repeated 1,000 times (that is 1,000 
trials). The expansion of the model takes into consideration the factor of time as it 
is expressed in t=1, 2, 3…50 periods. In this case we attempt to simulate a situa-
tion where the shipper signs contracts with the providers so as to transport his 
cargo in more than one time periods. The essential reason for this generalized ap-
proach was the necessity to test the model’s reliability after the insertion of the time 
period sequence assumption. 
One final point concerns the logical connection among ex-ante transaction 
costs and the probability of failure Pr in the dynamic setting. In period t=1 the 
shipper incurs information and bargaining costs but he cannot readjust. The ex ante 
transaction costs are therefore random numbers between 10 and 100—ex-ante costs 
can be low but never 0 as they may take the form of non-monetary opportunity 
costs, in the simulation this is represented by the fact that the random number 
cannot be below 10—. However, the expansion allows the possibility of bargaining 
re-adjustment. If in period t the carrier fails to deliver, in t+1 the shipper will 
spend more time on bargaining and negotiating incurring simultaneously higher ex 
ante transaction costs than those in period t. Therefore, the dynamic version has the 
advantage that it permits partial memory for the shipper unlike the static case. 
Even if he is not satisfied with the logistics provider at t he will continue doing 
business with him as he has no other choice. The difference, however in this case is 
that the ex ante transaction costs in period t+1 will depend on the carrier’s perform-
ance in period t. 
Model results 
In the non-integrated case, we assumed a network of four logistics service providers 
and a customer that interact a completely non-integrated network. The market 
interface is imperfect meaning that there is not free flow of information neither 
downward nor upward. The entropy is the sum of the entropy of the four different 
transactions. The sum of the transaction costs accounts for the total amount of 
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costs that burden the shipper during each trial. The ex ante costs take random 
numbers between (10,100) whereas for ex post transaction costs it is assumed that, 
depending on Pr, they might be between 10 and 45 if Pr  0.5 or between 45 and 
100 otherwise (the amounts are arbitrary). Analytically, the higher the Pr the lower 
the transaction costs. For the ex ante transaction costs however we suppose that they 
take random numbers between (10,100). This decision depicts the fact that the 
shipper arrives at the network only once and therefore his transaction costs, before 
the transaction itself, are unknown and unrelated to the provider’s performance. 
In the partially integrated case the initial invariability of time still applies. We 
assume that a partial integration has taken place. For example a carrier owns a 
terminal and a rail carrier owns his own trucks. When Pr is less than or equal to we 
assume the transaction has not been completed successfully. The opposite happens 
if the Pr is greater than 0.5. The joint entropy in this case is given by the sum of the 
entropy of the two semi-integrated components. The ex-ante and ex-post costs in the 
second case occur exclusively at the integrated levels. Ex ante transaction costs 
take random numbers between 10 and 100, whereas for ex post transaction costs it 
is assumed that they are between 10 and 45 if Pr  0.5 or between 45 and 100 
otherwise. 
In second partially integrated case, we assume that a full-scale vertical inte-
gration has taken place among the logistics providers. For example a carrier that 
provides integrated transportation through its own terminal, rail and trucks. When 
the Pr is less than or equal to 0.5 then the transaction is not fulfilled. The opposite 
happens if Pr assumes values greater than 0.5. In this case the system’s entropy 
equals the entropy of the integrated logistic service provider. The sum of the trans-
action costs accounts for the total amount of costs that burden the shipper during 
each trial.  
In all three cases we run the simulation 1,000 times using the Crystal Ball 
Professional Version 7.2. The simulation yielded the results reported in table 20. 
Table 20: Mean and standard deviations as reported by the simulation. 
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Source: Karydis (2007) 
The mean in the case of partial integration has substantially decreased com-
pared to the case of non-integration. Partial integration returned lower uncertainty 
and lower transaction costs than the fully non-integrated network. Essentially, the 
number of market participants has reduced and so did the number of transactions 
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in the system. If we compare the entropy charts in an overlay chart we can observe 
that for all different levels of vertical integration the levels of entropy decreases as 
the integration increases. The more integrated a system is the less uncertainty it 
will exhibit.  
As far as the transaction costs are concerned, we observe that also in this case 
they are reduced as integration proceeds further. Their variability also reduces. 
The third case exhibits the lowest mean105.8, compared to 210.14 of case 1 and 
419.67 of non-integration. 
 
 
Figure 15: Entropy overlay chart. 
Source: Karydis (2007) 
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Figure 16: Transaction costs overlay chart. 
Source: Karydis (2007) 
In the simulations we assumed that our input data are uniformly distributed. 
This means that after n trials the shipper will always have to deal with a situation 
where his chances of having his cargo successfully transported will be on average 
50%. This assumption is rather counterintuitive, as we would not expect logistics 
service providers to be so unreliable. We can show that under different distribution 
assumptions the results still hold. We tried repeating the exercise using the triangu-
lar distribution. This distributional form is typically used as a subjective description 
of a population for which there is only limited sample data, and especially in cases 
where the relationship between variables is known but data is scarce. Instead of 
assuming 0.5 probability of success, the triangular distribution is based on know-
ledge of the minimum and maximum and an "inspired guess" as to the modal 
value. Thus, the simulation using a triangular distribution for the probabilistic in-
put with 0% as a minimum and 1 as a maximum and a 0.7 success rate delivers 
similar results. We present the simulation results for the three cases described be-
fore after 1,000 trials assuming a triangular distribution for the probabilistic input. 
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Figure 17: Entropy graph overlay (triangular hypothesis). 
Source: Karydis (2007) 
 
Figure 18: Transaction costs graph overlay (triangular hypothesis). 
Source: Karydis (2007) 
Model conclusions 
The starting point of our analysis is the observation that a great deal of transac-
tions within the supply chain can be investigated using the lenses of transaction 
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cost economics. Key concepts in this area of research are transaction costs and in-
formation asymmetries and we have explained how these concepts contribute in 
shaping supply chain relations, most notably in outsourcing and procurement 
problems. Asymmetries in information in particular are fundamental in justifying 
how contractual relations within the supply chain are shaped and why most of 
supply chain contracts are incomplete. We provided a formalisation of information 
using the concept of entropy developed in the context of information economics. 
Making use of Monte Carlo simulation, we have explored how transaction costs 
and information are affected by integration. 
In the simulation model we assumed a supply chain made up of four compo-
nents. A cargo owner is faced with three alternatives: dealing with four non-
integrated logistic service providers, two semi-integrated logistics service providers 
or one fully-integrated logistics service provider. Each transaction is characterised 
by the uncertainty of how successful the transaction will be. Under our assump-
tions, and assuming that the expectations on the success of a transaction are distri-
buted uniformly between 0 and 1, we have shown that an integrated logistics ser-
vice provider offers a higher level of transaction reliability, since the information 
associated with the transaction of a single integrated service provider is by defini-
tion higher. This also results not only in a lower mean for the entropy, but also in 
reduce of variability. Ex-ante and ex-post transaction costs are also reduced. 
These results are in line with the advantages presented in the literature on 
integrated supply chain service providers. Nonetheless, our analysis does not model 
the costs deriving from integration, nor does it distinguish among the various types 
of logistics activities. It is likely to expect that integration results in a successful 
strategy as long as the costs associated with it do not exceed the advantages associ-
ated with the reduction in transaction costs and the increase in information. The 
resulting trade-off is an interesting topic for further research. 
The simulation could have been more accurate if the availability of real time 
data had been feasible. The model can be tested for its validity if the random 
probabilities are substituted by actual performances of logistics service providers. 
Nevertheless this task would require an extensive survey into the actual transaction 
costs figure. The hypothesis employed in the model, along with the general as-
sumption of no information and therefore random selection of providers, are func-
tional in highlighting the gradual minimization of uncertainties at every level of 
integration, that was the core focus of this part. 
The topic of vertical integration in the maritime and transport industry 
should be analysed further. The frameworks provided by transaction costs eco-
nomics offer an interesting perspective on the problem and we trust that the dia-
logue between supply chain management, maritime economics and transaction 
cost economics can be a fruitful one.  
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The chapter presented an alternative explanation to vertical integration be-
tween ocean transportation and other logistics services based on TCE. We ex-
plained that TCE offers valuable insights in analysing the issues connected with 
vertical integration in the industry. We proposed alternative models of governance 
and discussed their characteristics in terms of asset specificity and contractual safe-
guard measures. The paper aimed at opening a dialogue between the branch of 
maritime economics that studies integration in liner shipping and the theory de-
veloped by transaction cost economists.  
The obvious extension of this chapter would imply the empirical estimation 
of the transaction costs and organisation costs. There are several examples of stud-
ies that attempted successfully this type of exercises (see Geyskens, et al. 2006). Fur-
ther problems that would be worth investigating empirically refer to the quantifica-
tion of the technical economies deriving from group synergies between ocean car-
riers and LSP. This analysis would require undertaking an analysis of these ec-
onomies on the basis of geography, product vertical and customer characteristics. 
Further issue for investigation refer to the impact of vertical integration on 
competition and on customer relations. Vertical integration is bound to have ef-
fects that go beyond the specific transaction that is internalised within the firm. 
Instruments to assess this type of problems though are still under development in 
the apparatus of TCE. A further interesting point of further research relates on 
how could global carriers and LSP leverage on the eventual synergies delivered by 
integration. The efficacy of the alignment between transactions and governance 
lies in the degree of bilateral dependency between the ocean carrier and the LSP. 
The characterisation of bilateral dependency in this industry is an urgent area 
open for investigation. 
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As discussed in the previous chapters there is a lack of empirical and theoretical 
research of the practice of bundling in the context of logistics and container trans-
portation. This lack of investigation has at least three important consequences: 
firstly the limited ability to assess the potential and benefits of product bundling 
internally for a carrier that decides to engage in this practice; secondly the limited 
ability to assess the impact on shippers and society by and large; and thirdly lim-
ited insight on the competitive effects on other carriers and logistics service provid-
ers. In connection with the first limitation an important issue is the selection of 
procedures and techniques that allow for the assembly of bundles that deliver the 
highest advantages for the firm, generally measured in terms of profit. 
With the exception of Fürderer (1999), in general the literature has dealt with 
the problem either as specific form of optimal non-linear pricing (Armstrong, 
1996; 2006; Shy, 2008; Armstrong and Vickers, 2010) or as an effective way to 
price discriminate (Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999; Eppen, et al. 1991; Guiltinan, 
1987). It should be clear that the concept of optimality in this case refers to profit 
of revenue maximisation and leads to two conceptually distinct, albeit interlinked, 
problems: the determination of optimal bundles in view of internal firm economies 
and the determination of optimal bundles in view of customer firms preferences. 
The issue of internal firm production economies has been partially discussed in 
chapter 6, while the issues related to the latter problem, i.e. the selection of optimal 
methods based on customer preferences is the subject of this chapter. 
In general optimal bundling techniques require behavioural inputs and cus-
tomer surveys are a proven method used for collecting reservation price data. 
                                                
* This chapter is based on Acciaro (2010d). 
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However, performing a firm customer survey in the case of bundling of ocean 
transportation and logistics services revealed to be unfeasible within the constraints 
of the current research project. Confidentiality issues and the sensitive strategic 
nature of service contracts do not place an independent researcher in the best posi-
tion to effectively survey reservation prices in this sector. In addition the limited 
applied research in this area implied that most of the work was bound to be ex-
ploratory in nature. It was decided therefore to limit the scope of the research to 
investigating the applicability of existing techniques to the bundling of ocean 
transportation and logistics, and leave the empirical testing of these techniques for 
future research. This chapter therefore will not present an empirical application of 
most of the techniques discussed. 
This chapter provides a synthesis and critical review of the findings of the 
marketing literature on product bundling with a particular focus on the container 
industry. The chapter contributes to the existing literature at least in three ways. 
First, it proposes an operational framework for managers in the container industry 
based on the existing theory aiming at highlighting the conditions under which the 
sale of bundles delivers benefits to a firm. This framework, structured in a set of 
key propositions, indicates the aspects that should be looked at by a container car-
rier before entering a product bundling strategy. Second, the article contributes to 
the general literature on bundling by providing a new set of examples, with high 
potential for further exploration. Although it is generally widely recognised that 
logistics offers multiple angles for the application of bundling among other price 
discrimination techniques, very limited empirical work has been done in this area. 
Finally, the discussions presented in this chapter will build on the existent method-
ologies to provide a set of techniques whose applicability to the liner shipping in-
dustry seems particularly appropriate.  
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following way. The next section 
will provide a review of the determinants of optimal bundling strategies and intro-
duce key concepts such as conditional reservation prices and asymmetry and 
variability in their distribution. The section will conclude with a set of twelve gen-
eral propositions that can help to determine cases where a bundling strategy can 
be considered optimal. These propositions are used in section 7.3 to determine on 
the basis of the data from the survey presented in chapter 4, what bundles of logis-
tics services are likely candidates to optimality. The rest of the chapter is more 
general and methodological in nature and aims at presenting the description of the 
most common techniques employed in other industries to determine optimal bun-
dling strategies. Particular attention will be given to conjoint analysis as it has re-
vealed itself as one of the most effective methodologies. A proposed step-by-step 
methodology for bundling strategy is provided in section 7.7. Considerations re-
lated to customer profiles in shipping and transaction costs is the object of the fol-
lowing section. Section 7.9 concludes. 
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The determination of the optimality of a bundling strategy depends on the distri-
bution of conditional reservation prices or customer’s willingness to pay. ‘A reserva-
tion price is the amount a consumer is willing to give up to acquire an extra marginal utility of 
some good’ (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004: pg. 661). On the basis of the theory of 
choice the reservation price vi for an additional unit of good i is given by: 
 
v
i
 u(x*)x
i
 
where 
 
u(x) is the monetary utility of a consumption alternative x = {x1, x2,…, xn} 
and x* denotes the optimal solution of the consumer budget problem. The con-
sumer’s reservation price for goods that are currently consumed is simply the cur-
rent market price. In general to entice a consumer to purchase a product, its price 
should drop below its reservation price. Reservation prices depend, like utility, on 
consumer preferences, wealth, current consumption levels, and the price of other 
goods consumers may buy (Varian, 1992). 
Although consumer theory in its original formulation (e.g. Hicks, 1946) refers 
to direct purchases of products by individual consumers, we can extend its applica-
tion to economic agents in general that make consumption decisions, i.e. firms too. 
This is also the approach that has emerged, although on the basis of different con-
siderations, in the context of Post-Keynesian behavioural theory (see for example 
Downward, 2004). This comparison, in the case of logistics services reflects the 
different logistics needs specific of each shipper and their production process or 
strategies, similarly to the differences in preferences of consumers. Their decision 
process therefore can be assimilated to those of a consumer. This generalisation 
allows us to make use of the frameworks and techniques developed in the market-
ing management literature. 
On the basis of the framework presented by Stremersch and Tellis (2002), we 
can define the concept of conditional reservation price as the ‘reservation price of a 
product, conditional on the consumer buying another product’. In the case of logistics services, 
the conditional reservation price of service is the willingness to pay for a service 
under the assumption that another service is required.  A segment is an identifiable 
group of customer firms that shows a similar distribution of conditional reservation 
prices. The relations among the reservation prices for the bundled services deter-
mine under what conditions the bundling of container transportation and logistics 
services might be an optimal strategy for ocean carriers. 
Guiltinan (1987) explains how the provision of bundles of two products may 
lead to the subdivision of consumers on the basis of different sets of reservation 
price distribution. The author argues that when a firm considers the option of pro-
viding a bundle of two products (X and Y), it is confronted with the following four 
market segments: 
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 Segment 1: consumers who only purchase product X; 
 Segment 2: consumers who only purchase product Y; 
 Segment 3: consumers who purchase X and Y; 
 Segment 4: noncustomers. 
Depending on the strategy the firm adopts, each segment may acquire more 
importance. In particular Guiltinan (1987) distinguishes between the following two 
different strategies: cross-selling, i.e. sell an additional service to customers that 
only purchased one service, and the acquisition of new customers, i.e. customers in 
segment 4. Guiltinan then proceeds analysing demand conditions that must be met 
if a bundling programme is to influence customers behaviour in the desired direc-
tion, i.e. favour cross-selling or customer acquisition. Although in general manag-
ers do not know the distribution of reservation prices for the two services A and B, 
they can usually estimate the demand levels in the absence of bundling within each 
segment in a specific period of time. That is why Guiltinan makes reference to ac-
tual quantities sold. 
In this respect Guiltinan distinguishes between mixed-leader bundling and mixed-
joint bundling, where with the former he indicates bundling intended at cross-selling 
in a situation where one of the two products is substantially more demanded than 
the other, while with the latter a situation when the volume gains from selling a 
bundle to customers that are already purchasing a product are close to those ob-
tainable from selling a bundle to customers that are already purchasing the other 
product. The key to effective demand response is the type of complementarity 
among products. 
Stremersch and Tellis (2002) expand the analysis of Guiltinan on the basis 
that the heterogeneity of consumer reservation prices has two dimensions: asym-
metry and variation. The dimension used by Guiltinan (1987) and others (Adams 
and Yellen, 1976; Tellis, 1986) is asymmetry. An asymmetric distribution of condi-
tional reservation prices for two products X and Y occurs when consumer segment 
a has lower conditional reservation price for product X than segment b, and at the 
same time segment b has lower conditional reservation prices for product Y than 
segment a (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). This corresponds to a negative correla-
tion of conditional reservation prices between the two products across segments 
(Adams and Yellen, 1976). 
For example let us consider the demand for transport services and let us as-
sume that a segment of customer firms have high conditional reservation prices for 
truck transportation with respect to rail transportation, for example because they 
demand small order batch sizes, while another has high reservation prices for rail 
transportation with respect to truck, since they require bulk deliveries at a railroad 
terminal. In this case the distribution of reservation prices is said to be asymmetric. 
Variation instead refers to the difference among consumers’ reservation 
prices for the bundle of products. As an example let us consider that an LSP pro-
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viders decides to offer a piggyback multimodal service comprising of rail transpor-
tation and trucking. It is likely that although a certain consumer segment may de-
mand such a service, others may show no interest. On the basis of the distinction 
between asymmetry and vaiability, bundling focus (price or product bundling) and 
bundling form (pure or mixed bundling), Stremersch and Tellis (2002) present 
twelve propositions that summarise the conditions certain bundling strategies are 
preferable to others. These propositions are listed below while for a detailed discus-
sion and proof of the propositions we refer readers to the original article. The next 
paragraph will discuss the applicability of these propositions in the context of 
ocean transportation and logistics services. 
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On the basis of the survey data presented in chapter 4 we can comment on the 
propositions of Stremersch and Tellis in the context of bundles of ocean transpor-
tation and logistics services. In chapter 4 data had been collected for three sectors: 
industrial manufacturing; food and beverages; and electronic parts and consumer 
electronics. Let us assume that a sector may well be considered as a separate con-
sumer segment, since it can be argued that the logistics requirements of companies 
engage in the production of similar products or group of products are similar. 
In what follows it is assumed that demand can be reasonably used as a proxy 
of the unknown reservation price distribution. This might not necessarily be the 
case and a more thorough analysis should consider collecting data directly with the 
aim of estimating reservation prices.  
From the results of the survey we observe that inventory management and out-
bound land transportation rank as the most demanded logistics functions in all the 
three sectors under analysis. This could lead one to think that these three segments 
do not show a high level of asymmetry in reservation prices for these two functions. 
Similarly warehousing, customs clearance and freight scheduling & routing emerge as most 
demanded functions for two of the three sectors. In particular sector 1 and 2 ap-
pear to differ only on rate negotiation and customs brokerage, warehousing and custom clear-
ance, the last two also demanded by sector 3, while sector 3 is the only one to seem 
to highly value terminal handling. 
If we look at the least demanded functions clearly factoring and product assem-
bly/installation are not considered as highly required functions across all three sec-
tors, followed by procurement and fleet management that appear among the least re-
quired functions in two of the three sectors. These functions are likely to have simi-
lar distribution of reservation prices. Interestingly, two functions, shipment consolida-
tion/deconsolidation and product marking/labelling/packaging appear as highly demanded 
by sector 3 and among the least demanded by sector 2. This leads to believe that 
the distribution of the reservation prices for these two functions for both segments 
might reveal to be asymmetric. 
If we look at the activities that are mostly outsourced (table 21) we observe 
that the following functions are outsourced in all three sectors: Terminal handling, 
Outbound land transportation, Transhipment / relay, Inbound land transportation, Shipment 
consolidation / deconsolidation, Freight scheduling & routing and Customs brokerage. With the 
exception of Terminal handling and Transhipment / relay that more than 80% of re-
spondents declare to outsource, we observe that for Customs brokerage is highly de-
manded in Sector 1 and  3, but only by 57% of respondents in Sector 2. Similarly 
Shipment consolidation / deconsolidation seems to be highly demanded (73%) in Sector 
1, but less in Sector 2 (67%) and even less in Sector 3 (57%). 
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Table 21: Most- and least-demanded logistics functions across three trade sectors. 
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Table 22: Outsourced logistics functions. 
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On the basis of proposition 1 we could argue that bundles that include Cus-
toms brokerage and Shipment consolidation / deconsolidation in conjunction with a service 
jointly demanded by all sector would be a good candidate for a price bundle, since 
the distribution of conditional reservation prices are likely to be asymmetric across 
the three sectors. Similarly bundles of shipment consolidation/deconsolidation and product 
marking/labelling/packaging may be candidates of good bundles. 
On the basis of propositions 2 and 4, we can argue that a mixed bundling 
strategy is preferable in the case of liner shipping as it is unlikely that the condi-
tional reservation prices do not vary among the various consumers. Notwithstand-
ing the integration of logistics processes the interest of shippers in a specific bun-
dled proposition will necessary vary on the basis of the geography where the ship-
pers is active, product verticals and shippers own logistics capabilities. In this case 
though, we would be discussing of product bundling, which, following proposition 
three would generate higher revenues. This is the typical case of ocean and hinter-
land transportation by rail for example. 
Proposition 3 and 5 suggest that those bundles that result in a reduction of 
transaction costs will yield benefits to the carrier. If the conditional reservation 
prices among the unbundled components and the bundles are asymmetric, then a 
combination of product and price bundles should be preferred (proposition 3 and 
5). As previously discussed, the integration of ocean transportation with hinterland 
transportation and to a certain extent warehousing and distribution seem to be the 
bundles that allow for lower transaction costs, through better coordination along 
the chain, reduction in repositioning costs and imbalances. Mixed bundling strat-
egies in this context should be preferred. Further empirical analysis would be re-
quired to assess whether propositions 5 is applicable in the context under examin-
ation, but it is unlikely that a bundle of ocean transportation and hinterland trans-
portation for example will have asymmetric conditional reservation prices with 
respect to ocean transportation or hinterland transportation alone. 
Propositions 6 and 7 would require more analysis on the objectives of liner 
companies. It is likely, given the network characteristics of the liner industry, that 
proposition 6 is more likely to describe the integrated liner sector, while proposi-
tion 7 the non-asset based logistics sector (3PL). For the way the markets are oper-
ating now, it is though commercially unfeasible to offer ocean transportation only 
in conjunction with other services. In addition following propositions 8 and 9 
mixed price bundling is a dominant strategy in the integrated liner shipping in-
dustry. Proposition 10 may give a good benchmark of the liner industry with re-
spect to other sectors. Since, as explained EOS and EOSC are substantial in the 
industry, there is scope for the implementation of bundling strategies in the liner 
shipping industry. 
Proposition 11 provides a criterion to evaluate in what cases a bundle of a 
specific logistics service and ocean transportation is surely a superior strategy. Un-
fortunately it is difficult to imagine too many examples of subadditive costs for 
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product bundles in the case under examination. Finally, proposition 12 provides a 
clear marketing advice to shipping lines on how to proceed with proposing bun-
dling strategies to their customers. This issue has been addressed indirectly in 
chapter 5 with respect to surcharges. 
G4D  !%($%&,,!'&''(,!%$-&$!&
The discussion in the previous sections has addressed the issue of optimal bundles 
of ocean transportation and logistics services in general terms. Although the propo-
sitions of Stremersch and Tellis (2002) revealed very useful in general, an import-
ant point of analysis is the determination of optimal bundling strategies in the case 
when a more accurate analysis is required. This problem can be addressed at two 
levels. At the one level there is the necessity to observe and take account of cus-
tomer preferences. At a second level the question is how to elaborate and combine 
this information with cost elements and come with an optimal, i.e. profit maximis-
ing, bundling strategy. 
The first problem is generally addressed by surveying customers and collect-
ing reservation prices. If the reservation prices are collected directly (Hanson and 
Martin, 1990; Venkatesh and Mahajan, 1993; Simonin and Ruth, 1995) we refer 
to direct methods. Direct methods have various disadvantages (Simon, 1989; Monroe 
1990; Monroe and Lee, 1999) since consumers tend to quote unrealistically lower 
prices, feeling obliged to act as conscious buyers (Morton, 1989) and prices are ev-
aluated in isolation. In order to overcome the difficulties with this approach, a set 
of techniques have been developed that are generally referred to as conjoint analysis 
(Green and Srinivasan, 1990). Conjoint analysis is a technique that measures con-
sumers’ tradeoffs among multi-attribute goods and services (Wübker and Mahajan, 
1999). Limited application of conjoint analysis has been made in bundling so far 
(Wübker Wübker and Mahajan, 1999) although the number of research studies 
has considerably increased in the last decade (Green and Srinivasan, 1990, etc.). 
The second type of problem refers to the elaboration of the consumer reser-
vation price information and the determination of an optimal bundling decision. It 
should be noted that an optimal bundling strategy entails the determination of the 
type of bundles to be sold (pure or mixed bundling), the set of bundles to be mar-
keted and the pricing scheme(s) that maximises profits or any other firm objective. 
This is generally obtained either through direct enumeration of the possible bun-
dling strategies and corresponding profits or by means of linear programming 
techniques. The next sections aim at presenting some of the techniques that are 
available to determine accurate bundling strategies for integrated liner companies. 
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This paragraph describes how to use conjoint analysis to obtain optimal bundling 
strategies in the case of ocean transportation combined with other logistics services. 
This is done by providing a detailed hypothetical case study. In general we will 
focus on unbundled sales, pure and mixed bundling. 
Knowing consumers preferences for alternative products can be very useful 
when a company wants to bring a new concept to the market. To measure these 
preferences for different product concepts or alternatives, companies can use a 
marketing tool known as conjoint analysis. The method derives utility values that 
consumers attach to varying levels of product attributes (Kotler and Keller, 2006). 
Consumers are confronted with different types of offers formed by combining 
varying levels of the attributes. The results are indexed and then management can 
identify the most appealing offer and the estimated market share and profit the 
company could realize when introducing this new concept.  
According to fundamental marketing principles, the aim of the services pro-
vided by a supplier must be to satisfy the existing and latent wants of consumers. 
The requirements of the client should determine every single detail of the market-
ing activities initiated by a service provider, since it is the response of the market 
that in the final analysis determines the new concept’s success or failure. At first 
sight, this notion of service bundle design appears easy to transform into practice 
(Fürderer, Huchzermeier and Schrage, 1999).  
From the point of view of the consumer, the price represents the equivalent 
value of the service provided. Consumer conceptions of utility with regard to bun-
dled services should therefore be placed at the centre of all pricing and product-
policy decisions. This approach has two advantages as compared with an analysis 
of respondents’ individual judgments of specific facets of the service package: first 
of all, it is possible to determine the value attributed by the clients to each of the 
components that make up the bundle of services. Secondly, the utility of the ser-
vices offered by the supplier can be enhanced by means of selective modifications, 
thus raising the probability that more consumers will wish to take advantage of 
them. It is consequently crucial to establish the client’s utility expectations in rela-
tion to the service bundle (Fürderer, Huchzermeier and Schrage, 1999). 
In 1973 Green and Wind used conjoint analysis for developing a new spot-
removing, carpet-cleaning agent for home use (Green and Wind, 1973). The paper 
was a major breakthrough in marketing research. Green and Wind could form 108 
different product concepts but this was clearly too comprehensive for consumers to 
rate; it will therefore be illustrated with an easier example. 
Instead of 108 different concepts, consumers can choose between 10 different 
concepts. Consumers can rank the concepts from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that the 
consumer derives the least utility and 1 that the consumer derives the highest 
utility from the specific attributes. When all the desired data is collected a marketer 
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can use a statistical program to derive consumers’ utility functions of each of the 10 
attributes. The derived functions are simple to analyse and the marketer can con-
clude that the function with the highest utility will probably cause highest profita-
bility or a bigger market share. 
In order to explain the technique let us consider the following products and 
attributes as summarised in table 23. For the sake of simplicity we are assuming 
only three logistics services: ocean transportation, on-carriage, i.e. transportation 
from the port of arrival to final destination, and pre-carriage, i.e. transportation 
from the origin of the shipment to the port of departure. For simplicity we assume 
that the purchase of pre-carriage and ocean transportation only is not possible.  
Table 23: Services and bundles currently on offer. 
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The question that we aim at answering is: is the integrated service price of 
ocean transportation, pre-carriage and on-carriage optimal? In other words are 
there any other pricing schemes that would increase the firm’s profit? 
Let us assume that the firm has the possibility of proposing seven alternative 
feasible stimuli, i.e. combinations of different level of attributes—in our case bun-
dle composition and price—. The stimuli are listed in Table 24. 
Table 24: Stimuli. 
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What is the best pricing strategy for the integrated service? The answer to 
this pricing question depends on the willingness to pay of the customer firm for the 
integrated service. This willingness to pay, reservation price, is represented by the 
utility the buyer would obtain from the most preferred bundle type or item among 
all bundle offerings. 
Assuming that the data relatively to the attributes, i.e. combinations of bun-
dles and prices, have been collected, and following the example of Wübker and 
Mahajan (1999), the preference model is specified by: 
Uk = Xkijij + k
j=1
5
i=1
2  
where Uk is the preference score (total utility) for stimulus k; Xkij is the dummy vari-
able for presence (=1) or absence (=0) of level j in attribute i, for stimulus k; ij is 
the path worth utility associated with level j of attribute i; and k is the usual error 
term for stimulus k. 
In our example we have seven stimuli, but from the previous equation we 
have to estimate 8 part-worth utilities. This is possible through Adaptive Conjoint 
Analysis (ACA). The advantages and disadvantages of ACA and the process of es-
timating part-worth utilities are described in Agarwal and Green (1991), Green, 
Krieger and Agarwal (1991) and Johnson (1991). 
Let us consider um* to be consumer m’s highest estimated total utility of any 
currently available stimuli, that is made op of the part-worth utility of the two at-
tributes bundle and price. Let B denote the index of the three-item bundle for 
which the reservation price is to be assessed. Let umB |~p denote the part-worth 
utility of the three item bundle, where the notation emphasizes that the utility con-
tributed by price is not included. We assume that consumer m refers the three item 
bundle B at price p to any other available stimulus if the following equation is satis-
fied: umB |~p + um(p) = um* + s, where um(p) denotes the part-worth utility of price p 
and s defines an arbitrary small positive number. This equation is satisfied for price 
pmB. 
Table 25: Estimated part-worth utilities. 
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Table 26: Total utilities for the bundle propositions on offer. 
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Assuming that the individual part-worth utilities have been estimated as in 
the table above, where the estimated part-worth utility for prices is listed in part a 
of the table, while the part-worth utility for the bundle or unbundled service is 
listed in part b of the table. From the sub-tables a and b of table 24 we can calcu-
late the total utility for the seven stimuli provided in the table 25. 
In the example above we observe that the customer firm is indifferent be-
tween buying the integrated service at 1,100 US$ or only ocean transportation at 
1,000 US$. Assuming that the customer firm will purchase the bundle that maxi-
mises its utility, it will purchase the bundle at 1,099 US$. Through this procedure 
we can derive the distribution of reservation prices for the integrated service and 
maximise the firm’s profit function given by: 
 = (pn  cn )Dn
n=1
5  
where  indicates overall profit; pn, cn and Dn are respectively the price, the cost 
and the demand for item n. As an example we can consider that from a survey of 
100 company customers we have obtained the distribution below of buyers of the 
different products.  
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Table 27: Example of optimal price calculation for a bundle. 
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The traditional approach towards the selection of optimal bundles would entail 
enumeration of all possible bundle configurations, price assignment and measure 
the profitability of each configuration. Enumerative approaches are still used in 
practice, although they may be rather cumbersome in terms of calculation as the 
number of bundle configurations grows exponentially and for each configuration 
several price propositions need to be tested and profits calculated. As discussed by 
Fürderer (1999) the advantages of more advanced methods are substantial against 
more straightforward simulation methods only when the complexity of the prob-
lem is large enough. 
In order to overcome the computational complexity of the optimal bundle 
determination problem, several authors have proposed a set of OR based models 
aiming at the selection of the bundle. One of the most well known techniques is the 
one proposed by Hanson and Martin (Hanson and Martin, 1990; Eppen, et al. 
1991), aiming at solving the optimal bundle pricing from the side of a monopolist.  
The customers observe the bundles and their prices and make purchases that 
maximise their consumers surplus. These decisions are taken into account in the 
maximisation of the company profit function. The model assumptions are as fol-
lows (Fürderer, 1999: pg. 50): 
 The benefit including the same component more than once in the bundle 
(duplication) is zero, and components resale is not possible; 
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 A single profit maximising firm determines the price of every bundle; 
 Given these prices, every customer maximises his/her consumer surplus. 
Consumer surplus equals the reservation price minus product price. 
 Purchasing nothing yields 0 consumer surplus; 
 All consumer segments face the same prices; 
 The reservation prices of all customer segments are known for all bundles 
 There is free disposal of unwanted components; 
 Marginal costs of a bundle are sub-additive; 
 Customers have zero assembly transaction costs for creating bundles from 
separate offered sub-bundles. 
In this model, unlike the model of Stigler (1968) or Adams and Yellen (1976) 
there are no restrictions on the number of components offered, the structure of 
reservation prices (i.e. strictly additive), or customer segment sizes. Nonetheless the 
model has the following limitations (Fürderer 1999): 
 Segmentation according to the same reservation price structure may result 
in as many segments as customers in case of product categories with a 
brand customer basis of heterogeneous preferences; 
 There may be correlation among the various bundles, since many product 
line items may be complements or substitutes; 
 The model does not account for competition; 
 The decision to provide a bundle is influenced also by the costs of develop-
ing and setting up the product lines to be bundled deriving from the costs 
of acquiring the capabilities to provide the service to be bundled or engi-
neering, testing, production preparation and various planning or structural 
activities necessary for producing a certain product. 
The parameters of the model are: 
S = {1,…,n} is the index set of component items. 
h =  index of components, h=1,…,n. 
i = index of component bundles, i=1,…,L where L = 2n – 1. 
k = index of customer segments, k=1, …, m. 
Rki = reservation price of customer k for bundle i, Rk{h} denotes the reservation 
price of the bundle which consists of only component {h}. 
cki = cost of supplying one customer of segment k with bundle i. 
Nk = number of customers in segment k. 
B(i) =  the set of components which define bundle i. 
I{1,…,L} = is the index set of bundles. 
The decision variables of the model are: 
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pi = Price assigned to bundle i; 
ki = 1 if customer k selects bundle i, 0 otherwise; 
sk = Consumer surplus obtained by customer segment k; 
and the auxiliary variables are 
ski = Consumer surplus of a customer in segment k if that customer selects 
bundle i. 
zki = Marginal revenue generated from a customer in segment k if that cus-
tomer selects bundle i. 
pki = The price a customer in segment k pays for selecting bundle i. 
The objective of the bundling offer is to maximise profit, therefore the objec-
tive function (OF) is given by: 
 
max N
k
z
ki
i=1
L
k=1
M  
The optimisation is constrained by the fact that each consumer is expected to 
maximise consumer surplus, sk. This is accounted for by the following constraint: 
Sk  Rki – pi, i = 1,…, L, k = 1,…,M.  
Hanson and Martin (1990) assume that prices are sub-additive, and therefore 
they introduce the price sub-additivity constraint as: 
 
p
i
 R
ki

ji
 p
ji( )
i=1
L , s.t. UjIB(j) = B(i), i =1,…,L, 
 Hanson and Martin (1990) assume that the firm cannot price discriminate 
between customer segments, so this implies that if a customer from segment k buys 
bundle i and a customer from segment h buys the same bundle, then phi = pki. This 
condition is enforced by the single price schedule constraints: 
 
p
ki
 p
i
 max R
ki{ }
k=1,...,M
i=1,...,L




	

1
ki( ) , i = 1,…, L, k = 1,…,M. 
pki  pi, i = 1,…, L, k = 1,…,M. 
In order to be able to solve the problem it is required to include a tightening 
constraint: 
 
s
k
 (R
ki

ji
 p
ji
)
i=1
L , k = 1,…, M, j = 1,…,M. 
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Finally Hanson and Martin (1990) assume that each customer purchases only 
one bundle. In order to ensure that this assumption is maintained they introduced 
the single purchase constraints as follows: 
 
z
ki
= p
ki
 c
ki

ki
, i =1,...,L k =1,...,M ,
s
ki
= R
ki

ki
 p
ki
, i =1,...,L k =1,...,M ,
s
k
= s
ki
i=0
L , k =1,...,M ,

ki
i=0
L =1, k =1,...,M ,
p
i
, p
ki
, s
ki
 0, s
k0
= 0, 
ki
 0,1{ }.
 
Hanson and Martin (1990) proposed also a relaxed bundle pricing model 
which only grows linearly and not exponentially as the number of components 
grow. Notwithstanding the popularity of the Hanson and Martin model, its for-
malisation revealed to be restrictive in practice. Fürderer, Huchzermeier and 
Schrage (1999), proposed an extended formulation of the bundling pricing prob-
lem that accounts for longer forecasting horizons and uncertainty in reservation 
prices. The proposed stochastic bundle pricing problem is conceptually similar the Han-
son and Martin formulation, but differs from it since it allows for the choice of sev-
eral bundles or individual products within a product line and accounts for costs 
deriving from the creation of multiple bundles (variant-dependent costs). 
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Although the model presented in the previous section is rather restrictive in its as-
sumption its application would reduce the computational complexity of selecting 
bundling strategies in practice. More complex liner formulations are not yet avail-
able to encompass the complexity of setting up an optimal bundling decision in the 
case of global supply chains. In particular no current formulations account for 
EOSC and EOS; all models developed so far do no account for strategic interac-
tions with competitors; and finally the substitutability among bundles and its im-
pact and influence on customer decisions is not accounted for.  
A practical solution is to refer to the conjoint analysis techniques illustrated 
before. The rest of the section will present a discussion of the practical steps re-
quired to implement a bundling strategy in the case of global supply chains. This 
discussion will be loosely based on Gustafsson, Hermann and Huber (2006), to 
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which we refer for a more detailed explanation of the theoretical aspects discussed.  
The first step is the definition of the underlying preference function between the 
different bundle components. The following models can be used depending on 
attribute scaling: partial benefit value model; ideal vector model; ideal point 
model. The difference among these three alternatives depends on the distribution 
of the preferences on the attribute level. A second decision refers to the data collec-
tion method. In the example used in section 7.5 we referred to ACA, but other 
methods, such as the profiles method or the two-factor methods are commonly 
used as well. The difference among these various methods refer to how incentive 
are presented, e.g. as a full description of the bundle, or as a sequence of trade-offs.  
 
 
Figure 19: Conjoint analysis decision steps. 
Source: Gustafsson, et al.  (2006). 
The third step in a conjoint analysis study requires the selection of a data col-
lection design. This is done in practice either with the full (or complete or factorial) 
profile design or the reduced design. The former entails listing all conceivable 
bundles, and mostly because of data collection expenses and the risk of wearing out 
respondents, the latter is generally preferred. A reduced design results in a random 
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sampling of the possible incentives, or, more commonly in systematically reduced 
design, generally so that orthogonality, i.e. independence of factors is retained. 
Since in general there is no independence of attributes, particular attention has 
been paid in the literature to data collection designs that take into account interac-
tion effects. 
The use of conjoint analysis assumes the studying of datasets of categorical 
variables. Most applications of conjoint analysis require specific assumptions on 
the interaction effects between these variables. If the relationship between the re-
sponse variable and the predictor variables is linear, the analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) can be used effectively for analysing interaction effects. When the rela-
tionship is not linear, as is often the case, more general models have been proposed 
(see Nelder and Wedderburn, 1972). In practice this issue is not yet fully resolved, 
and the result of conjoint studies may be affected. This is one of the various techni-
cal issues that are still open in the application of conjoint analysis in general. 
The third important step in the determination of a conjoint analysis study en-
tails the decision on how to present the stimuli to respondents. This area has not 
been the subject of through examination, although a survey is presented by Vriens 
(1995). In particular the effective presentation of bundles of services such as in the 
case of global supply chains is an intriguing issue worth further exploration. This is 
also linked to the issues connected to the relation between the way incentives are 
presented and interviewee responses. In particular the selection of the procedure 
used to collect respondents statements may have significant implications on the 
validity of their answers. The fourth decision that needs to be taken is therefore the 
selection of the appropriate data collection means, i.e. telephone, e-mail, in-person 
interviews, etc. 
The scale to be used by respondents for evaluating the incentives is a further 
issue that needs to be addressed when setting up a conjoint study in practice. 
Scales can be metric or non-metric. The most common methods used are rating 
scales, ranking scales and paired profile comparisons. In the first case respondents 
are asked to rate the perceived benefits obtainable from a bundle on a numerical 
scale, while with the ranking method they are asked to order the bundle proposi-
tions in terms of preferences. In paired profile comparisons, respondents are re-
quested to choose between two stimuli and the rankings are then inferred after-
wards. 
A further set of important problems refers to data analysis once the date has 
been collected. The selection of the appropriate algorithm depends substantially 
on the preference model selected and the scale level of the preferences data col-
lected. A large amount of literature has been devoted to the determination of in-
ferences that is not here the right place to review. The aim of these techniques is 
that of estimating benefit values, and, through the part-worth utilities, determine 
which are the individual characteristics of a bundle that contribute to a specific set 
of preferences. Classic conjoint analysis methods make use of hierarchical cluster 
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models that aim at grouping individuals on the basis of conditional reservation 
prices.   
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Clearly the discussions presented above on the optimality of bundles refer to tech-
niques developed in the context of consumer behaviour studies. As mentioned it 
would not be difficult to reconsider the discussion and the methods present above 
in terms of cost preferences for the customer firm. Clearly we can picture every 
customer firm as very different from the other. The preference for a bundle or 
separate components and the decision to purchase or, more appropriately out-
source, a certain service, is deeply rooted in the logistics strategy the company has 
adopted, and, in the end in its overall strategy. 
Further reference to the measurement of the logistics performance of a firm 
and to the importance of fine-tuning its logistics decision with its logistics strategy 
are given later in this study, for the moment it is important to highlight the role of 
costs in the determination of different bundling strategies. Intuitively, in fact why 
would a firm have an interest in purchasing a bundle of, for example ocean trans-
portation, on-carriage and pre-carriage, at a higher price, when it could purchase 
the various separate components independently at a lower price? The answer to 
this fundamental question is the fact that, as it has been shown above, bundles are 
not simply the result of a random combinatorial exercise. A successful bundle has a 
higher value in the eye of the firm, similarly to the case of a customer. 
What determines the difference in value between a bundle and the purchase 
of the separate components is the knowledge that the logistics service provider of-
fers in terms of efficiencies, ability to exploit economies of scope, reduction in ne-
gotiations time and costs, etc.—what we will refer to in the rest of the thesis as 
transaction costs—that transforms a set of products into a bundle, or, a group of lo-
gistics services, in a supply chain solution. The way each customer firm perceives 
its logistics transaction costs, or, even more fundamentally, the logistics necessities 
of the customer firm, will determine in the end the different customer profiles, that 
in consumer theory are represented by the distribution of reservation prices. 
When logistics service providers analyse a product vertical or typify a certain 
type of customer firm, are essentially engaging in market segmentation. When they 
group together certain type of logistics services they are engaging in discrimina-
tion, in the same way and airline differentiates between business class tickets and 
last minute deals, and all the differences in between. The claim that logistics ser-
vice providers, and hopefully also those associated with a shipping line, have not 
engaged in effective price discrimination, is actually not grounded. On the con-
trary they have managed to almost perfectly price discriminate, since they are re-
quired to acquire a deep understanding of the logistics demands of each and 
everyone of their customers. 
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The aim of this chapter was that of providing an overview of the available tech-
niques that are used in practice to select optimal bundling strategies. Since most of 
the bundling literature has been developed in the context of consumer products, 
reference have been made in the chapter mostly to marketing techniques that have 
been specifically targeted for this purpose. 
In particular the chapter elaborates on a set of propositions proposed by 
Stremersch en Tellis (2002) advancing optimal bundles proposition in the context 
of global supply chains based on the results of the survey presented in chapter 4. 
From the proposition it emerges that mixed product bundles appear to be the most 
appropriate bundling strategy for ocean transportation. The conclusions are neces-
sarily general and, we argued, the accurate determination of optimal bundles 
would entail a more detailed study that could only be performed by a ocean carrier 
/ LSP making use of its customer information and contacts. 
For this purpose we provide an example of a study based on fictitious data 
that makes use of one of the most commonly techniques employed for bundling: 
conjoint analysis. The advantages and specific operational characteristics f conjoint 
analysis are presented also in this chapter. Reference is also made to an alternative 
approach that has been proposed in the determination of optimal bundles through 
liner optimisation. The chapter also presented the Hanson and Martin (1990) 
model and argued that further research would be beneficial in this area. 
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This chapter is based on the consideration that in order to be able to make use of 
product bundling strategies ocean carriers need to have a very clear picture of 
where the cost advantages are in the supply chains where they operate. For this to 
happen they are required to have insight in the supply chains of their customers. 
This responds to two objectives, on the one side provide better information to their 
customers (visibility) on the other identify those cost savings opportunities that are 
at the basis of product bundling. 
Liner shipping operators have traditionally dedicated particular attention to 
efficiency and cost control. This is not surprising as liner shipping is a capital-
intensive industry, and cost related performance indicators such as vessel utilisation 
are of paramount importance. In particular, in market downturns, only those 
companies that manage advanced cost control practices are able to compete. Cost 
control and performance management are at the foundation of key carrier deci-
sions such as whether to reduce sailing speed, restructure networks, reduce the 
number of available services or cut down human resources. 
Container carriers’ performance can be traditionally assessed through a large 
number of financial and operational indicators that allow management to evaluate 
the impact of management decisions and of changes in external factors. Typical 
measures are vessel utilisation, port delays and slot bookings. The selection of ad-
equate performance measures is intrinsically connected to the overall strategy of 
the company and to its corporate values. 
                                                
* This chapter is based on Acciaro and Liu (2009; 2010), Acciaro (2008a; 2010a). 
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The development of integrated logistics and the increasing involvement of 
carriers in terminal and hinterland transportation operations have broadened the 
scope of the activities of container carriers and have necessarily affected the evalu-
ation of their performance. If on the one hand cost issues remain important, on the 
other hand the decision of providing logistics services as part of integrated logistics 
solutions requires broadening the management perspective to include a more con-
spicuous role of the customer service dimension. All major companies evaluate 
customer satisfaction, but very limited discussions at academic level exist on the 
topic in the context of ocean transportation.  
This is rather surprising as so much attention has been paid in the literature 
to cost minimisation, network and vessel scheduling optimisation, optimal speed, 
optimal vessel size, the vessel bay plan problem and berth allocation problem—see 
for example Christiansen, Fagerholt and Ronen (2004; 2007) for a literature re-
view for routing and scheduling problems—. This wide range of problems has 
been analysed in general with the use of operations research techniques that are 
particularly suited to limited resource allocation problems. It is clear that the ap-
proach taken in these studies is that of cost control and that, if they were to be 
translated into a management approach, these studies point in the direction of im-
provements in operational efficiency.  
At the same time, a large corpus of literature has been developed on the in-
creasing importance of supply chain integration strategies for container carriers. 
Although this is clearly a prolific research stream, the nature of the majority of the 
academic contribution is to describe ex-post the change that has been taking place 
in the liner industry and explain what factors have influenced the development of 
such strategies. Shippers and consignees increasingly require the responsibility for 
all logistic activities to be assumed by global supply chain specialists and logistics 
integration has become a common strategy of transport providers (Frankel, 1999b). 
Shipping lines seem to have been the most dynamic organisation in exploiting the 
advantages deriving from vertical integration (Notteboom and Merckx, 2006). 
Globalisation of liner shipping has offered opportunities for total integrated 
management and operation of the supply and delivery chain (Frankel, 1999b). 
Heaver (2002a; 2002b) supports this perspective and indicates that there is an in-
crease in vertical integration among shipping lines and logistics service providers. 
Haralambides and Acciaro (2009) explain the reasons behind vertical integration 
and discuss product bundling strategies in the liner sector. The development of 
logistics integration in liner companies is the subject of a paper from Midoro and 
Parola (2006), where the development of logistics activities within ocean carriers is 
framed in the overall development of the liner industry. The case of dedicated con-
tainer terminals (Haralambides, et al. 2002; Soppé, et al. 2009) provides evidence of 
the theory underlying supply chain integration in the industry and is one of the few 
cases that has been discussed more in detail in the literature. 
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Notwithstanding the obvious importance in the academia of supply chain 
integration strategies in ocean transportation, limited academic contributions have 
tried to explain how supply chain integration can be incorporated in liner oper-
ation strategies and how carriers should modify their processes to view ocean 
transportation in the supply chain perspective and act accordingly. If the supply 
chain integration perspective is not included next to cost and financial control in 
the company performance assessment and benchmarked, it is difficult to under-
stand how supply chain integration strategies can be successful in this industry.  
Inclusion of the supply chain perspective in the company performance as-
sessment requires the identification of representative key performance indicators 
(KPIs) in line with the overall company strategy. Examples of supply chain integra-
tion KPIs can be drawn from the supply chain integration literature and to a large 
extent can be easily adapted to the liner industry. In the literature in general, more 
than providing examples of specific KPI, academics have provided directions on 
how and why the supply chain perspective should be incorporated in the perform-
ance assessment processes. In a recent paper from Wong and Wong (2008), the 
authors review the existing literature on supply chain performance measurement 
and call for a more rigorous approach. 
Also in this literature stream there is no reference to the liner shipping in-
dustry, but the framework in which supply chain integration is discussed is always 
that of a third party logistics service provider or that of a supply chain manager. 
This framework though is applicable to ocean carriers only to a certain extent as 
one of the distinctive features of a liner company is its reliance on ships as key asset 
to its business. As metrics drive behaviour, the identification of performance met-
rics and frameworks against which liner companies can benchmark is essential.  
The chapter argues that for this to happen ocean carriers need to look be-
yond their traditional company boundaries, focusing on transcorporate performance 
measures that are characteristic of supply chains. This approach requires the 
modification of traditional performance measure indicators to include also 
transcorporate performance measures. This, it is argued, should not only take 
place at the carrier level, but also within the other members of the container sup-
ply chain, such as terminals, ports, hinterland transport providers, distributors, 
warehouses and third party logistics providers. The chapter aims in essence at ex-
plaining how carriers, and other members of the container supply chain, can make 
advantage of the cooperative nature of modern supply chains. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section will introduce the con-
cept of transcorporate performance measurement. Section 8.3 will discuss the tra-
ditional performance measures used in the liner shipping industry. Section 8.4 will 
dwell upon the importance of adopting a supply chain perspective in liner shipping 
and section 8.5 will discuss some suggestions on how this perspective should be 
implemented. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the application of trans-
action performance measurements to the port and terminal industry. Section 8.6 
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will explain why the adoption of this approach is particularly urgent. Section 8.7 
will discuss the methods used generally to assess performance in terminals, while 
section 8.8 and 8.9 present the application of the supply chain perspective in these 
areas. The last section concludes and indicates further directions for research. 
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Every company has some form of measurement system. Companies can benefit 
from performance measurement in the following ways (Harbour, 2009): 
 Determine where they are; 
 Establish goals based on their current performance; 
 Determine the gap between a set of desired goals and current performance 
levels; 
 Track progress in achieving desired performance goals; 
 Compare and benchmark performance measure against competitors; 
 Control performance measurements within specified boundaries; 
 Identify problem areas and possible problem causes; 
 Better plan for the future. 
In general, as companies are required by law to report financial key figures to 
authorities or shareholders, a large amount of financial key figures is available to 
management. Financial figures are often seen as synonymous of performance in 
the company and this can be true in a stable industrial environment, but could be 
questioned in a period of rapid change. 
Performance measurements should be consistent with the goals of the organi-
sation. As Sink and Tuttle (1989) point out, it is not possible to manage what is not 
measured. A framework for performance measurement should start therefore from 
the definition of the purpose of the measurement (Bredrup, 1995). In general per-
formance metrics are developed around the three dimensions of performance: 
 Achievement metrics – direct metrics for business achievement; 
 Diagnostics metrics – indirect metrics for business achievement; 
 Competence metrics – capabilities for future business achievement. 
This traditional approach to performance measurement though has its limita-
tions. Globalisation and the increasing expectations concerning customer service 
quality have forced companies to look beyond their organisational boundaries. 
The building of global alliances and partnerships (Womack, Jones and Ross, 1990) 
and the development of information and communication (ICT) technologies have 
enabled companies to improve their performance in a globalised world, but have 
also led companies to embed the transcorporate perspective in their management 
more urgently. This is particularly evident in the management and coordination of 
the company supply chains, that have increasingly become transcorporate supply chains 
(Hieber and Schönsleben, 2002).  
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The recognition of the importance of supply chain management in an or-
ganisation has contributed in expanding the focus of performance from internal 
measures to external or transcorporate measures. This is because, as Van Hoek 
(1998) clearly explains, “the supply chain concept fundamentally changes the nature of organi-
zations; control is no longer based on direct ownership and control, but rather based on integration 
across interfaces between functions and companies” (pg. 187). Improper use of performance 
measurement systems and the lack of supply chain performance indicators can be 
a barrier to the implementation to transcorporate logistics concepts (Lee and 
Billington, 1992).  
As Hieber and Schönsleben (2002) point out, the major difficulties in the de-
velopment of performance measurements in the supply chain perspective are es-
sentially the lack of performance metrics aiming at the trancorporate processes in 
logistics networks, and the lack of measures that address the combination of inte-
grated and non-integrated indicators.  
As far as the first point is concerned, most indicators are related to single ac-
tivities and functions in the supply chain. In general it is not possible to simply add 
corresponding indicators of subsequent activities or functions in the network with 
the objective of joint optimisation. A joint approach is necessary in order to avoid 
piecemeal optimisation and to consider potential consequences in other points of 
the network (Bechtel and Jayaram, 1997).  
With reference to the second difficulty, by providing to all supply chain 
members a combination of information, not only on their performances (non-
integrated metrics) but also on the performance of the whole network (integrated 
metrics), each member can assess the overall competitiveness of the network as a 
whole while still being enabled to focus on improvement efforts for their own per-
formance. 
If only non-integrated metrics are in place, the result is the isolated optimisa-
tion of single segments of the entire network. This is likely to happen, especially 
because although network performance is a result of the actions of each network 
partner, each segment of the network is managed independently with its own per-
formance indicators and optimisation objectives. The consequence will be isolated 
optimisation, which can be even counterproductive to overall performance of the 
network. 
In general overall performance indicators are seldom in place and when the 
overall performance is measured, this is done in oversimplified and sometimes 
counterproductive (cost reduction based) terms (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). The 
lack of appropriate performance measurement has been cited as a major obstacle 
to effective collaboration in logistics networks (La Londe and Pohlen, 1996; Lee 
and Bilington, 1992). 
In transport logistics, timely and accurate assessment of overall system per-
formance as well as individual system component performance is of paramount 
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importance. An effective performance measurement system provides a basis for 
understanding the system, influences behaviour throughout the system, and pro-
vides information regarding the results of system efforts to network members and 
outside stakeholders (Fawcett and Clinton, 1997) 
Given the central role of ocean transportation in global supply chains and the 
key function that carriers play in the supply and distribution networks, the overall 
system performance cannot be complete without including the performance of the 
liner industry. In addition the key position of ocean transportation at the core of 
global supply chains grants ocean carriers a privileged position in observing and 
influencing the performance of the chains. Probably also for this reason, carriers 
have increasingly expanded their business scope to include supply chain manage-
ment service provision and coordination. The importance of performance meas-
urement in the container liner industry and in the port and terminal industries 
cannot be overstressed, as this is relevant not only for the industry itself but also for 
the global supply chain system.  
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Traditionally, liner shipping performance has been measured by a variety of cost 
related indicators. This is not surprising given the large capital costs necessary to 
provide global regular ocean transportation services as well as the characteristics of 
demand for these services (Haralambides and Veenstra, 2000; Haralambides, 
2007). Vessel utilization is one of the most important metrics employed in the in-
dustry since it provides managers with information on the actual use of capital em-
ployed and on the movement of demand. In addition the use of larger vessels de-
livers cost advantages  (economies of scale) only under the condition that the ves-
sels operate at level close to full operational capacity (Imai, et al. 2006). 
Further metrics related to the utilisation of the vessel include sailing speed, 
port turnaround time, dry-docking overruns, numbers of accidents, mechanical 
failures, etc. All these metrics provide management with information on the utilisa-
tion of capital and in the end contribute to the fleet size decision. 
A second set of metrics refers to variable costs. Typically managers will moni-
tor fuel consumption and fuel prices, crew wages, insurance premiums, etc. Oper-
ational variable costs influence the decision on whether to operate the ship, at 
which speed and what margins can be obtained from a specific trade. The steep 
increase in fuel price in 2007 and 2008 made enormous impact on liner shipping 
and global trade. At over US$140 a barrel in June 2008, some trade observers 
even suggested that globalization was being hindered and trade patterns changed. 
High fuel prices can influence transport costs so much that these, and not tariffs or 
quotas, become the largest barrier to global trade. The industry reacted by reduc-
ing sailing speed and by sailing schedules reorganization. A 10% reduction in 
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speeds can lead to 25% reduction in fuel consumption, but normally in order to 
maintain service frequency, more vessels needed to be added in the fleet. 
A third set of metrics relates to the changes in demand. Vessel utilisation pro-
vides partially also information on demand fluctuations, but variables such as the 
number of bookings, or the type and size of containers demanded, the destination 
and information on the cargo transported provide better insight on demand char-
acteristics and the customer base of the company.  
 The majority of international containerized cargo is transported by regular 
liner shipping services structured in networks. Therefore, the composition and 
structure of these networks is a determinant of the competitiveness of the com-
pany. Liner shipping connectivity includes the number of available services and 
the number of shipping lines operating direct services between pairs of destina-
tions. The construction of more efficient routes and networks for the fleet is clearly 
a key challenge, since the ever-growing competition among carriers has squeezed 
the profit margin to a minimum level. A ship involves a major capital investment 
and its daily costs can easily amount to thousands of dollars. Therefore significant 
savings can be expected if routings are optimized. 
Another set of metrics relates to the fleet container boxes. The shipping in-
dustry has witnessed an overwhelming growth in recent years mainly due to 
China’s economic boom. If we take Asia-Europe trade as an example, greatly un-
balanced cargo flows have generated significant number of empty containers.  
Container fleet size, container utilization and empty/full balances are hence other 
important performance metrics.  In general container managers try to maximise 
the use of their container fleet, and reduce the number of empty moves.  
The metrics described so far are traditional cost base metrics, but as already 
mentioned, ocean transportation can no longer be considered in isolated terms. 
Liner shipping should be viewed and evaluated as a part of a global supply chain 
system, which provides door-to-door seamless service from the suppliers to the end 
customers. Following this approach, liner shipping companies had to adjust to re-
spond to this change. 
Since the eighties, container shipping lines have been confronted with new 
challenges such as the rapid growth of containerized cargo volumes, heavier com-
petition among carriers, demand by customers for greater reliability of container 
shipments at lower total door-to-door cost, port congestion and increasing envi-
ronmental regulation and volatile bunker prices. All these challenges required 
shipping mangers to rethink their strategies and, consequently their performance 
assessment indicators. 
One of the greatest issues that have emerged in recent years is that of sched-
ule integrity. According to a survey conducted by Drewry Shipping Consultants in 
2006 and data from Containerization International, 40% of the vessels deployed 
on worldwide liner services arrived one or more days behind their schedules. This 
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causes difficulties with coordination at terminals and with hinterland transporta-
tion modes, it increases pressure on terminal operators and generates complains 
from the customers. Although strong variations were observed between different 
carriers and different liner trade routes, this seems to be a particularly relevant is-
sue overall across the industry. 
Schedule integrity has clearly an impact on liner costs, as clearly summarised 
by the former CEO of Piraeus Port Authority: “the name of the game of all major con-
tainer lines is their ability to meet their schedules, as they incur enormous costs in case they do not” 
(Psaraftis, 2004: pg. 195). But it has even a more important impact on customer 
satisfaction given the centrality of time in transportation (Notteboom, 2006; De 
Langen, 1999). 
Terminals have a crucial role to play in this context. It goes without saying 
that choosing the most efficient terminal operators guarantees better overall per-
formance. At present, required terminal productivities of 120 TEU per ship per 
hour are no longer an exception, leading to high expectations both in terms of 
gantry crane availability and the speed of quayside operations. In addition, espe-
cially in those ports where congestion is more frequent, timely availability of space 
at berth can be a critical factor for the carrier competitiveness. The necessity of 
higher terminal performance and guaranteed space at berth has led shipping lines 
to acquire interests in terminals and engage in partnerships with terminals and 
ports (Haralambides, et al. 2002). 
Increasingly, some ocean carriers have realised that their competitiveness lies 
in their ability to differentiate beyond the traditional boundaries of the liner ship-
ping industry. For this reason many of them invested beyond the terminal into hin-
terland transportation and are able to provide, generally through sister companies, 
door-to-door integrated supply chain management solutions by and large (Heaver, 
2002a; 2002b; Frémont, 2006; 2009). 
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A first reason to proceed with the analysis of container carriers’ performance from 
a supply chain point of view lies precisely in the increasing efforts that carriers 
have made in integrating along the supply chain; that was briefly discussed in the 
previous paragraph. In particular ocean carriers have been directing their integra-
tion efforts on terminals and hinterland transportation. Beginning with the trans-
pacific trade-lane, aiming at securing access to their most important markets, car-
riers increasingly offer a variety of logistics activities that were previously not con-
sidered as core activities and naturally have been subcontracted (Cariou, 2008; 
Midoro, et al. 2005). 
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As David Lim, president of NOL, suggests31, there are two basic models of 
liner shipping. On the one side there is the low cost option and on the other con-
tainers are treated as part of a packaged service. For the liner companies that op-
erate under the second model, the challenge is to find ways to product differentiate 
in order to support premium pricing (Stopford, 2009). 
As discussed by Stopford (2009), for those carriers aiming at service differ-
entiation the following seven characteristics are likely to be relevant: 
 Vessel on-time arrival; 
 Transit time door-to-door; 
 Carrier cost per move; 
 Cargo tracking; 
 Frequency of sailing; 
 Reliability of administration; 
 Space availability. 
Being able to differentiate on the basis of these characteristics comes of 
course at a cost, and not all carriers are able or willing to pursue such strategy. The 
major issue for liner companies lies on whether customers would be willing to pay 
a premium for a better service and how to reconcile the customers requesting 
highly integrated services with those customers requesting low costs, typically for 
low-value, high-volume cargoes (Stopford, 2009). 
The reasons for the increasing efforts to further integrate along the supply 
chain are manifold but rooted in the desire to efficiently coordinate supply chains 
whose complexity is continuously increasing and offer customers a single point for 
contracting. Panayides (2002) further assesses the pursuit of integration by apply-
ing a transaction costs approach. It is found that in industries with high levels of 
asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, frequency with which transactions occur, 
integration is more likely to occur. It is argued, that the decision to integrate de-
pends on whether a different governance structure would result in larger benefits 
in production and transaction costs. This is likely the case in the container in-
dustry, at least for high value commodities. 
A more general reason for the development of a supply chain perspective in 
the evaluation of carrier performance relates to the fact that the assessment of the 
overall performance of the supply chain is connected with the ability of the system 
to progress in the future through benchmarking. This aspect is embedded in the 
delivery, recovery and stewardship model (DRS) developed by the Logistics Consulting 
Partners Ltd and is consistent with the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) framework or-
iginally formalised by Edward Demming and often referred to as Shewhart cycle 
(Braithwaite, 2007). 
                                                
31 As quoted in Containerization International, August 2006, pg. 32. 
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Benchmarking delivers better performance and is an essential tool for per-
formance measurement (Rolstadås, 1995a; Fawcett and Cooper, 1998). Bench-
marking techniques have been widely in use besides the evaluation of supply chain 
performance measuring results, and are common practice for shipping lines as 
well. Gillen (2001) advances the identification of best performers not only inter-
nally and historically, but on each step of the value chain and among companies.  
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As already mentioned, the performance metrics predominantly employed by ocean 
carriers refer to cost control, such as vessel utilisation, fuel consumption, dry-
docking overruns, accidents and mechanical failures. Beamon (1999) points out 
that the two major weaknesses of this type of approach relate to the lack of meas-
urement of all pertinent aspects (inclusiveness) and ambiguous representation of 
costs. 
As far as inclusiveness is concerned, considering the complexity and inter-
firm dependencies within a supply chain, it is unlikely to find a one-fits-all-
approach as the traditional cost-related measurement systems suggest. Lacking this 
quality, cost-related metrics may lead to misjudging the performance of the com-
pany, as inter- and intra-firm linkages are not considered. In addition, basing 
company performance solely on costs runs the risk of misrepresentation due to the 
various potentially distorting accounting practices. 
To circumvent the above problems, Beamon (1999) suggests basing the sup-
ply chain performance system on three key pillars: resource measures, output 
measures and flexibility measures. Similarly Chan (2003) defines seven criteria to 
evaluate performance in the supply chain perspective: costs, quality, resources uti-
lisation, flexibility, visibility, trust and innovativeness. 
This approach has considerable implications on ocean carrier performance 
measurement. In fact next to traditional resources measures, output and flexibility 
are given substantial importance. Output-related measures may include metrics 
such as volumes transported, delay reduction, customer satisfaction and network 
growth, while among flexibility metrics one may list the ability of the company to 
accommodate customers request of changes in unloading port or destination, or 
mode of on-carriage. The number of metrics can be expanded in accordance to 
the suggestion of Chan to include quality metrics (damaged shipments, delays), or 
visibility (container traceability, information availability), or innovativeness (new 
and better ways to deliver competitive advantage to customers). 
Visibility in particular is an important aspect in the definition of a perform-
ance measurement in the supply chain perspective. As Bartlet, Julien and Baines 
(2007) indicate, improving visibility may deliver substantial advantages to the sup-
ply chain performance. This relates to the case of container supply chain where the 
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issue of visibility has been identified as one of the major challenges for ocean carri-
ers32. 
Another approach that could be easily applied to liner shipping, suggests styl-
ing a performance measurement system according to the balanced scorecard 
(BSC) framework developed by Kaplan and Norton (1996). The basic idea of the 
balanced scorecard framework is to better and more effectively link the top-down 
strategic goals of the overall firm strategy with the objectives identified to be rel-
evant by a bottom-up process. As such, the BSC propagates a balanced perform-
ance measurement system that takes into account various performance indicators 
from four different areas: 
 Customer perspective, 
 Business process perspective, 
 Innovation and learning, 
 Financial perspective. 
By adopting this methodology for measuring supply chain performance, 
three main advantages can be distinguished (Gillen, 2001): 
1. The interlocking nature of (maritime) supply chains is taken care of by 
focusing on effective intra- and inter-firm collaboration and integration; 
2. Chances are increased that a balanced management approach is prac-
ticed along the supply chain and its partners; 
3. It stimulates and is open for the creation of new firm or supply chain spe-
cific performance measures; 
4. The advanced approach in measuring supply chain performance will 
focus management and employees on goals beyond the traditional supply 
chain performance measures. 
Braithwaite (2007) suggests the use of the supply chain diamond reproduced 
in the figure on the next page and indicates that supply chain performance meas-
urements should be built on the combined use of adequate metrics, balanced 
scorecards and the delivery, recovery and stewardship model framework presented 
before. 
Braithwaite (2007) also indicates the following six key points to hold in focus 
when developing a supply chain management framework: 
 No single measure defines supply chain performance – there are many 
dimensions to measure; 
 Measures can be in conflict – accentuating rather than breaking functional 
differences; 
 The need is to obtain balance throughout the supply chain and be pre-
pared to change; 
                                                
32 See for further references and a definition of visibility, Francis (2008). 
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 Measuring the overall performance at input and output levels is a key first 
step to making improvements; 
 This requires considerable investment in time and commitment; 
 Measurement and its interpretations are valuable and difficult skills that 
organisations should develop and nurture. 
 
 
Figure 20: The supply chain diamond. 
Source: Braithwaite (2007). 
It should be noted that given the complex and nested intra firm processes of 
which today’s supply chains are composed, the measurement of a company’s per-
formance in the supply chain perspective has to be multifold and may generate 
measurements that are conflicting (Beamon, 1999). This is particularly true for 
shipping lines, where the internal company processes may be directed towards ob-
jectives that differ from those of the supply chains where they operate. For exam-
ple, in order to maximise vessels use, a carrier may decide to make concessions to 
schedule integrity instead of chartering in an additional ship. But for some ship-
pers, schedule integrity is essential. 
In addition, ocean carriers may connect to several networks at the same time, 
so that the role of the carrier in each network may translate differently and con-
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flicting objectives may coexist. So for instance, a shipper dealing with fresh pro-
ducts may be more sensitive to time disruptions in the chain, than a shipper deal-
ing with chemical products, or may value the provision of container traceability 
information from the carrier more than others.  
Performance metrics then, if aiming at improving the overall performance of 
the supply chain, should be associated with the understanding of the role the car-
rier plays in the various supply chains it belongs to. This leads to the necessity of 
each carrier to understand and specialise on certain commodity verticals that are 
not only representative of a certain customer base, but provide the carrier with 
valuable insights to the characteristics of the supply chains they are active in. 
On the basis of what was explained in the previous paragraph we can rec-
ommend two types of supply chain metrics for ocean carriers. On the one side we 
have intra-chain metrics that reflect the contribution the carrier delivers to each of 
the supply chains where it operates, or in other words the contribution to the 
achievement of the customer supply chain objectives. On the other side we can 
consider inter-chain metrics that refer to the ability of the carrier to respond to the 
requirements of all supply chains. The precise definition of the metrics depends on 
the company strategy but should embed concepts such as flexibility, innovative-
ness, visibility and customer satisfaction among others. 
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The recent slowdown in container traffic growth seems to have decreased the pres-
sure on container terminals to increase capacity and rationalise the use of infra-
structure. Nonetheless terminals are still striving to reach high performance levels. 
This is not only because customers demand it, but also because port capacity can-
not be developed as rapidly as increases in demand (Haralambides, et al. 2002), 
overcapacity may be quickly exhausted and episodes of congestion may rise even 
in the most efficient terminals. 
With larger vessel sizes becoming a common trait of the industry, it has been 
argued that the number of calls these ships will be able to make will be smaller 
(Cullinane and Khanna, 1999; Imai, et al. 2006). They will concentrate on a lim-
ited number of calls a larger number of containers, in turn impacting the berth and 
crane productivity of the terminal. The use of larger vessels is bound to have a cas-
cading effect also on those terminals that are not suitable to berth very large con-
tainer carriers, either for limitations in the availability of infrastructure or because 
they occupy a different position in the trades (i.e. feeder ports). 
The expected increase in transhipment associated with larger vessel size, is 
likely to impact the terminals not only by means of requiring them to handle 
higher volumes in the same period of time, but also to reduce the variability of its 
operations (i.e. increase reliability) in order to guarantee seamless flows of cargo 
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among transhipment ports and/or transhipment port and feeder ports (Gilman, 
1999; Midoro, et al. 2005). 
These changes take place in the context of ever increasing competition 
among terminals. As logistics and hinterland transportation develop further, ship-
ping lines may be virtually indifferent between loading and unloading at certain 
terminals and try to secure capacity in various terminals to be able to maintain 
flexibility. Inefficient terminals lose rapidly their competitive edge, as slow terminal 
operations result in higher inventory costs and have repercussions on the entire 
supply chain (Heaver, 2002b). 
As a consequence, shipping lines, logistics service providers and port authori-
ties continuously assess the performance of the terminals they have or intend to 
have relations with. This is generally done on the basis of the variables observed by 
shipping lines (e.g. ship-to-shore productivity, crane productivity) or on the basis of 
the information the terminals supply directly. 
This information provides also critical inputs for terminal managers. Key 
performance indicators (KPI) are useful tools to benchmark the performance of the 
terminal with respect to the past and its competitors. The selection of indicators to 
be collected is an important step in shaping a terminal management philosophy 
and it can substantially affect its performance.  
These considerations become even more important considering the crucial 
position that terminals occupy in the supply chain. As containerisation provides 
the essential link for modern production systems, and terminals are central to 
containerisation, their role in the supply chain cannot be overstressed. This in turn 
increases the competitive pressure on terminals to improve the reliability of their 
operations. Terminals are expected to act as buffers and accommodate the re-
quests of their clients (i.e. primarily shipping lines) concerning last minute schedule 
changes, delays, break of calls, yard storage, etc. (Notteboom, 2006). 
This is the consequence of the indispensable role that supply chain manage-
ment has acquired in modern production networks. In the network, cost reduction 
advantages deriving from relocating production processes can only be enjoyed as 
long as the supply chain supporting these processes is able to enrich them by deliv-
ering value. In fact supply chains work well when they are able to generate value 
and, consequently, terminals perform well when they are able to generate value in 
the supply chains they serve. As such, when assessing container terminal perform-
ance we should refer to the position the terminal occupies in the supply chain and 
to its ability to create value. The performance of the terminal should be seen in this 
perspective. 
For this to happen, the chapter argues that a terminal performance paradigm 
in the supply chain perspective needs be based on a holistic approach, where next 
to the performance of the terminal sub systems, more attention is dedicated to the 
relations between the terminal and the other agents in the supply chain, as this is 
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crucial and is what ultimately determines the ability of the terminal to generate 
value. These interactions can be measured by means of transcorporate perform-
ance metrics. 
Since the terminal is only one of the agents involved in the supply chain, its 
ability to add value is constrained by the actions of the other agents in the supply 
chain. The actions of the other agents may be determined by the creation of value 
elsewhere in the supply chain networks, as some of them may be operating in dif-
ferent locations, and may be part of supply chains that are directly competing with 
those of a specific terminal. This can be a source of friction. 
In order to overcome this friction, the chapter argues that one of the options 
is increasing supply chain visibility, so that the best paths in the network can be 
identified by all agents and terminal strategies can be adapted to best serve the 
supply chains where they operate. This is clearly a dynamic process, so that as 
soon as bottlenecks emerge (e.g. congestion, lack of capacity, lack of coordination, 
etc.), terminals and ideally also other supply chain agents can adapt to the new 
situation. 
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In the last thirty years the literature on efficiency and productivity measurement in 
the container terminal industry has become substantial. UNCTAD (1999) distin-
guished between two categories of performance indictors in the context of ports 
and terminals: macro performance indicators that focus on aggregate impacts of 
port activities and micro indicators that aim at quantifying input-output ratios. 
Among the micro indicators, notable are the contributions of UNCTAD (1976), 
UNCTAD (1983), De Monie (1987), Tongzon (1995), Talley (2007), Ger-
manischer Lloyd and Global Institute of Logistics (2008), Ständer (2008). In par-
ticular the report of Germanischer Lloyd and Global Institute of Logistics (2008) 
refers to the Container Terminal Quality Indicator Standard (CTQI), recently 
developed to benchmark container terminal performance. The standard embeds in 
its assessment system, next to productivity and resource utilisation metrics, a com-
ponent dedicated to service quality offered to the users of the terminal. Total and 
partial factor productivity approaches have been widely used in the terminal and 
port sector, most notably in the 80s. Some of the reference publications include 
UNCTAD (1976), Bendall and Stent (1987), Kim and Sachish (1986), De Monie 
(1987), Frankel (1991), as well as some more recent articles (Talley, 1994; Sachish, 
1996; Fourgeaud, 2000; Talley, 2007; Bichou, 2007).  
More recently the literature has focused on aggregate methods that aim at as-
sessing container terminal performance by estimating directly or implicitly the con-
tainer terminal production function. A first type of approaches makes use of the 
direct estimation of the production frontier through econometric techniques on the 
basis of cross sectional data. These techniques generally refer to stochastic frontier 
  198
analysis (SFA) although the production function could also be estimated determin-
istically. In SFA the estimation of a production function through usual economet-
ric techniques is extended to include two random terms, one capturing inefficiency 
and one the probabilistic nature of the estimation (Coelli, et al, 2005). The method 
has been used in the evaluation of container terminal efficiency quite extensively in 
the literature (Cullinane and Song, 2003; Cullinane, Song and Gray, 2002; Coto 
Millan, Banos Pino & Rodriguez Alvarez, 2000; Wang, Cullinane and Song, 2005; 
Trujillo and Tovar, 2007; Notteboom, Coeck and Van der Broeck, 2000). The 
advantages of the SFA is that it is a parametric method, able to handle irregular 
data sets and it takes into account the heterogeneity of the production function in 
the port sector. The major disadvantage is that is requires the statistical specifica-
tion of the probability distribution on the error term. 
A large portion of the literature has focused on frontier methods known as 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA estimates the efficiency of a set of pro-
duction units relatively to the frontier. It does not therefore require the specifica-
tion of the production function. This technique has been used quite extensively for 
port and terminal efficiency estimations (Roll and Hayuth, 1993; Martinez-Budria 
et al, 1999; Tongzon, 2001; Cullinane, 2003; Barros and Athanassiou, 2004; Wang 
et al, 2005; Wang and Cullinane, 2006; Cullinane et al, 2006; Cullinane, Song & 
Wang, 2005; Haralambides, et al. 2010; among others). The major advantages of 
this not parametric technique is that it does not require any probability assump-
tion, it is rather flexible, it can easily account for a multiple inputs and outputs, it 
makes account of the heterogeneity of the production function and it can account 
for increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale (Daraio and Simar, 2007). 
Major disadvantages thereof are that it does not provide any error measurements 
being deterministic in nature and is subjected to rather heavy bias from outliers. 
Wang, et al. (2005) provides a critical comparison of DEA with respect to other 
techniques, while Cochrane (2008) and De Koster, Balk and Van Nus (2009) high-
light the implications of misusing the technique. A resent account of the advanta-
ges and disadvantages of DEA and SFA is presented in Haralambides, et al. (2010). 
Although the importance of terminals and ports in the supply chain has be-
come evident (Notteboom and Winkelmans, 2001a), few of the studies mentioned 
before have encompassed the supply chain dimension in the evaluation of con-
tainer terminal performance. Before looking at these studies more in detail is expe-
dient to briefly discuss the reasons for which framing terminal performance in the 
supply chain is becoming increasingly urgent. 
H4H *%!&'&,!&*,*%!&$(*'*%&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In the previous parts the increasing role of shipping lines in integrated logistics as a 
consequence of the changes in the demands of shippers and consignees has been 
discussed. Ports and terminals on the contrary have only been reactive to the 
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change (Notteboom, 2004b; Slack, Comtois and Stelmo, 1996). The further in-
volvement of ports in logistics, so that they could virtually become transport solu-
tion providers, envisaged for example by UNCTAD (1999) in its discussion on the 
fourth generation ports, does not seem to have materialised yet. Marlow and Paixão 
Casaca (2003) as well as Mangan, Lalwani and Fynes (2008) have indicated the 
opportunities that could accrue to ports from a better understanding of their role 
in logistics.  
Robinson (2002) proposed an analytical paradigm where ports are seen as 
elements in the value-driven supply chain. Although enticing, this new paradigm is 
far from having become the common perspective. Robinson (2002) argues that 
shippers and logistics service providers do not compare transport services alone but 
compare supply chains. As a consequence freight moves in particular logistics 
pathways served by particular firms because these firms are able to create and sus-
tain competitive advantage (Robinson, 2002). Ports and terminals have naturally a 
competitive advantage, as they possess a valuable position in the supply chain 
(Robinson, 2002). In order though to fully benefit of the position, they should pro-
actively seek to sustain competitive advantage through value added creation. 
The increasing centrality of supply chain thinking impacts terminals directly 
and therefore terminal managers and port authorities cannot ignore the change 
(Slack, et al. 1996). This change can be traced in the following trends: 
 the development of dedicated terminals; 
 the participations of shipping lines and other chain agents in terminal joint 
ventures; 
 the integration  among logistics service providers, hinterland transport ser-
vice providers, ocean liners and feedering service providers; 
 the integration of distribution networks; 
 the inclusion of performance conditions in terminal lease contracts; 
 the increased dependency of terminals and shipping lines on larger cus-
tomers; 
 the increasing role of terminals as buffers; 
 the necessity to increase responsiveness in the supply chain. 
From the list above it is clear that container terminals and ports are not the 
drivers of change. By passively reacting to the change, they are unable to entirely 
benefit from the valuable position that they naturally have on the supply chain 
(Slack 1993). 
The shift towards the supply chain perspective is particularly urgent also be-
cause the interfaces between the terminal and the other modes have become the 
greatest bottlenecks in the system. Most modern terminals are able to move a con-
tainer out of the terminal within hours from unloading, while terminal yards act as 
buffer for those containers that have to wait for a full train to be loaded or for the 
trucks to pick them up. Although internal processes of container terminals are effi-
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cient, difficulties arise with the interfaces (hinterland and sea) of transportation. If 
those inefficiencies are not properly monitored, even the most efficient terminals 
may be constrained in their ability to deliver value to their customers. 
It is widely recognised that performance measurement should be closely re-
lated to the goals of an organisation, since effective management requires accurate 
measurement (Sink and Tuttle, 1989). Nonetheless, it should be noted that this is 
rarely the case for ports and terminals as far as their position in the supply chain is 
concerned. Bredrup (1995) explains that the first step in determining a framework 
for performance measurement is selecting the purpose of the measurement, and 
this should be done consistently with the organisation’s strategy. As metrics drive 
behaviour, failing to synchronise strategy and performance evaluation, may hinder 
management or harm the organisation. The measurement of terminal and port 
performance in a supply chain perspective is therefore central, if ports are to be-
come the agile organisations envisaged by Marlow and Paixão Casaca (2003). 
A more general reason for the development of a supply chain perspective in 
the evaluation of terminals refers to the fact that the assessment of the overall per-
formance of the supply chain is connected with the ability of the system to progress 
in the future. This aspect is consistent with the delivery, recovery and stewardship 
model (DRS) and the Plan, Do, Check, Act (PDCA) framework previously mentioned 
(Braithwaite, 2007). Benchmarking delivers better performance and is an essential 
tool for performance measurement (Rolstadås, 1995a; 1995b; 1998; Fawcett and 
Cooper, 1998). Benchmarking techniques have been widely used besides the ev-
aluation of supply chain performence measuring results, and are common practice 
for terminal managers as well. Gillen (2001) suggests the identification of best per-
formers not only internally and historically, but on each step of the value chain 
and among companies. As observed by Bichou (2007), port performance focuses 
largely on competitive benchmarking but rarely against other direct product com-
petitors, and process benchmarking or generic benchmarking are entirely ignored 
in the port literature. 
The reasons for which many ports are not yet able to exploit entirely their 
valuable position in the supply chain cannot be entirely addressed here. Nonethe-
less one of the main reasons relates to the difficulty that port managers and termi-
nals have in identifying and measuring their performance in the supply chain. A 
recent survey (Bichou and Gray, 2004) observes that more than half of the port 
interviewed, hardly ever uses logistics techniques to assess their performance, if at 
all, although a large part of the respondents recognised the importance of evaluat-
ing logistics performance. 
It is surprising that although there is general agreement over the importance 
of the supply chain position for ports and terminals, very little is proposed in the 
literature to evaluate the performance of terminals and ports in the supply chain 
perspective. The identification of performance metrics and frameworks against 
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which terminals can measure themselves, is essential and is not an issue to be easily 
resolved.  
The evaluation of performance in the context of the supply chain does not 
involve only terminal operators. Supply chains are increasingly becoming coopera-
tive (Thomas and Griffin, 1996; Hoyt and Huq, 2000) and coordination among 
the various segments of the chain have turned out to be one of the major challen-
ges for sea-ports (Van der Horst and De Langen, 2008). The understanding of the 
performance of each supply network member can be greatly improved if the per-
formance of the other members is also analysed. In particular it can be envisaged 
that terminals, carriers, third party logistics operators and port authorities all have 
a role in the performance of a chain, or in other words, in delivering value to the 
supply chain users. This defines in the end the value-delivery framework where the 
terminals operate. The performance of terminals within the supply chain, need to 
be enriched by transcorporate metrics, since the value delivery of the terminal is 
constrained by the actions of other network members. 
There are to date few major contributions in the literature that aimed at 
framing the performance of container terminals in the supply chain. Marlow and 
Paixão Casaca (2003) advocate the inclusion of the following variables as outputs 
in the evaluation of container terminal effectiveness, where with the term effec-
tiveness they indicate the ability of a port to act as an effective link: 
 Timeliness in picking up and delivering shipments; 
 Reliability of transit time/ transport availability; 
 Responsiveness of transport suppliers in meeting customers’ requirements; 
 Adaptability of existing processes to customers’ requirements; 
 Flexibility of operations; 
 Accuracy of information regarding status of shipment; 
 Accuracy in processing information; 
 Compliance with customers’ requirements; 
 Value for money; 
 Notification of any changes in the multimodal process; 
 Level of damage to the shipment; 
 Overall transport costs; 
 Lead-time to service delivery; 
 Level of conflict with other processes; 
 Employees’ interaction with customers. 
With respect to the terminal’s role in the supply chain, Bichou and Gray 
(2004) develop a model that attempts at identifying linkages between the port and 
its various stakeholders within the supply chain. They distinguish between internal 
and external drivers of change that integrate into a port management system. Core 
management and operational functions are being centred in a performance man-
agement system, which is linked through key performance indicators to the port 
management system and thus forms an integral part of the model.  
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The various indicators defined by Bichou and Gray (2004) are used for 
measuring the performance of container terminals: 
 Physical indicators: usually time measures and mainly concerned with the 
ship (turn around time, waiting time, berth occupancy rate, etc.) 
 Factor productivity indicators: labour and capital required to unload a 
ship. 
 Economic and financial indicators: total income related to gross registered 
tons (GRT), operating surplus per twenty foot equivalent unit (TEU) 
The concluding remark of their research highlights the vast potential, espe-
cially for ports, that lies in the application of a performance measurement system 
that integrates well into the supply chain as a whole. 
The article of Bichou (2007) expands some of the conceptualizations of Bi-
chou and Gray (2004). This contribution provides a review of container terminal 
performance measurement and discusses in detail the advantages and limitations 
of the various approaches to port efficiency. Bichou also proposes a coherent sup-
ply chain framework based on channel management concepts, and distinguishes, 
in the case of ports, among logistics, trade and supply channels. The metrics that 
can be identified in this perspective are more integrated as they allow direct port 
operations and value-adding logistics activities. The integrated framework he ad-
vances links the logistics and supply chain channels, where benchmarking is ac-
tively employed to evaluate and improve performance. 
A complementary way of approaching the supply chain perspective could re-
fer to the concept of transcorporate performance measurement advanced by Lee 
and Billington (1992) among others.  
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The measurement of an organisation’s performance in the supply chain perspec-
tive has to be multifold and may generate measurements that are conflicting (Bea-
mon, 1999). This is particularly true for terminals, where the internal terminal 
processes may be directed towards objectives that differ from those of the supply 
chains where the terminal operates. For example, in order to maximise the use of 
the terminal yard, a terminal may decide to introduce penalties for container ex-
ceeding a certain dwell time. But for some logistics operators, maintaining the con-
tainer at the terminal may respond to a specific logistics strategy. Ideally, the ter-
minal, most likely jointly with the port authority should strive to find a solution, 
e.g. a transferium or a hinterland container deposit. 
Furthermore, terminals may be part of several networks at the same time, so 
that the role of the terminal in each network may translate differently and conflict-
ing objectives may coexist. So for instance, a shipper dealing with fresh products 
may be more sensitive to time disruptions in the supply chain than another ship-
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per, who may value the provision of certain information from the terminal more 
than another shipper.  Terminal metrics, if seen as aiming at improving the overall 
performance of the supply chain, should therefore be associated with the under-
standing of the role the terminal plays in the various supply chains. This leads to 
the distinction between intra-terminal, intra-port and intra-chain metrics on the 
one side and inter-chain metrics on the other. 
Intra-terminal metrics (e.g. crane performance, berth utilisation, resources 
utilisation, cost-based metrics) reflect the contribution the terminal delivers to the 
achievement of the internal objectives of the terminal, intra-port metrics (e.g. cus-
tomer service, value added, connectivity, total costs analysis, employment) reflect 
the contribution that the terminal delivers to the port objectives and intra-chain 
(e.g. customer service, value added, flexibility, reliability) the contribution that the 
terminal delivers to each of the supply chains where it operates. Inter-chain metrics 
will refer to the ability of the terminal to respond to the requirements of the supply 
chain networks it belongs to, i.e. multiple supply chains. 
 
Figure 21: Transcorporate performance measures. 
Source: Author. 
Neglecting the intra-port, intra-chain and the inter-chain dimensions not 
only has effects on the supply chain where the terminal operates, but also on the 
terminal internal processes. The performance metrics predominantly employed in 
terminals can be classified as cost-related indicators (operating costs, crane utiliza-
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tion, berth productivity, etc.) and a combination of cost and customer responsive-
ness measures (dwell time, yard utilisation, ship turnaround time, etc.). Those 
measures are either maximised or minimised depending on overall firm strategy 
and operational capabilities. Beamon (1999) points out that the two major weak-
nesses of this approach are related to the inclusiveness33 and ambiguous represen-
tation of costs. 
As far as inclusiveness is concerned, considering the complexity and inter-
firm dependencies within a supply chain, it is misleading to search for one-fits-all-
approaches of the kind of what the traditional cost-related measurement systems 
advocate. Cost-related metrics may lead to optimizing the performance of the ter-
minal sub processes only, losing sight of the inter- and intra-firm linkages. Fur-
thermore, basing the terminal performance solely on cost runs the risk of misrepre-
sentation due to the various potentially distorting accounting practices. The differ-
ent terminal operating systems may impact the universality attribute, while issues 
connected with measurability and consistency are self-evident.  
A possible solution to this type of problems is offered by Beamon (1999) and 
Chan (2003) when they suggest basing supply chain performance systems on a 
broader set of measures and criteria. This approach, that has been presented al-
ready in section 8.5, seems applicable also to terminals. The application of the 
BSC framework developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992; 1996) and also discussed 
in section 8.5 for ocean carriers, could also successfully be applied to terminals. All 
these approaches, as clearly discussed by Braithwaite (2007), could be integrated in 
the supply chain diamond reproduced in figure 20 and discussed above. This 
framework appears appropriate also for terminals if they are to acquire a more 
active position within the supply chain. 
Another important aspect in the definition of a performance measurement in 
the supply chain is the account of visibility. As Bartlet, et al. (2007) indicate, im-
proving visibility may deliver substantial advantages to the supply chain perform-
ance. This relates to the case of container supply chain where the issue of visibility 
has been indicated in recent years as one of the major challenges for container 
terminals, defined as ‘the black holes’ of the container supply chain (Ständer, 
2008).  
                                                
33 A terminal performance measurement system, like any other performance measurement in gen-
eral, should be characterized by the following attributes (Beamon 1999): 
- inclusiveness (measurement of all pertinent aspects), 
- universality (allow for comparison under various operating conditions), 
- measurability (data required are measurable), 
- and consistency (measures consistent with organization goals). 
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The chapter argues that ocean carrier performance should also be viewed in the 
context of the supply chain. Ocean transportation is a subsystem within the supply 
chain and as such performance should not be limited to the evaluation of its inter-
nal processes. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs it is the performance of the 
entire chain that really matters. If the supply chain performs well, i.e. creates 
value, then it will be chosen and as consequence also the carrier will be chosen. As 
the supply chain is as strong as its weakest link, a carrier may be extremely efficient 
in its operations, but if terminals, or hinterland transport providers do not provide 
adequate levels of service, or the access roads to the port are congested, this will 
impact the ability of the chain to create value and in essence also the competitive-
ness of the carrier. 
The focus on the supply chain is requested also by the fact that the perform-
ance of each link is influenced by the performance of the other links. As such the 
performance of a liner company is affected by the performance of a terminal and 
in turn, the performance of the container terminal is affected for example by ineffi-
cient trucking, or inefficient port policy. The cooperative nature of supply chains 
requires a different approach to performance, where, next to traditional intra 
company measures, also inter chain metrics should be monitored and analysed. 
This of course raises particular challenges for the supply chain operators, as 
cooperation among the various stakeholders becomes then a fundamental pre-
requisite for the implementation of efficient supply chain strategies. From the side 
of the carriers, in particular of those that chose to provide third party logistics ser-
vices, investment in ICT and in improving supply chain visibility should be on top 
of their development strategies. But this of course cannot and should not be done 
independently. 
In the chapter we propose next to the use of traditional cost based perform-
ance metrics, intra- and inter-chain performance metrics. This approach is consis-
tent with the supply chain diamond and transcorporate performance measurement 
recommended by Hieber and Schönsleben (2002) for the evaluation of the supply 
chain system performance. In addition we postulate the applicability of the balance 
scorecard framework for ocean carriers. 
The evaluation of performance in the context of the supply chain does not 
and cannot involve only ocean carriers. Supply chains are increasingly becoming 
cooperative (Thomas and Griffin, 1996) and therefore the measurement of the per-
formance of each stakeholder depends to a large extent on the performance of 
other stakeholders. In particular it can be envisaged that ocean carriers, shippers, 
terminals, third party logistics operators and port authorities all have a role in the 
performance of a chain. This defines the value-delivery framework where they op-
erates, and although the performance of carriers within the supply chain is con-
  206
strained by the actions of other actors, it should still be possible to assess the value-
delivery of each chain and of each component of the chain. 
We recommend further study of the performance measurement systems ac-
tually used by shipping lines. This would contribute to a better understanding of 
what motivates ocean carriers to invest in logistics and provide useful contribution 
to improve the performance of supply chain systems. Further study should be car-
ried out on the perspective used in the performance measurement of other chain 
components, such as terminals and port authorities. Some studies (Bichou and 
Gray, 2004; Bichou, 2007; Marlow and Paixão Casaca, 2003) recommend the im-
plementation of the supply chain perspective also in the case of port and suggest 
that the issue discussed in the chapter are relevant and still open. 
Terminals performance should be reframed in the context of the supply 
chain. The terminal is a subsystem within the supply chain and as such perform-
ance should not be limited to the evaluation of its internal processes. As mentioned 
in the previous paragraphs it is the performance of the entire chain that matters. If 
the supply chain performs well, i.e. creates value for its users, also the terminal will 
prosper. As the supply chain is as strong as its weakest link, a terminal may be ex-
tremely efficient in its operations, but if its hinterland does not provide adequate 
levels of service, or the access roads to the terminal are congested, this will impact 
the ability of the chain to create value and in turn the competitiveness of the ter-
minal. 
The various frameworks proposed in the literature are legitimate in providing 
adequate estimations of container terminal performance, as long as the supply 
chain focus is also included in the analysis. The focus on the supply chain requires 
a different approach to performance where quality indicators are juxtaposed to 
costs and resource utilisation metrics. In particular at the intra- and inter-chain 
level, customer service, value creation, flexibility, reliability and visibility become 
crucial. At the intra- and inter port level, responsiveness, connectivity, employment 
and local effects should also be monitored. This approach has as a consequence an 
increased focus on intangible investment such as ICT, information visibility and 
ability to monitor the chain, with respect to infrastructure. 
The traditional approaches based on costs and efficiency indicators fail to 
appreciate the complexities of supply chains. More advanced approaches identify 
performance indicators that are more inclusive and cater for the special character-
istics of a supply chain by applying a holistic evaluation methodology. These ad-
vanced approaches have positive effects on the terminal internal processes, as stud-
ies on the BSC and DRS seem to indicate, since performance measurement is a 
defining component of good management and metrics drive behaviour.  
In general in the case of terminals, three major sets of recommendations can 
be made. Firstly, it seems imperative to proceed with the setting up of standards for 
terminal performance and benchmarking in order to harmonise and be able to 
compare information. In particular more information on the different types of 
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cargo flows at the terminal would help targeting operations to better serve the 
chain. This, in association with further data transparency and data harmonisation, 
would contribute improving the quality of terminal performance metrics. Secondly 
a change in perspective from the side of terminals and port operators is required, 
in order to fully develop terminal potentials as elements in the supply chain. This 
requires more focus on time metrics, added value and customer service. Thirdly, 
further research would be useful in this area. In particular the creation of a task 
force on the issue and the formulation of clear analytical frameworks would be 
very useful. 
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The issue of bundling has been addressed in the industrial organisation literature 
as a strategic device to better control consumers and gain market control. Al-
though the results of this stream of research are still controversial in the case of 
oligopoly, we assume the possibility of strategic advantage a reason good enough to 
investigate the issue further. The approaches used to model this type of strategic 
interactions are generally based on game theory. This is also the approach decided 
below, notwithstanding the conceptual difficulties that the use of game theory 
models imply in the case of applied industry examples. 
This chapter presents two game theory models aiming at formalising the stra-
tegic interactions that could contribute explaining the carrier motivation to engage 
in bundling.  
I4B -&$!&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The thesis uses a simple game theory approach, based on Economides (1993), in 
an attempt to formulate a strategic decision process that could lead to the provision 
of a bundle. The major differences with the model of Economides (1993) is that the 
game here is a single stage game, for, in the specific context under analysis, the a 
priori decision of a carrier not to provide bundles is unrealistic and, in any case, the 
focus of the present model is limited to those carriers that do provide bundles (ex-
clusive liner companies are kept out from the analysis). In addition, we introduce a 
parametric representation, in order to distinguish among the different abilities of 
                                                
* This chapter is based on Acciaro and Haralambides (2007) and Haralambides and Acciaro (2010). 
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carriers and shippers in providing the bundle. These parameters, which we will 
refer to as transaction costs, in reality summarise the differences among carriers in 
performing integrator tasks. The latter are seen as a function of the carrier’s mar-
keting ability; the resources dedicated to logistics; production efficiency; or the car-
rier’s bargaining power. The disadvantage of those extensions is that calculations 
become tedious and formulas less elegant34. 
We can simplify the analysis by assuming that each transaction is the result of 
a game between two carriers, C1 and C2. The supply chain is assumed to consist of 
two components, ocean transportation (O) and a logistics service (S). The services 
are provided by the two carriers either on their own or as a bundle.  
The bundle can be provided by C1 either by assembling its own services, or 
combining one of his own services with the services provided by his competitor. 
Naturally every service implies a cost, but in the analysis here the technical costs of 
producing the two services have been kept out, as they would make it impossible to 
obtain (analytically) equilibrium.35 
In addition, if the shipper does not buy the bundle from either carrier but 
buys only the separate components instead (eventually by the same carrier), she is 
penalized by an additional cost component (tS) deriving from the transaction costs 
of assembling the bundle herself. Analogously, the carriers have to bear their own 
transaction costs when providing the bundle (t1 and t2 respectively). 
Implicitly we are assuming that if the carriers diverge in their ability to pro-
vide the bundle, the difference in the bundle prices will also increase, while the 
difference in the price of the individual components will be proportionally re-
duced. In other words, the ability of each carrier in providing the bundle is re-
flected in the price charged to the consumer. 
The game can be thought of as a single stage game, where the players (the 
carriers) decide a set of prices for the bundle and the unbundled services.  Follow-
ing are the possible situations in the game: 
1. The shipper buys the bundle either from C1 or C2; 
2. The shipper buys the services separately; 
3. The shipper buys ocean transportation from C1 and the logistics service 
from C2; 
4. The shipper buys ocean transportation from C2 and the logistics service 
from C1; 
5. The shipper buys both ocean transportation and logistics from C1, but 
does not buy the bundle; 
6. The shipper buys both ocean transportation and logistics from C2, but 
does not buy the bundle; 
                                                
34 In what follows, we acknowledge use of Wolfram’s Mathematica. 
35 The impact of introducing costs on the competitive outcome is reserved for a forthcoming paper. 
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Let’s now define the set of strategies available to C1 and C2, given the set of 
coefficients, tS, t1, t2. The strategy for the carriers is defined as the set of prices Pi = 
{ri; oi; si}, i=1,2. 
Given a set of prices, Pi = {ri; oi; si}, a demand system is next required on 
order to determine the payoffs of the players. Assuming a linear demand in (ri ; oi; 
si), we can express the demand system as: 
 
D(B1) = a – br1 + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s1) + f(o2 + s2) + g(r2) 
D(B2) = a – br2 + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s1) + f(o2 + s2) + g(r1) 
D(N1,1) = a – b(o1 + s1) + c(o1 + s2) + d(o2 + s1) + e(o2 + s2) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
D(N1,2) = a – b(o1 + s2) + c(o1 + s1) + d(o2 + s1) + e(o2 + s2) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
D(N2,1) = a – b(o2 + s1) + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s2) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
D(N2,2) = a – b(o1 + s2) + c(o1 + s1) + d(o1 + s2) + e(o2 + s1) + f(r1) + g(r2) 
 
The demand system is similar to the one used by Economides (1993)36, with 
the difference that in this case it has been adapted to a single stage game, where 
the prices of the bundle and the separate components are set simultaneously. 
In general we will have b > c + d + e + f + g, so that an increase in the prices 
of all six systems will decrease the demand for each system. Without loss of gener-
ality we can assume c = d = e = f = g. If we also consider the shippers transaction 
costs tS, the demand system becomes: 
 
DB1 = a – br1 + c(2o1 + 2s1 + 2o2 + 2s2 + r2) 
DB2 = a – br2 + c(2o1 + 2s1 + 2o2 + 2s2 + r1) 
DN11 = a – b(o1 + s1) + c(o1 + s1 + 2o2 + 2s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
DN12 = a – b(o1 + s2) + c(o1 + 2s1 + 2o2 + s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
DN21 = a – b(o2 + s1) + c(2o1 + s1 + o2 + 2s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
DN22  = a – b(o2 + s2) + c(2o1 + 2s1 + o2 + s2 + r1 + r2) - tS 
 
For the carrier i (i =1,2), the payoff will be defined as the difference between 
the price obtainable from selling the individual services at price (oi, si) or the bundle 
(ri), and the cost of assembling the bundle (ti). 
                                                
36 As rightly pointed out for example in Liao and Taumann (2002), liner demand systems have some 
undesirable characteristics. A refinement of the analysis will be presented in a forthcoming paper. 
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The payoff (profit) functions for C1 and C2 are given by: 
 
1 = (r1 -t1) DB1 + (o1 + s1) DN11 + o1 DN12 + s1 DN21 
2 = (r2 -t2) DB2 + s2 DN12 + o2 DN21 + (o2 + s2) DN22 
 
The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterized by the following condi-
tions: 
 
1 /r1 = DB1 + (r1 -t1) D’B1 + (o1 + s1) D’N11 + o1 D’N12 + s1 D’N21 = 0 
1 /o1 = (r1 -t1) D’B1 + DN11 + (o1 + s1) D’N11 + DN12 + o1 D’N12 + s1 D’N21 = 0 
1 /s1 = (r1 -t1) D’B1 + DN11 + (o1 + s1) D’N11 + o1 D’N12 + DN21 + s1 D’N21 = 0 
 
2 /r2 = DB2 + (r2 -t2) D’B2 + (o2 + s2) D’N22 + o2 D’N21 + s2 D’N12 = 0 
2 /o1 = (r2 -t2) D’B2 + DN22 + (o2 + s2) D’N22 + DN21 + o2 D’N21 + s2 D’N12 = 0 
2 /s2 = (r2 -t2) D’B2 + DN22 + (o2 + s2) D’N22 + o2 D’N21 + DN12 + s2 D’N12 = 0 
 
This, simplified, leads to the following system of equations: 
 
1) 1 /r1 = 4c o1+2c o2 – 2b r1+c r2+4c s1+2c s2+ a + b t1= 0 
2) 1 /o1 = 4(c – b) o1+4c o2+4c r1+2cr2+2(3c – b) s1+(3c - b) s2 +2(a – tS – c t1)= 0 
3) 1 /s1 = 2(3c – b) o1+(3c – b) o2+4cr1+2c r2+4(c – b) s1+4c s2+ 2(a – tS – c t1)= 0 
 
1’) 2 /r2 = 2c o1+4c o2 + c r1-2 b r2+2cs1+4 c s2+ a + b t2= 0 
2’) 2 /o2 = 4c o1+4(c – b)o2+2cr1+4cr2+(3c - b)s1+2(3c – b)s2+2a – 2 c t2 – 2tS = 0 
3’) 2 /s2 = (3c – b)o1+2(3c – b)o2+2c r1+4c r2+4c s1+4(c – b) s2+2a – 2c t2 –2tS = 0 
 
From the comparison of equations 2, 3, 2’ and 3’ we know that one equilib-
rium is given by o1 = s1 and o2 = s2. 
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Solutions are r1, r2, o1,o2, s1, s2: 
 
 
r
1
=
7a
(14 b - 55 c)
+
 c(35b - 88 c) t
2
- (352bc - 352c2 - 70 b2 )t
1
 
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c)
-
24 c
(14 b - 55 c)(b + c)
t
S
r
2
=
7a
(14 b - 55 c)
+
 c(35b - 88 c)t
1
- (352bc - 352c2 - 70 b2 )t
2
 
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c)
-
24 c
(14 b - 55 c)(b + c)
t
S
o
1
= s
1
=
4 a
(14 b - 55 c)
+
2 c  3(4b -11 c  )t
2
- 2(b -11 c) t
1
 
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c)
-
2 (2b - c)
(14 b - 55 c)(b + c)
t
S
o
2
= s
2
=
4a 
(14 b - 55 c) 
+
2 c  3(4 b -11 c) t
1
- 2(b -11 c  )t
2
   
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c)
-
2 (2b - c)
(14 b - 55 c)(b + c)
t
S
 
From this we can work out the prices of the unbundled services observed by 
the shippers: 
 
 
o
1
+ s
1
= 2o
1
= 2s
1
=
8a
(14 b - 55 c) 
+
4c  (3(4b -11c) t
1
- 2(b -  11c) t
2
)
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c)
-
 (2b - c)
(14 b - 55 c) (b + c)
t
S
o
2
+ s
2
= 2o
2
= 2s
2
=
8a
(14 b - 55 c) 
+
4c(3(4 b -11 c  )t
2
- 2(b -11 c  )t
1
)
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c)
-
 (2b - c)
(14 b - 55 c) (b + c)
t
S
o
1
+ s
2
= o
2
+  s
1
=  
8 a
(14 b - 55 c) 
+
2c  (t
1
+ t
2
)
(14 b - 55 c)
-
4(2b - c) 
(14 b - 55 c) (b + c)
t
S
 
The difference (r1- r2) is linear in t1-t2 and is given by: 
 
 
r
1
- r
2
=
5b - 8c
10b -11c
(t
1
- t
2
)  
 
While the difference (o1-o2 = s1- s2) is given by: 
 
 
o
1
- o
2
= s
1
- s
2
=
-2c
10b -11c
(t
1
- t
2
)  
 
These differences comply with the assumption of the model that if the com-
panies diverge in their ability to provide the bundle, the difference in the bundle 
prices will also increase, while the difference in the price of the individual compo-
nents will be proportionally reduced.  
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The relations between r1, r2, o1+o1, o1+s2, o2+ s1 are given in the following for-
mula, where the term G is provided in Table 27. 
 
 
D =
-a
(14 b - 55 c)
+
G
(14 b - 55 c) (10 b -11 c) 
 +  
4 (2 b - 7 c) t
S
(14 b - 55 c) (b + c)
 
 
Table 28: G term. 
r1 – o1+s1 70 b2 t1 + 44 c2 (11 t1-4 t2) + bc (-400 t1+43 t2) 
r1 – o1+s2 = r1 – o2+s1 70 b2 t1 + 3 bc (-124 t1 + 5 t2)+ 22 c2 (17 t1 -3 t2) 
r1 – o2+s2 70 b2 t1 + 44 c2 (6 t1+t2) - bc (344 t1+13 t2) 
r2 – o1+s1 bc (43 t1-400 t2) + 70 b2 t2+ 44 c2 (-4 t1+11 t2) 
r2 – o1+s2 = r2 – o2+s1 3 bc (5 t1-124 t2) + 70 b2 t2 + 22 c2(-3 t1+17 t2) 
r2 –o2+s2 
 G = 
bc (13 t1+344 t2) + 70 b2 t2 +  44 c2 (t1+6 t2) 
Source: Author. 
The differences between o1+o1, o1+s2, o2+ s1 are given in Table 28. 
 
Table 29: Differences between pairs of combined prices. 
o1+s1 0 
o1+s2 = o2+s1 2 c (t2-t1)/ 10 b-11c o1+s1 
o2+s2 4 c (t1-t2)/ 10 b-11c 
o1+s1 2 c (t1-t2)/ 10 b-11c 
o1+s2= o2+s1 0 
o1+s2 
o2+s1 
o2+s2 2 c (t2-t1)/ 10 b-11c 
o1+s1 4 c (t2-t1)/ 10 b-11c 
o1+s2= o2+s1 2 c (t1-t2)/ 10 b-11c o2+s2 
– 
o2+s2 
= 
0 
Source: Author. 
The model allows for the specification of t, and we can see that the bundle 
price is affected by the difference in the transaction costs of the two carriers in as-
sembling the bundle, allowing only the company with the lowest assembling cost to 
bundle. 
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Let’s start with the simplest case where t1 = t2 = tS = 0. In this case clearly r1 = 
r2 = r and o+s=o1+s1=o1+s2=o2+s1=o2+s2. The non-cooperative equilibrium prices 
are given by: 
 
r  =  
7a
14 b - 55 c
o + s =  
8a
14 b - 55 c
 .
 
It is clear that the price of the bundle will be always lower than the price of 
the unbundled alternatives (o+s). This conclusion is also in line with economic 
theory, for, in a duopoly, the bundle will be the Nash equilibrium of the game if no 
transaction costs are taken into account. 
Let’s consider now the case where t1=t2=t with t > 0, while tS is still equal to 
0. We know that clearly r1=r2, and o1+s1=o1+s2=o2+s1=o2+s2=o+s, so the consumer 
is indifferent between carrier 1 and carrier 2. In this case though, the price of the 
bundle is not necessarily the lowest. The introduction of transaction costs t affects 
the outcome of the game. 
 
 
r =
7a + (7b - 24c)t
14b - 55c
o + s =
8a + 4ct
14b - 55c
 
 
As long as t is relatively small, the bundle will remain attractive. If t is greater 
than 
 
a
7(b - 4c)
, then the price of the bundle will be higher than the price of the 
separate components and the equilibrium in the game will shift to the provision of 
separate components. It will here be more profitable for the shipper to buy the non 
bundled alternatives37. 
                                                
37 Note that we are assuming that b5c, then the quantity a/7(b-4c) is always positive. 
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In general, as long as tS is small relatively to t, the price of the bundle will re-
main above that of the sum of the individual components. In case t is also positive, 
the equilibrium prices are given by: 
 
 
r =
(b + c)(7a + (7b - 24c)t ) - 24ct
S
(14b - 55c)(b + c)
o + s =
4(b + c)(2a + ct ) + 4(c - 2b)t
S
(14b - 55c)(b + c)
 
 
Specifically, as long as t> tS, where  is the following quantity, 
 
 
q =  
a
7(b - 4c)
+
 4(7c - 2b)
7(14b - 55c)(b - 4c)
 
 
then the price of the bundle is greater than the sum of the prices of the individual 
components. Clearly if tS is significantly greater than t, then the bundle will be al-
ways preferred. 
We can extend this analysis to the case where the carriers incur different costs 
in assembling the bundle, so that t1  t2, i.e. one of the two carriers is better at pro-
viding the bundle. We can assume that t1 < t2. 
Let us start with the case where t1 < tS. In this case, the bundle to be sold will 
be the one provided by carrier 1, at price 
 
 
r
1
 =  
(b + c)(7a + (7b - 24c)t
1
) - 24 c  t
S
(14 b - 55 c)(b + c)
 
 
which is lower than r2 (the opposite will of course be the case when t2 < t1 and t2 < 
tS). 
If t1 is greater than tS, i.e. tS<t1<t2, then the bundle will not be sold and 
min{o1+s1, o1+s2, o2+s2} = o1+s1= 2o1 = 2s1. If on the contrary t1 > t2 and t > tS then 
the equilibrium price will be min{o1+s1, o1+s2, o2+s2} = o2+s2= 2o2 = 2s2. Finally the 
for the carriers to sell a component each in the unbundled alternative, it will have 
to be min{o1+s1, o1+s2, o2+s2} = o2+s1= o1+s2, this implies that at the same time, 
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t
1
<
2(12 - 5a)b +11(a - 6)
2(2 + 5a)b -11(4 + a)c
t
2
t
1
< -
2(2 + 5a)b -11(4 + a)c
2(12 - 5a)b +11(a - 6)
t
2
 
These conditions cannot hold, given that both t1 and t2 are both non-
negative. This implies that if t1  t2 then equilibrium exists only if the shipper con-
sumes service 1 and service 2 of the same carrier or one of the bundles is provided. 
Table 30 summarizes the cases just discussed. 
Table 30: Transaction costs and equilibrium outcomes. 
!,-,!'& '&!,!'&+ $,!'&', + !((* '/+,(*!
A1 
tS < t1 
t1 < t2 
+-/)'+)((/. o1 + s1 
A2 
tS < t2 
t2 < t1 
+-/)'+)((/. o2 + s2 
B1 
t1 < tS 
t1 < t2 
0(&+-)1#4--#-F r1 
B2 
t2 < tS 
t2 < t1 
0(&+-)1#4--#-G r2 
C 
t = t1 = t2 
t > tS +-/)'+)((/. o + s 
D 
t = t1 = t2 
t < tS 0(& r = r1 = r2 
Source: Author. 
The model shows that the carriers in reality are competing on the bundle not 
only among themselves but also with their customer. 
I4C +-$,+', %'$
The theoretical model described above is an attempt to discuss the implications of 
bundling of separate activities that involve a certain cost of producing the bundle. 
Intuitively we would expect the transaction costs of the carrier to be lower than 
those of the shipper (tS). In reality the model may apply to a situation where those 
demanding the separate services are the freight forwarders. For some of them tS 
may actually be lower than the transaction costs of the carriers. 
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In real markets, then, the carrier who has the possibility to offer bundles is 
exposed to competition from two sides. On the one hand, he is forced to reduce his 
bundle price, for he is competing directly with other carriers. This pressure stems 
from the competitiveness of each carrier in assembling the bundle. On the other 
hand, the carrier faces competitive pressure generated from the demand side. 
In previous papers it has been shown that mixed bundling is a dominant 
strategy in duopoly for both firms, even if its outcome is not the best possible (Pris-
oner Dilemma). In the situation outlined in our model we show that, in reality, 
differences in the ability to provide the bundle -wrt the ability of providing the 
bundle from the demand side, may justify the decision of a company not to pro-
vide bundles. If a carrier knows that compared to his competitors, or alternatively 
to his customers, the costs of providing bundles are too high (implying that the 
competitor will provide a cheaper bundle or the customer will be able to assemble 
the bundle cheaply herself) then the best strategy available will be not to provide 
bundles and focus only on the separate components. 
In the specific case of the model used here, mixed bundling is a dominant 
strategy for carriers depending on the distribution of transaction costs. The analy-
sis shows though that the equilibrium elasticity to a change in transaction costs of 
the carriers is much higher than that of a change in the transaction costs of the 
shipper. 
I4D $*,+
Welfare calculations are omitted in the paper, as the results are analogous to those 
obtained in the existing literature on bundling in oligopoly, albeit much more tedi-
ous. The addition of transaction costs does not add anything to the results obtained 
for example in the aforementioned article of Economides (1993) or Liao and 
Taumann (2002). For the purpose of our discussion it should be noticed that mixed 
bundling is socially beneficial as it lowers consumer prices and increases choice for 
consumers.  
I4E *!!&!+!'&+!&'$!'('$0/!, ,*&+,!'&'+,+
A simple game theoretic approach is employed below to formulate the strategic 
decision process that leads to a bundle price. Without loss of generality it can be 
assumed that each transaction is the result of a game between two carriers and one 
shipper. It is assumed that the supply chain consists of two components, ocean 
transportation (t) and a logistics service (l). The two services are complementary 
and they are provided by one carrier as substitutes for the respective two services 
provided by the other. The shipper purchases a combination of t and l. Nj = {tj, lj} 
is the set of services provided by carrier j. Let T = {t1, t2} and L = {l1, l2} be the 
sets of ocean transportation and logistics services respectively. N = TL is the set 
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of all services. A system S consists of two products t and l, where t  T and l  L. Let 
C = {{t, l}| t  T and l  L} be the set of all possible systems, so that S  C. The 
system {tj, li} is a mixed system if j  i and a pure system if j = i. This formulation is 
similar to the one proposed by Liao and Tauman (2002). The services are pro-
vided by the two carriers either separately or as a bundle (mixed bundling). 
To simplify the analysis, and without loss of generality, we assume that the 
costs involved in the provision of each service are null. This implies that carriers 
possess the same technology and are characterised by the same level of efficiency 
in providing ocean transportation and logistics services. Although restrictive, this 
assumption does not affect the essence of the bundle pricing decision.  
In our case of two carriers and one shipper, we have C ={S11; S22; S12; S21}, 
where the specification of all four systems is as follows: 
 S11 ={t1, l1} The shipper buys the bundle from carrier 1; 
 S22 ={t2, l2} The shipper buys the bundle from carrier 2; 
 S12 ={t1, l2} The shipper buys ocean transportation from carrier 1 and the 
logistics service from the other carrier; 
 S21 ={t2, l1} The shipper buys ocean transportation from carrier 2 and the 
logistics service from the other carrier. 
Shippers have identical tastes (symmetric) and are indifferent between pur-
chasing a bundle or buying the two services separately from the two carriers. For 
simplicity we assume that their willingness to pay is equal to a large enough arbi-
trary value, V. Shippers are penalized by bearing an additional cost k deriving from 
the transaction costs involved in assembling the bundle themselves. If they decide 
to buy the bundle from either carrier, k = 0, otherwise k  > 0. The carriers have to 
bear their own transaction costs when providing the bundle (k1 and k2 respectively). 
Let us now define the set of strategies available to the carriers and the ship-
per. A strategy for carrier j is defined as the triplet of prices 
 
p j = p
r
j
, p
t
j
, p
l
j{ } , 
where 
 
p
t
j  and 
 
p
l
j are the (non-negative) prices of each service sold separately, and 
 
p
r
j  is the (non-negative) price of the bundle. A strategy for the shipper is a decision 
rule 
S , which determines the subset of services he will buy at a price system
 
p = pi , p j( ) . 
Let us now define a game G as follows. In the first stage of the game, each 
carrier decides its strategy
 p
j . Carriers compete in a Bertrand fashion and select 
their prices simultaneously. In the second stage, the shipper observes the price vec-
tor p and selects his consumption set. We assume shipper and carriers are rational 
and information is perfect.  
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Payoffs are defined as the net profit of the carriers, and the sum of the cost of 
purchasing the services, plus the (eventual) cost of assembling the bundle k for the 
shipper. Namely:  
(1)  
 
 j p, S p( )( ) = p j  k j
jS p( )N j
  
(2)  
 
CS p, S( ) =V  p j  k
jS p( )
  
Let NE be the set of all pure strategy Nash equilibria which are subgame per-
fect. We will refer to a point in NE as an equilibrium point. The first step in the 
solution of the game consists of determining the behaviour of the shipper given all 
possible carrier strategies. The shipper observes p and will purchase the product 
that gives him the highest CS. 
In order to find solutions to the game, we proceed by listing the payoffs for 
the shipper and both carriers for every possible pricing strategy. We will start our 
discussion by considering 
 
pi
r
< p j
r
 and 
 
pi
t
+ p j
l
< p j
t
+ pi
l
. The following alternatives 
exist: 
1. If 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k < p
r
i , the shipper will purchase the separate compo-
nents, namely ocean transportation from carrier i and the comple-
mentary logistics service from carrier j. 
2. If 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k = p
r
i , the shipper is indifferent between buying the 
bundle of carrier i and the separate services bought from the two car-
riers. 
3. If 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k > p
r
i , the shipper buys the bundle from carrier i 
The shipper and the carriers’ payoffs are given in table 31 below. 
We can therefore distinguish three cases: 
 Case 1: when 
 
pi
r
< p j
r
 and 
 
pi
t
+ p j
l
< p j
t
+ pi
l
; 
 Case 2: when 
 
pi
r
< p j
r
 and 
 
pi
t
+ p j
l
= p j
t
+ pi
l
; 
 Case 3: when 
 
pi
r
= p j
r
= p
r
. 
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Table 31: Shipper and carriers’ payoffs in case 1. 
  !((* **!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i
r
+ pi
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t
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p
t
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+ p
l
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r
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r
 
 
pi
r
 k i  0 
 
The case 
 
pi
t
+ p j
l
> p j
t
+ pi
l
 can be worked out similarly. We discuss below the 
case
 
pi
t
+ p j
l
= p j
t
+ pi
l
. The payoffs are given in the following table. 
Table 32: Shipper and carriers’ payoffs in case 2. 
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l
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4
 
 
p j
t
+ p j
l
4
 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k > p
r
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pi
r
 k i  0 
 
The case in which 
 
pi
r
> p j
r
leads to payoffs analogous to the ones presented 
above. We next discuss the payoff system in the case of 
 
pi
r
= p j
r
= p
r
. The shipper 
payoffs remain unchanged while the carriers’ payoffs are given in the table below. 
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Table 33: Shipper and carriers’ payoffs in case 3. 
 **!*! **!*"
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The other payoffs can be easily calculated on the basis of what was presented 
in the above tables. 
Now that the payoffs have been listed, let us discuss the solutions to the game 
in relation to the transaction costs parameters  k
i ,  k
j  and k . It should be noted that 
we are assuming that these are the only costs incurred in the provision of the ser-
vices, i.e. production costs are 0. In the simple case of  k
i
= k j = k = 0 , the equilib-
rium for the game is, as to be expected, 
 
p
r
i*
= pi*
t
= pi*
l
= 0,i . Shippers are indiffer-
ent between purchasing the bundle or the separate components; profits for both 
carriers are 0 and shipper payoff is V. This example corresponds to the Bertrand 
oligopoly pricing model, as the four systems in C are perfect substitutes. 
The other equilibria depend apparently on the relations among the transac-
tion costs parameters  k
i ,  k
j  and k . We will assume in the rest of the discussion that 
 k
i   k j  since the case  k i =  k j  is trivial. 
Let us assume without loss of generality that k
i <  k
j  with k <  k
j . The results 
of the analysis are the same irrespective of whether k is greater than  k
i . In this 
case, if the shipper purchases the bundle, he will do so only from carrier i. Carrier i 
has the possibility of setting 
 
pi
r
>  k
i . As long as 
 
pi
r
  k j , carrier i does not fear 
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competition from carrier j, who is unable to set prices at the same level. Carrier i 
could then set 
 
pi
r
= k
j   , for  arbitrarily small. Carrier j does not have the possi-
bility of setting 
 
p
r
j  below  k
j . Remember that carrier i and carrier j can have the 
same costs for service t and l, therefore they differ only on their ability to assemble 
the bundle, i.e.  k
i and  k
j . Carrier j cannot therefore compete on the bundle and 
his best strategy is to try to lead consumers to buy the unbundled components. To 
do so he sets 
 
p
l
j and 
 
p
t
j  as low as profitably possible, so that the shipper has a dis-
incentive to purchase the bundle. 
This implies that 
 
p
l
j  and 
 
p
t
j  need to be set so that 
 
pi
t
+ p j
l
+ k = p j
t
+ pi
l
+ k  p
r
i . If we replace 
 
pi
r
with  k
j   , the following relations 
hold: 
 
p j
l
 k j    pi
t
 k  and 
 
p j
t
 k j    p
l
i  k . Carrier j’s best strategy is setting: 
 
(3)  
 
p j
l
= k j    pi
t
 k  and 
 
p j
t
= k j    p
l
i  k  
 
We still however need to define how carrier i sets 
 
pi
l
 and 
 
pi
t
. If he sets 
 
pi
t
 
and 
 
pi
l
 so that 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k > p
r
i  and 
 
p
t
j
+ p
l
i
+ k > p
r
i , the shipper will buy the bun-
dle carrier i’s payoff will be  k
j    k i . 
If prices are set so that 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k  p
r
i  or 
 
p
t
j
+ p
l
i
+ k  p
r
i , the shipper buys 
the unbundled alternative, and carrier i’s profit will be 
 
pi
t
 or 
 
pi
l
 if the shipper buys 
only the unbundled alternative, and 
 
p
r
i
+ p
t
i
2
 or 
 
p
r
i
+ p
l
i
2
 if the shipper also buys the 
bundle, i.e. if 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
+ k = p
r
i  or 
 
p
t
j
+ p
l
i
+ k = p
r
i . Apparently, i’s strategy would 
then be setting 
 
pi
t
 or 
 
pi
l
 as high as possible, as long as the shipper continues to 
purchase the unbundled alternative. The latter will do so if and only if 
 
p
t
i  k j    p
l
j  k  and 
 
p
l
i  k j    p
t
j  k . The best strategy for carrier i is then 
to set: 
 
(4)  
 
p
t
i
= k j    p
l
j  k  and 
 
p
l
i
= k j    p
t
j  k  
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From equations (3) and (4) we have that 
 
p
t
i
+ p
l
j
= p
t
j
+ p
l
i . Symmetrically, we 
also have 
 
p
t
i
= p
l
i and that
 
p
t
j
= p
l
j  and therefore 
 
p
t
i
= p
t
j
= p
l
i
= p
l
j . Rearranging 
terms in (3) and (4) we get: 
 
(5)  
 
p
t
i
= k j    p
t
i  k p
t
i
=
k j    k
2
= p
t
j
= p
l
i
= p
l
j  
 
The following set of prices is therefore an equilibrium: 
 
(6)  
 
pi*
r
= k j   , 
 
p j*
r
= k j , 
 
p
t
i*
= p
t
j*
= p
l
i*
= p
l
j*
=
k j    k
2
  
 
this implies that 
 
pi*
t
+ p j*
l
+ k = p j*
t
+ pi*
l
+ k = pi*
r
.The payoffs for the carriers and 
the shipper are given by: 
 
 i = 3k
j  3  2k i  k
4
 
(7)  
 
 j = k
j    k
4
 
 
CS =V  k j  ( )
 
 
Note that although the equilibrium affords the best possible result to the 
shipper, carrier i is better off if and only if 
 
3k j  3  2k i  k
4
 is below the profit the 
carrier makes by selling the bundle only, i.e: 
 
 
3k j  3  2k i  k
4
< k j    k i ; or 
 
k i <
k j   + k
2
. 
When 
 
k i >
k j   + k
2
, the carrier would have been better off if the bundle 
only had been sold.  
It can be easily shown that if 
 
k i =
k j   + k
2
, carrier i is indifferent between 
the shipper buying the bundle or the unbundled components. For carrier j we ob-
serve that payoffs are always below those obtained by selling only the separate 
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components, but above those obtained if only the bundle was sold. These con-
siderations are summarised in Table 34. 
Table 34: Maximum payoffs. 
	! +,(0'
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k i >
k j   + k
2
 
 
k j    k
2
 
 
k j    k
2
 
 
k i =
k j   + k
2
 
 
3k j  3  2k i  k
4
 
 
k j    k
4
 
 
k i <
k j   + k
2
  k
j    k i  0 
 
V  k j  ( )  
 
Another way of looking at it: As the shipper is the one that determines the 
outcome of the game, and he is indifferent between the bundle and the unbundled 
components, the payoffs are given by the second row of Table 34. 
This implies that in some circumstances, i.e. every time 
 
k i  k
j   + k
2
, the 
carrier will obtain a profit that is lower than what he could have achieved simply 
because of the nature of competition. 
Let us now discuss the case in which  k
j  k . In this case carrier i has the 
possibility of setting the price of the bundle even above  k
i  and be sure that the 
shipper will continue buying the bundle. Let us assume that carrier i sets 
 
p
r
i
= k j    as before.  Even with 
 
p
t
j and
 
p
l
j equal to 0, if carrier i sets 
 
p
t
i
= p
l
i
= 0 , 
the shipper will always purchase the bundle; his payoff (cost) by doing so will al-
ways be less than what he would obtain from purchasing the separate components, 
i.e. 
 
V  k V  k j  ( ) . 
 
The equilibrium in this case is given by: 
 
(8)  
 
pi*
r
= k j   , 
 
p j*
r
= k j , 
 
pi*
t
= p j*
t
= pi*
l
= p j*
l
= 0  
 
This implies that 
 
pi*
t
+ p j*
l
+ k = p j*
t
+ pi*
l
+ k = pi*
r
. The payoffs for the carriers 
and the shipper are given by: 
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  i = k j    k i  
(9)    j = 0  
 
CS =V  k j  ( )  
 
Note that this case is very different from the case where k < k
j  discussed 
above. In fact, no matter what the price of the bundle now is, and at what level 
carrier j sets 
 
p
t
j and
 
p
l
j , carrier i will always set 
 
p
t
i and
 
p
l
i high enough to ensure 
that the shipper buys the bundle. The results of the game are given in Table 35. 
Table 35: Equilibrium prices and payoffs. 
*%,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 k
i
= k j = k c  
 k < k
c  
 
pi*
r
= k c ; 
 
p j*
r
= k c  
 
pi*
t
= p j*
t
= pi*
l
= p j*
l
=
k c  k
2
 
 
 i = k
c  k
4
;
 
 j = k
c  k
4
 
 CS =V  k c  
 k  k j  
 k
i  k j  
 
pi*
r
= k j   ; 
 
p j*
r
= k j  
 
p
t
i*
= p
t
j*
= p
l
i*
= p
l
j*
=
k j    k
2
 
 
 i = 3k
j  3  2k i  k
4
;
 
 j = k
j    k
4
 
 
CS =V  k j  ( )  
 k
i
< k j  k  
 
 
pi*
r
= k j   ;
 
p j*
r
= k j , 
 
pi*
t
= p j*
t
= pi*
l
= p j*
l
= 0  
 
 
  i = k j    k i ;   j = 0  
 
CS =V  k j  ( )  
 
 k
i
= k j = k c  
 k  k c  
 
pi*
r
= k c ; 
 
p j*
r
= k c  
 
pi*
t
= p j*
t
= pi*
l
= p j*
l
= 0  
  i = 0 ;  j = 0  
 CS =V  k c  
 
If the bundles were not available, the shipper would always obtain  CS =V  k  
and carriers   i =  j = 0 . The option of having the bundle may increase shipper 
payoff as long as  k
j is lower than k, in other words, as long as the less efficient car-
rier in assembling the bundle in the industry has the ability to assemble bundles 
better that its customers (i.e. at a lower transaction cost). 
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The theoretical model described above discusses the implications of bundling sepa-
rate logistics services at a cost. We have referred to this cost as transaction costs. In-
tuitively we would expect carriers to be able to assemble bundles with greater effi-
ciency than shippers, i.e. the transaction costs of the carrier ( k
i  and  k
j ) to be lower 
than those of the shipper (k). It should be noted that this is not necessarily the case, 
since some shippers, e.g. freight forwarders, may be more efficient in assembling 
bundles. Each carrier faces competition in the bundle market from two sides: di-
rectly from other carriers on the supply side, and from their clients on the demand 
side. This assumption is embedded in the model. 
The results of the model indicate that engaging in bundle provision is more 
profitable for a carrier who is significantly more efficient in providing bundles than 
its competitor or its client. If transaction costs are not simultaneously significantly 
below those of its client or its competitor, bundling does not seem to be a particu-
larly profitable strategy. On the contrary, when a carrier reaches sufficient levels of 
efficiency in the provision of the bundle, this grants him the ability of obtaining 
positive results. 
Having lower costs in assembling bundles, vis-à-vis competitors, might not af-
ford a carrier substantially higher profits. This is because, in the model, the profi-
tability of the bundling strategy depends on the ability of the shipper to assemble 
the bundle himself. Similarly, the ability of offering bundles at a low price does not 
necessarily ensure that the shipper will purchase the bundle.  
It should be noted that bundling is nonetheless never a worse strategy than 
selling only separate components, as long as the difference in the costs of assem-
bling the bundles between carriers are small. Therefore, if the costs of setting up a 
logistics branch within the company are small enough, the decision of engaging in 
bundle provision is at least as good as the decision of not engaging in this practice.  
In previous research (see Tauman et al.1997) it has been shown that mixed 
bundling is a dominant strategy in duopoly for both firms, even if its outcome is 
not necessarily the best possible for the firms (Prisoner Dilemma). In the situation 
outlined in our model we show that differences in the ability to provide the bundle, 
with respect to the ability of providing the bundle by the demand side, may justify 
the decision of a company not to provide bundles. If a carrier knows that com-
pared to his competitors, or alternatively to his customers, the costs of providing 
bundles are substantially higher (implying that the competitor will provide a 
cheaper bundle or the customer will be able to assemble the bundle cheaply her-
self) then the best strategy available will be not to provide bundles and focus only 
on the separate components. 
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The results of our model do not differ substantially from the findings of previous 
research (Economides, 1993 or Liao and Taumann, 2000). The effects of bundling 
on consumer surplus and social welfare are ambivalent. When shippers are sub-
stantially more efficient in assembling the bundle, it seems that competitive inter-
action in the oligopoly is not enough to ensure that welfare is maximised, and soci-
ety might be penalised. In this case, disallowing bundling might be a better option. 
When one of the carriers reaches substantial levels of efficiency in assembling 
bundles, the effects on consumer surplus are mixed, depending on whether the 
carrier’s transaction costs are lower than the transaction costs of the shipper. The 
effects on social welfare are also dependent on the difference between carrier- and 
shipper transaction costs. When carriers are able to assemble bundles at a lower 
cost than shippers, bundling affords society and consumer better welfare results. 
Table 36: Consumer surplus and social welfare. 
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 k
i
= k j = k c  
 k < k
c   
CS =V  k c 
 
V  k
c
+ k
2

 k  k j  
 k
i  k j   
CS =V  k j  ( ) 
 
V  k
i
+ k
2

 k
i
< k j  k  
 
CS =V  k j  ( )   CS =V  k i 
#30(&#(!
 k
i
= k j = k c  
 k  k c   CS =V  k
c   CS =V  k c 
)0(&#(!
 CS =V  k   CS =V  k 
 
The interesting feature of bundling, as opposed to the case in which bundling 
is not permitted, concerns the possibility of carriers passing efficiency gains on to 
shippers and society. We observe that when a carrier is more efficient than a ship-
per in assembling the bundle, social welfare is higher. The effects on consumer 
surplus depend on the difference between the transaction costs of the less efficient 
carrier and the shipper. If the transaction costs of the shipper are lower than those 
of the less efficient carrier, bundling lowers consumer surplus; if they are greater, 
then bundling increases consumer’s surplus.  
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The model adds to the discussion on the strategic dimensions of bundling deci-
sions. This is done by evaluating the outcomes of competition in a duopoly where 
carriers compete on prices; can sell individual components or bundles; and both 
carriers and the shipper incur a cost in assembling the bundle. The most interest-
ing finding of the models is that bundling allows for efficiency gains to be passed on 
to shippers and society, an eventuality that cannot take place when bundling is 
forbidden. 
This desirable feature of bundling though comes at a risk since carriers may 
not necessarily have the highest levels of efficiency in providing the bundle. When 
this is the case, bundling tends to reduce consumer surplus and can even reduce 
social welfare. An important issue that remains open for further research is 
whether carriers are intrinsically better than other parties in the supply chain in 
providing bundles. If this is the case, competitive forces, even in the restrictive case 
of duopoly, ensure that this efficiency is passed on to consumers and society. 
It should be noted in addition that one of the benefits of mixed bundling is 
that it increases choice for consumers. Considerations on social welfare should 
then additionally be weighted against the value of increased choice and variety. 
Especially in the case of certain supply chains, these benefits can be substantial. 
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Even if the practice of product bundling is common in many consumer markets, in 
the case of ocean transportation and other logistics services it is still rare, and, in 
some circumstances, even forbidden by law. As indicate by Kühn et al. (2005), the 
legal implications of bundling have become clearer and the approach of legal 
authorities towards this practice more consistent and in line with the findings of 
economic theory. A recent set of preliminary interviews done by Erasmus Univer-
sity Rotterdam and Singapore Management University (EUR-SMU, 2006), within 
a research framework promoted under the auspices of the NOL Foundation of 
Singapore, indicated a large interest of the industry on the possibilities offered by 
product bundling and solicit the question whether the attitude towards price bun-
dling in the container industry is about to change. 
Notwithstanding the general acceptance in the industry of the advantages de-
livered by logistics service integration, the reluctance of shippers to accept product 
bundling is still substantial (Acciaro and Haralambides, 2007; EUR-SMU, 2006; 
SMU-EUR, 2008a). Besides, the legal restrictions on product bundling, the specific 
regulatory regime that governed the liner sector until the last decades of the twen-
tieth century and of the debate that has animated the reform of this regulatory re-
gime, have contributed to increase the diffidence towards this practice in the con-
tainer sector. 
The large existing corpus of economic theory and legal cases is often cited in 
the industry as a reason for dismissing product bundling as an anticompetitive 
practice and terminating any discussions on its possible implementation in the con-
tainer industry. In addition, product bundling has been regarded by container car-
                                                
* We acknowledge reference to Parameritis (2009) on which part of the chapter is based. 
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riers as difficult to sell and its potential as a marketing and strategic tool has never 
been structurally assessed in the context of container transportation. 
From the academic side, the analysis of the market structure effects of pro-
duct bundling has animated the debate since the seventies, and, although scientific 
studies have tried to apply the findings of the theoretical literature to a large num-
ber of industries—the hotel and holiday industry, the software industry, to the 
health-care and the automobile industry are well-known examples of successful 
applications of product bundling—a very limited amount of research has been de-
voted to the topic in the context of container transportation, where product bun-
dling is so important to constitute in essence the backbone of what we refer nowa-
days as (maritime) logistics. 
With the exception of some exploratory works (Acciaro and Haralambides, 
2007; EUR-SMU, 2006) and seminal papers (Haralambides, et al. 2002), and of 
the very specific literature resulting from the debate on the so-called inland transpor-
tation clause of the European Commission review process of the regulation 
823/2000 and the TACA38 case, the discussion on product bundling has never 
been addressed systematically in the container industry. 
Transport policy has changed significantly in the last decades in order to 
cope with the developments of the liner industry and the various reforms in the 
regulatory regimes of countries involved in the shipping sector. Globalization and 
liberalization have been widely seen in the sector making it imperative for policy 
makers to reflect these changes in the legislation regarding the liner sector. In addi-
tion, containerization and its impact on the size and number of vessels have con-
tributed to the increasing popularity of alliances and consortia in order to share 
investment costs and maintain a competitive liner shipping service (Consultation 
paper on the review of 4056/86).  Also, people from the industry quite often advo-
cate it contains unique competition features, which require global attention due to 
the international character of shipping. There are still contradictory national regu-
lations, fortunately to a lower extent than two decades ago. It should be mentioned 
that even within the organization of economic cooperation and development 
(OECD) there have been serious controversial thoughts about how to form the 
appropriate competition rules for the shipping sector. Conferences and alliance 
activities are conducive to complicating further the regulation packages that used 
to be modified at a constant basis due to the dynamic environment of the liner in-
dustry. 
The aim of the competition policy is the improvement of competition 
through economic regulation of the market (Sjostrom, 2002). Its origin is traced in 
                                                
38 In 1998 the European Commission found that parties adhering to the TACA (Trans-Atlantic Con-
ference Agreement) had abused their joint dominant position by inducing potential competitors to 
join TACA, thereby altering the competitive structure of the market. The decision made also specific 
reference to hinterland transportation.  
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the United States where is referred as antitrust policy. The term “antitrust” was 
used to describe policies aiming at the prevention of anti competitive business 
practices which were seen in the United States at the end of the 19th century. 
Business practices that restricted competition were prevented by the anti trust laws 
which were based on the concept that a competitive market is desirable due to the 
fact that it promotes the most efficient use of a society’s scarce resources (Sjostrom, 
2002). 
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Antitrust in the USA 
US antitrust policy is rooted in the Sherman Act (1890), the Clayton Act (1914) 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act (1914). Section 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act constitute the major provision of American antitrust law. In particular section 
1 prohibits concerted action that leads to, or is intended to lead to, restraints of 
trade. Section 2 deals with unilateral behaviour. The Clayton Act contains specific 
provision dealing with price discrimination, tying and exclusive dealing and mer-
gers (Sections 2, 3 and 7). 
Given the generality of the Sherman Act provisions, a great deal of US anti-
trust law is based on court decisions. In particular the following business practices 
are illegal under Section 1 (Church and Ware, 2000). 
 Horizontal price-fixing; 
 Vertical price-fixing; 
 Horizontal market division; 
 Vertical market division or non-price vertical restraints; 
 Tying; 
 Exclusive dealing; 
 Group boycotts. 
The following business practices are illegal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: 
 Actual monopolisation; 
 Attempted monopolisation; 
 Joint monopolisation; 
 Incipient Conspiracy to monopolise. 
Enforcement of antitrust law in the USA is the responsibility of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). Private enforcement is also allowed. The Antitrust Division has the option 
                                                
39 This section is loosely based on Church and Ware (2000), Anderson and Rogers (1992), Goyder, 
(1995) and Brooks (2000). Literature on conference regulation in other regions is nonexistent, with 
the exception of Brooks (2000; 2002b) for Canada; and to some extent Bennathan and Walters (1972) 
for Asia. 
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of bringing a civil or a criminal case, but many cases are settled by consent decree 
(Anderson and Rogers, 1992). 
Competition policy in Europe 
The foundations of the European competition law are Articles 81 (amended article 
85) and 82 (ex article 86) of the European Economic Treaty, or Treaty of Rome, 
signed in 1957. Article 81 deals with concerted action and agreements among 
firms, while article 86 prohibits abuse of dominant position. The European Com-
mission has jurisdictional pre-eminence over member states for investigations con-
cerning articles 81 and 82, exclusive authority to issue exemptions; the ability to 
impose fines up to 10% of annual worldwide turnover; extensive powers of investi-
gation and a high degree of autonomy.  
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US Policies 
In the US, competition rules related to the liner industry are covered by the 
“Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998”. Cooperation, nevertheless, in the business 
relationships of the industry occurred earlier than the jurisdiction of the “Shipping 
Act of 1984”. A consortium of two or more carriers can be classified either as a 
“joint venture” or “cooperative working agreements”. An alliance should have its 
own name during the operation and provision of liner services, publish its own tar-
iff otherwise it will be considered as a working agreement and not a single carrier, 
thus joint venture. The sample conditions in an alliance agreement were (Brooks, 
2000): 
 Coordination of sailings, including: members of vessels and total capacity, 
sailing schedules, service frequency, ports served and rotation, feeder ar-
rangements, and notice of changes in vessel allocation. 
 Reciprocal space chartering, including terms of its provision, and adver-
tisement of its availability 
 Contracting with and co-ordination with suppliers of equipment, terminals 
and ancillary services 
 Maintenance of individual marketing and sales offices  
 Joint development of documentation and data systems  
 Conditions of withdrawal from agreement 
 Duration of agreement  
 Conditions determining breach of agreement  
Alliances usually are related to better asset organization and sharing of re-
sources in order to provide better services. Cargo or profits sharing are not part of 
the alliances. 
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EU Policies  
Initially EU policies regarding consortia in the shipping industry were related 
to conferences (Brooks, 2000). After the issue of the Commission Regulation 
870/95, there was a clear separation between these two types of agreements. In 
order to evaluate a merger, the EU examines various business agreements by using 
a framework for the particular business structure being examined. According to 
Article 3 of Council Regulation 4064/89 a merger has occurred when a company 
acquires the securities or assets of another company by contract or other form of 
agreement which leads in taking the control directly or indirectly of this company. 
In order for the merger to be covered under the Council Regulation 4064/89 it 
must have a “community dimension” meaning that the world turnover of the par-
ties should equal or exceed ECU 5 billion or at least one of them to have a turn-
over of ECU 250 million or more.  
The consortium according to EU regulation, not often can be resembled a 
merger due to the fact that lacks the permanent character of the merger as it con-
tains clauses regarding its termination. Nevertheless, a consortium can be con-
sidered as a joint venture which under EU law it can have a “concentrative” na-
ture or have the form of “coordination” leading to efficiency advantages (Brooks, 
2000). The merger control regulation excludes the consortium which aim is to co-
ordinate the competitive activities of independent undertakings. In that case the 
Council Regulation 17/62 of 21 February 1962. As far as concentrations are con-
cerned the EU prohibits only those that can lead to accumulative significant mar-
ket power. The phrase “performing on a lasting basis” in the Article 3(2) of Coun-
cil Regulation 4064/89 is what differentiate cooperative and concentrative joint 
ventures resulting in the conclusion that liner shipping consortia are not concentra-
tions. 
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It should be clear from the review of pricing practices presented in the previous 
paragraph, that the liner shipping industry has been characterised by a rather 
unique regulatory regime. Before proceeding with the discussion on the applic-
ability and legality of bundling of ocean transportation and other logistics services, 
it is useful to review the regulation in the USA and Europe in particular with refer-
ence to service contracts (SC). This regulation has deeply affected industry prac-
tices and perceptions of bundling strategies, and in particular in Europe bundling 
has been discussed at the deliberations in some landmark antitrust cases against 
conferences. The three most important cases are discussed in the next section, 
while in the remainder the foundations of antitrust policy in Europe and USA are 
presented. 
The Shipping Act of 1984 is the piece of regulation that sets the standards for 
pricing in ocean transportation to and from the USA and sanctions the existence 
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and operation of conferences. Conferences existed in the USA before, but the spe-
cific aim of the Shipping Act was to limit their market power by introducing the 
two concepts of independent action (IA) and service contracts (Brooks, 2000). IA is 
the possibility granted to conference members to negotiate rates below the publicly 
filed conference rates. Although the shipping act endorsed IA, it also specifically 
allowed conferences to veto IA on specific commodities. This controversial provi-
sion was revoked with the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998.  
The Shipping act of 1984 also contained important provisions on the applic-
ability of SC in Section 8 and Section 3(21), although they are reported to have 
been in use before (Marlow and Nair, 2008). SC are agreements between shippers 
and carriers or conference members to transport cargo over a period of time. SC 
are defined in the Shipping Act of 1984 as: 
‘[…] a contract between a shipper and an ocean common carrier or con-
ference in which the shipper makes a commitment to provide certain 
minimum quantity of cargo over a fixed time period and the ocean com-
mon carrier or conference commits to a certain rate or rate schedule as 
well as a defined service level such as, assured space, transit time, port 
rotation, or similar service features; the contract may also specify provi-
sions in the event of non-performance on the part of either party.’ (Ship-
ping Act of 1984, Section 3(21)) 
Since the OSRA, SC are to be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission 
(FMC) on a confidential basis, while according to the provisions of the Shipping 
Act of 1984, they had to be filed in tariff format and made available to other ship-
pers. These provisions aimed at ensuring and maintaining the common carrier 
principle, under which in essence the terms of the contracts should be made avail-
able to all shippers located in the same region and for similar services. In particu-
lar, the provisions of the Shipping Act of 1984 under Section 8(c) required that in 
case a lower rate for a particular commodity was offered to a new shipper entering 
in a SC, the same rate had to be offered to existing shippers (known as the ‘me too’ 
principle). Although this clause was aiming at preserving competition, it had the 
potential to weaken carrier rate exposure, especially in market downturns (Marlow 
and Nair, 2008).  
The provisions on SC in the Shipping Act of 1984 were substantially re-
viewed with the adoption of OSRA in 1998. In 1989 the Shipping Act had already 
been reviewed by the FMC, however, the essence of the regulation on conferences 
was not altered despite the fact that shippers complained that liners tried to pre-
vent fruitful negotiations (Brooks, 2000). It was only in 1992 that the regulation 
attracted the attention of the legislator, when the newly developed conference 
TAA (Trans-Atlantic Agreement) announced capacity reductions in specific routes 
in order to increase prices due to accumulated losses of millions, bad utilization 
levels and low freight rates (Brooks, 2000). 
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The TAA announcement, which also attracted the attention of the European 
Commission (see below), specifically discriminated between conference and non-
conference members; defined the limits and contents of SCs individual members 
were able to enter into with their shippers, including provision on inland rates; 
and, limited to the westbound routes only, it also endorsed a capacity management 
program. Shippers loudly complained against these provisions and engaged in 
fierce lobbying action with the regulator. In 1994, seventeen powerful shippers and 
the National Industrial Transportation League (NIT League) filed a complaint 
about the TAA with the FMC. The casus belli was that the TAA refused negotia-
tion on rates, conditions and rules for carriage of cargo (Clarke, 1997). The NIT 
League proposed to the FMC the following changes in the Shipping Act (Sjostrom, 
2002):  
 Removing carriers’ antitrust immunity altogether; 
 Terminating the requirements for public filing of tariffs and service con-
tracts with the FMC; 
 Abolition of the FMC and transfer monitoring consortia to the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ). 
The FMC initiated a new investigation on conferences resulting in a modifi-
cation of the stipulations of the TAA, which, in the meanwhile also under fire on 
the other side of the Atlantic, was renamed TACA (Brooks, 2000). The TACA was 
different from the TAA in the sense that it did not discriminate between confer-
ence and non-conference members; it relaxed the restrictions on the capacity 
management programme; increased volume limits on SCs; and loosened control 
on IA. The FMC required further changes to the TACA before approval could be 
granted. Specifically, the FMC stipulated the elimination of any form of capacity 
management, the removal of limits on SC volumes and further flexibility on IA.  
In September 1995, the US House of Representatives proposed a modifica-
tion of the Shipping Act of 1984 by passing the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1995, in 
the attempt to remove the obligation of carriers to file tariffs and SC provisions 
with the FMC (Fusillo, 2006). The relatively more favourable conditions deriving 
from confidential contracts for larger shippers with respect to smaller ones resulted 
in the stalling of the Act in the Senate. The impasse was resolved in March 1997 
and finally on the 1st October of 1998 the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 was 
passed by the Senate with effect as of 1st of May of 1999. 
OSRA modified significantly the Shipping Act of 1984 since carriers were no 
longer obliged to file their tariffs with the FMC. However, they were requested to 
publish their tariffs electronically and make them available to the public through a 
system accessible from remote locations. The provisions related to SCs were also 
significantly altered. SCs could include provisions among common carriers and 
shippers, that deviated from those of the conference, but most importantly, the 
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following terms of the contract did not have to be filed with the FMC and re-
mained therefore confidential (Gardner, Marlow and Nair, 2002):  
 The origin and destination of cargo in the case of intermodal movements; 
 The maritime haul freight rate; 
 The specifications of the service commitments; 
 The eventual amount of damage payment for non-performance. 
Most notably, the clause that required existing shippers to be treated in the 
same way as new shippers entering into service contracts was removed. Further-
more, the OSRA set further limitations on conferences and other ocean common 
carrier agreements (Gardner, at al. 2002). In particular, these agreements may not 
prohibit a member or members of the agreements to enter into SC negotiations 
with one or more shippers; a member of the agreement is not obliged to disclose 
negotiations or the terms of a SC, with the exception of the terms that are pub-
lished under Section 8(c); mandatory rules regarding the right of a member to ne-
gotiate or enter into a SC were prohibited.  
The OSRA appeared to be a very pro-competitive Act, since it grants the 
ability of conference carriers to enter into IA or service contracts without fear of a 
conference veto or retaliation (Brooks, 2000). It was also consistent with the nature 
of the logistics requirements of shippers in today’s business environment where 
supply chain management has become an integral part of shippers’ negotiations 
and confidentiality is a necessary requirement for successful collaboration with the 
LSP (Jané and de Ochoa, 2007).  
The US approach diverges from the one adopted in the EU mainly as a re-
sult of the intrinsic difference in perspective and objectives between US and Euro-
pean antitrust regulation (Haralambides, 2007). The European focus is on the 
abuse of dominant market position while the objective of US antitrust regulation is 
the elimination of unjustifiably high prices and price discrimination practices det-
rimental to consumers. Although the outcome of the regulation may be in the end 
similar, the assessment methods and approaches towards potentially anticompeti-
tive practices are different. This is also evident in the case of the liner shipping in-
dustry.  
Furthermore, regulation in Europe is the concerted result of negotiations 
among countries that may have different national interests and policy perceptions 
resulting therefore in longer time for an effective policy to be found and imple-
mented (Brooks, 2000). Antitrust regulation within the EU is based on the Euro-
pean Community Treaty or Treaty of Rome Articles 81 and 82 and is monitored 
closely by the European Commission (EC). In line with the European policy prin-
ciple of subsidiarity and although transport policy was at the origin of the establish-
ment of the EU, every Member State had the freedom to implement the provisions 
of the European Treaty in the way they deem most appropriate. In addition, the 
Treaties came on top of the existing multilateral and bilateral agreements among 
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Member States and among Member States and parties outside the Community. 
This resulted in the existence of transport regulatory frameworks that differed sub-
stantially among Member States in terms of degree of government intervention, 
ratified multilateral and bilateral agreements and in general the degree of market 
liberalisation (Brooks, 2000).  
The divergence of policy framework among various Member States is evident 
for example in the discussions related to the adoption of the UNCTAD Code of 
Conduct for Liner Conferences. Some of the provisions of Code of Conduct were at 
variance with those of the Treaty of Rome (Brooks, 2000). European Council 
Regulation 954/79 granted permission to Member States to ratify the UNCTAD 
Code, under the pressure of some of the Member States that had already made 
provisions in order to allow for self-regulation in the liner shipping industry and 
essentially since the EEC shipping industry was loosing competitiveness against 
East European countries and the USSR. The Code did not apply among the EEC 
countries and EEC countries and OECD counties. 
The European Council recognised the advantages deriving from the UNC-
TAD Code for the Common Market, and allowed its ratification in 1983. At the 
time it was recognised, in the Cockfield Report for example, that a more concerted 
approach to liner shipping regulation would have been more beneficial to the EEC 
(Brooks, 2000). This resulted in the elaboration of a set of rules—the so-called First 
Package—aiming at harmonising the Single European Market maritime policy.   
The ‘First Package’ was accepted by the Council of Ministers in December 
1986, in effect from July 1987. The package contained one of the most crucial 
pieces of regulation on the liner shipping industry, the European Council Regula-
tion 4056/86 that remained in effect until October 2008.  The package though 
consisted of four regulations (Brooks, 2000): 
 Council Regulation (EEC) 4055/86 of 22 December 1986: applied the 
principle of freedom in providing services to maritime transport between 
member states and between member stated and third countries; 
 Council Regulation (EEC) 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 (repealed): 
brought detailed rules regarding the application of Articles 85 and 86 (re-
lated to competition policy) of the Treaty of Rome to the maritime sector; 
 Council Regulation (EEC) 4057/86 of 22 December 1986: monitored un-
fair pricing practices in maritime transport; 
 Council Regulation (EEC) 4058/86 of 22 December 1986: this regulation 
was about coordinated action in order to ensure free access to cargoes in 
ocean trades. 
These measures aimed at enhancing the competitiveness of the European 
shipping industry and improving its strength over unfair practices from third 
countries (Brooks, 2000). One feature of the Council Regulation 4056/86 was that 
it excluded liner conferences from antitrust regulation granting a block exemption 
  240
from the cartel rule of Article 81(1) (at that time 85(1)) of the EC Treaty. In addi-
tion to granting carriers the possibility of coordinating tariffs the exemption also 
allowed for: 
 coordination of shipping timetables, sailings dates or dates of calls; 
 determination of the frequency of sailings or calls; 
 coordination or allocation of sailings or calls among members of the con-
ference; 
 management of the carrying capacity offered by each member; 
 allocation of cargo or revenue among members. 
The regulation also included provisions aiming at avoiding the abuse of the 
exemption. In particular, benefits should also accrue to consumers; the block ex-
emption is ‘indispensable’ in the sense that its benefits cannot be obtained in other 
ways; the onus of proof of these benefits is on carriers; carriers were not to use dis-
criminatory policy among ports and shippers, and were expected to discuss with 
shippers matters of mutual relevance (Brooks, 2000).  The regulation also intro-
duced the possibility in Article 6 of ‘loyalty agreements’, an instrument to allow 
conference carriers to give immediate, but not deferred, rebates, in line with Arti-
cle 7 of the UNCTAD Code, and required carriers to file tariffs with the EC.  
As already mentioned, Council Regulation 4056/86 came under attack in 
1992, when the TAA was notified to the Commission in August. The Commission 
argued that the TAA did not constitute a conference due to the fact that pricing 
was not fixed among all members, but the capacity management programme was 
illegal under Council Regulation 4056/86. In addition the TAA provided for the 
creation of an inland pricing authority, and this, in the view of the Commission, 
was beyond the scope of the antitrust block exemption and in breach of the Coun-
cil Regulation 1017/68 that ensured at the time competition on inland transporta-
tion.  
In October 1994, the Commission ruled against the TAA and in December 
of the same year, it banned the Far Eastern Freight Conference from setting 
multimodal tariffs. Although the Court of First Instance in March 1995 granted a 
stay of the decision in the fear of market instability, the members of the renamed 
TACA could set multimodal tariffs until April 1995, when the Commission passed 
Regulation 870/95 on consortia. The consortia regulation allowed antitrust im-
munity to a long list of activities, typical of joint ventures, but not to price-fixing. In 
this sense the Commission Regulation 870/95 differs substantially from Council 
Regulation 4056/86. Another characteristic of Commission Regulation 870/95 
worth noting is its similarity to OSRA: it aims at encouraging IA and SC, but does 
not allow extensive cooperation on inland transportation and capacity manage-
ment.  
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On the 21 of June 1995, the Commission lifted TACA’s block exemption on 
the basis of collective inland rate-fixing and penalties were imposed on its mem-
bers. The TACA members appealed against this decision but the Court of First 
Instance, on the 30th of December 2003, upheld the Commission’s decision. 
Nevertheless, the TACA had already been revised to conform to the requirements 
of the Commission and had been granted exemption in November 2002. The 
1995 was an important year not only for Commission Regulation 870/95 but also 
because of the publication of the Van Miert Report, that specifically addressed the 
issue of multimodal pricing.  
The Van Miert Report advised the Commission that conferences should not 
be allowed to set jointly tariffs for inland transportation, although it argued that a 
possible exemption could be granted for those services where separate provision 
would cost more than joint provision, referred to as fused services (Brooks, 2000). 
The ‘Van Miert Report’ did not recognise the TACA agreements on inland trans-
portation as joint services, although it agreed to the fact that the TACA’s proposed 
hub and spoke system improved substantially the efficiency of the system and there-
fore could eventually qualify for the exemption of intermodal rate from antitrust 
regulation.  
The consultations since 2003 resulted in 2005 in the proposal to the Euro-
pean Council of repealing Regulation 4056/86, mainly on the grounds that the 
cost structure of the liner shipping industry is not unique and therefore protection 
from competition is no longer essential. In addition the Commission argued that 
the industry did not satisfy the three requirements for a block exemption as laid 
down in Article 81(3) of the Treaty of Rome (Benacchio, et al. 2007). The condi-
tions are that the benefits of the exemption must be higher than its costs, that they 
should be passed on to consumers and that no other measures may be adopted to 
achieve comparable results (indispensability requirement). In the eyes of the 
Commission, none of these conditions were met by conferences, and in particular 
argued that the exemption granted to consortia was sufficient to account for the 
cooperation needs of the industry. On the 25th of September 2006, Council Regu-
lation 4056/86 was repealed terminating the block exemption of conferences 
to/from Europe. The liner industry had to meet the new legislation by the 18th 
October 2008. 
The repeal clearly put an end to the discussion on inland joint rate agree-
ments, and it should be noted that as of today joint inland negotiations are not 
permitted as part of consortium regulation. They are though allowed as part of 
service contracts negotiated confidentially among individual carriers and ship-
pers—note that consortia are not allowed to prevent their members from entering 
into SC. Carriers are allowed to offer intermodal rates to shippers competitively 
although they are required to respect the ‘not below cost’ rule. The rule entails 
that the inland component of a multimodal tariff cannot be priced below the ac-
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tual cost of the inland service (Marlow and Nair, 2008). The aim of this rule is to 
prevent ocean carriers to cross subsidise inland operations with ocean transport. 
Another substantial difference with respect to regulation in the liner shipping 
industry worth mentioning refers to the use of discussion agreements. Discussion 
agreements grant carriers, under US regulation, the possibility of exchanging in-
formation between conference members and independents in relation to oper-
ational variables such as capacity or operating costs on a particular route as well as 
information on freight rate levels. These information exchanges are not allowed in 
trades to and from the EU but are allowed in trades to and from the US. 
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This paragraph reviews three landmark cases involving integrated pricing that de-
termined the development of bundling practices in Europe in the past. The cases 
focused on concerted price fixing practices on inland rates as an extension of the 
provisions of Council Regulation 4056/86. All cases rejected the applicability of 
inland price fixing on the grounds that this was neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition to achieve technical and operational advantages that could benefit ship-
pers and society by and large. 
 
The Far East Freight Conference (FEFC) case 
The German Shippers’ Council complained to the European Commission about 
FEFC practices on the 28th of April 1989. The complaint was about the collec-
tively fixed price setting for inland transport by members of the FEFC and, accord-
ing to the shippers, the fact that this price fixing was not part of the block exemp-
tion included in Article 3 of Regulation 4056/86. 
At the time, FEFC offered the following services in the Europe - Far East 
route: maritime transport services, port handling services and inland transport ser-
vices. This was the consequence of the involvement of carriers in logistics activities 
and of competition against freight forwarders and other transport intermediaries 
(Nair, Gardner and Banomyong, 2001). Shippers, in fact in most cases, did not pay 
to transport intermediaries the rate negotiated by the carrier and the inland trans-
port provider but a door-to-door price. 
In the proposal of the FEFC the tariff was collectively set by the Conference 
and was integrated in the total price of the multimodal service. The multimodal 
service was offered together with the maritime service and shippers were charged 
with a multimodal tariff. This was openly in contrast with the provisions of Regula-
tion 4056/86, that in Article 5(3) obliged conferences to allow shippers to choose 
the merchant haulage of their choice for the inland transport leg. It should be 
noted that in reality no objection was ever brought against multimodal pricing in 
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itself, as long as it did not involve collective pricing, as in the case of ocean tariffs. 
The reasons of Article 5(3) were (Nair, et al. 2001): 
 
 prevent conference carriers to dominate the inland transport market by 
providing services in combination with the maritime leg of the transporta-
tion; 
 mitigate foreign exchange risk, as inland services could be bought in local 
currency; 
 enable FOB buyers who had their own ships to be charged with separate 
inland tariffs. 
FEFC, in order to support collective pricing on the hinterland leg, argued 
that collective pricing in the trade was essential in order for shipping companies to 
provide scheduled services. This ensured rate stability but as markets were moving 
towards multimodal transport services, collective pricing had to be extended to this 
segment of the transport chain as well. The conference argued therefore that 
Regulation 4056/86 was applicable also in the case of the integrated multimodal 
services offered by conference members. 
The European Commission argued that the appropriate regulation for the in-
land part of the trade was the Regulation 1017/68, as it provided rules for price 
fixing agreements in the field of transport by rail, road or inland waterways. The 
European Commission did not accept the argument that a sector complementary 
to one that was granted a block exemption should be exempted as well. The 
Commission rejected therefore the arguments of the FEFC on the ground that 
(Nair, et al. 2001): 
 the agreements regarding inland prices were commercial agreements and 
did not involve technical improvements or cooperation; 
 the FEFC subcontracted inland transport services from other providers 
and did not provide them itself; 
 other transport intermediaries such as railway companies and forwarders 
were not granted antitrust exemption; 
 it was possible to provide similar services without the aid of the antitrust 
exemption, since there were carriers that were providing such services 
without being part of a conference. 
The Commission provided further clarification on the applicability of the 
regulation stating that exemptions to antitrust regulation were allowed in case of 
“successive, complementary, substitute or combined transport operation” between 
inland modes and not between sea and inland modes, making the exception ap-
plicable only when transportation was carried wholly inland (Nair, et al. 2001). 
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The Trans Atlantic Agreement (TAA) case 
The TAA applied for an exemption under Article 81(1) and of Regulation 
4056/86 on the 28 of August 1992. The most important provisions of the TAA 
Agreement were: 
 
 Price agreements on the maritime transport; 
 Capacity management programmes for the maritime transport; 
 A two tier pricing agreement with two classes of membership; 
 Collective inland price fixing as part of the multimodal transport service. 
The two tier pricing agreement allowed the members of TAA that were also 
members of an existing conference to charge a different price from the members of 
the agreement that had not previously been part of a conference (so called independ-
ent carriers). The Commission did not consider tariffs set up through this mechanism 
as common tariffs, although agreed in common, and therefore TAA did not satisfy the 
legal definition of conference. This two tier pricing mechanism was later abandoned 
by TACA. 
The provision concerning inland transportation was rejected by the Commis-
sion on the 28th of September 1992 on the ground that such agreements should be 
examined under Regulation 1012/68. The TAA advocated that the agreement 
was established in order to achieve stability on the North Atlantic route and in-
sisted that the agreement should be examined under Regulation 4056/86 of ship-
ping conferences. 
The TAA sought an exemption for the inland transportation segment argu-
ing that it was connected to the maritime leg. As discussed in the previous para-
graph, this justification was not sufficient for an exemption under Regulation 
4056/86, as it did not meet the criteria of a traditional conference. But since the 
TAA was not a regular conference agreement, the Commission had to examine 
the case of inland pricing separately. The agreement regarding inland pricing re-
stricted competition in rail, road and waterway transport and could only be al-
lowed under Regulation 1017/68 (now partially repealed by Council Regulation 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002). Hence, the case was reviewed by the Commission 
under Regulation 1017/68 and its provision for rate fixing. At the time cooper-
ation among transport operators could be justified under Regulation 1017/68 only 
in case of substantial efficiency gains deriving from technical agreements mostly 
aiming at the joint implementation of new technologies and standards. 
The European Commission decided that (Nair, et al. 2001): 
 The price agreement was not a technical agreement and it did not aim at 
achieving technical improvement or cooperation; 
 The services were not provided by the conference but by other inland 
hauliers; 
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 There were no benefits for the consumers, as shippers complained about 
inland price fixing. 
  
The Commission also referred to the FEFC case and stated that the argu-
ments that had been made there were also applicable in this case. It highlighted 
that multimodal service providers operated successfully outside the TAA, without 
having an exemption, proving that efficient multimodal service provision was not 
dependent on price fixing. 
On 19 October 1994,the European Commission reached the following deci-
sion (Nair, et al. 2001): the provisions concerning price fixing and capacity man-
agement infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and, therefore, the application of 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty and Article 5 of Regulation 1017/68 is rejected. The 
TAA challenged the decision in the Court of First Instance but the appeal was 
dismissed by order of the President of the European Court of Justice on the 19th of 
July 1995. 
 
TACA Ruling Against Integrated Pricing 
The TAA was renamed TACA and on the 5th of July 1994 it submitted a modi-
fied application for exemption under Article 81(3). The agreement was permitted 
under the US law, allowing the conference to operate in the US, but TACA carri-
ers did not want to face the same problem they faced as TAA with the European 
Commission. The new agreement had been amended quite extensively (Nair, et al. 
2001). This clearly showed the intentions of the carriers to abandon the old TAA 
provisions which were questioned by the Commission. Taking into consideration 
the previous decision of the European Commission on the TAA, the new TACA 
had abandoned the capacity management programme and the two tier pricing 
agreement with the two classes of membership. The Commission intended to 
examine the new agreement under Regulations 17/62 and 1017/68, as Regula-
tion 4056/86 was in their view again not applicable to inland transportation.  
The European Commission considered TACA as a landmark case due to the 
fact that there were other issues in addition to multimodal pricing which attracted 
the Commission’s attention. The members of the TACA were considered to have 
a dominant position in the relevant market and, as already mentioned, the TACA 
imposed strict limitations on service contracts.  
With reference to pricing of inland services, more specifically, the provisions 
of TACA were similar to the ones contained in the TAA. The major difference 
consisted of the fact that the TACA further elaborated on the purposes of multi-
modal pricing by defining two cooperation programmes designed to improve the 
operations and management of containers in Europe. Specifically, these program-
mes consisted of the European Inland Equipment Interchange Arrangement 
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(EIEIA), aiming at enhancing the efficiency of the inland repositioning of empty 
containers in Europe, and programme two focusing on the development of Hub 
and Spoke networks in Europe. 
Initially, the European Commission responded as follows to the rate stability 
claim, put forward by TACA members as a justification for the exemption (Nair, et 
al. 2001): 
“A liner shipping conference brings stability to the trade it affects by fix-
ing a uniform tariff which serves as a reference point for the market. 
Prices set in this way are likely to remain unchanged for a longer period 
of time than if they are set by individual lines. The reduction in the price 
fluctuations which would be expected in a normally competitive market 
may benefit shippers by reducing uncertainty as to future trading condi-
tions.” 
This stability in rates would also bring reliability in the services and ensure a 
satisfactory quality level. The agreement on rate fixing could benefit from the ex-
emption as long as the members of the agreement remain subjected to competi-
tion. The commission’s definition of the concept was deliberately restrictive in 
order to avoid difficulties with similar agreements in the future. In addition the 
Commission stated why inland price fixing was not under the scope of Regulation 
4056/86 (Nair, et al. 2001):  
 the Commission had rejected similar provisions in the TAA and the 
FEFC; 
 the Report that was sent to the Council regarding the application of the 
Communities’ competition rules to maritime transport concluded that the 
provision of multimodal services did not depend on fixing prices; 
 the decision of the Court of Justice in the Spediporto case in which Regu-
lation 4056/86 could not be applied due to transportation by road of 
goods unloaded from the vessel. 
Subsequently, the Commission, similarly to the previous cases, tested 
whether the agreement could be exempted under Regulation 1017/68 and it de-
liberated that (Nair, et al. 2001): 
 there was no evidence to prove that collective price fixing was conductive 
to improving the quality of inland transport, and that on the contrary im-
provements were derived from fruitful negotiations between shippers and 
carriers; 
 rate stability was not an issue in the market for haulage transport; 
 no increases in productivity of inland or multimodal services had been re-
ported; 
 there was no evidence of technical or economic improvement in the of-
fered inland or multimodal services; 
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 the inland services were not provided by conference members but out-
sourced; therefore, benefits for consumers were limited if any. 
On 26 of November 1996, the European Commission revoked the immunity 
to the TACA members on inland price fixing. On the 11th of April 1997, the 
Commission, following the European Court rulings, decided that collective inland 
price fixing was not under the scope of Regulation 4056/86 and therefore it could 
not grant an exemption.
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The previous paragraph has presented the basic arguments of the discussions on 
inland price fixing that set the scene for integrated pricing in the last decade. It 
should be noted that the European Commission did not believe that these agree-
ments were to be considered as part of conference price fixing, but never con-
demned the application of integrated pricing as part of SC. On the contrary, the 
Commission in several cases rejected the agreements on the basis that they would 
restrict the flexibility of carriers to engage in SC. It is useful at this stage to exam-
ine what bundling practices may or may not come under the scrutiny of the anti-
trust authorities. 
Although the literature on bundling and antitrust law is far from conclusive 
and in several occasions the antitrust authorities have clearly stated that it is not 
possible to deliberate on the desirability of bundling (Kobayashi, 2005a; 2006), it 
may be useful to summarise what practices are considered legal and what practices 
are forbidden.  
In order to proceed with the understanding of the legality of bundling prac-
tices, in addition to the distinction between bundling and tying and pure and 
mixed bundling, another definition may be useful. The distinction, based on the 
definition provided by Stremersch and Tellis (2002), refers to the difference be-
tween product and price bundle. With the latter the authors refer to the sale of two or 
more products in a package at a discount, without any integration of the product 
at the production level. This implies that the reservation price for the bundle is 
equal to the linear sum of the reservation prices for the separate components. This 
type of strategy is common in consumer goods, for example when a certain sham-
poo is sold in a package with a hair conditioner. It should be noted that this type of 
strategy takes advantage of a certain degree of complementarity between the two 
products, and leverages on the likelihood that a consumer requiring one product 
will also need the bundled one. 
The concept of product bundling is used instead when the creation of the 
bundle provides at least some of the consumers with an increase in value (Strem-
ersch and Tellis, 2002). In other words, the bundle is somewhat perceived from the 
consumer as a different (new) product and as such consumer reservation prices are 
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different than the linear sum of the prices of the individual bundle components 
(most likely higher). The sale of holiday travel packages is an example of this type 
of bundles that may include a return flight to Milan, a four nights’ accommodation 
and two operas at the Scala theatre. Another example of product bundling is the 
integration of logistics services and ocean transportation. The provision of the two 
services in an integrated form generates added value to the consumer in terms of 
better coordination, supply chain visibility, etc. 
The table below summarises the different possible bundling strategies be-
tween the two products X and Y, as outlined in the article of Stremersch and Tellis 
(2002). In the table (X,Y) indicates a price bundle, while (XY) indicates a product 
bundle. To this diagram we have added the case of tying, that similarly to pure 
bundling, does not allow the use of product X (the tying product) without product 
Y (the tied product) although product Y could be freely purchased independently 
from product X, and would generally be provided under more competitive condi-
tions. 
Table 37: Legality of bundling. 
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Source: Adapted from Stremersch and Tellis (2002) 
In general pure price bundling (shaded in grey in table 37) is illegal under the 
provisions of antitrust law in Europe and in the US for firms with market power 
(Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). Similarly, tying is illegal (see for example the case of 
Microsoft and the bundling of Internet Explorer with Windows OS) in those cases 
where a firm has considerable market power in the market for the tying product, 
since it is perceived that by tying it may extend its power to the market for the tied 
product (Whinston, 2001). 
This is summarised by Stremersch and Tellis (2002) in what they call rule of 
reason: ‘Bundling is illegal under the rule of reason when it involves (1) pure bundling (2) of sepa-
rate products (3) by a firm with market power, (4) involving a substantial amount of commerce, 
(5) which poses a threat that the bundling firm will acquire additional market power over at least 
one of the products that is being bundles with the tying product, and (6) no plausible consumer 
benefits offset the potential damage to competition.’ (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002: pp. 58-
59). 
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Under the rule of reason, bundling of ocean transportation and logistics ser-
vices would be illegal only when an ocean carrier that would have substantial mar-
ket power (1) on a relatively important route (4) would sell ocean transportation 
only in conjunction (2) with a logistics service, that could be considered a separate 
product (3), with the objective of acquiring market power on either of the service 
markets (5) and with limited or no benefits for the consumers (6).  
It goes without saying that as long as ocean transportation is still provided as 
a separate product and priced at levels that would not prevent customer firms to 
purchase the service alone, there are no objections under antitrust law to the prac-
tice of bundling. In fact all six conditions listed in the rule of reason need to apply 
simultaneously. 
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There is unanimous agreement that the future of transportation is in integrated 
supply chain solutions. In this respect, the regulation in the US seems to be a step 
ahead of regulation in Europe, most likely also as a consequence of the differences 
in geography, demography and culture. It seems that in the US antirust regulation 
regarding inland transport services has adapted to ensure better performance (Lo-
pez 2003). Two points show clearly the different approach that the US has fol-
lowed in regulating intermodal transport. The first difference relates to the struc-
ture of the institutional environment where integrated transportation service pro-
viders operate, that is characterised by clear institutional responsibilities and tasks. 
This is the consequence of the existence in the US of institution active at federal 
level to promote intermodality such as the Office of Freight Management Oper-
ations or the Intermodal Association of North America (IANA). The second differ-
ence relates to the overall objective of competition regulation, which places more 
emphasis on the improvement of efficiency and performance, even when competi-
tion is reduced. 
Companies in the US, in order to cope with competition and ensure long 
term contracts with shippers, are seeking forms of cooperation which help cost re-
duction and enhance efficiency. The regulator is aware of that and tries to pro-
mote competition by eliminating regulatory constraints with the exception of those 
regarding security concerns. Contrary to what is happening in Europe, regulation 
allows carries more flexibility in negotiating prices for intermodal activities, as 
regulatory institutions are of the opinion that this will bring stability in the market 
and stimulate investments (Lopez, 2003).  
Although intermodal transport is a priority in Europe, there is no specific 
legislation regarding the regulation of intermodal activities (Lopez, 2003). This can 
be attributed to the fact that intermodal transport has been analyzed in terms of its 
separate constituent modes instead of as a whole. Policies and regulations have 
followed a unimodal approach and policy makers have neglected the fact that con-
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tainerized cargo can switch modes without breaking the whole chain and with re-
markable efficiency. The European Commission pointed out the importance of 
each mode’s special characteristics, in order to apply effectively the competition 
legislation as presented in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome. Due to the 
fact that regulation concerning competition in transport derives from the general 
rules of competition, it should be possible for the Commission to decide which 
rules to apply in any case.  
Although the impact of the repeal of Council Regulation 4056/86 in trades 
to and from Europe is deemed to be negligible, as a consequence of SC and IA 
(Benacchio, et al. 2007) it might have an important effect in favouring the devel-
opment of all-inclusive prices. It is unlikely that ocean freight rates will in the fu-
ture disappear, being replaced by all inclusive door-to-door rates, simply because 
some customers would still prefer unbundled pricing, in cases for example where 
the customer has access to cheaper haulage on his own account, or does not re-
quire any haulage at all.  
As carriers have two major types of clients, direct shippers and Non-Vessel 
Operating Common Carriers (NVOCCs), it is likely that price bundling will de-
velop differently according to the type of customer typology. Although some direct 
shippers often prefer to control their chain directly and are able to obtain from 
hinterland transport operators advantageous rates on the basis of their own vol-
umes and long standing contractual relations, others, especially in sector such as 
automotives; footware; electronics; and chemicals, completely outsource their sup-
ply chain activities to LSPs. In the case of NVOCCs these companies are large 
logistics service providers, for which the provision of bundles is common practice. 
They are able therefore to provide bundles to their customers at a better price than 
the carriers often can. 
This has as consequence the fact that hinterland transportation is performed 
for a large part through merchant haulage and only for a small part as carrier 
haulage. Rates in general on hinterland transportation are very low, and it is not 
particularly interesting for the carrier to provide this service for reasons other than 
strategic positioning. 
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This chapter aimed at analysing the feasibility of bundling of ocean transpor-
tation and other logistics services together against the regulatory constraints in the 
liner and in the logistics industries and on the practice of bundling. The chapter 
reviewed regulations in the USA and Europe and observed that the practice of 
bundling is not illegal in neither jurisdiction as long as (i) services are priced within 
the instrument of confidential service contracts, i.e. not as part of conference rate-
fixing agreements, (ii) a service bundle is not provided exclusively, i.e. the shipper 
has always the possibility of purchasing the various bundle components independ-
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ently, (iii) inland service rates and specifications are not negotiated jointly by carri-
ers as a consortium, (iv) the ‘not below cost rule’ is respected for those trades where 
conference tariffs are applicable (v) in trades to and from the EU, no use is made of 
discussion agreements.  
These provisions allow for the use of bundling strategies in all other circum-
stances and therefore the development of these strategies is strongly advised. The 
chapter argues also that the repeal of Council Regulation 4056/86 will favour the 
development of bundling strategies and that ocean carriers should aim at further 
investigating the advantages offered by this strategy. 
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This chapter summarises the major conclusions and scientific contributing of the 
thesis and provides directions for further research. The thesis aimed at investigat-
ing the practice of bundling, its use and applicability to global supply chains, i.e. 
supply chains that are characterised by intercontinental transportation by means of 
container shipping. 
The thesis is structured in nine chapters in addition to the introductory and 
the concluding chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of the industrial organisation 
and the marketing management literature on bundling. Chapter 3 presents a re-
view of the liner shipping economics concepts and characteristics that are import-
ant to the application of bundling. Chapter 4 summarises the results of two surveys 
of shippers’ preference on outsourcing and bundling. Chapter 5 reviews the cur-
rent practice of bundling in the liner industry and presents the finding of a set of 
interviews to representatives of ocean carriers and to other industry experts. The 
role of transaction costs and vertical integration revealed to be crucial in under-
standing the benefits deriving from the practice of bundling and therefore chapter 
6 is dedicated to these two subjects. Chapter 7 focused on how optimal bundles 
can be assembled and suggests the use of conjoint analysis and linear programming 
as appropriate techniques for the selection of optimal bundles. Chapter 8 shows 
how a carrier can only fully understand the potential of bundling if it strategically 
refocuses so that to embed supply chain thinking in its organisation. Chapter 9 dis-
cusses the strategic implications of bundling through two game theory models, 
while chapter 10 expands on the legal and antitrust issues that might be relevant 
for carriers and society and that, unless resolved, could hinder the development of 
bundling practices in the future. This chapter provides a summary of the conclu-
sions of the thesis and directions for further research. 
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The rest of the chapter has been structured around the seven themes from 
which the practice of bundling has been looked at. These themes are: 
 Bundling impact on society and shippers; 
 Bundling and carriers’ competitive advantage; 
 Transaction costs and bundling; 
 Strategic bundling; 
 Bundling and the supply chain; 
 Competition issues and regulation. 
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Bundling is a pervasive practice in most industries, however its application in the 
container industry is still limited. From the surveys presented in chapter 4 and the 
interviews conducted in chapter 5 it appears that shippers appreciate the advanta-
ges of bundling in terms of tariff simplification; easiness to compare quotes from 
different carriers through door-to-door prices; and the increase in the number and 
types of logistics solutions on offer. Notwithstanding the general agreement on the 
benefits of bundling, the maritime industry still looks at it with diffidence. This 
seems to be due to the rather confrontational nature of the past relationships be-
tween ocean carriers and shippers and the perception that bundled tariffs may 
conceal additional mark-ups.  
It should be noted that when bundling is associated with the sale of its indi-
vidual components, in what is generally referred to as mixed bundling, it always re-
sults in an increase of consumers’ choice. Considerations on social welfare should 
therefore always be weighted against the benefits deriving from increased choice 
and variety. Especially in the case of certain supply chains, these benefits can be 
substantial. The results for society are in principle positive, although monitoring of 
the practice is essential and further research in this area is imperative. 
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Among the major findings of the thesis is that bundling is motivated in practice by: 
cost advantages; demand drivers; differentiation strategy; the possibility of obtain-
ing higher margins by jointly offering ocean and hinterland transportation; the 
necessity to better control coordination costs with hinterland connections. Integra-
tion seems to be the business strategy that will prevail among carriers in the long 
term. Bundling provides a useful aid in implementing this strategy successfully. Not 
all bundles are advisable though. Depending on the distribution of reservation 
prices among the various customer segments served by each carrier, optimal bun-
dles are those that result from the combination of services that have asymmetric 
conditional reservation prices, or, in other words, services for which the reservation 
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prices in a segment of consumers complement the reservation prices of the same 
services for another segment of consumers. 
AA4D *&+,!'&'+,+&-&$!&
Successful implementation of bundling requires a focus on the nature of the trans-
action between shippers and ocean carriers. Only with this focus can ocean carri-
ers build on bundling propositions and increase the profitability of bundling and its 
desirability in society. The use of transaction cost economics can be particularly 
valuable in the context of ocean transportation and logistics outsourcing and con-
stitutes a solid ground on which ocean carriers can engage in bundling strategies. 
Although bundling does not necessarily require vertical integration, as discussed in 
chapter 6, when the transactions between the carrier and a logistics service pro-
vider are taken out of the market, carriers may have a better position to engage in 
bundling. This happens because of their better ability to harness transaction costs 
and reduce the impact of information asymmetries. These are the type of bundles 
that are referred to as product bundles. As explained in chapter 7, product bundling 
always yields better results than unbundling (proposition 3). 
In order to fully appreciate the potential offered by product bundling ocean 
carriers should open up to the advantages offered by vertical integration. The the-
sis argues that for this to happen ocean carriers need to look beyond their tradi-
tional company boundaries and focus on transcorporate performance measures 
that are characteristic of supply chains. This approach, described more in detail in 
chapter 8, requires the modification of traditional performance measure indicators 
to include also transcorporate performance measures. This, it is argued, should not 
only take place at the carrier level, but also with the other members of the con-
tainer supply chain, such as terminals, ports, hinterland transport providers, dis-
tributors, warehouses and third party logistics providers. 
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Although research in this area is still in its early stages, the applicability of bundling 
in a competitive market delivers interesting conclusions. In particular it emerged 
from the two models discussed in chapter 9 that bundling has mixed effects on 
consumer surplus and total welfare, depending on the efficiency of carriers and 
transaction costs. The most interesting finding of the thesis is that bundling allows 
for efficiency gains to be passed on to shippers and society, an eventuality that 
cannot take place when bundling is forbidden. 
This desirable feature of bundling though comes at a risk since carriers may 
not necessarily have the highest levels of efficiency in providing the bundle. When 
this is the case, bundling tends to reduce consumer surplus and can even reduce 
social welfare. An important issue that remains open for further research, although 
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it is partially addressed in chapter 6, is whether carriers are intrinsically better than 
other parties in the supply chain in providing bundles. If this is the case, competi-
tive forces, even in the restrictive case of duopoly, ensure that this efficiency is 
passed on to consumers and society. 
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The thesis brought attention to two important issues in supply chain management 
that require further investigation: supply chain pricing and performance metric 
selection. In particular the former area of investigation seems particularly interest-
ing in view of the potential offered by price discrimination and revenue manage-
ment techniques in the context of logistics service provision. The application of 
bundling as a technique to price integrated logistics services allows for discriminat-
ing among customers, improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of the chain and 
increase the competitive advantage of the integrated company. Chapter 7 offers 
examples on possible applications of bundling in the liner and logistics industries. 
The latter issue relies on the hypothesis that ocean transportation is a subsys-
tem within the supply chain and as such its performance should not be limited to 
the evaluation of its internal processes. It is the performance of the entire chain 
that really matters. This is reflected in the survey of shippers in chapter 4 and from 
the discussions in chapter 8. If the supply chain performs well, i.e. creates value, 
then it will be chosen and consequently also the carrier will be chosen. As the sup-
ply chain is as strong as its weakest link, a carrier may be extremely efficient in its 
operations, but if terminals, or hinterland transport providers do not provide ad-
equate levels of service, or the access roads to the port are congested, this will im-
pact the ability of the chain to create value and in essence also the competitiveness 
of the carrier. 
The focus on the supply chain is required also by the fact that the perform-
ance of each link is influenced by the performance of other links. As such the per-
formance of a liner company is affected by the performance of a terminal and in 
turn, the performance of the container terminal is affected for example by ineffi-
cient trucking, or inefficient port policy. The cooperative nature of supply chains 
requires a different approach to performance, where, next to traditional intra 
company measures, also inter chain metrics should be monitored and analysed. 
This of course raises particular challenges for supply chain operators, as co-
operation among the various stakeholders becomes then a fundamental pre-
requisite for the implementation of efficient supply chain strategies. From the side 
of the carriers, in particular of those that choose to provide third party logistics ser-
vices, investment in ICT and in improving supply chain visibility should be on top 
of their development agendas. But this of course cannot and should not be done 
independently. The thesis concludes that a lack of supply chain focus in the evalu-
ation of the carriers’ performance has a crucial impact on the ability of a inte-
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grated carrier to exploit its competitive advantage and successfully implement 
bundling. 
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The thesis reviewed the regulation in the USA and Europe and observed that the 
practice of bundling is legal in both jurisdictions as long as (i) services are priced 
within the instrument of confidential service contracts, i.e. not as part of confer-
ence rate-fixing agreements, (ii) a service bundle is not provided alone, i.e. the 
shipper has always the possibility of purchasing the various bundle components 
independently, (iii) inland service rates and specifications are not negotiated jointly 
by carriers as a consortium, (iv) the ‘not-below-cost rule’ is respected for those 
trades where conference tariffs are applicable (v) in trades to and from the EU, no 
use is made of discussion agreements. Further discussion on these conditions is 
provided in chapter 2 and chapter 10. 
These provisions allow for the use of bundling strategies in all other circum-
stances and therefore the development of these strategies is strongly advised. The 
thesis argues also that the repeal of the Council Regulation 4056/86 will favour 
the development of bundling strategies and that ocean carriers should aim at fur-
ther investigating the advantages offered by this strategy. 
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The transdisciplinary nature of bundling and the other topics discussed in the the-
sis revealed to be a very fertile ground for further research and opens new areas for 
investigation. This paragraph aims at providing some indication of the subjects 
that in our view are most likely to offer valuable opportunities for analysis. 
An interesting area of research relates to the study and application of non-
linear pricing and revenue management in the logistics and transportation in-
dustry. Although the appropriateness of these techniques to the logistics industry 
seems obvious, very little research is available both from a theoretical and an em-
pirical perspective. Pricing techniques such as auctions, dynamic pricing and over-
booking have revealed very successful in a variety of industries, but their applica-
tion in the logistics sector is still limited. 
It would be interesting to connect these different forms of pricing with the 
characteristics of the various models of logistics service provider observable in 
practice in terms of asset control for example. Further research could test whether 
certain forms of yield management are better implemented by a fully integrated 
logistics provider or could be equally successful if implemented by an asset-light 
3PL. 
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This discussion brings in the role of ocean transportation and the continuous 
trend in vertical integration. In addition to the discussions on the appropriateness 
of a vertical integration strategy and its benefits, other less debated issues are worth 
further investigation. The issue of competition among logistics service providers 
and ocean carriers, for example, requires surely further analysis.  
The double role of many logistics providers as competitors and customers of 
the carriers is an interesting phenomenon that could be worth investigating also in 
more general terms. An interesting approach could entail the empirical testing of 
the conceptual transaction cost economics models discussed in chapter 6. This is 
surely interesting, since, although transaction costs economics paradigms have 
been empirically validated, no empirical testing has been performed on their ap-
plicability in the logistics and ocean transportation industries. 
This is linked to the use of service contracts as the most common negotiation 
instrument in the industry. Service contracts have radically modified the nature of 
competition between carriers and the traditional logistics service providers. Carrier 
involvement in supply chain management has deepened and therefore their stra-
tegic scope has been adapted to better fulfil this new role. Research should address 
how the relation between carriers, shippers and logistics service providers has 
changed as a consequence of the development of service contracts. 
Service contracts are of course linked to the change in the regulatory frame-
work that has characterised the liner shipping industry in the last decades and that 
has its most recent turn with the repeal of the conference regulation in trades to 
and from Europe. The issue on the appropriateness of the current regulatory re-
gime to foster trade is still the subject of a debate that goes beyond the role and 
importance of conferences, and addresses the impact of consortia and alliances on 
the industry and consumers, and is likely to remain an interesting subject for inves-
tigation. 
In more general terms also the debate on the welfare effects of bundling on 
consumers and society by and large are still highly contested, and further research 
is required on the definition of the appropriate regulatory framework in this area. 
The liner and logistics industry could prove to be interesting sector examples. In 
particular, research on the effects of bundling in situations of (limited) competition 
is still inadequate although the potential of bundling as a market segmentation de-
vice seems to be widely accepted.  
The relations among bundling practices, market segmentation research and 
contracting, appear an interesting area of analysis. More attention should be paid 
to the identification of the specific operational and contracting issues in the design 
of (service) bundle solutions in terms for example of their impact on price elastici-
ties. Again the liner and the logistics industries could offer a large number of ex-
amples to test these concepts. 
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A variety of other operational issues are still open to discussion. In particular, 
the following areas of research should be further explored:  
 The role of supply chain information and visibility in product and price 
bundling; 
 The impact of changes in ocean transportation price elasticities and mar-
ket structures on the profitability of bundling; 
 The difference in price elasticities of ocean transportation and logistics ser-
vices when they are provided as pure bundles, mixed bundles or unbun-
dled;  
 The feasibility of designing and developing modular logistics and transpor-
tation products aiming at providing flexibility in setting up bundled solu-
tions. 
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Interview 1 – October 2nd, 2006 
Interviewer: Can you briefly define the logistics strategy of your company? 
Interviewee: OK, the logistics strategy of [...]? 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Interviewee: [...] is quite a versatile company, it operates in various parts of ship-
ping, various in terms of bulk, car carrier, liner shipping and then also 
it has recently bought […], a freight airline. It has a forwarding divi-
sion, […] and it also has a logistics division, [...] Logistics. The logis-
tics division, unlike other carriers, was not an extension of the liner, 
but actually a self standing logistics division, mainly to look after some 
of the Japanese customers who were getting into big foreign direct in-
vestments, so, for instance the logistics in Europe really stepped up in 
the mid-eighties, when quite a few Japanese companies were investing 
in assembling in Europe, and didn’t prefer to use the local logistics 
providers so [...] bought one or two companies and started operating 
from there. So nowadays logistics for [...] is quite a wide spread series 
of activities from warehousing to distribution, forwarding, supply 
chain sections, so it is quite wide spread. I think it is recognised by the 
industry as something not being a liner extension, but as being a busi-
ness in its own right. 
Interviewer: OK, thank you. The second question that I have deals with a set of 
statements and I would like to ask you if you strongly agree, just 
agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, or if you do 
not wish to express any judgment on it. 
Interviewee: OK 
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Interviewer: The first statement is: ‘Strategically our company considers logistics as 
important as ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: True. Agree. 
Interviewer: Agree or fully agree? 
Interviewee: Fully agree.  
Interviewer: The second statement is: ‘Logistics is strategically important for our 
company but in the end our core business is ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: Disagree. 
Interviewer: The third statement is: ‘The major reason for which we have stepped 
into logistics is because margins in ocean transportation are too 
small’. 
Interviewee: Disagree. 
Interviewer: the fourth statement is: ‘Competition in the logistics business is more 
intense than in ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: Disagree.  
Interviewer: The fifth statement is: ‘Our only interest in logistics lies with its provi-
sion in conjunction with ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: Disagree.  
Interviewer: The next statement is: ‘Our company aims at becoming a fully inte-
grated logistics operator’. 
Interviewee: Fully agree. 
Interviewer: The last statement is: ‘Our company aims at being in the forefront in 
the provision of logistics services’. 
Interviewee: Fully agree. 
Interviewer: Do you have any comments on some of the previous statements? 
Interviewee: No, I… hopefully in my previous remarks I hope it becomes clear 
that [...] Logistics is not a sort of a product extension of [...] line, it 
was set up as a separate division. 
Interviewer: OK.  
Interviewee: The only thing I would like to add is that one of the reasons it was set 
up is, although the returns in logistics, in terms of returns on capital 
employed, are not particularly high, they tend to be steadier, than 
those particularly in the container liner industry. And I think that it 
was felt that [...] wanted to increase its amount of revenues in the sort 
of businesses that had a very steady cash flow and income to offset the 
fluctuations of the liner business. That’s part of this construction. 
Interviewer: OK. I move to the third question, that is if you could you provide a 
rough breakdown of your liner and logistics costs and revenues? for 
example 80% liner and 20% logistics as far as costs and as far as rev-
enues are concerned. 
Interviewee: Well, I do not know in terms of costs, but certainly in terms of rev-
enues, liner is about, of the total company, liner is bout 35 and logis-
tics is about 30. 
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Interviewer: Are you planning to change this ratio in order to favour logistics 
through investments in other logistics activities? To increase the logis-
tics side of the business I mean. 
Interviewee: I don’t … not necessarily, [...] is also investing heavily in liner as well 
as in logistics, so, I have a thought that that ratio will probably be 
maintained.  
Interviewer: How many components such as warehousing, tracking, RFID, etc, 
does one have in a door-to-door supply chain in your view? 
Interviewee: I don’t think you could describe the number, but, out of though, 
probably more than ten in an average transaction. But all our cus-
tomers are different in somewhat additional features rather. 
Interviewer: OK. The next question is: Does your company provide all inclusive 
packages to customers? that means: Does it organise door-to-door 
transportation for at least one of its customers under a single all-
inclusive price? If so can you mention what percentage of your port to 
port business is also door-to-door? 
Interviewee: Right. Those are two really different aspects, one is the company 
where we do the complete supply chain, including warehousing and 
things like that, I will tell you the just the difference between busines-
ses… hum, can we came back to the fist part of the question? 
Interviewer: Yes. If your company provides all inclusive packages to customers, or 
in other words if it organises door to door transportation for at least 
one of its customers under a single all-inclusive price. 
Interviewee: Right. Yes it does that. 
Interviewer: OK. And the second part is: if it does that, what percentage of your 
port to port business is also door to door? 
Interviewee: OK, I would say probably about 20%. It varies from region to region. 
Like in the UK is approximately 50%, in Scandinavia also just about 
50, in the Mediterranean, no more than 10%. 
Interviewer: Do you have an idea of the ratios in Asia for example, or in other 
parts of the world? 
Interviewee: Hum, no, I think I’d have to guess. 
Interviewer: OK. Let’s move on to another question then: ‘If we define bundling 
as the provision of ocean transportation together with one or more lo-
gistics services under a single tariff, why might bundling be an attrac-
tive proposition? 
Interviewee: To the carrier or to the customer? 
Interviewer: To the carrier. 
Interviewee: To the carrier? 
Interviewer: To the carrier and also to the customer if you want to add anything. 
Interviewee: To the carrier, I think bundling is interesting because it allows to have 
a deeper relation with the customer, that is, I suppose if a customer is 
treated under a logistics contract, it is more likely to give us a multi-
  314
year agreement, as opposed to a purely sea freight agreement, that 
frankly, if you get a one-year contract you’d be lucky. So it gives lon-
gevity to the relationship. So from the customer point of view it 
means you don’t have to coordinate so much of your transport ac-
tivity, than you would have with separate transport providers, obvi-
ously with the necessary safe cards. 
Interviewer: What are the difficulties you face in trying to sell bundled products? 
Interviewee: [...] is known as a logistics provider and it is also known as a liner 
company, and I think there is a difficulty in selling bundled products 
in whether we would provide neutrality in terms of choosing the best 
carrier, alternative when we recommend [...] Logistics for warehous-
ing to our carrier customers, again they want to be sure that we have 
researched the market and provide in fact the best opportunity. 
Interviewer: Are your competitors better or worse in providing bundled products 
and in selling them? 
Interviewee: I think one or two of our competitors have specific products which do 
involve some bundling that they sell, but… they tend to be quite rigid 
in terms of what they offer, so that they cannot be altered or changed. 
What we would say, it that we can work from scratch with our cus-
tomers, because we can provide a large set of products that we can 
bundle, so we can give our customers more flexibility. 
Interviewer: I move to the following question. Which of the following logistics ser-
vices provided by your company is priced jointly with ocean transpor-
tation? Can you indicate on a scale from 0 to 5, where zero means 
never and five means always, how often does this occur? Ok the ser-
vice I mention is Terminal Handling. 
Interviewee: I would say a two. 
Interviewer: then I have warehousing. 
Interviewee: I would say zero. 
Interviewer: Stripping/stuffing containers and cargo consolidation. 
Interviewee: Two, no sorry, that’s a one. 
Interviewer: Container services (fumigation, maintenance, repairs, etc) ? 
Interviewee: Zero. 
Interviewer: Container logistics? 
Interviewee: You mean trucking and so on? 
Interviewer: Exactly. 
Interviewee: Two. 
Interviewer: Cargo logistics? 
Interviewee: One. 
Interviewer: Value added logistics services, like labelling, packaging, etc.? 
Interviewee: One. 
Interviewer: Hinterland transportation? 
Interviewee: That would be a three. 
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Interviewer: Are there any important services or activities that I did not mention 
and that you think should be included? 
Interviewee: No I do not think so. 
Interviewer: OK, then I will move to the following question. How many of the 
door-to-door supply chain components listed before, in your view, 
could be successfully bundled? 
Interviewee: Terminal handling and inland transport quite effectively. Those 
would be certainly the main ones. 
Interviewer: Which of the above components can you provide yourself and which 
ones do you have to outsource? 
Interviewee: We can provide all of them ourselves. 
Interviewer: If you have to outsource, do you do this strategically in advance, or 
after you have stricken a deal or a contract with a customer? 
Interviewee: That does not apply; we would not be keen on offering bought in ser-
vices for a bundle. 
Interviewer: How do you price a bundle? 
Interviewee: Taking full recognition of the costs and revenue potential for all indi-
vidual elements. The intention of bundling is that this isn’t a discount. 
Interviewer: If we consider three services, s1, s2 and s3, each one priced individually 
as p1, p2 and p3, is the bundle price equal to pb=p1+p2+p3, higher or 
lower? 
Interviewee: It is the revenue opportunity for each individual component that mat-
ters. So we would consider what it costs you and what the value for 
somebody else is. And normally bundling allows you to obtain the po-
tential revenue for every component plus a margin, because of the 
convenience to the customer in having a single price. And you may 
have to take a little bit of risk on some of those components, in terms 
of the contractual obligations that you may have with the customer, 
so you would like to have a margin on top. So, all in all, the price of 
the bundle would be probably at the sum of the individual prices or 
slightly above. 
Interviewer: The following question is: ‘Which methods do you use to, or in other 
words how do you, assess your customers’ willingness to pay for dif-
ferentiated services? 
Interviewee: Through negotiations. 
Interviewer: Then I go to the last but one question. Could bundled products be 
developed and priced by alliance members? For instance, trucking by 
company X, warehousing by company Y, liner by company Z and 
the bundle sold by all at the same price? 
Interviewee: I suspect that’s illegal, but we wouldn’t want to do it anyway. 
Interviewer: Why not? 
Interviewee: Well, I think it may be illegal because within a consortium you are 
not supposed to do single pricing. Normally we would prefer provid-
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ing the bundle ourselves, if, you say we are in a strategic alliance with 
someone in a different field in order to put together our product and 
their product, then possibly. But we would then not be supposed to 
know the figure at which we would be selling them, and not both sell 
them at the same price. Because then you would get into price com-
petition. 
Interviewer: OK. Then I would move to the last question. I will read you a set of 
topics and I would like to ask you which one of the following topics 
you think would require a better understanding from an academic 
point of view. 
Interviewee: OK. 
Interviewer: The role that logistics may play in granting shipping lines a better 
control of demand for ocean transportation. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: The way in which the provision of logistics services jointly with ocean 
transportation may increase profitability in the liner business.  
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: The reasons for which shippers are reluctant to accept all-inclusive 
pricing mechanisms that include ocean transportation. 
Interviewee: Also yes. 
Interviewer: The identification, from an operational and marketing point of view, 
of better mixes of services that would suit shippers better. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: The competitive advantage that the provision of ocean transportation 
jointly with logistics services might grant to shipping lines. 
Interviewee: Yes, that is important. 
Interviewer: The way in which the provision of ocean transportation jointly with 
logistics services might be affected by the geographical differences in 
the logistics markets of the world. 
Interviewee: Yes that’s also very important. 
Interviewer: The benefits for shipping lines deriving from the provision of services 
under a single pricing mechanism. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: The benefits for shippers deriving from the provision of services under 
a single pricing mechanism. 
Interviewee: Yes 
Interviewer: The eventual competitive advantage obtained by the provision of ser-
vices under a single pricing mechanism to a shipping line in the ocean 
transportation market. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: How bundling might affect competition among shipping lines. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
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Interviewer: How bundling might affect competition between shipping lines and 
freight forwarders. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Interviewer: Do you have any other topics that I have not mentioned that you 
think might be interesting to be further analysed from an academic 
point of view? 
Interviewee: Well, no, I cannot think of any at the moment.  
Interviewer: Is there anything you would like to comment on the interview that we 
had? 
Interviewee: No, that’s fine. 
Interviewer: OK. Thank you very much. 
 
 
Interview 2 (Report) – October 5th, 2006. 
Introduction 
After a brief introduction on the objectives of the study and the aim of the inter-
view, it is agreed to proceed with the discussion of the major points of the interview 
guidelines. It is made clear by the interviewees that the questionnaire presented is 
not appropriate to an interview with a Logistics provider or a 3PL. It is explained 
to the interviewees that the focus of the project is bundling of logistics services with 
ocean transportation, and that the idea behind an interview with them was to ob-
tain better insight to the meaning of bundling from a 3PL provider. 
 
The nature of the business 
It is clarified by the interviewees that [...] is an independent 3PL and as such it is 
not required to combine its logistics services with ocean transportation, and none-
theless with ocean transportation provided by the liner company within the group. 
The interviewees explain that in the view of a logistics provider ocean transporta-
tion is just another logistics service, and it might well be that in some cases to some 
customers the do not arrange for it. It is also specified that [...] when arranging for 
transportation that involves ocean transportation does not necessarily uses the liner 
company within the group. What the two companies have in common is the fact 
that they are part of a group, but cooperation and the provision of joint services, 
although encouraged, is not a necessary condition for the provision of services for 
both the companies. In other words, [...] may make use of ocean transport services 
provided by other lines and the liner company may make use of 3PL services pro-
vided by companies other than [...]. 
 
Customers’ preference 
The choice of using one line, in place of another, is generally determined by the 
preference of the shipper. [...] may choose to use the liner within our group or 
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some other liner operator but sometimes shippers may have specific requirements 
as to which liner operator is used. 
 
Customers’ preferences are also important in the choice of the way bundles are 
marketed and proposed. If it is true that in general the provision of a bundle of 
services, may grant the shipper a lower price, it is also true that very few shippers 
entrust their entire door-to-door chain to a single 3PL. This, as it is clarified later 
in the interview, is a result of the attempt of shippers to reduce the exposure to risk 
of their supply chain, and originates from the geographical and physical differences 
inherent to the supply chain of different good in different regions of the world. [...] 
is nevertheless able to provide full door-to-door logistics, and it des it for a very 
limited number of customers. 
 
Bundling Pricing 
The way a bundle is priced to the shipper is also a matter of customer preferences. 
If a shipper allows [...] to provide a set of logistics services (that may or may not 
include ocean transportation, but that generally includes at least a form of interna-
tional transportation either by sea, air or land) under a single price, most likely this 
price will be lower than the sum of the prices of the individual services. This is the 
result of the opportunity that is given by a bundle to play with profit margins and 
the advantages obtainable from lower costs and better coordination. If the shipper 
requires it, it is possible to break down the price for the various components, which 
would be most likely lower for every component of the stand-alone price. This of 
course under the condition that the components are not sold separately. 
 
An additional point worth noting is that certain bundles may rise invoicing prob-
lems and internal accountability problems. 
 
Economies or diseconomies of scope? 
From the interview it is asked whether the cost of providing the various services 
may increase due to the obligation of bundling. In the opinion of the interviewee 
this would not be the case, and he can think mostly of cases where the costs might 
be reduced. When asked though, he acknowledges the possibility of certain bun-
dles to cost more that the linear sum of their stand alone costs. In the end are the 
savings for shippers arising from reduced transaction costs that make such bundles 
viable business propositions. If these savings are not present, how would one try to 
rationalize the existence of such bundles? In exceptional cases, the characteristics 
of the supply chain, in terms of cargo, geography and time sensitivity may allow for 
such “uneconomical” bundles to be provided and bought.  
 
An example of the reduction of costs obtainable through bundling is the possibility 
to top up a container with other cargo, and thus reduce the shipment costs. An-
other example of reduction in costs comes from combining the delivery with the 
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repositioning of an empty container. If a customer requires the delivery of an 
empty, this may facilitate repositioning containers for another customer. 
 
Policy issues 
Some of those cost reduction effects seem though to be constrained at times by 
government policy. The transhipment status of a container, as instance, does not 
allow a logistics operator to perform any type of operation with the cargo of the 
container outside the port area. This means that the container cannot be brought 
outside of the port, and this brings the additional problem of custom procedures 
etc, that generate costs that are higher than the savings obtainable by the better 
use of the capacity of the container. It is asked if there might be other circum-
stances or other issues where policy is a hindrance to the better exploitation of the 
advantages obtainable from the bundling of services. 
 
Definition of the spectrum of logistics services 
The possibility to reduce costs and identify profitable bundles seems to boil down 
to the characteristics of logistics service. Those characteristics depend mostly on 
the supply chain characteristics, the product that is transported and the geography 
of the departure and destination as well as the modality used for transportation. 
Another point is risen referring to the basic consolidation, i.e. some services, e.g. 
invoicing, or custom clearance, are automatically bundled, e.g. with transportation 
or terminal handling. The occurrence of basic consolidation is generally a result of 
local practice, geographical differences in the preferences of shippers, legal frame-
work, the trade lines and the characteristics of the cargo. 
 
Feasible and infeasible bundles including ocean transportation 
From the point of view of the interviewees ocean transportation is successfully 
bundled with, terminal handling, container services and often hinterland transpor-
tation and container logistics, depending on the location (for example it is common 
practice for shipping lines to provide city-to-city rates in the US). Other services 
such as stripping and stuffing of containers and cargo consolidation (that tradition-
ally was done by the line) and warehousing, etc, are most of the time done by the 
logistics operator, and not by the line. Cargo logistics and value added logistics do 
not seem to fall within the scope of the bundling with ocean transportation. 
 
In what circumstances to outsource? 
The company interviewed takes the decision to outsource services to other com-
panies on the basis of the requests of the customers. The decision to provide cer-
tain services in specific areas of the world is a strategic decision that is made after 
careful evaluation of the following factors, among others: the knowledge of the 
area, the business environment, the demand from the shippers from the area. So 
for those services that are likely to be demanded, the general attempt is to secure 
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facilities in advance, while for those services in areas that are more exceptional 
local suppliers may be selected. 
 
The assessment of the preferences of the shipper 
The preferences of a shipper for bundled or not bundled services are generally as-
sessed during the negotiation phase. Apart from market analysis then, the interest 
of the shipper is assessed on the basis of the requests he makes. In general smaller 
shippers will have a preference for bundled products (all inclusive door to door 
supply chain solutions), while the larger shippers may balance several logistics ser-
vice providers in various parts of the world on the basis of the type of cargo, the 
preferences of the other parties involved (suppliers, retailers) and the location. 
 
Conclusion 
From the interview emerged that bundling is a common practice for the company 
interviewed, as this is the essence of the activity of a third party logistics provider, 
even if not to the degree of providing fully integrated door-to-door services for all 
customers. The major driver in this case is the demand from the customers that set 
the way prices are proposed to them and the various services bundled. There 
seems to be very much scope for bundling in the 3PL market. 
 
 
Interview 3 – October 7th, 2006 
Interviewer: Can you briefly define the logistics strategy of your company? 
Interviewee: We say we want to provide a variety of shipping services, and this has 
to be interpreted in the sense that we remain a shipping company and 
the core of our business is shipping at the moment. Logistics is defined 
in a way to support shipping. That’s the definition of logistics in our 
company. If we go through question two then, I think this would help 
more to define what the definition of logistics for us is. The first 
statement was: ‘Strategically our company considers logistics as im-
portant as ocean transportation’. And we do not disagree with this, in 
the sense that we believe that logistics is an important part of our 
business in supporting shipping that is our core business. So I agree to 
the first statement. But when I move to statement two that says: ‘Lo-
gistics is strategically important for our company but in the end our 
core business is ocean transportation’. Well with this we strongly 
agree. This statement clearly states the direction in which we are 
going.  
Interviewer: Just as a specification, then, there is no company that is providing 
third party logistics services to [...]. 
Interviewee: There are many! 
Interviewer: Also as part of the [...] group? 
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Interviewee: We have companies within the group, such as [...] Logistics, that have 
a wide spread network, and we closely work with [...] Logistics, and of 
course their mission is to maximise their profit and increase, what 
they call their shareholders wealth, and this is surely the objective of 
[...] Logistics, but when it comes to cooperation between the logistics 
company and the shipping company, especially within the [...] group, 
we think shipping is more important, and the logistics activity are 
there to support the shipping activities within the group. 
Interviewer: Ok thank you, we can move then to the thirst statement, that is: ‘The 
major reason for which we have stepped into logistics is because mar-
gins in ocean transportation are too small’. 
Interviewee: I think, it depends, I do not agree with this statement, because I can-
not say that the margins in ocean transportation are too small, this is 
not correct to my belief. Because margins in ocean transportation in 
the last three, four years are very good! But if you take the average for 
ten years or twenty years, I think the margins in ocean transportation, 
I would not say too small, I think they are fair, mostly because of the 
cycles in the business. 
Interviewer: Maybe logistics is more stable. 
Interviewee: yes, with that I agree, logistics tends to be more stable. That means 
that if you diversify into logistics, this means that there is an influence 
in your profits and losses that will have a stabilising effect on your 
profits and losses. Because the profitability in ocean transportation 
goes up and down, up and down drastically, diversification into logis-
tics gives a stabilisation of those ups and downs, smoothing the transi-
tion in the profitability. That effect we expect from the logistics busi-
ness. 
Interviewer: Thank you. The fourth statement is: ‘Competition in the logistics 
business is more intense than in ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: Yes, I think there are more players in the logistics field than in ocean 
transportation. But remember the number of players in ocean trans-
portation is very limited, because it is a very capital intensive industry. 
But the logistics is much less capital intensive, you can start with a 
telephone and some paper, and some PCs you need these days. It is a 
much less capital intensive business, and in that sense everybody can 
start a logistics business. In the end the entry barriers in the logistics 
business are very low, while in ocean transportation, entry barriers 
are very high.  
Interviewer: Statement E is: ‘Our only interest in logistics lies with its provision in 
conjunction with ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: Oh, yes with this we agree, but not only in conjunction with ocean 
transportation, because the logistics business in our group is not 
treated as a cost centre, but as a profit centre, so they have to try to 
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make profits for themselves,  not only to support ocean transportation 
but also to make their own business, and deliver profits to their share 
holders. That is another mission we have. But from the liner prospec-
tive, logistics is more to be seen as a supporting business.  
Interviewer: When you mention that logistics activities are not run as cost centres, 
are you referring to logistics activities perfumed within the liner or are 
you referring to the separate third party logistics operator within the 
[...] group? 
Interviewee: When we come to [...], we have separate companies, so logistics is 
done only within the logistics company. 
Interviewer: So the liner company only performs port to port transportation? 
Interviewee: We do carriers haulage and feeder. 
Interviewer: So the liner company does not, for example delivers containers to an 
inland location, and this is done by the liner company, without the 
intervention of the logistics company. 
Interviewee: Oh, yes, this is possible. If the container is discharged in Rotterdam, 
and goes to a Scandinavia port, for example, we arrange the feeder 
connection, and as well, if the container is going to Düsseldorf by 
truck, and the carrier has been asked to deliver the container to the 
final destination, then we would arrange. By truck or rail or another 
mode, but that’s all we would do.  
Interviewer: OK, thank you. The next statement is: ‘Our company aims at becom-
ing a fully integrated logistics operator’. 
Interviewee: No, I disagree. Our mission is still, as I said, of a shipping company, a 
global strong shipping company, not a logistics company.  
Interviewer: Then statement G is: ‘Our company aims at being in the forefront in 
the provision of logistics services’. 
Interviewee: No, as I said in the previous question, we are not aiming at becoming 
a fully integrated logistics service provides, we are aiming at a global 
strong shipping company which can provide a variety of shipping ser-
vices, so I do not think we are aiming at being the frontrunners in the 
provision of logistics services. 
Interviewer: Do you have any comments on some of the previous statements? 
Interviewee: I think question one and two are totally related, so by answering ques-
tion two in all the points you should have a clear definition of our lo-
gistics strategy.  
Interviewer: OK. Then I move to question number three, that is if you could you 
provide a rough breakdown of your liner and logistics costs and rev-
enues?  
Interviewee: Yes, well, liner is – forget about the unit of measurement, dollars or 
yen, does not matter – liner is about 4000, and logistics is around 600. 
I think you can see the portion, right? Liner is about 4000 and logis-
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tics is 600. If you divide 4000 on 4600, you have 87%. So 87% liner 
and 13% logistics. 
Interviewer: And this is revenues, I suppose.  
Interviewee: Yes, revenues. 
Interviewer: Is your company planning to change this ratio in order to favour lo-
gistics through investments in warehousing and other logistics activi-
ties? 
Interviewee: I think it is not the ratios we are focussing on, we are focussing on ex-
panding our total revenue, so if by increasing the warehousing ac-
tivity, for example, we accelerate our revenue increase then we would 
do so. But I do not think, you know, the expansion in trucking, ware-
housing and so on, I do not think this would bring an increase in rev-
enues in the liner and logistics as a total. So I think, that, you know, 
this is a good question, we are not so much concerned with the ratios, 
but if a customer comes to us and says ok, I want to use [...] from Eu-
rope to Japan, but please provide warehousing service in Europe and 
also trucking, etc, and then we will use [...] as a total carrier, then we 
would do so. We would combine our services and try to offer a pack-
age to our customer. But that’s not because we wanted to increase the 
ratio, but because we wanted to increase the revenue. 
Interviewer: Ok, how many components does one have in a door-to-door supply 
chain in your opinion? 
Interviewee: I think we are not very big in the logistics services, but we have all 
components. For example if the container is discharged in Rotter-
dam, we can make custom clearance, transport the container, we can 
empty the container and take the cargo within the container, we can 
store the cargo, we can order-pick it, we can assemble it, we can con-
trol with radio frequencies, perform inventory control, we can send 
smaller pieces to the final destination and the consumers as well. Al-
though our activities are very small, we have all these capabilities. 
Interviewer: This would be done by [...] Logistics I suppose, not by the liner. 
Interviewee: Yes, these activities would be passed to [...] Logistics. 
Interviewer: Does your company provide all inclusive packages to customers? that 
is if it does it organise door-to-door transportation for at least one of 
its customers under a single all-inclusive price?  
Interviewee: Yes we do this. But I think when you say door-to-door, you should be 
careful. Because door-to-door has two meanings, in ocean transporta-
tion, door-to-door means to transport containers from a warehouse 
door to a warehouse door. But from a supply chain perspective, this is 
from the door of the producer or even of the supplier of raw materials 
to the door of the consumer. So the scope is much bigger. And if you 
ask our liner division, if we have door-to-door services, yes we do. For 
a container, that’s also possible. But if you ask our logistics division, 
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can you do door-to-door, that means the door of the factory that pro-
duces the product to the door of the consumer or the distribution 
warehouse, that is a larger scope, and as I said in question five we do 
have all the elements to provide services from the door-to-door in the 
larger sense. And we are charging sometimes all inclusive rates, which 
is based on the revenue of the customer. That means it is not divided 
into trucking, customs clearance, storage, packing, small parcel deliv-
ery, not those components separately. We are charging, let’s say, two 
percent, three percent of the total revenue of the customer, something 
like that. In this case it is better to charge a single all inclusive price, 
instead of charging for every single segment of the chain separately, 
or each sub-chain within the supply chain. 
Interviewer: OK, and if you had to give a percentage, what percentage of your 
port to port business is also door to door? 
Interviewee: It depends, I think it really depends, if we are dealing with a kind of 
very inexpensive retailer shop, which sells very cheap goods, the per-
centage is very small. But if they are very valuable goods, like medical 
appliances and high value machineries, this percentage is high. But 
we do not charge twenty or thirty percent, this percentage is only a 
one digit percentage.  
Interviewer: OK. I move to question seven: ‘If we define bundling as the provision 
of ocean transportation together with one or more logistics services 
under a single tariff, why might bundling be an attractive proposition? 
Interviewee: I think it is, it is a very attractive proposition, especially for customers 
who want a one stop shopping option. This happens when a customer 
does not want to speak to a shipping company and a trucking com-
pany and a customs broker and a warehousing company, and they 
want one person to whom they can speak, one person that can ar-
range all kind of transportation from point A to point B in the most 
efficient way. If we can sell the services like, as I said, a percentage of 
the first turn over, or so, than I think it would be a very attractive 
proposition for many customers. But in the meantime, we have also to 
bear in mind that some customers do not prefer that. They want a 
strong control on each leg of the transportation, like from port to port 
they have a service contract, and they really like to negotiate it with 
the shipping company because their volumes are so large, and also 
they want to have separate negotiation with the warehouse company 
because they require so large warehouses, etc. So I think in the end it 
depends on the volumes and the type of strategy each customer has in 
their supply chain. Currently, especially middle size and small size 
customers, they do not want to have to call five persons to arrange the 
transportation from A to B. They only make one call, and transporta-
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tion from A to B is done. I think that is the best way, and that’s why 
bundling is a very attractive proposition.  
Interviewer: So it depends mostly on the type of customers, and it depends also on 
the volumes transported? 
Interviewee: Yes, definitely.  
Interviewer: Ok, and let’s suppose we are considering customers who might be 
interested in bundling, what are then the difficulties – and I move to 
question eight – that you face in trying to sell bundled products? 
Interviewee: Bundle services sometimes should be provided on a global scale. I do 
not think for a customer to say we need a bundles service for the 
USA, but not for Europe. Or I want a very seamless service to Asia, 
but I do not need such a seamless service to India, for example. That 
would be very inefficient and inconsistent. So I think when we sell 
bundled products, I think we need a global network. One stop shop-
ping needs to be based on a global network, requires establishing a 
global network, and this is very difficult. Every forwarder is striving to 
do so at this moment.    
Interviewer: Do you think that your competitors are better or worse in providing 
bundled products and in selling them? 
Interviewee: Oh, they are much better I think! Maersk Line, APL … Maersk and 
Mearsk Logistics work very closely, and they are very good at selling 
bundled products. And APL and APL Logistics also. NYK and NYK 
Logistics also. When it comes to [...], I think we are not so god at sell-
ing bundles, because the one thing… the philosophy – and again we 
come to question one – behind logistics is that it is a supporting func-
tion for us, a complementary function.  
Interviewer: Thanks, I will move then to question ten, I will read a list of several 
components in a logistics chain and then I will ask you which of the 
each of the logistics services provided by your company is priced 
jointly with ocean transportation and how often? so zero if they are 
never priced jointly with ocean transportation and five if they are al-
ways priced jointly. 
Interviewee: Ok  
Interviewer: Terminal Handling Charges? 
Interviewee: Yes, THC is always charged by the ocean transportation company. 
We always do. As well as CAF and BAF, currency adjustment factors 
and bunker adjustment factors. 
Interviewer: Warehousing? 
Interviewee: Only upon request. So no more than a one or two, a one maybe. If a 
customer asks, do you know a good warehousing company in, let’s say 
Rotterdam, then I would introduce them to [...] Logistics. But if they 
ask, can you suggest a good warehouse somewhere in Africa, then we 
have no idea at all.  
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Interviewer: Stripping/stuffing containers and cargo consolidation services? 
Interviewee: Yes, if we are asked, we provide consolidations services within our 
group. So we would introduce our consolidation service division to 
the customer. These days, the customers that might require cargo 
consolidation and customers who do not require cargo consolidation 
are clear, and the markets are very different. Our cargo consolidation 
service company goes to the cargo consolidation services market. If 
you look at the transpacific business, Wal-Mart is the largest company 
that needs consolidation. Kmart, you know, those kinds of retailers 
are buying from thousands of vendors in China, and so they need to 
consolidate their cargo. So we know who needs consolidation. Going 
back to the question I think a shipping line is rarely asked to provide 
cargo consolidation, they would go directly to a consolidation com-
pany. So in this case it is probably a one or even a zero.  
Interviewer: Container services (fumigation, maintenance, repairs, etc)? 
Interviewee: Yes, this we will do. We will always fumigate the containers, mainte-
nance and repairs, yes, of course we will do. Because the container it-
self, the equipment, belongs to us. Se we need to perform mainte-
nance, repairs, etc., yes. 
Interviewer: Container logistics? 
Interviewee: Container logistics, I think, meaning rail, truck, transport of contain-
ers in general, right? 
Interviewer: Yes. 
Interviewee: Well also in this case if we are asked by the customer, from a port to 
an inland location, then we would do. Only upon request. 
Interviewer: So maybe something more than a one, a two? 
Interviewee: No, more. Two, three. 
Interviewer: If we consider cargo logistics? 
Interviewee: What do you mean by cargo logistics? 
Interviewer: The logistics of the cargo inside the container. 
Interviewee: Ok, so the larger scope of the door-to-door, right? I think this will be 
done by the logistics division within the group. And I think this would 
be charged separately. So considering the liner, this is a zero. 
Interviewer: Value added logistics services, like labelling, packaging, etc.? 
Interviewee: The same. Those customers will not go to a ocean transportation 
company but to a logistics company. 
Interviewer: Hinterland transportation? 
Interviewee: Hinterland transportation of the container by truck can be arranged 
by us, of course. As I already said in general the container logistics. 
Door-to-door in container transportation can also be arranged, but 
door-to-door in the case of the retailer and consumer will be done by 
the logistics company. 
  327 
Interviewer: Do you think there any other important logistics that are done by the 
liner that should be included in this list? 
Interviewee: I think the payment of custom duties, on behalf of the shipping con-
signee. This is also a service that the shipping line is doing whenever 
necessary. Yes, customs clearance is one of the things, so the liner 
company pays those duties on behalf of the shipper or the consignee. 
And inventory control also. It is very important because the consignee 
always want to see where is the cargo, how much is in storage, etc. 
Interviewer: OK, and in these cases custom clearance is done also very often by 
the shipping line, or not? 
Interviewee: No, no, as a shipping line we do not do that. That would be done by 
the logistics company. 
Interviewer: And the same holds for the inventory control, right? 
Interviewee: Yes, exactly. 
Interviewer: How many of the door-to-door supply chain components listed be-
fore, in your view, could be successfully bundled? 
Interviewee: I think again it depends on the type of commodity. If we are talking 
about the retailer business, I think, when you go to retail shops, there 
is a large number of products that are made in China where there are 
many small vendors, so the retailer in Europe or in the USA, when 
they buy in China, have to collect all the products from thousands of 
places in China. In this sense, then, consolidation, but also bundle to-
gether logistics services can be very effective, because they need it. But 
when you come, for example to the automotive industry, the supply 
chain is close to the factory, with just in time deliveries, etc… and that 
is separated from the ocean transportation, and also at the factory 
side, before the products reach the factory, there is another logistics 
chain. So the logistics is very different, as it cannot be a total inte-
grated logistics chain. You have origin logistics, container logistics and 
the logistics at the destination. I really think it depends on the type of 
the commodity, and on the industry in the end. But all industries are 
becoming increasingly interested in one-stop services. So there is a 
general trend towards putting together as many components as pos-
sible, and trying to bundle them together. 
Interviewer: Ok, you have already answered question twelve in the answer to the 
previous question, so I move to question thirteen, that is : ‘If you have 
to outsource, do you do this strategically in advance, or after you have 
stricken a deal or a contract with a customer?’. And then I think it 
may be useful in this case to distinguish between the services provided 
within the liner company and the services provided by the logistics 
operator. 
Interviewee: OK, I think in the liner business it is clear generally what we need to 
outsource. We have been doing this for hundred years, and of course 
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every year the economic situation changes, but we know how many 
containers we need to move from A to B, from Rotterdam to 
Gothenburg, Rotterdam to Hamburg, so we know what to outsource 
in advance: trucking services, feeder services, rail services necessary to 
move all our containers. Based on the volumes and the discounts we 
can obtain, we will strategically decide which provider to use. But for 
the logistics part, I think, that mostly they will negotiate and out-
source in advance, but for value added service which is not requested 
regularly, or services that are requested ad hoc, or with very high 
standards value added services, they have to provide them themselves, 
and they cannot outsource them in advance. 
Interviewer: How would the price of a bundle be set? 
Interviewee: I think the easiest way is to base the price on a win-win scenario, 
where we share the cost savings between the customer, the carrier and 
the other logistics service provider. I think that would be the best way. 
I would not say, one parcel one dollar or so, but the total logistics cost 
savings deriving from combining the logistics services can be shared 
between the cargo owner and the logistics service provider. That is, I 
think, the ideal way, but it is not done in such a way. But if you ask 
me how do I price such bundles of services, then the savings sharing, 
is in my view the best way. So if I look at question fifteen, if we con-
sider three services, s1, s2 and s3, each one priced individually as p1, p2 
and p3, the bundle price is not equal to the sum of the three prices, 
but much, much lower. That’s why, you know, the single service pro-
vider of s1, s2 and s3 individually, cannot compete with the compre-
hensive service provider. If I can only do s1, and someone can do s1, s2 
and s3, and they provide them all together, I will be never able to 
compete on the bundle. And I think that is the strategy behind many 
shipping companies going logistics. 
Interviewer: Do you think that the combination of some of the logistics services 
with ocean transportation may actually increase the cost of the provi-
sion of the two services, because for example the coordination that is 
necessary, etc. do you think this might be a case? Or the fact putting 
together two services will always reduce the overall cost of producing 
them?  
Interviewee: I think if you combine the services, is not done manually, this is done 
by computer and many companies are providing seamless services, 
what we call a ‘glass pipeline’. You can see the pipeline, because it is 
made of glass, you can see inside, and you can easily see with the help 
of the computer, where is your cargo now. Is it at the port? Is it in the 
warehouse? Has it already been loaded on a vessel? Is it sailing? That 
pipeline inventory, the seamless service of course it increases the de-
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velopment costs, the initial costs, but once this product has been de-
veloped, I do not think that combining services would lead to a cost 
increase. Once you have a good system, a good tool, then combina-
tion of services, does not lead to an increase in costs. That’s what I be-
lieve.  
Interviewer: Ok, then I move to the following question, that is: ‘Which methods do 
you use to assess your customers’ willingness to pay for differentiated 
services?’. 
Interviewee: IT, definitely, that’s IT. The pipeline inventory, as I said, or visible 
inventory systems that customers can access from the internet and see 
any time, anywhere in the world, where the cargo is and how many 
inventories they have. And we know that a customer will be willing to 
pay more for such services. 
Interviewer: So it will depend on what a current customer asks you, in a way. In 
this way you can assess what their needs are. 
Interviewee: Yes, that’s also, yes. 
Interviewer: Then we move to the next question. Could bundled products be de-
veloped and priced by alliance members? So for example, trucking by 
company X, warehousing by company Y, liner by company Z and 
the bundle sold by all companies at the same price? 
Interviewee: I think it is difficult in two ways, for two reasons. The first reason is: 
within the alliance, whatever alliance, they have different customer 
profiles. APL is good at American customers, Hapag-Lloyd is good 
with the German automotive industry, China Shipping is very strong 
at Chinese customers and they are selling at all different prices, I 
think it is difficult because the members of the alliance have strengths 
in all different fields, different from the other members. So I think it is 
difficult to combine the prices, and sell a bundle at the same prices. 
Interviewer: This means they would have to share information on certain custom-
ers, and maybe those customers with which they are strong. 
Interviewee: Yes, that’s right. And the second reason is that you may know that the 
EU, last week, repealed the block exemption for shipping conferences. 
You know that shipping conferences were exempted form antitrust 
law, but now they are not allowed anymore in Europe. In America, I 
think because of the Shipping Act in the nineties, there are no confer-
ences anymore, and so also Europe has abolished the conference ex-
emption. So fixing prices among the lines and adjusting the space ca-
pacity plans for the future will not be allowed anymore. So for these 
two reasons, a marketing reason and a regulation reason, I think it is 
difficult to sell a similar service at the same price. 
Interviewer: OK, thank you, and I just have the last question. I would like to ask, 
which one of the following topics you think would require a better 
understanding from an academic point of view. 
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Interviewee: Yes, the interesting point is as I said earlier, many shipping companies 
are going logistics, APL has APL Logistics, Maersk, Maersk Logistics, 
OOCL, OOCL Logistics, etc, and by doing that they are expanding 
their scope of services, form port-to-port to warehouse-to-warehouse, 
and then from the factory to the retailer. And although we under-
stand the notion behind that, we understand the way of thinking and 
why they are doing it – and that is why [...] is also doing the same, 
expanding the scope of our services beyond the traditional scope of 
port to port – my question is: is the way we are going profitable en-
ough to make shipping companies survive competition in the long 
term? The essence of the argument is, as I said in question fifteen, s1, 
s2 and s3, with individual prices p1, p2 and p3, if services are bundled, 
the price will be less. And that means more competitive. Bundled ser-
vices are sold more competitively than individual services. That’s 
what I believe. But still in my company, there are not yet many peo-
ple who believe this. Theoretically maybe, but practically shipping is 
shipping, and shipping is still profitable by itself. So I am in a di-
lemma, that theoretically, bundling is OK, but practically I think a 
shipping company has to control equipment, capacity, etc. very much 
oriented on the equipment side and not on the service side. Maybe 
many shipping companies are also increasingly focussing on services, I 
think of APL, Hapag-Lloyds or NYK, they are doing a similar thing, 
they are maximising their asset utilisation, not maximising the satis-
faction of their customers, but from the logistics point, you always 
need to maximise the satisfaction of the customer. And these are two 
very contradicting approaches I think. Shipping is very much equip-
ment oriented, Logistics is very much customer oriented. And we are 
combining them together, whether it is the right direction to go or 
not. The points you mention in your questionnaire are all interesting, 
but this is really the question I have. 
Interviewer: Ok, then I thank you very much for your time. 
 
  
Interview 4 – October 8th, 2006. 
 
Interviewer: Can you briefly define the logistics strategy of your company?  
Interviewee: Our Company operates within the Group strategy of “Differentiated 
Liner and Focused Logistics” By Focussed Logistics we offer 4 verti-
cals within the Industry, - Warehouse management, Contract logis-
tics, Consolidation services and Freight Forwarding. Commodity 
focus is, FMCG, Electronic goods, Auto sector and Garment Industry 
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Interviewer: For each of the following statements you should mention if you 
strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree, do not know. The 
first statement is: ‘Strategically our company considers logistics as im-
portant as ocean transportation’. 
Interviewee: Strongly agree. 
Interviewer: Logistics is strategically important for our company but in the end our 
core business is ocean transportation. 
Interviewee: Agree. 
Interviewer: The major reason for which we have stepped into logistics is because 
margins in ocean transportation are too small. 
Interviewee: Disagree. 
Interviewer: Competition in the logistics business is more intense than in ocean 
transportation. 
Interviewee: Disagree. 
Interviewer: Our only interest in logistics lies with its provision in conjunction with 
ocean transportation. 
Interviewee: Disagree. 
Interviewer: Our company aims at becoming a fully integrated logistics operator. 
Interviewee: Agree. 
Interviewer: Our company aims at being in the forefront in the provision of logis-
tics services. 
Interviewee: Strongly agree. 
Interviewer: Do you have any comments on the previous statements? 
Interviewee: Logistics provision without ocean capabilities and vice versa is an 
outdated sales model. Our customer profile shows that both are a re-
quirement. 
Interviewer: Could you provide a rough breakdown of your liner / logistics costs 
and revenues? 
Interviewee: 80%/20% Liner/Logistics. 
Interviewer: Are you planning to change this ratio in order to favour logistics 
through investments in, say, warehousing, etc.?  
Interviewee: Not at this time as our logistics strategy is asset light model. However 
the logistic revenue percentage may increase without such invest-
ments. 
Interviewer: How many components (e.g. warehousing, tracking, RFID, etc.) does 
one have in a door-to-door supply chain?  
Interviewee: Too many to mention, the basis of the complete supply chain involves 
vendor management, procurement, finance and physical product 
flow, console/deconsole, milk runs and ocean freight.  
Interviewer: Does you company provide all inclusive packages to customers, i.e. 
does it organise door-to- door transportation for at least one of its cus-
tomers under a single all-inclusive price? If so can you mention what 
percentage of your port to port business is also door-to-door?  
  332
Interviewee: My company does offer door/door to customers who require a single 
document, with the logistics arm issuing a house Bill of Lading. The 
ocean piece,(Port/Port) within the current door/door contracts is cur-
rently a small segment of the total port/port liner business, - I would 
suggest a maximum of 10%. 
Interviewer: If we define bundling as the provision of ocean transportation to-
gether with one or more logistics services under a single tariff, why 
might bundling be an attractive proposition?  
Interviewee: The attraction is not a single tariff, the attraction is more of outsour-
cing the transportation chain under one management, allowing the 
Transport department of the customer to simply issue purchase order 
information and sit back while the 3PL provider takes care of the rest. 
The overused term is a “one stop shop”, but in essence it greatly sim-
plifies the customer interaction requirements.  
Interviewer: What are the difficulties you face in trying to sell bundled products?  
Interviewee: Customers want to see the individual cost components, and then ne-
gotiate individually, – this is counter productive to the aim of a pack-
age. Equally customers hear “bundled services” and feel it is a one 
size fits all product, whereas clearly we are able to tailor make a bun-
dled service dependant on their individual needs.  
Interviewer: Are your competitors better or worse in providing bundled products 
and in selling them?  
Interviewee: Difficult to comment on this, - we feel of course that we understand 
our customer needs better than most. 
Interviewer: Which of the following logistics services provided by your company is 
priced jointly with ocean transportation? Can you indicate on a scale 
from 0 to 5, where 0 means never and 5 means always, how often 
does this occur? Terminal Handling Charges? 
Interviewee: Never. A zero, the charge remains always separate. 
Interviewer: Warehousing. 
Interviewee: Three. 
Interviewer: Stripping/stuffing containers and cargo consolidation. 
 Interviewee: Four. 
Interviewer: Container services, such as fumigation, maintenance, repairs, etc. 
Interviewee: Four. 
Interviewer: Container logistics. 
Interviewee: A five, always. 
Interviewer: Cargo logistics. 
Interviewee: Four. 
Interviewer: Value added logistics services. 
Interviewee: Three. 
Interviewer: Hinterland transportation. 
Interviewee: Four. 
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Interviewer: How many of the door-to-door supply chain components listed be-
fore, in your view, could be successfully bundled?  
Interviewee: There is no reason why all of the elements of door/door supply chain 
cannot be bundled, always depending on the terms of purchase. 
Working to bundle across two customers, CNF, is more difficult than 
with one, FCA. 
Interviewer: Which of the above components can you provide yourself and which 
ones do you have to outsource? 
Interviewee: Land transportation, warehousing, and airfreight tend to be a mixture 
of contracting and owned dependant on geography specifications, all 
others are provided by the 3PL company within the group. 
Interviewer: How do you price a bundle?  
Interviewee: Several models, – component parts sum at cost plus, or Contribution 
Margin parameters, or what the market will bear. In each case mini-
mum EBIT levels are required. 
Interviewer: Which methods (how) do you use to assess your customers’ willingness 
to pay for differentiated services? 
Interviewee: Engaging the customer with his current cost of Supply Chain and 
breaking it down into it’s component parts, will ascertain where there 
is low hanging opportunity, if any. The end result of the bundled ser-
vice has to be either increased efficiency for customer or reduced in-
ventory carrying cost. Provided the value our bundled service brings 
exceeds the cost of our offering, we can sell. 
Interviewer: Could bundled products be developed and priced by alliance mem-
bers? E.g. Trucking by company X, warehousing by company Y, 
liner by company Z and the bundle sold by all at the same price? 
Interviewee: Theoretically yes, however we only need to see that alliances offering 
sea freight alone still compete on price, bundling would be no differ-
ent, in fact it may run foul of competition laws. 
Interviewer: Which of the topics listed in the interview guidelines do you think 
would require a better understanding from an academic point of 
view? 
Interviewee: The way in which the provision of logistics services jointly with ocean 
transportation may increase profitability in the liner business; the 
competitive advantage that the provision of ocean transportation 
jointly with logistics services might grant to shipping lines; and the 
eventual competitive advantage obtained by the provision of services 
under a single pricing mechanism to a shipping line in the ocean 
transportation market. 
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The thesis aims at studying the viability and the benefits of the sale of multiple ser-
vices in a single package, generally referred to as bundling, in the container industry, 
and specifically with reference to the joint provision of ocean transportation and 
other logistics services. Bundling is a pervasive practice in most industries, but its 
study and application in the container industry has been rather limited, partially as 
the result of the very special regulatory regime that has characterised ocean trans-
portation and partially as a consequence of the rather conservative nature of the 
liner industry. The involvement of liner shipping companies in the logistics sector 
has characterised the industry since the late eighties and is a continuing trend. The 
changes in regulation and market conditions, has offered liner companies the op-
portunity of design new and more flexible forms of non linear pricing, such as 
bundling, that allow for better serving customers and develop synergies. 
One of the most relevant directions for analysis was the investigation of the 
impact of bundling on shippers and society by and large. Shippers appreciate the 
advantages of this business practice in terms of simplification of tariffs; easiness to 
compare quotes from different carriers; and the increase in the number and types 
of logistics solutions on offer. However the practice in the maritime sector is still 
looked at with diffidence. This appears to be due to the rather confrontational rela-
tionships between ocean carriers and shippers and the perception that bundled 
tariffs may conceal hidden mark-ups.  
It should be noted in addition that, when the sale of bundled offers is com-
bined with the sale of the individual components, under what is generally referred 
to as mixed bundling, it results in an increase in choice for consumers. Consider-
ations on social welfare should then additionally be weighted against the value of 
increased choice and variety. Especially in the case of integrated supply chains, 
these benefits can be substantial. The results for society are positive, although 
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monitoring of the practice is essential and further research in this area is impera-
tive.  
A second area of research aimed at assessing the value of bundling for carri-
ers in terms of enhancing their competitive advantage. Among the major findings 
of the thesis is that bundling is in practice motivated by: cost saving advantages; 
demand drivers; differentiation strategy; the possibility of obtaining higher margins 
by jointly offering ocean and hinterland transportation; the necessity to better con-
trol coordination costs with hinterland connections. Integration seems to be the 
business strategy that will prevail among carriers in the long term. Bundling pro-
vides a useful aid in implementing this strategy successfully. Not all bundles are 
advisable though. Depending on the distribution of reservation prices among the 
various customer segments served by each carrier, optimal bundles are those that 
result from the combination of services that have asymmetric conditional reserva-
tion prices.  
One of the important observations of the thesis refers to the superiority of 
bundling propositions that allow for exploiting consumption complementaties and 
cost advantages deriving for example from economies of scope or of route density. 
For these advantages to be identified though a focus on interfaces among the vari-
ous logistics components, in particular with ocean transportation, is required. Suc-
cessful implementation of bundling, in fact, requires a focus on the nature of the 
transactions among shippers; liner companies; and logistics service providers. Only 
in this way can ocean carriers develop product bundling propositions that increase 
the profitability of bundling and its desirability for society. 
The use of transaction cost economics can be particularly valuable in the 
context of ocean transportation and logistics outsourcing and constitutes a solid 
ground on which ocean carriers can assess their willingness to engage in bundling 
strategies. Although bundling does not necessarily require vertical integration, 
when the transaction between the carrier and a logistics service provider are taken 
out of the market, carriers may acquire a better position to provide bundles. This 
happens because of their better ability to harness transaction costs and reduce the 
impact of information asymmetries. These product bundles, as explained in chapter 7, 
always yield better results than unbundling (proposition 3). 
In order to fully appreciate the potential offered by product bundling ocean 
carriers should open up to the advantages offered by vertical integration. The the-
sis argues that for this to happen ocean carriers need to look beyond their tradi-
tional company boundaries, focusing on transcorporate performance that is char-
acteristic of supply chains. This approach requires the modification of traditional 
performance measures to include also transcorporate performance indicators. 
This, it is argued, should not only take place at the carrier level, but also with the 
other members of the container supply chain, such as terminals, ports, hinterland 
transport providers, distributors, warehouses and third party logistics providers. 
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A further area of research cantered around the potential offered by bundling 
as a device aiming at providing carriers with some sort of strategic advantage. Al-
though research in this area is still scant, the applicability of bundling in a competi-
tive market may deliver interesting conclusions. In particular it emerged from the 
two models discussed in the thesis that bundling has mixed effects on consumer 
surplus and total welfare. The model adds to the discussion on the strategic dimen-
sions of bundling decisions. This is done by evaluating the outcomes of competi-
tion in a duopoly where carriers compete on prices; can sell individual components 
or bundles; and both carriers and the shipper incur a cost in assembling the bun-
dle. The most interesting finding of the thesis is that bundling allows for efficiency 
gains to be passed on to shippers and society, an eventuality that cannot take place 
when bundling is forbidden. 
This desirable feature of bundling though comes at a risk since carriers may 
not necessarily have the highest levels of efficiency in providing the bundle. When 
this is the case, bundling tends to reduce consumer surplus and can even reduce 
social welfare. An important issue that remains open for further research is 
whether carriers are intrinsically better than other parties in the supply chain in 
providing bundles. If this is the case, competitive forces, even in the restrictive case 
of duopoly, ensure that this efficiency is passed on to consumers and society. 
At the basis of the thesis there is the development of supply chain thinking 
that has characterised the transportation industry in the last three decades and the 
emergence of the logistics outsourcing as a significant business practice. The con-
tribution of the thesis in this area is twofold: there is a great potential in applying 
yield management techniques to the supply chain and performance metric selec-
tion are a decisive factor in the success of vertical integration strategies along the 
chain. The area of supply chain pricing is still relatively underdeveloped and the 
thesis suggests that the application of the extensive toolbox of non-liner pricing 
developed in the industrial organisation literature may point towards new and in-
teresting research directions. 
As far as the second contribution is concerned, its starting observation is that 
ocean transportation is a subsystem within the supply chain and as such perform-
ance should not be limited to the evaluation of its internal processes. It is the per-
formance of the entire chain that really matters. If the supply chain performs well, 
i.e. creates value, then it will be chosen and as consequence also the carrier will be 
chosen. As the supply chain is as strong as its weakest link, a carrier may be ex-
tremely efficient in its operations, but if terminals, or hinterland transport provid-
ers do not provide adequate levels of service, or the access roads to the port are 
congested, this will impact the ability of the chain to create value and in essence 
also the competitiveness of the carrier. 
The focus on the supply chain is required also by the fact that the perform-
ance of each link is influenced by the performance of the other links. As such the 
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performance of a liner company is affected by the performance of a terminal and 
in turn, the performance of the container terminal is affected, for example, by inef-
ficient trucking, or port services. The cooperative nature of supply chains requires 
a different approach to performance, where, next to traditional intracompany 
measures, also inter-chain metrics should be monitored and analysed. 
This of course raises particular challenges for supply chain operators, as co-
operation among the various stakeholders becomes then a fundamental pre-
requisite for the implementation of efficient supply chain strategies. From the side 
of the carriers, in particular of those that choose to provide third party logistics ser-
vices, investment in ICT and in improving supply chain visibility should be on top 
of their development strategies. But this of course cannot and should not be done 
independently. 
A final area of investigation relates to government intervention in regulating 
bundling in the container industry. Although mixed bundling is a practice that is 
always permitted under antitrust regulation for companies with no or limited mar-
ket power, there is no complete legal accordance on the issue. 
The thesis reviewed the regulation in the USA and Europe and observed that 
the practice of bundling is not illegal in neither jurisdiction as long as (i) services 
are priced within the instrument of confidential service contracts, i.e. not as part of 
conference rate-fixing agreements, (ii) a service bundle is not provided exclusively, 
i.e. the shipper has always the possibility of purchasing the various bundle compo-
nents independently, (iii) inland service rates and specifications are not negotiated 
jointly by carriers as a consortium, (iv) the ‘not below cost rule’ is respected for 
those trades where conference tariffs are applicable (v) in trades to and from the 
EU, no use is made of discussion agreements.  
These provisions allow for the use of bundling strategies in all other circum-
stances and therefore the development of these strategies is strongly advised. The 
thesis argues also that the repeal of the Council Regulation 4056/86 will favour 
the development of bundling strategies and that ocean carriers should aim at fur-
ther investigating the advantages offered by this strategy. The thesis also argues 
that the regulator should on the contrary aim at supporting the development of 
inter industry bundling practices as these are bound to stimulate cooperation 
among supply chain partners. 
The thesis is structured in eleven chapters, that analyse the various issues out-
lined above. Chapter one is the introduction to the thesis and outlines the relevant 
research and methodological issues as well as framing the thesis in the broader dia-
logue on bundling. This is followed by two chapters aiming at reviewing the litera-
ture on bundling and on the liner shipping industry. In doing so, the chapters not 
only provide a new synthesis of these research areas, but also highlight those as-
pects that are most relevant for the application of bundling to the liner and logistics 
sectors. 
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Chapter 4 adds the shipper dimension to the analysis. Since one of the most 
relevant reasons for developing bundling propositions is shippers demand, the the-
sis integrates shippers’ perspective by reporting the results of two questionnaires on 
shippers preferences on outsourcing and bundling. Specularly to chapter 4, chap-
ter 5 is an account of current business practices and the carrier’s perspective on 
bundling. It emerges on chapter 5 that the decision of providing bundles is con-
nected to the make or buy decision and whether bundles are better provided by a 
carrier that has acquired the full control of the capabilities necessary to assemble 
the bundle. Whether to organise the provision of a bundle through the market 
(outsourcing) or through hierarchies (integration) depends on the nature of the 
transactions involved, and is the subject of chapter 6.  
This open the discussion on what approach carriers should use in order to 
develop optimal bundles. The thesis will suggest conjoint analysis and liner pro-
gramming as the most appropriate techniques. One of the important conclusions 
of the thesis, as already mentioned, is the necessity of setting adequate measures 
that monitor the creation of supply chain value and help identify bundling oppor-
tunities. For this reason chapter 8 is dedicated to measurement and performance, 
with a particular focus on the interface between ocean transportation and hinter-
land (terminals) and a discussion on the performance measurement practices in the 
liner industry.  
Chapter 9 and 10 are devoted to the analysis of the potential and implication 
of bundling as a strategic device aiming at providing carriers with better control of 
the market. From the two models developed and the analysis of the regulatory 
framework that governs the liner and logistics industry, it emerges that bundling is 
beneficial for society and carriers and represents an incentive for improving supply 
chain efficiency. Chapter 11 concludes and provides directions for further re-
search. 
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Dit proefschrift is gericht op het bestuderen van de haalbaarheid en de voordelen 
van de verkoop van meerdere diensten in een pakket (een praktijk algemeen aan-
geduid als bundling) in de container-industrie, en in het bijzonder met betrekking tot 
het gezamenlijke aanbod van vervoer over zee en andere logistieke diensten. De 
praktijk van het bundelen van producten is binnen de meeste industrieën wijdver-
breid, maar onderzoek over de toepassing hiervan in de containersector is vrij be-
perkt, deels als gevolg van de zeer speciale regelgeving die vervoer over zee door 
de jaren heen heeft gekarakteriseerd  en deels als gevolg van de tamelijk conserva-
tieve aard van de lijnvaart industrie. De betrokkenheid van  lijnvaartbedrijven in 
de logistieke sector heeft de sector sinds de late jaren tachtig bepaald en is een 
aanhoudende trend. Veranderingen in de regelgeving en de marktomstandigheden 
hebben lijnvaartbedrijven de mogelijkheid geboden om nieuwe en meer flexibele 
vormen van non-lineaire prijszetting zoals bundling te ontwerpen, welke een betere 
dienstverlening aan klanten en de ontwikkeling van synergieën mogelijk maken. 
Een van de meest belangrijke conclusies van dit onderzoek komt voort uit de 
studie van de effecten van bundling op verladers en de samenleving als geheel. Ver-
laders waarderen de voordelen van deze praktijk in termen van vereenvoudiging 
van de tarieven; het gemak om offerten van verschillende lijnvaartmaatschappijen 
te vergelijken; en de toename van het aantal en de aard van logistieke oplossingen 
die aangeboden kunnen worden. Maar in de maritieme sector wordt deze praktijk 
nog steeds met argwaan bekeken. Ogenschijnlijk wordt dit veroorzaakt door de 
nogal confronterende relaties die bestaat tussen lijnvaartbedrijven en verladers en 
de perceptie dat gebundelde tarieven verborgen prijsverhogingen kunnen omvat-
ten. 
Er dient tevens te worden opgemerkt dat als de verkoop van gebundelde 
aanbiedingen wordt gecombineerd  met de verkoop van afzonderlijke componen-
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ten (over het algemeen aangeduid als mixed bundling) dit resulteert in een toename 
van keuzes voor consumenten. Beschouwingen over het maatschappelijk nut moet 
dan worden afgewogen tegen de waarde van de toegenomen keuzevrijheid en di-
versiteit. Vooral in het geval van geïntegreerde toevoerketens kunnen deze voorde-
len aanzienlijk zijn. De resultaten voor de samenleving zijn positief, hoewel toe-
zicht op deze praktijk van essentieel belang is en verder onderzoek noodzakelijk is. 
Een tweede onderzoeksgebied was gericht op het beoordelen van de waarde 
van bundling voor vervoerders in het verbeteren van hun concurrentievoordeel. De 
belangrijkste bevindingen van dit proefschrift zijn, dat bundling in de praktijk wordt 
ingegeven door: kostenbesparende voordelen; vraaggestuurde factoren; differentia-
tiestrategieën; de mogelijkheid tot het verkrijgen van hogere marges door het ge-
zamenlijk aanbieden van vervoer over zee en naar het achterland; en de noodzaak 
voor een betere controle van de coördinatie kosten met betrekking tot de achter-
landverbindingen. Op lange termijn lijkt integratie de strategie die binnen de rede-
rijen zal overwinnen. Bundling is een nuttig hulpmiddel om deze strategie met suc-
ces uit te voeren. Maar niet alle vormen van bundels worden echter aanbevolen. 
Afhankelijk van de verdeling van de reserveringsprijzen tussen de verschillende 
klantensegmenten bediend door elke vervoerder, zijn optimale bundels die bundels 
die voortvloeien uit een combinatie van diensten met asymmetrische voorwaarde-
lijke reserveringsprijzen.   
Eén van de belangrijke waarnemingen van dit proefschrift heeft betrekking 
op de superioriteit van bundels die het mogelijk maken complementair af te stem-
men op de klant en of kosten voordelen aan te bieden die voortvloeien uit bijvoor-
beeld economies of scope of de route dichtheid. Een succesvolle implementatie van 
bundling, vereist in feite aandacht voor de aard van de transacties tussen verladers, 
lijnvaartbedrijven, en logistieke dienstverleners. Enkel op deze manier kunnen re-
derijen bundels ontwikkelen, die de winstgevendheid van bundling en de wenselijk-
heid ervan voor de samenleving vergroten.  
Het gebruik van Transaction Cost Economics kan bijzonder waardevol zijn in het 
kader van het vervoer over zee en de logistieke uitbesteding en vormt een solide 
basis waarop lijnvaartmaatschappijen hun bereidheid tot bundelstrategieën kun-
nen beoordelen. Hoewel bundling niet per se verticale integratie nodig heeft,  zullen 
rederijen in een betere positie zijn om bundels aan te bieden, als de transacties tus-
sen de rederijen en de logistieke dienstverleners niet langer deel uitmaken van de 
waardeketen. Op deze manier zijn zij beter in staat om transactiekosten te beheer-
sen en de impact van informatie asymmetrie te verminderen. Dergelijke bundels 
van producten, zoals uitgelegd in hoofdstuk 7, brengen altijd betere resultaten dan 
losse producten (stelling 3). 
Om ten volle de mogelijkheden van het bundelen van logistieke diensten te 
waarderen, moeten rederijen zich openstellen voor de voordelen van verticale in-
tegratie. Het proefschrift betoogt dat om dit te laten gebeuren, rederijen verder 
moeten kijken dan hun traditionele bedrijfsgrenzen, door nadruk te leggen op in-
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tersectorale prestaties kenmerkend voor toevoerketens. Deze benadering vereist 
dat binnen de traditionele prestatie-indicatoren ook intersectorale prestatie-
indicatoren worden opgenomen. Dit, zo wordt gesteld, moet niet alleen plaatsvin-
den op het niveau van de vervoerder, maar ook op het niveau van de andere leden 
van de container waardeketens, zoals terminals, havens, achterlandvervoerders, 
distributeurs, magazijnen en logistieke dienstverleners. 
Een ander onderzoeksgebied richtte zich op het potentieel van bundling om 
rederijen een strategisch voordeel te verschaffen. Hoewel onderzoek op dit gebied 
nog beperkt is, kan de toepasbaarheid van bundling in een concurrerende markt 
interessante conclusies opleveren. Uit de twee modellen besproken in dit proef-
schrift is in het bijzonder voortgekomen dat bundling gemengde effecten heeft op 
het consumentensurplus en de totale welvaart. Het model heeft toegevoegde waar-
de voor de discussie over de strategische dimensies van bundling-besluiten. Dit 
wordt bereikt door de evaluatie van de resultaten van concurrentie in een duopo-
lie, waar vervoerders op prijs concurreren; waar vervoerders afzonderlijke compo-
nenten of bundels kunnen verkopen, en waar zowel de lijnvaartmaatschappijen als 
de verzender kosten maken bij het samenstellen van een bundel. De meest interes-
sante conclusie van het proefschrift is dat bundling het mogelijk maakt dat efficiën-
tiewinst wordt doorgegeven aan de verladers en de samenleving; iets wat niet kan 
plaatsvinden wanneer koppelverkoop verboden is. 
Dit wenselijke effect van bundling brengt echter een risico met zich mee, aan-
gezien lijnvaartmaatschappijen niet noodzakelijkerwijs het hoogste niveau van effi-
ciëntie hebben bij het verstrekken van een bundel. Wanneer dit het geval is, neigt 
bundling het surplus van de consument en zelfs het sociaal welzijn te verminderen. 
Een belangrijke kwestie die open blijft staan voor verder onderzoek is de vraag of 
lijnvaartmaatschappijen intrinsiek beter zijn dan andere partijen in de toevoerke-
ten om bundels te leveren. Als dit inderdaad het geval is, zorgt concurrentie ervoor 
dat, zelfs in het geval van een beperkende duopolie, efficiëntie aan de consumen-
ten en de maatschappij wordt doorgegeven. 
Aan de basis van het proefschrift ligt de ontwikkeling van het supply chain 
denken welke de vervoersindustrie de laatste drie decennia heeft gekenmerkt en de 
opkomst van logistieke uitbesteding als een belangrijke business praktijk. De bij-
drage van deze scriptie aan dit gebied is tweeledig: het toepassen van yield manage-
ment technieken in de waardeketen biedt veel potentie en de selectie van prestatie 
indicatoren is een beslissende factor in het succes van verticale integratie strategie-
en binnen de keten. Het gebied van supply chain prijsstelling is nog steeds relatief 
onderontwikkeld en het proefschrift suggereert dat de toepassing van de uitgebrei-
de toolbox van non-liner prijsstellingen, reeds ontwikkeld in de industriële organisa-
tie literatuur, kan wijzen in de richting van nieuwe en interessante onderzoeksrich-
tingen. 
Wat de tweede bijdrage betreft, is het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift de 
constatering dat vervoer over zee een subsysteem is binnen de waardeketen en als 
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zodanig moet het rendement hiervan niet beperkt worden tot een evaluatie van de 
interne processen. Het is de prestatie van de gehele keten die er echt toe doet. Als 
de keten goed presteert, dat wil zeggen waarde creëert, dan zal voor deze keten 
gekozen worden en daarmee dus ook voor de vervoerder over zee. Aangezien de 
waardeketen zo sterk is als zijn zwakste schakel, kan een vervoerder zeer efficiënt 
zijn, maar als terminals of aanbieders van vervoer naar het achterland geen ade-
quaat niveau van dienstverlening bieden, of de toegangswegen tot de haven over-
vol zijn, zal dit het vermogen van de keten om waarde te creëren beïnvloeden en 
in wezen ook de concurrentiepositie van de vervoerder. 
Deze nadruk op de waardeketen is ook noodzakelijk vanwege het feit dat de 
prestaties van elke schakel beïnvloed worden door de prestaties van de andere 
schakels. De resultaten van de rederij worden beïnvloed door de resultaten van de 
containerterminal en die resultaten worden weer beïnvloed door bijvoorbeeld inef-
ficiënte wegtransporteurs of havendiensten. De noodzaak tot samenwerking bin-
nen de keten maakt een andere benadering van prestatie beoordeling noodzakelijk, 
waar naast de traditionele maatstaven binnen de onderneming, ook indicatoren 
voor de keten als geheel moeten worden gecontroleerd en geanalyseerd. 
Dit werpt natuurlijk specifieke uitdagingen op voor de actoren in waardeke-
ten: samenwerking tussen de verschillende belanghebbenden wordt op deze ma-
nier een fundamentele voorwaarde voor de implementatie van efficiënte toevoer-
keten strategieën. Van de kant van de rederijen, en in het bijzonder van degenen 
die ervoor kiezen om meerdere logistieke diensten aan te bieden, dienen investe-
ringen in ICT en de verbetering van de zichtbaarheid van de waardeketen in de 
top van hun ontwikkelingsstrategieën te staan. Maar dit kan natuurlijk niet en 
moet niet los van elkaar gedaan worden. 
Het laatste onderzoeksgebied heeft betrekking op de tussenkomst van de 
overheid in de regulering van bundling in de container-industrie. Hoewel gemengde 
bundling een praktijk is die altijd is toegestaan op grond van antitrust regelgeving 
voor bedrijven met weinig of geen macht op de markt, is er geen volledige juridi-
sche overeenstemming over de kwestie. 
Het proefschrift onderzocht de regulering in de Verenigde Staten en Europa 
en merkte op dat de praktijk van bundeling niet illegaal is in bevoegd zolang (i) 
diensten zijn verleend als deel van vertrouwelijke service contracten, dus niet als on-
derdeel van de conference prijsafspraken, (ii) een dienstenbundel niet exclusief wordt 
aangeboden, dat wil zeggen dat de verlader altijd de mogelijkheid heeft tot aan-
koop van de verschillende componenten afzonderlijk, (iii) binnenlandse prijzen en 
specificaties niet gezamenlijk onderhandeld worden door vervoerders als een con-
sortium, (iv) de "niet onder de kostprijs"-regel wordt gerespecteerd voor de vaarge-
bieden waar de tarieven van de conferences van toepassing zijn (v) op routes van 
en naar de EU, geen gebruik wordt gemaakt van discussion agreements. 
Deze bepalingen zorgen ervoor dat het gebruik van bundeling strategieën in 
alle andere omstandigheden is toegestaan en dus wordt de ontwikkeling van deze 
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strategieën sterk aangeraden. Het proefschrift stelt ook dat de intrekking van de 
Europese Raad Verordening nr. 4056/86 de ontwikkeling van bundelingsstrate-
gieën zal bevorderen en dat rederijen verder onderzoek moeten uitvoeren naar de 
voordelen van deze strategie. Het proefschrift betoogt voorts dat de toezichthouder 
zich moet richten op het ondersteunen van de ontwikkeling van bundeling praktij-
ken tussen de partners in de toeleveringsketen, aangezien dit samenwerking binnen 
de keten zal stimuleren. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit elf hoofdstukken, die de verschillende kwesties 
analyseren zoals hiervoor genoemd. Hoofdstuk 1 is de introductie van het proef-
schrift en schetst het relevante onderzoek en de methodologische zaken en geeft 
tevens aan waar in de bredere discussie rond bundling dit proefschrift zich bevindt. 
Dit wordt gevolgd door twee hoofdstukken die gericht zijn op het belichten van de 
beschikbare relevante literatuur op het gebied van bundling en de lijnvaart industrie. 
Deze hoofdstukken bieden niet alleen een nieuwe synthese van deze onderzoeks-
gebieden, maar markeren ook de aspecten die het meest relevant zijn voor de toe-
passing van bundling op de lijnvaart en logistieke sectoren. 
Hoofdstuk 4 voegt de dimensie van de verlader toe aan de analyse. Aange-
zien één van de belangrijkste redenen voor de ontwikkeling van bundling producten 
de vraag van verladers is, integreert dit proefschrift het verladers perspectief, door 
verslag te doen van de uitkomsten van twee vragenlijsten over verladersvoorkeuren 
met betrekking tot outsourcing en bundling. Hoofdstuk 5 is een verslag van de hui-
dige zakenpraktijk en de kijk van de rederijen op bundling. Uit hoofdstuk 5 komt 
naar voren dat de beslissing om bundling aan te bieden samenhangt met de “maak 
of koop” afweging en of het beter is om pas bundels aan te bieden als je als reder 
alle vaardigheden in huis hebt om alle onderdelen van de bundel zelf te maken. De 
afweging of het aanbod van bundels plaats dient te vinden via marktwerking 
(outsourcing) of door hiërarchische krachten (integratie) is afhankelijk van de aard 
van de transacties die nodig zijn en is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 6. 
Dit opent de discussie over welke aanpak reders dienen te gebruiken om op-
timale bundels te ontwikkelen. Het proefschrift beveelt conjunctanalyse en linear 
programming aan als de best bruikbare technieken. Eén van de belangrijke con-
clusies van het proefschrift is, zoals reeds opgemerkt, de noodzaak van het opstel-
len van geschikte instrumenten die de waardecreatie in de toevoerketen kunnen 
vaststellen en zo bundelingsmogelijkheden identificeren. Hoofdstuk 8 is gewijd aan 
prestatiemeting met een nadruk op de interactie tussen zeetransport en achter-
landverbindingen (terminals) en een discussie van de prestatiemetingspraktijk in de 
lijnvaart industrie. 
Hoofdstuk 9 en 10 zijn gewijd aan de analyse van de potentie en de implica-
tie van bundling als strategisch middel voor rederijen om grotere macht in de 
markt te krijgen. Uit de twee modellen die hiertoe ontwikkeld zijn en de analyse 
van het regelgevende kader dat betrekking heeft op de lijnvaart en logistieke indus-
trie blijkt dat bundling voordelen heeft voor de samenleving en de rederijen. Tevens 
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biedt het een impuls voor het verbeteren van de efficiëntie binnen de waardeketen. 
Hoofdstuk 11 bevat de conclusies en aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek. 
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Questa tesi si propone di studiare l’applicabilità e i vantaggi derivanti della vendita 
di servizi logistici in un unico pacchetto o bundle nel settore del trasporto contenito-
ri, e in particolare con riferimento alla fornitura congiunta di trasporto marittimo e 
di altri servizi logistici. La pratica della vendita a pacchetto, spesso indicata con il 
termine inglese bundling, è una pratica diffusa in molte industrie, sebbene la sua 
applicazione nel settore contenitori sia piuttosto limitata. L’uso sporadico delle 
vendite a pacchetto in questo settore è attribuibile in parte al particolare regime 
normativo che ha caratterizzato il trasporto transoceanico ed è conseguenza 
dell’approccio piuttosto tradizionalista delle aziende di linea nei confronti di nuove 
pratiche di tariffazione. Il coinvolgimento delle aziende di trasporto transoceanico, 
gli ocean carriers, nella logistica ha caratterizzato il settore sin dalla fine degli anni 
Ottanta ed è una tendenza in continua crescita. I cambiamenti delle condizioni di 
mercato e del regime antitrust derivanti dall’abolizione della normativa 4056/86, 
hanno offerto nuove opportunità per lo sviluppo di forme di tariffazione più flessi-
bili, come il bundling, che consentono di offrire migliori servizi e sviluppare sinergie 
tra vari segmenti della catena logistica. 
Uno degli aspetti più interessanti dell'analisi effettuata nella tesi fa riferimento 
agli effetti dell’utilizzo delle tecniche di bundling sui clienti delle aziende di trasporto 
contenitori e in generale sui consumatori. I clienti delle aziende sembrano apprez-
zare i vantaggi di questa pratica commerciale in termini di semplificazione tariffa-
ria, facilità di confronto tra le offerte dei vari vettori e l'aumento del numero e tipo 
di soluzioni logistiche disponibili. Tuttavia, la pratica nel settore marittimo è anco-
ra guardata con diffidenza, probabilmente a causa delle relazioni piuttosto conflit-
tuali tra le aziende di trasporto e i loro clienti e del timore che nel bundling passano 
celarsi margini aggiuntivi. 
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Va osservato che la vendita in un bundle combinata con la vendita dei singoli 
componenti separatamente, nella forma che viene chiamata di bundling misto, 
comporta sempre un aumento della scelta per i consumatori. La valutazione della 
desiderabilità di tale pratica pertanto va sempre commisurata ai vantaggi derivanti 
dalla disponibilità di maggiore scelta e varietà. Specialmente nel caso delle catene 
logistiche integrate, questi vantaggi possono essere notevoli. Non esistono ragioni 
per ritenere che lo sviluppo delle pratiche di bundling possa avere risvolti negativi 
per la società. Tuttavia, l’utilizzo di questa forma di tariffazione richiede ancora 
per il momento attenta considerazione e ulteriore ricerca in quest’area è indispen-
sabile. 
Un altro insieme di considerazioni importanti derivanti dalla tesi fa riferi-
mento al ruolo che le pratiche di bundling avrebbero nel migliorare il vantaggio 
competitivo delle aziende di trasporto contenitori. Questo vantaggio deriverebbe 
dalla riduzione dei costi ottenibile col bundling, dalla migliore aderenza tra doman-
da e offerta, dalla capacità di differenziazione dell’offerta, dalla possibilità di otte-
nere margini più elevati combinando l’offerta di trasporto marittimo e trasporto 
terrestre, e dalla necessità di ridurre i costi di coordinamento con l’hinterland. L'in-
tegrazione verticale nel trasporto marittimo di linea sembra essere la strategia di 
business che prevarrà a lungo termine, e l’uso di pratiche di bundling favorirebbe 
l'attuazione di questa strategia.  
La tesi fornisce anche indicazioni sul processo di selezione dei servizi da in-
cludere in un bundle. Una delle osservazioni importanti desumibili dalla tesi fa rife-
rimento alla superiorità di proposte di bundle che permettono di sfruttare le com-
plementarità tra i servizi e le riduzioni di costo derivanti, ad esempio, dalle eco-
nomie di scopo o di densità di rotta. Il successo di una proposta di bundle, infatti, è 
legato al coordinamento tra le attività degli spedizionieri, degli operatori terminali-
sti, delle compagnie di linea, e dei fornitori di servizi logistici, tra cui gli autotra-
sportatori e le linee ferroviarie. Solo in questo modo è possibile sviluppare proposte 
di bundle redditizie per le aziende di trasporto marittimo e allo stesso tempo van-
taggiose per i consumatori. 
I paradigmi offerti dall’Economia dei Costi di Transazione sono particolar-
mente utili nel contesto dell’outsourcing, a cui alla fine lo sviluppo della logistica 
integrata fa riferimento, e costituiscono una solida base su cui le aziende di traspor-
to contenitori integrate possono misurare il valore delle strategie di bundling. Quan-
do le transazioni tra l’azienda di trasporto transoceanico e il fornitore di servizi 
logistici sono portate fuori dal mercato, l’azienda di trasporto transoceanico divie-
ne un operatore logistico integrato. Sebbene lo sviluppo di proposte di bundle non 
richieda necessariamente integrazione verticale, gli operatori logistici integrati si 
trovano in una posizione migliore per offrire un bundle. Questa è una diretta conse-
guenza del maggiore controllo sui costi di transazione e della riduzione delle a-
simmetrie informative. I bundle di servizi offerti in queste condizioni non sono mai 
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proposte di valore peggiori di quelle associate all’offerta separata dei servizi logisti-
ci che li compongono. 
Per apprezzare appieno le potenzialità offerte dalle vendite a pacchetto è ne-
cessario che le aziende di trasporto contenitori si aprano ai vantaggi offerti 
dall’integrazione verticale. La tesi sostiene che perché questo accada le aziende di 
trasporto contenitori debbano guardare oltre i loro confini aziendali tradizionali, 
concentrandosi sulle relazioni transaziendali caratteristiche delle catene logistiche. 
Quest’approccio richiede la modifica delle misure di prestazione aziendale tradi-
zionali così da includere anche indicatori di performance transaziendali. Questo 
non deve avvenire solo a livello delle aziende di trasporto contenitori, ma anche 
tra gli altri membri della catena logistica, come ad esempio le imprese terminaliste, 
i porti, i trasportatori terrestri, i distributori, gli spedizionieri, i centri logistici e i 
fornitori di logistica integrata. 
Un’altra area di ricerca esplorata nella tesi, è incentrata sul potenziale strate-
gico offerto dallo sviluppo di proposte di bundling. Sebbene la ricerca in questo set-
tore sia ancora limitata, l’uso delle vendite a pacchetto in un mercato altamente 
competitivo come quello del trasporto transoceanico può portare a conclusioni 
interessanti. In particolare emerge dalle formalizzazioni discusse nella tesi che gli 
effetti dell’uso delle pratiche di bundling sul surplus del consumatore e sul welfare 
totale risulterebbero essere ambigui. In particolare è interessante notare che le 
proposte di vendita in bundle comporterebbero aumenti di efficienza che possono 
essere trasferiti ai consumatori sotto forma di una riduzione dei prezzi o migliora-
mento dell’offerta, un’eventualità, questa, che non può avvenire quando la pratica 
è vietata.  
Quanto detto sopra dipende però dall’efficienza delle aziende di trasporto 
contenitori. Se l’industria fosse caratterizzata da elevati livelli di inefficienza, lo 
sviluppo di vendite a pacchetto risulterebbe in una riduzione del surplus dei con-
sumatori, e addirittura anche del welfare totale. La questione se i vettori siano in-
trinsecamente migliori di altri operatori all’interno della catena logistica nella crea-
zione di bundle di servizi richiede ulteriore analisi. Se questo fosse il caso, la concor-
renza, anche nel caso di duopolio, garantirebbe che tali efficienze siano trasferite ai 
consumatori. 
Alla base di gran parte dei concetti presentati nella tesi vi è l’idea che il tra-
sporto transoceanico di contenitori sia solo una delle componenti della catena logi-
stica. In questo senso la valutazione del trasporto transoceanico in sé non è suffi-
ciente per determinare l’efficacia dell’intero sistema di trasporto. Questo perché 
ciò che costituisce gran parte del vantaggio competitivo di un operatore logistico è 
l’abilità della catena logistica in cui esso opera di creare valore. Il successo di una 
catena logistica dipende dalla sua capacità di creare valore, e dipende in modo 
critico dall’efficacia del suo anello più debole. Un’azienda di trasporto contenitori 
può essere estremamente efficiente nelle sue operazioni, ma se gli operatori termi-
nalistici, o i trasportatori, o gli uffici doganali, non forniscono un livello di servizi 
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adeguato, o le strade di accesso al porto, o altre infrastrutture sono congestionate, 
questo avrà un impatto determinante sulla capacità della catena di creare valore e, 
alla fine, anche sulla competitività dell’azienda di trasporto. 
Questo ovviamente rappresenta una sfida importante per tutti gli operatori 
logistici, e richiede lo sviluppo di forme di cooperazione per migliorare l’efficienza 
complessiva della catena logistica. Per quanto riguarda le aziende di trasporto con-
tenitori, e in particolare per quelle che offrono servizi integrati, è importante inve-
stire in nuove tecnologie di informazione e migliorare la visibilità della catena logi-
stica. Questo naturalmente non può e non deve essere effettuato senza la coopera-
zione degli altri operatori coinvolti nella catena logistica e delle istituzioni. 
Un’altra area di ricerca sviluppata nella tesi fa riferimento al ruolo del regola-
tore nella promozione di pratiche di bundling nel settore contenitori. La tesi analiz-
za il regime antitrust in Europa e negli Stati Uniti e offre un criterio di analisi per 
determinare in quali circostanze le pratiche di bundling possono ritenersi in linea 
con la normativa per la tutela della concorrenza. In generale le forme di bundling 
conosciute come bundling misto non contravvengono mai alla normativa antitrust 
per aziende senza o con limitato potere di mercato. Tali disposizioni consentono 
l'uso di strategie di bundling per gran parte delle aziende contenitori e delle rotte e 
quindi lo sviluppo di tali strategie è fortemente consigliato. La tesi sostiene inoltre 
che l'abrogazione della normativa del Consiglio Europeo n. 4056/86 favorirà lo 
sviluppo di strategie di bundling.  
Lo studio delle strategie di prezzo nel settore della logistica integrata, e in 
particolare l’applicazione di tecniche di prezzo non lineari, offrono molteplici dire-
zioni di ricerca che solo in parte possono essere esplorate nella tesi. La tesi rappre-
senta un contributo nella direzione dell’applicazione di tecniche di prezzo non li-
neari al settore logistico e offre un’analisi esplorativa degli aspetti più rilevanti per 
la comprensione di quest’area di ricerca. 
Questi temi sono discussi negli undici capitoli della tesi. Il primo capitolo in-
troduce la tesi e gli aspetti di carattere metodologico oltre ad offrire una panorami-
ca sulla pratica del bundling. L’introduzione è seguita da due capitoli che mirano ad 
offrire una sintesi della letteratura esistente sul bundling e sull’economia del traspor-
to marittimo. Il capitolo 4 contribuisce all’analisi la prospettiva dei clienti delle a-
ziende di trasporto, e riporta i risultati di due studi sulle preferenze di outsourcing 
delle aziende in vari settori. Il capitolo 5 espone come le strategie di bundling ven-
gono attuate in pratica, e spiega come un operatore logistico integrato sia in una 
posizione di vantaggio nell’offrire un bundle. Il tema dell’integrazione verticale è 
ulteriormente approfondito nel capitolo 6, che ne discute i vantaggi e le implica-
zioni in termini di costi di transazione. 
Il capitolo 7 si apre col tema delle strategie che le aziende di trasporto conte-
nitori possono impiegare per sviluppare bundle ottimi. La tesi suggerisce l’uso di 
tecniche di analisi congiunta e di programmazione lineare per la determinazione 
di bundle ottimi. Una delle conclusioni importanti della tesi fa riferimento alla ne-
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cessità di approntare misure adeguate all’identificazione del valore all’interno della 
catena logistica come presupposto alla creazione di bundle ottimi. Per questa ragio-
ne il capitolo 8 è dedicato alla misurazione e alla performance con particolare at-
tenzione alle interfacce tra il trasporto transoceanico, i terminali e l’hinterland. Il 
capitolo 9 e 10 sono dedicati all’analisi del potenziale e delle implicazioni delle pra-
tiche di bundling come strumento per acquisire vantaggio strategico e miglior con-
trollo dl mercato. Dai modelli presentati e dall’analisi della normativa relativa 
all’industria del trasporto marittimo e della logistica risulta che la pratica di bundling 
non sia dannosa per i consumatori e per le aziende. Essa al contrario costituisce un 
incentivo per il miglioramento dell’efficienza delle catene logistiche. Il capitolo 11 
conclude ed offre indicazioni per ulteriori ricerche. 
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l)BUNDLING STRATEGIES IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS
The development of logistics has offered a wide range of new business opportunities for
transport operators. Shipping lines have been taking advantage of these opportunities
and have expanded their business scope beyond the movement of cargo to include, for
example, coordination among transport modes, route rationalisation and even value added
logistics services. Carriers offer today transportation as part of integrated global supply
chain solutions in an attempt to provide a better service to their customers as well as
improve their bottom lines. This appears to be a winning strategy since an increasing number
of industry players are investing in logistics operations and infrastructure.
The offering of products and services jointly as a package or bundle is a common mar -
keting strategy in a variety of industries and also appears to be a successful strategy for
enhancing shipping lines’ competitiveness and profitability. Only limited research is available
though to better understand under what conditions such bundled sales are possible; what
attitude shippers show towards this industry trend; how bundling strategies could be
develop ed optimally; and how they could be priced. This thesis is a contribution to research
in this area and provides an analysis of the viability and the benefits of bundling strate -
gies in the container industry, and specifically with reference to the joint provision of ocean
transportation and other logistics services.
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